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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
 
Ottoman Turkish has been transliterated using modernTurkish orthography 
according to Faroqhi, S. N. and K. Fleet (eds), The Cambridge History of 
Turkey. vol. 1-3 (Cambridge University Press, 2006). In the case of Arabic and 
Persian words the transliteration system applied in Jackson, P. and L. Lockhart 
(eds), The Cambridge History of Iran, vol.6 – The Timurid and Safavid Periods 
(Cambridge, 1986) is applied in this thesis, but diacritical marking of long 
vowels has not been used. Giving the different scholarly traditions in 
transliteration used in the above mentioned works, some terms (for example, 
vizier) have been given under the most familiar form. 
 
All Cyrillic names and terms will be transliterated according to the following 
table. 
 
Russian English Remarks 
а a  
б b  
в v  
г g As in ‘get’ 
д d  
е or ѣ ye/e The Russian ‘e’ is pronounced ‘ye’(as in ‘yes’), and 
wherever a Russian ‘e’ follows a vowel, it has been 
transliterated as ‘ye’. If ‘e’ follows a consonant, that 
consonant is soft in Russian. 
ё yo yo as in ‘yonder’ 
ж zh As the ‘s’ in ‘pleasure’ 
з z  
и or i i  
й y The English letter ‘y’ has been used for both ‘й’ and 
‘ы’. However, as ‘ы’ never follows a vowel and ‘й’ 
never follows a consonant, no confusion can arise. 
к k  
л l  
м m  
н n  
о o  
п p  
р r  
с s  




у u As ‘oo’ in ‘boot’ 
ф or θ f  
х kh  
ц ts  
ч ch  
ш sh  
щ shch  
ы y The English letter ‘y’ has been used for both ‘й’ and 
‘ы’. However, as ‘ы’ never follows a vowel and ‘й’ 
never follows a consonant, no confusion can arise. 
э e  
ю yu  
я ya  
ь y Soft consonants – wherever soft consonant is followed 
by a vowel, the vowel is preceded by ‘y’ in the 
English rendering. 
 
Source: W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields –A History of 
the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921 (Nashville, 1999 – 






Ever since Vladimir Putin began reinvigorating Russia’s foreign policy by 
placing military pressure on its neighbors and adjacent territories, the question 
of Moscow’s military drive toward the Near East and the Caucasus has, again, 
become a major military and political issue for both local and international 
analyzers, political figures and the media in a broader perspective. Going 
through Chechnya, Abkhazia, Crimea and Ukraine and reviewing the current 
intervention in Syria and the strong political pressure, imposed on Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, we can argue, that for the last fifteen years Moscow has initiated a 
series of foreign interventions. Their aim is buttressing Russia’s influence on the 
land route to the Indian Ocean and Central Asia, and countering the US 
advances in the region following the Gulf War. Support for Iran and an 
elaborated approach toward China have been an essential element of the new 
Eurasian project, developed with additional political as well as economic and 
cultural means.  
 To assume, however, that these trends are all signs of a modern process, 
the roots of which grow out of the Post-Soviet fragmentation of Western and 
Central Asia, is incorrect. Russia’s interest in its southern periphery has existed 
for centuries and has followed a certain pattern of political and military 
approach. These trends have been evolving on the turn of the eighteenth and the 
nineteenth centuries, via an ever-shifting and expanding notion of both direct 
and indirect political domination. Russia’s southern interventions date back from 
the end of the seventeenth century, but traces could be found even earlier during 
the reign of Ivan IV (r. 1547-1584) and his expansion in the Lower Volga 
region. This long period of time has provided Russia with an abundant set of 
examples and practical lessons, which, if correctly understood and implemented, 
could provide a cutting edge in the race for political influence on the dramatic 
conflicts that shape the face of the twenty first-century’s “Levant”. 
The following dissertation aims at presenting an innovative perspective on 
Russia’s earliest involvements in the region. What is labeled “the Southern 
Campaigns” were, in fact, a series of military interventions, aimed at exploiting 
the political instability in Russia’s southern periphery.1 This was a region, 
stretching between the Dnieper and Volga rivers (from west to east) and from 
the Lower Volga in the north to as further south as Russia’s forces could march. 
The driving force behind these incursions was the desire of Peter the Great (r. 
1682-1725) and his aristocracy to expand the political, economic and cultural 
frontiers of the late-Muscovite and early-imperial state. The process of transition 
from an early modern principality into an Enlightenment-era empire has been 
studied by both western and Russian historians and has received substantial 
                                                 
1 In the current dissertation the term “Southern campaigns” refers to all Russian military endeavours undertaken 




attention in its many perspectives.2 This dissertation aims to present a new and 
different perspective on Russia’s southern periphery as both a frontier and a 
crucial battleground, the specifics of which influenced the overall development 
of the Russian army in the first decades of the eighteenth century. The southern 
frontier and the conflicts it hosted served as training ground for the reforming 
military machine of the tsars. For that reason they can be used for the evaluation 
of reform success and the study on how innovation and transition correlated in 
forming the patterns of Russia’s early modern military evolution. The diverse 
geographical features and political counterparts provide a new, different 
perspective, through which the effectiveness of Russia’s military potential can 
be measured. So far, martial capability has been mainly assessed in terms of the 
Tsardom’s participation in the Great Northern War (1700-1721) and the War of 
the Polish Succession (1733-1738) and has received less attention in terms of 
Moscow’s (and after 1704 - Petersburg’s) confrontation with the Ottoman and 
Safavid empires.3 The following research aims at expanding the existing 
historiography by providing further and in-depth analysis of actual battlefield 
performance and by presenting a new and innovative evaluation of the various 
factors, which have influenced the course and the outcome of the Southern 
Campaigns.  
Generally, these factors can be divided in two main types - internal and 
external. The internal factors are related to the functioning of both army and 
state in the Petrine and post-Petrine era. These aspects include the mustering and 
deployment of troops, the organization of adequate logistics system and the 
arming of soldiers. State-influenced factors also consist of the provision of 
adequate transportation, the appointment of capable military commanders, as 
well as drawing the general strategy for upcoming conflicts. After the actual 
outbreak of war, the state was expected to be able to maintain its military effort 
by expanding its logistics on the basis of stretching lines of communication and 
also by providing reinforcements and diplomatic support to its field armies. All 
of these factors will be taken into consideration in the evaluation of Russia’s 
military potential and actual battlefield capability. These elements will be 
further supplemented by more combat related aspects of the army’s performance 
such as the conduct of sieges, the level of tactical skills, demonstrated in open 
engagements, as well as the ability of marching and retreating through enemy 
territory. 
The external factors can also be divided into two general types of notions 
that would be taken into consideration in this work. On the one hand, the 
dissertation will examine the influence of the geographical features on the 
performance of the army: the impact of weather, terrain and abundance or 
absence of natural resources. On the other hand, the thesis will outline the 
                                                 
2 Bibliography is discussed in a separate section below.. 
3 In the dissertation the term Safavid is used throughout the text. However, variations of the term may appear in 




strengths and weaknesses of Russia’s adversaries and will determine to what 
extent the success or failure of Russia’s military endeavors was a product of its 
own strong points and flaws and to what rate was influenced by the abilities or 
inabilities of its opponents.  
These two general types of factors will be explored in the second part of 
the dissertation, which will deal with the Southern Campaigns and will focus on 
bringing together the historical narrative of combat and the analytical evaluation 
of field performance. After offering a brief overview of the historical 
background and the existing historiography, each section will present campaign 
preparations in detail. The thesis will outline the main elements of logistics 
organization, the levying and concentration of troops toward the main military 
frontiers, as well as the furnishing of weapons, animals and provisions. The next 
step of the campaign’s depiction will include the day-to-day tracking of the 
army’s route and will present any major confrontation, which was fundamental 
for the development of the military enterprise. A more detailed analysis will be 
provided for the main battles and sieges in the course of each expedition, 
focusing on the applied tactics, as well as the troops and commanders’ 
performance on the field. The last element of each campaign’s study will 
include an overall evaluation of the gains and losses – in means of human lives, 
territory and material. Finally, by comparing results with those of previous 
campaigns, the thesis will define the main features of the army’s performance 
and the level of logistics organization, evaluate them and place them in the 
general line of Russian military conduct.  
In order to fully reveal and comprehend the variety of internal and 
external factors, the dissertation will be divided into two general parts. They 
will, in turn, be constructed by several chapters. The first part of the research 
would deal with describing and examining the state of Russia’s military 
potential. The military establishment of the tsarist state will be analyzed in terms 
of its development from the time of Ivan IV throughout its evolution under the 
early Romanovs. Finally, the innovations and transitions, introduced during the 
Petrine and the post-Petrine eras will be presented. Reform trends were essential 
for Russia’s military development, but substantial attention will also be paid to 
the existing material basis for Peter’s army as well as its social impact in terms 
of expanding levies and taxes. After analyzing the Russian military 
establishment and its key elements, the thesis will examine the state of the 
Ottoman and Safavid armies and will evaluate the degree to which their military 
power could counter and influence the development of Russia’s southern policy. 
Following the pattern, outlined in the description of the Russian army, Ottoman 
and Safavid forces will be presented in terms of their main components – regular 
and irregular troops, as well as through depicting their logistics capabilities and 
their ability to exercise and project their military potential in the adjacent 
territories. Apart from these two main political entities in the region, the 




societies, which were dependent and dominated by the imperial policies of 
Petersburg, Istanbul and Isfahan. The Crimean Khanate, the Cossack Hetmanate, 
the Nogais and Kalmyks and the petty kingdoms of the Caucasus were all 
essential elements in the political and military developments of the Pontic and 
Caucasus regions. Understanding their potential for waging wars and their 
pursuit of political autonomy and following their own interests in the shifting 
frontier allegiances is as important for the outcome of this research as 
comprehending the key political and military aspects of imperial policy. As with 
the Ottoman and Safavid states, the frontiersmen will be introduced and 
reviewed in terms of both political and military development in the course of the 
seventeenth century with additional attention to their combat capabilities and 
manner of waging wars. 
After setting the stage and presenting the key dramatis personae, the 
dissertation will turn to its second general part, which will focus on the Southern 
Campaigns, starting with the sieges of Azov and ending with the final gunshots 
of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1736-1739. The second part of the research will 
be divided into three chapters, each dealing with a set of campaigns and 
confrontations, marking the three general stages of Russian military 
development between 1695 and 1739. The first stage – that of reform and 
reshaping of the old army - will be examined through series of campaigns, 
launched against Azov (1695-1697) and, later, supplemented by Peter’s march 
against the Swedes and the Ottomans (1711) and Apraxin’s march toward 
Kuban. Apart from presenting a substantial figures and data research regarding 
the campaigns, the narrative will allow the reader to gasp the actual transition 
from a seventeenth-century, semi-regular army into a regular standing force 
from the Enlightenment Age – a goal, which Peter I pursued with more vigor 
than any other enterprise during his reign. 
Following the study and evaluation of Russian battlefield performance in 
the early campaigns, the research will continue with the Persian Campaign - a 
certain aspect of the Petrine foreign policy, which has received insufficient 
historiographical attention. The expeditions, launched against the Safavid 
territories in Dagestan, Gilan and Shirvan will be examined in detail, paying 
considerable attention to the geographical factors as being essential for the 
outcome of the campaign. This trend is easy to justify – the Persian campaign is 
the only major endeavor carried out by the Russian forces outside the usual 
scope of their military conduct. It was the first time that a state-funded European 
army of such proportions marched into Asian territory, facing a whole new 
climate and terrain challenges. Studying the way Russian troops succumbed or 
overcame these new hindrances can tell us a lot more about the success rate of 
reform and military evolution than examining a certain trend of military action 
carried out by an army on the same well-known battlefields. 
The final chapter of this second part will deal with the Russo-Ottoman 




the approach in the previous chapters in order to trace the changes in military 
organization and battlefield performance. Instead, the war will be summarized in 
a joint, overall assessment of Russian military conduct, tracing certain patterns 
and trends, which manifested themselves throughout the entire conflict. The 
narrative will pay attention not only to the main vector of military engagements 
– the operations along the Dnieper River and in Moldavia, but will also present 
the campaigns of the secondary army under General P.von Lacy with its superb 
conduct during the invasions of Crimea. The evaluation of Russia’s performance 
during the War of 1736-1739 will give us the necessary reasoning, upon which 
could be estimated not only the success rate of the army reform and military 
practice, but also the proportion of transition and innovation, accumulated 
between the establishment of the Petrine army and the reshaping of Russia’s 
military under the reforms of Minikh. 
The conclusion of this dissertation will determine the extent to which the 
southern frontier shaped and changed the nature of Russian warfare in the first 
half of the eighteenth century. The campaigns against the Ottomans and the 
Safavids will be used as a measuring stick to determine to what extent the 
Petrine and Minikh’s reforms did actually upgrade the battlefield performance of 
the tsarist army. The trends and patterns, demonstrated in the first siege of Azov 
up until the Battle of Stavuchany will be used to trace and evaluate the different 
aspects of military conduct as well as pinpointing the notions of modernization 
and transition. The conclusion will also depict the southern frontier in its 
diversity and uniqueness in regard to the well-studied and well-known western 
theaters in the Baltic region and Poland. By outlining the main elements of 
diversity, the conclusion will present a way of understanding why certain 
aspects of Russian military conduct worked, and why others did not function 
properly.  
 
Sources and historiographical perspectives  
 
As noted above, the first part of the research will handle the overall evolution of 
Russia’s military machine throughout the early modern period and also will 
outline the main military features of its political allies and adversaries. Why is 
this necessary? Peter’s army reforms represent a watershed in Russia’s military 
history, but they were the product of a steady evolution, rather than a rapid 
revolution. Hence, the military development of the past hundred and fifty years 
prior to Peter’s reign, have to be briefly revised, and the primary focus of 
Russian military evolution should be determined before continuing with Peter’s 
designs. Regarding this early period of Muscovite rise to power, both Russian 
and western historiography have been rather critical of the qualities of Pre-
Petrine warfare.4 Notions of backwardness regarding the combat techniques, 
                                                 
4 M.C. Paul, “The Military Revolution in Russia, 1550-1682”, The Journal of Military History 68, 1 (2004), 9-




tactics, and armament, dominate the evaluation of Muscovite battlefield 
performance. While these perceptions could not be disregarded, the following 
dissertation will argue that military reticence and lack of western-style 
techniques is overly exaggerated and should be reconsidered by historians of the 
period. Nevertheless, the two sub-chapters dealing with the pre-Petrine warfare 
will comprise only a small part of the first section of this work. The primary 
focus of this first chapter will be Peter’s reforms – their aims, application and 
results. On this issue, historiography breaks into three points of view. The 
“positivists” believe that Peter’s reforms led to the creation of a regular standing 
army, comparable and even surpassing its western counterparts.5 The essential 
part of this group of historians is comprised of Russian scholars, who firmly 
believe that during Peter’s reign, Russia became equal of its contemporaries 
regarding regular standing forces and even surpassed “the West” in particular 
areas, such as iron production, for example. As main proponent of this theory 
stands one of USSR’s most renowned military scholars – L. Beskrovnyy who, in 
his several works on eighteenth century Russian warfare, states that Peter 
managed to forge his new army out of the uncertainties of it predecessors’ age.6 
Following the official Soviet dogma, other Russian historians were fast to 
follow, and no critical evaluation of the Petrine standing regular army was 
offered. However, the post-Soviet historiography, while critical of Peter’s 
overall reign, remains adamant on its position regarding the status of the Petrine 
army. As demonstrated in the works of Kurukin and Shirokorad, Russia 
possessed a truly modern army, which outmatched its counterparts in the East – 
Persia and the Ottoman Empire.7 To this group of scholars, we must also add 
several western proponents of the Petrine standing army - the works of 
Christopher Duffy and Michael Paul, who offer us a concise, although a bit too 
summarized image of the Russian army under Peter.8 Their thesis is supported 
by the classical study of the Petrine Age by Reinhard Wittram, who puts much 
emphasis on the establishment of the navy and the conduct of the field army in 
the course of the Great Northern War.9 
On the opposite side of this debate are Peter’s critics. They claim that 
there was no such thing as a regular standing Russian army under Peter. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Volkovskiy & D.N. Volkovski (eds), Vse Voyny – Mirovoy Istorii po Kharperskoy entsiklopedii voennoy istorii, 
1500-1750, vol. (St.Petersburg: Poligon, 2004), 403-39. 
5 I am loosely using this term here in order to summarize the number of historians, supporting a positive 
approach toward Peter’s reforms. The other two points of view will be referred “moderates” and “skeptics” 
respectively.  
6L.G. Beskrovnyy, “Strategiya i taktika russkoy armii v poltavskiy period Severnoy voyny” in L.G. Beskrovnyy 
(ed.), Poltava: K 250-letiyu Poltavskogo srazheniya; sbornik statey, (Moscow: Akademia nauk, 1959), 21-62; L. 
G. Beskrovnyy, Russkaya armiya i flot v XVIII veke (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1958). 
7 I.V. Kurukin, Persidkiy pokhod Petra Velikogo. Nizovoy korpus na beregah Kaspiya 1722-1735 (Moscow: 
Kvadriga, 2010); A. Shirokorad, Russko-Turetskie voiny 1676-1918 (Moscow, 2000). 
8 C. Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power, 1700 – 1800 
(London: Routledge, 1981); M.C. Paul, “The Military Revolution in Russia, 1550-1682”. 
9 R. Wittram, Peter I. Czar und Kaiser. Zur Geschichte Peters des Großen in seiner Zeit (Gottingen: 




According to these scholars, Peter’s military reforms were the mere result of a 
response to military problems rather than a general strategy for army 
reformation. The chief proponent of this theory is William Fuller who, in his 
book on Russian warfare, argues that the tsarist army was far from a mighty war 
machine.10 He gives a very critical overview of Peter’s military reforms and 
plans and concludes that the resources, the society and the government of Russia 
were quite unable to produce not only a regular but even a standing army. 
Fuller’s theses are accepted by Lindsey Hughes. In her book on Peter the Great, 
she repeats Fuller’s ideas, although her narrative lacks his sharp criticism.11 
Another expository overview of Russia’s army under Peter is presented by John 
Keep who summarizes key issues and features of the Petrine army and opens the 
debate on the actual quality of the Russian army during the first quarter of the 
eighteenth century.12 
In the middle of these opposite theories can be situated the popular article 
of Richard Hellie on the Petrine army.13 Hellie places the emphasis in his work 
on the idea that Peter’s army reforms were not an innovation, but rather a 
continuation of the work of his father Aleksey I (r. 1645-1676) and his military 
advisors – Knyaz Golitsyn and General Gordon. Hellie points out the patterns of 
continuity in every aspect of Peter’s reforms, comparing them to the army 
establishment during Aleksey’s reign. What the article lacks is a clear evaluation 
of Peter’s army outside the context of Russia’s seventeenth-century war efforts. 
Nevertheless, in combination with Michael Paul’s article, the work of Hellie is 
essential for understanding the evolution of Russia’s armed forces during the 
reign of Peter the Great. 
The final sub-chapter of the exposition on Russia’s military evolution will 
deal with the post-Petrine era, and its goal is not so much to debate, but rather to 
outline the main features of continuity and change in the Russian army, 
following the death of Peter the Great in 1724. Here, the abovementioned works 
of Duffy, Keep, Fuller, Beskrovnyy and Shirokorad will prove most valuable in 
presenting the “positivist”, “moderate” and “pessimist” points of view on the 
post-Petrine warfare. 
The second chapter - entitled “Friends, Foes, and Frenemies in the South” 
aims at depicting the main military features of Russia’s southern neighbors. In 
order to present the different military systems of each state and frontier society, 
the study will rely on both Russian and English-language works, as well as on 
valuable Internet sources. Regarding the Ottoman warfare, the most valuable 
works are the works of Gabor Ágoston on Ottoman armament, as well as 
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Rhoads Murphey’s study on Ottoman logistics during the seventeenth century.14 
The Russian concept of Ottoman military is summarized in V. Penskoy’s article 
on Ottoman military revolution.15 Regarding the warfare of the Cossacks and 
their Tatar adversaries the most valuable English-language works come from 
two scholars – Michael Khodarkovsky and Brian Davies. They are both experts 
on the Eurasian Steppe frontier and their studies have contributed significantly 
to our understanding of the Northern Black Sea region and the Asian Steppe.16 A 
valuable addition to their works is presented by Carol Stevens and Thomas 
Barrett, who offer us concise and well-written accounts of Cossack warfare 
during the seventeenth century.17 Unlike the Ottoman military history, Russian 
scholars have paid significant attention to Steppe warfare and there are 
numerous articles about the Crimean Khanate, the Cossacks and the Caucasian 
states. Choosing the most accurate and concise studies would be a burdensome 
task for any scholar, and since this topic is not the focus of the current research, 
I have relied strictly on several prominent works.18 What unites them is the vast 
number of primary sources, included in their bibliography, as well as the 
objective point of view, regarding Russia’s relations with the Steppe. For the 
Persian military system and Safavid warfare the few available articles are 
included in the current research.19 To some extent Persian warfare under the 
Safavids is a neglected theme by contemporary historiography and can be a 
niche for future research.  
The Second part of this work will deal with the combat performance of 
the Russian Army during its southern campaigns between 1695 and 1739. This 
period is fundamental for understanding Russia’s policy toward the Ottoman 
                                                 
14 G. Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan – Military Power and Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); G. Ágoston, “Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia, 
1500–1800”, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 12 (2011), 281–320; G. Ágoston, 
“Gunpowder for the Sultan’s Army: New Sources on the Supply of Gunpowder to the Ottoman Army in the 
Hungarian Campaigns of the 16th and 17th Centuries”, Turcica, 25 (1993), 75-96; R. Murphey, Ottoman 
Warfare, 1500 - 1700 (University College London Press, 1999). 
15 V.V. Penskoy, “Voennaya revolyutsiya i razvitie voennogo dela v Osmanskoy imperii v XV-XVII v.”, Vostok, 
vol.6 (Moscow, 2007), 30-40. 
16 B. Davies, Empire and Military Revolution in Eastern Europe: Russia’s Turkish Wars in the Eighteenth 
Century (New York & London: Continuum, 2011); B. Davies, Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea 
Steppe, 1500-1700 (New York: Routledge, 2007); M. Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a 
Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002); M. Khodarkovsky, Where Two 
Worlds Met: The Russian State And the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600-1771 (Cornell University Press, 2006). 
17 T.M. Barrett, At the Edge of Empire: The Terek Cossacks and the North Caucasus Frontier, 1700 – 1860 
(Oxford and Colorado: Westview Press, 1999); C. B. Stevens, Soldiers on the Steppe: Army Reform and Social 
Change in Early Modern Russia (Northern Illinois University Press, 1995). 
18 Davies, Warfare, State and Society; V. Ostapchuk, “Crimean Tatar Long-Range Campaigns: The View from 
Remmal Khoja's History of Sahib Gerey Khan” in B. Davies (ed.), Warfare in Eastern Europe 1500-1800 
(Leiden and London: Brill, 2012), 147-72.; B.G. Williams, The Sultan's Raiders: The Military Role of Crimean 
Tatars in the Ottoman Empire (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 2013). 
19 R. Matthee, “Unwalled Cities and Restless Nomads: Firearms and Artillery in Safavid Iran” in C. Melville 
(ed.), Safavid Persia: The History and Politics of an Islamic Society (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 
389-417; L. Lockhart, “The Persian Army in the Ṣafavī Period”, Der Islam: Journal of the History and Culture 
of the Middle East 34, 1 (1959), 89-98; M. Haneda, “The Evolution of the Safavid Royal Guard”, Iranian Studies 




Empire and serves as a starting point for what would later become the Eastern 
Question. It was during this period that France, England, Austria, Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire for the first time became engaged in both diplomatic and 
military terms in order to secure the balance of power in Southeastern Europe 
and West Asia.  
Before reviewing the other sources, which will be used to describe the 
separate campaigns, an important work by the Russian historian Tatarnikov 
must be noted. His outstanding research on Russia’s army armament between 
1700 and 1730 presents a combination of all available sources on the matter. His 
precise, step by step description of the separate regiments troops and the artillery 
accurately depicts the way Russia’s army looked during the reign of Peter I.20 
The combination of this material with the excellent analysis by Brian Davies in 
his study on Russo-Ottoman relations during the eighteenth century will provide 
the required theoretical framework, upon which the thesis is constructed.21 
When speaking of Brian Davies' profound study, a side note is necessary. Prof. 
Davies' book is the latest study on Russia's Southern Campaigns that has been, 
to my knowledge, published in any language. This fact makes it a benchmark on 
which any further work, such as the current, should be measured. So what would 
this dissertation offer, which is not covered in Brian Davies' work? First and 
foremost, Davies’ study focuses not so much on the military performance of the 
Russian forces, but rather - on the social cost of Peter’s (and his successors') 
military policy. What Davies' book clearly lacks is the evaluation of field 
performance of the tsarist forces in the context of the military transformations 
during the Petrine age. Furthermore, the Azov Campaigns and the Persian 
Campaign, which are instrumental in the development of the Russian army, are 
not included in Davies' study. It is these gaps in his, otherwise, concise work 
that the following thesis will exploit to its fullest.  
Regarding Russia’s first campaigns in the south, the research relies on 
three primary sources – the letters and papers of Peter the Great, the campaign 
journal for 1695-1704 and the personal diary of General Patrick Gordon, who 
commanded one third of the entire army in 1695 and 1696.22 All documents 
include dispatches between Peter I and his generals, as well as a description of 
army numbers, the countryside, and the weather conditions. The campaigns are 
followed in detail in Ustryalov's work on Peter's rule, as well as the narrative of 
Lieutenant General P. Bobrovskiy in his history of the 13th Guards regiment.23 
The perspective of the Soviet historiography is clearly outlined in the work of 
                                                 
20 K.V.Tatarnikov, Russkaya polevaya armiya 1700-1730. Obmundirovanie i snaryazhenie (Moscow: 
Lyubimaya Kniga, 2008). 
21 Davies, Empire and Military Revolution. 
22 Pisyma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikago, vol. I (St. Petersburg, 1887); Pokhodnoy Zhurnal 1695-1701 (St. 
Petersburg, 1885); M.R. Ryzhenkov (ed.), Patrik Gordon - Dnevnik 1690-1695 (Moscow: Nauka, 2014). 
23 N.G. Ustryalov, Istoriya tsarstvovaniya Petra Velikogo, vol. 2 (Saint Petersburg, 1858); P.O., Bobrovskiy, 




Porfiryev. He emphasizes on the native developments and to a certain degree 
neglects the foreign influence on the evolution of Peter's army.24 
For the Pruth Campaign of 1711, the thesis again will rely on Peter’s 
private correspondence as well as his campaign journal.25 Moreover, the 
dissertation will include the eyewitness accounts of Peter Henry Bruce, as well 
as the letters from Britain’s ambassador in Istanbul – Sir Robert Sutton.26 In 
addition to these primary sources, the thesis will also rely on the above-
mentioned works by B. Davies and K. Tatarnikov. 
Regarding the Persian Campaign of 1722-1724, the study will build on the 
leading primary source – the campaign journals of 1722 and 1723, which will be 
supported by additional data, derived from the works of L. Lockhart, V. Lystsov 
and I. Kurukin.27 In addition to these sources, the eyewitness accounts of Peter 
Henry Bruce, as well as - the narrative of Abraham of Yerevan, who presents the 
Armenian point of perspective on Russia’s southern venture, will also be 
examined in the current research. 28 
Finally, the Russo-Ottoman War of 1736-1739 will be depicted by using 
two most valuable sources – the memoirs of Christof von Manstein and the 
notes of Field-marshal Minikh. While Minikh was the commander-in-chief of 
the Russian army, Manstein served as colonel and had a first-hand experience of 
the field service and the chain of events, which shaped the conflict. In addition 
to these two primary sources, the dissertation will also include the above-
mentioned work by B. Davies, which deals with Russia’s military engagements 
following the death of Peter the Great. The main Russian study on the war is A. 
Bayov’s history of the Russian army during the reign of Empress Anna 
Romanova.29 His exhaustive narrative remains unmatched, even though it was 
written a century ago. An interesting and useful asset to these texts would be 
Zvegintsov’s work on the Russian army during the first half of the eighteenth 
century.30 While not as exhaustive as Tatarnikov, Zvegintsov presents an in-
depth look at the main features of Russia’s armed forces during the 1730s. 
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After outlining the structural and analytical frame, the thesis will continue with 
the first part of the research. It will present an essential overview of the military 
potential and establishment of Russia, our protagonist in this story, and the 
number of its friends, foes and frenemies, who had substantial role in the 





PART I - CALCULATING THE FORCES 
 
The first part of this narrative will deal with the problems of military evolution 
and the development of Russia’s military machine as well as the fighting 
condition of its enemies and friends in the course of the Southern Campaigns. 
The following section will be divided into two general chapters, subdivided into 
smaller sections, which will clarify certain aspects of military doctrine: the state 
of the armed forces, as well as the political context, in which the forces of the 
countries and societies developed. The narrative will begin with Russia and then 
move forward to the other major and lesser players on the geopolitical 
chessboard of the Pontic region. 
 
CHAPTER 1  
Russia’s Military Development 
 
The question of Russian military capability during the eighteenth century has 
troubled both western and Russian historians for many years. Different authors 
present different notions on how Russia’s military development has to be 
measured. Questions whether there was a standing regular force or not, or 
whether Peter and his successors created a concise military machine or only 
improvised with the available resources and the existing military system are 
essential not only for the history of Russia but also for the entire Eastern Europe. 
This notion is due to the mere fact that this region was dominated, intimidated 
and challenged by the power of St. Petersburg. The following chapter will try to 
answer central questions regarding the development of Russia’s military 
strength during the first four decades of the eighteenth century. To appreciate 
the changes, which took place during this period, firstly the main trends of 
Muscovite military development will be discussed, since they were essential for 
the later transformations that took place under Peter I and his successors.  
 
1.1. Military Revolution or Military Evolution? Problems and Debate in 
Military Historiography 
 
In order to understand and evaluate the power of Russia under Peter the Great 
and to explain different aspects of the military power complex, the narrative is 
divided into several parts. The first part reviews the idea of the Military 
Revolution and its relation to the development of early modern Russia. The 
Military Revolution debate has existed for over sixty years after Professor 
Michael Roberts held his famous lecture in 1956.1 Ever since, military historians 
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of the early modern world have struggled to establish the exact boundaries and 
parameters of the Military Revolution. First Geoffrey Parker and later Jeremy 
Black, John Lynn and David Parrott have worked on different possibilities for 
explaining the Military Revolution and its impact on early modern state and 
society. Many other volumes have also addressed the same issue, criticizing, 
denying or supporting the Revolutionists’ theses.2 
Nevertheless, the common feature of all these works is their emphasis on 
the Military Revolution in Western Europe and its impact on the development of 
European powers. However, none of these works establishes a strict boundary 
between what Europe is and what is not. For almost forty years, everybody has 
been talking about a European Military Revolution, but they referred to a small 
portion of European countries, concentrated in the western part of the continent. 
Furthermore, military establishment outside these states was overlooked and 
neglected. In some aspects, Geoffrey Parker tried to establish the impact of the 
Military Revolution outside Europe, but he only refers to the export of 
European-style warfare and does not take into consideration the developments 
that took place in the extra-European countries. These developments, however, 
often had nothing to do with European influence.3 Until recently there was no 
concise study on the military events in Asia in the context of Europe’s 
“revolution” in warfare. However during the past two decades, thanks to the 
ideas of globalization and supra-natural history, there have been attempts to 
apply the ideas of the Military Revolution in a greater scope, including the Asian 
states.4 
In his book on Military Revolution in Asia, Peter Lorge tries to apply the 
standards developed by the Revolutionist historians to explain the development 
of East- and South-Asian warfare during the early modern period.5 However, the 
real value of his work is that he questions the entire revolutionary concept and 
suggests a different approach to the problem: 
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There is no question that warfare changed markedly between 1500 and 
1800 in Europe. But warfare also changed in Europe between 1200 and 
1500, and 1800 and 2000. The debate very often turns on the definition of 
‘‘revolution’’. A ‘‘revolution’’ is clearly more than a mere change, but in 
what way? Many of the objections to Parker’s arguments concern the 
mechanisms of change rather than the fact of that change. A rather more 
serious objection to the idea that there was a revolution is that there is 
always change in warfare, and the ‘revolution’ that Parker or Roberts 
describes was no different than any other change. Certainly any 
technology that was available in the late sixteenth century had precursors, 
and even infantry and cavalry tactics, or fortification designs, had been 
evolving beforehand. 6 
 
Unfortunately, Lorge does not further develop his idea, which gives the 
opportunity to elaborate on his thesis. It is an unquestionable fact that war and 
human society are bonded for better or worse. Hence, any development in one of 
them changes the other. One may argue that explaining the relations between 
war and society would be like the “the chicken or the egg” dilemma. However, 
this is simply not the case. If we go back to the origins of warfare, we will 
discover that if a war is to take place, there must be at least two organized 
human societies to fight in it. Thus, there can be no war, unless there is a society 
to develop the idea of war, to create some kind of military force in order to win 
the war and finally to take advantage of the gains or losses of the conflict. 
Therefore, it is the development of human societies with their culture, 
technology, economics, administration and idea of government and religion that 
shape the way wars are fought. This notion, however, does not mean that wars 
cannot change human societies. A product could transform its creator, and in all 
spheres of human development we can find proof of this fact. If there is a 
revolution in warfare, first there has to be a revolution in society. 
Still, as the early modern period illustrates, there were no revolutionary 
changes in the development of European societies during this period. There was 
indeed a development, but it was relatively slow and steady, and it took 
centuries before the medieval societies were completely transformed into 
modern ones. In the same sense, it took centuries before war was modified in the 
fashion, suggested by the Military Revolution theory. Without diving deep into 
the debate, also it can also be pointed out, that historians like Clifford Rogers 
and Jeremy Black imply the existence of several Military Revolutions that took 
place between the 1340s and 1790s.7 Indeed, a lot has changed for these three 
and a half centuries, but human logic requires that these changes should be 
perceived not as a series of separate revolutions, but rather as an evolutional 
process. Furthermore, changes in warfare are taking place ever since war exists. 
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If the Revolutionist idea is developed further, this will lead to the conclusion 
that there was a Military Revolution almost each century in the past 2 500 years. 
Therefore, it would be incorrect to remove warfare developments during the 
early modern period from the context of the general military development. 
Instead of having more than, say, a hundred military revolutions, it would be 
much easier to accept the idea of evolutional development, which was often 
accelerated by important discoveries in the fields of science and technology.8 
So far, only a handful of concise studies elaborate on Russia’s response to 
the changes in warfare that took place during the sixteenth and the seventeenth 
centuries. Among them are the works by R. Hellie, M. Poe, J. Keep and M. 
Paul.9 While Hellie studies the transfer of seventeenth century Russian warfare 
into the “new style” army of Peter the Great, Paul dedicates his work entirely on 
pre-Petrine period and examines the influence of western warfare on Muscovy’s 
military conduct.10 Keep, on the other hand, presents a study of the continuous 
development of the Russian army and seeks the roots of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries’ reforms in the evolution of the Muscovite state. Another 
point of view is presented by Poe, who tries to fit Muscovy into the overall 
development of the Military Revolution debate. The main advantage of these 
works is that they are very informative and present considerable data, which 
could be applied to a concise evaluation of Russia’s eighteenth-century 
development and military potential.11 What the studies lack is the Russian 
perspective on the issue and all changes are measured by western standards. 
Differences between the East and the West are often labeled “backwardness” 
and condemned as failure. Unfortunately, the general approach toward the East 
and more precisely toward Eastern Europe has not changed for quite a long time. 
While Western Europe rediscovered Asia and Africa, led by different cultural 
and political motives, Eastern Europe still remains outside the general scope of 
Western European historiography. One of the tasks of the current work is to 
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reverse this process and shed light at least on the Russian military evolution and 
the reasons why it differed from the western path. 
 
1.2. Muscovy’s Path to Power12 
 
The second trend essential for understanding Russian power requires a new look 
at the main factors which influenced the military evolution in the Russian lands. 
These factors could be divided into two broad categories – internal and external. 
The internal factors are related to the administration of the Russian lands: their 
vastness and character, as well as the size and the composition of their 
population. The external factors are related to the influence of the Mongols on 
the development of Russia’s army, the character of the neighboring lands and 
states and the type of armies that threatened Russia’s borders. 
The administration of the Russian lands was a complicated issue ever 
since the disintegration of Kievan Rus during the late twelfth century.13 The vast 
territories between the Baltic Sea and the Volga River were fractured into 
dozens of small principalities, each claiming the right to inherit the title of 
“grand prince” and rule as a suzerain over the other states. Thus, a state of 
constant small-scale warfare developed in which several principalities allied 
against each other and fought for prestige and control over trade and taxes.14 The 
core of each army was the elite cavalry unit (druzhina), which could be 
enhanced by allied or mercenary cavalry.15 In the rare cases when infantry was 
required, it was levied on the growing number of serfs (krestyyane), which lived 
in the principality and served the prince or his vassals. The pre-Mongolian 
Russian forces were small and irregular, and the quality of their infantry was 
nowhere near the experienced English, Flemish or Swiss footmen.16 When the 
Mongols arrived in the first half of the thirteenth century, their experienced, 
well-organized and numerous hordes had no trouble defeating the disintegrated 
Russian forces and expanding their political influence over most of Russia. The 
“Mongolian yoke”, as Russian historians tend to describe the following two and 
a half centuries, brought one main significant change in the development of 
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Russia’s art of war – the cavalry archers.17 This development, combined with the 
expansion of serfdom and the vast distances on which campaigns were carried 
out, led to the general decline of the infantry.18 The revival of infantry as equal 
participant on the battlefield remained a feature only of western warfare. Here, it 
is essential to note that this lack of adequate infantry does not necessarily imply 
that Russian warfare was falling behind the western one. If a successful 
application of infantry was possible in the limited fields of France, the Low 
Countries, and Germany, or was the best solution for war issues in the 
Highlands and Switzerland, this was certainly not the case in Russia. It suffices 
to say, that no infantry could keep up with constant marches over several 
hundred kilometers through a vast sea of grass, harassed by horse archers, who 
could destroy any infantry formation. Then we could argue that an infantry 
“revolution” in the manner, suggested by C. Rogers, was inapplicable to Russian 
conditions and that the general use of infantry against the Mongols and other 
Russian knyaze was doomed to fail.19 
After the expulsion of the Mongols and the unification of the Northern 
Russian principalities under Muscovy, the ground was clear for the 
establishment of a new military system, which would bring Russia closer to 
western development and would return the general logic of military 
development, implied by Western historians. That, however, did not happen. 
Instead of limiting the size of the cavalry and expanding the infantry, the grand 
knyaze of Muscovy integrated other rulers’ druzhini into their army and made 
conquered rulers part of Muscovy’s nobility.20 Noble cavalry, armed with bows 
and lances, remained the dominant force in Russia. Furthermore, the cavalry 
contingent was expanded by the inclusion of the Cossacks into the military 
system of Muscovy. These semi-independent free-raiders were an excellent 
supplement to the heavier noble cavalry units. Infantry remained irregular and 
was used in rare occasions, mainly as garrisons. But why did this happen? Why 
did not the grand knyaze change their manner of war after they managed to 
unify Russia into a single state? Again we must return to the reasons, listed 
above. It was not backwardness but pure necessity that influenced the military 
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19 Rogers, “The Military Revolution”, 55-95; the idea of the lack of usefulness of western infantry models in 
Russia was also applied by Michael Paul. (Paul, “The Military Revolution in Russia”, 36-7) Yet, Paul implies 
that the Military Revolution did not succeed in Russia or was greatly delayed. What the present dissertation 
argues is that military evolution did take place in the same time as in Western Europe, but in Russia it had its 
own pattern of development. 
20 For example, the Shuysky Family from Pskov, who later served as field commanders under Ivan IV (r. 1533-
1584) and held a high position in the state administration. For the building of Muscovy’s forces, see А.V. 
Chernov, Vooruzhennye sily Russkogo gosudarstva v XV-XVII v.v. (Moscow, 1954), 17-43 




development of Muscovy. After the Mongols and other princes had been 
defeated, Muscovy found itself surrounded by states, which also used cavalry as 
the main striking force of their armies.21 Furthermore, all these countries were 
far from Russia’s heartland. Sending an expedition on more than a thousand 
kilometers was always a hard task, even without a slow-moving infantry with an 
enormous supply train. It was general logistical problems that limited the 
diversity of Muscovy’s forces. There was no developed road system and for half 
a year the land transport was impossible due to the rains and the transformation 
of grasslands into a sea of mud and marshes. Thus, rivers remained the only 
possible option and thenceforth the medieval Russians did manage to develop 
their river transport at a surprisingly high level.22 The predominance of the river 
transportation meant that campaigns had to be organized only in locations which 
were accessible by water. However, rivers had vast hinterlands that could be 
conquered only by a mobile and easy to transfer force, which was not entirely 
dependent on river transport. Cavalry seemed the only possible solution. The 
logistics problem was further complicated by the difficult supply of goods for 
the army. In the steppe, it was quite easier for a cavalry force to live off the land. 
The grass was found in immense proportions and horses could be used to carry 
the supplies of their masters. An infantry would require a supply train with 
oxcarts and a lot more provisions than a cavalry.23 Also, as noted above, a 
supply train would significantly reduce the speed of the army, and in the 
steppes, speed was essential for success. 
Another problem that predetermined the importance of cavalry was 
serfdom. Since Muscovy’s economy was based on serfdom, it was the serf’s 
duty to produce and transport food supplies for the army, repair the roads, build 
boats for the river transportation, etc. Furthermore, unlike Western Europe, the 
wealth of a nobleman was not measured by his treasury, but by the number of 
serfs he possessed.24 It turns out that the only possible source for infantry 
recruits was also the main driving force of the state economy and the primary 
source of wealth for the nobility. It was against the interest of both state and 
nobility to allow the recruitment of peasants in the army. Unlike Western 
Europe, where the well-established bourgeois population was free of land labor 
and serfdom and could serve as the backbone of an infantry force, Russia did not 
                                                 
21 The Principality of Lithuania (from 1569 The Grand Duchy of Lithuania), Poland, the State of the Teutonic 
Order and Livonian Knights, the Siberian and Crimean Khanates and the Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan. All 
of these states preferred mounted warfare, due to the same reasons that influenced Muscovy – huge distances, 
tradition of noble cavalry usage, the impact of serfdom, as well as the general weakness of western style armies, 
when applied to the vast spaces of the East. The Teutonic Order is an interesting case of how a heavy armored 
western army had to adapt to the conditions of steppe warfare. 
22 Starting with the Viking experience in the Eastern European Rivers and continuing to the trading system of the 
Russian lands in the medieval period. 
23 The levying of cavalry was limited in numbers as the gathering of footmen would mean a greater number of 
men, who, unlike horses, could not live on water and grass. 
24 For an exhaustive narrative, regarding the impact of serfdom on Russian state and society, see R. Hellie, 




possess a significant or well-developed free urban population that could be used 
by the knyaze as the core of infantry units.25 
With the advance of Muscovy in western and southern direction, however, 
its forces faced a new issue that had not been a problem during the fourteenth 
and the fifteenth centuries – fortified cities. The cities of Pskov, Smolensk, 
Kazan and Astrakhan were well fortified and a new type of force was required 
for their conquest – artillery.26 When need occurred, Muscovy was fast to evolve 
and met this necessity by developing a large siege train.27 Breaching the walls 
was one thing and maintaining the conquest was quite another. Thus, Russia 
finally needed to develop an infantry unit capable of seizing the city once the 
artillery had played its part. Furthermore, the expansion of firearms called for 
better garrison units for the frontier defence. Firstly, at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century an irregular type of gunmen was developed. They were called 
pishalyniki and their first appearance on the battlefield was during the final siege 
of Pskov in 1510.28 However, these units were irregular and were disbanded 
after the end of the campaign season.29 The next step in the development of the 
Muscovite infantry was taken by Ivan IV and was again a response to his plans 
for militant policy.30 The growing power of Poland-Lithuania and Sweden, 
combined with the weakening of the Livonian Confederation called for more 
substantial infantry force, which could be used to attack and later garrison the 
conquered fortresses in Livonia, Samara, and the Lower Volga. Thus, the 
streltsy were established. Fortunately for Russia, the creation of a standing 
infantry force coincided with the expansion of firearms infantry in West. Russia 
did not hesitate to adopt the mass usage of firearms in the infantry, and it turned 
out that most of Russia’s infantry were now armed with handguns. Again there 
was a difference in tactics. While western harquebusiers participated actively in 
open engagements, the streltsy were seldom sent into pitched battle, instead of 
being used against fixed positions or fortifications. Often protected by cavalry, 
they fired upon the enemy from wooden platforms, behind moats or fascines, or 
from mobile wooden fortifications (gulyay-gorod — literally ‘moving city’) 
some of which were three meters wide and erected specialy for the occasion.31 
The defensive tactic was more a response to the specifics of the landscape, than 
due to the backwardness of Muscovite generals. Unlike the broken terrain in 
Western Europe, the steppes of Eurasia were flat, and a cavalry could easily 
                                                 
25 In terms of either forming a militia or levies, or using them as mercenaries. 
26 Although firearms were well known in Russia ever since 1382, but it was under Ivan III that the Muscovites 
began to create an efficient artillery force, see A.N. Kirpichnikov, Voennoe delo na Rusi.  
27 Paul, “The Military Revolution”, 29; According to Michael Paul over 150 cannons were used in the siege of 
Kazan in 1552. 
28 Ibid., 20; Chernov, Voorzuhennye sily, 17-43; Chernov estimates a force of 1,000 pishalyniki during the siege, 
after which 500 were left as a garrison. 
29 This was nothing unusual since disbanding the army at the end of the campaigning season was the general 
practice among all European states during the first half of the sixteenth century. Thus, Russia was on the same 
level as western states and not falling behind as is the general concept; see Paul, “The military Revolution”, 20. 
30 Chernov, Vooruzhennye sily, 43-75. 




flank an unprotected infantry. In order to resist enemy cavalry attacks and cover 
the movement of their mounted soldiers, the streltsy mastered the usage of field 
fortification. The problem of supplying food and ammunition in the large 
distances made it necessary to station the strelcy in towns, preferably near 
bigger rivers.32 
The last two decades of the sixteenth and the first twenty years of the 
seventeenth centuries were troublesome for Russia. The death of Ivan IV and the 
ruin of Muscovy after the wars against Poland-Lithuania, Crimea, and Sweden, 
were followed by the notorious “Time of Troubles”. During this great internal 
and external strife, Muscovy’s military potential was crippled and the lack of 
strong central government prevented the immediate adoption of the latest 
Western military techniques.33 After peace was finally restored in 1619, 
Muscovy had lost Smolensk to Poland-Lithuania and Ingria to Sweden. Further 
expansion westward would indeed lead to a catastrophe and Mikhail I Romanov 
(r. 1613–1645) decided to redirect his state’s effort towards the east. General 
peace on the western frontier and the swift success in the east further prolonged 
the adoption of necessary reforms in the army. Things changed under Mikhail’s 
successor – Aleksey I (r. 1645–1676).34 After the conquest of Siberia had 
brought new lands and revenues to the crown, Aleksey decided to turn his 
attention toward Poland and the Baltic coast. He was fast to realize the necessity 
for reformation of the army and for most of his reign he fought to establish a 
force, which could prove a match to western standards. In order to fight Sweden 
and Poland-Lithuania, Aleksey developed “regiments of new formation” units 
that were in part commanded by foreign officers and fought in the same fashion, 
                                                 
32 Positioned there they could be resupplied through river transport coming from Moscow. In addition, they were 
well-accustomed in defending positions such as riverbanks and walled cities. (А.V. Chernov. Vooruzhennye sily, 
43-75; Kirpichnikov, Voennoe delo na Rusi) Furthermore, Ivan IV established a system of settling the streltsy. 
Thus, in peace time, they had to support themselves by trade and by working their land and selling the harvest. 
Since the Muscovite state was not rich enough to pay regularly salaries to its soldiers, the central administration 
decided to grant land in exchange for service. This system was also applied toward the nobility. In general, it 
was built on the same basis as the earlier Byzantine themata system and the later timar system in the Ottoman 
Empire. 
33 Here it is reffered to the military reforms that took place in the Dutch Republic and Sweden. The 
rearrangement of ”shot units” and, more importantly, the application of light field artillery did not take place in 
Muscovy up until the seventeenth and even eighteenth century The heavier siege artillery was not up to date with 
the newer and better guns developed in the context of the Thirty Years’ War. Even after Muscovy was unified 
under Mikhail Romanov in 1613, it lacked sufficient resources to reform its forces. On the other hand, David 
Parrott argues that the first half of the seventeenth century did not bring any major changes in warfare but instead 
proved that western states could not response adequately to the new necessities, imposed by the growing armies. 
He concludes that actual changes took place only after 1660 with the establishment of centralized absolutist 
states, giving France, Sweden and Prussia as examples. It could be argued that Muscovy was again up-to-date 
with the West since reforms in the Muscovite army began after 1654, during the Thirteen Years’ War. 
Nevertheless, social conditions and lack of revenue prevented the adoption of a standing army during the reign 
of Aleksey I. 
34 The first western-style reforms were actually introduced in 1631, when Muscovy was preparing for the 
Smolensk campaign against Poland-Lithuania but their success was temporary and uncertain. Therefore, it is 
better to perceive Aleksey as the actual reformer of the Muscovite force, since a qualitative change in the 
fighting style of the Russian army took place under his reign; See А.V. Chernov Vooruzhennye sily, 133-56, 





applied by armies in Germany.35 The war against Poland was successful and 
brought back some of the territories, lost during the “Time of Troubles”. War 
with Sweden resulted in a status quo ante bellum, but nevertheless, the Russians 
managed to hold off the Swedish army, regarded as one of the best forces in 
Europe during this period. 36 However, Muscovy did not manage to produce a 
regular standing force and this is probably the main disadvantage of its military 
evolution.  
 
1.3. Aleksey’s Inheritance 
 
To fully appreciate the reforms, introduced by Peter I, the general condition of 
the Russian army under his father, Aleksey must be presented. The second ruler 
of the Romanov dynasty governed Muscovy in a period of crisis and expansion 
during which the Russian state embarked on several aggressive campaigns 
against its neighbors. 
During his long reign Aleksey’s primary purpose was to elevate the 
military power of Russia to a new level, a level from which it could match and if 
possible – overpower its enemies on several fronts. Whether his efforts were 
successful or not is still a matter of debate. W. Fuller, always critical of Russian 
military power, points out that during the first half of the seventeenth century 
Russia did not possess the potential to wage offensive wars. He places logistics 
as the main issue behind Russian failure on the battlefield during Aleksey’s 
reign and the Crimean Campaigns of 1687 and 1689. However, he does 
acknowledge that apart from Sweden Russian military technology was superior 
to that of its neighbors.37 J. Keep points out that the army of Aleksey suffered 
from three major disadvantages – lack of money, high level of desertion and low 
morale. Regarding the capability of the Muscovite forces, Keep is rather 
                                                 
35 It was under Aleksey that western officers began to play a greater role in the officer corps of Muscovy. Since 
the Russians did not have the time to create their officer corps (the Thirteen Years War began only eight years 
after the accession of Aleksey), foreign mercenaries and volunteers were used to accelerate the modernization of 
the Muscovite force. As Richard Hellie notes, the tradition of a non-native officer corps was not an ”invention” 
of Peter I but was developed under the reign of Aleksey I in the middle of the seventeenth century. One might 
suppose that this was a general weakness of Russian military advance, but then the same should apply to western 
powers as well. Half of the military leaders and a great part of the army in most European states were foreigners. 
Austria relied on German, Italian and Bohemian specialists. France imported Italians, Germans and Scots. Spain 
had a long tradition of hiring Italians and Flemish to command their forces. Even Sweden did not hesitate to use 
foreign generals, the most famous example being Bernard of Saxe-Weimar. This situation did not change even 
during the War of the Spanish Succession when some of the major military leaders were still foreigners with 
regard to their subordinate armies. Notable examples are Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Duke of Berwick, the 
Dukes of Baden and Lorraine. Furthermore the number of foreign experts was insignificant in comparison to the 
number of native Russian officers, who served in the army; See N.L.Volkovskiy and D.N.Volkovskiy (eds) Vse 
Voyny – Mirovoy istorii po Kharperskoy entsiklopedii voennoy istorii, 1500-1750, vol. 3 (Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, 2004), 421; The German manuals of war were the most popular in Russia. Furthermore, the reforms 
of Mikhail I and Aleksey were carried out parallel with the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and most of the 
foreigners, hired to transform the Muscovite force had served in that war. Thus, the general experience 
accumulated in Germany was transferred to Russia.  
36 The Russo-Swedish War of 1656–1658. 




unimpressed, although he calculates a twofold increase in the army strength in 
comparison to the previous century. Russian historiography offers a different 
evaluation. Although admitting the logistical problems, Chernov stresses the 
importance of military reform and the gradual strengthening of the Russian 
army. He points out that the expenditure of “new-model” regiments and the shift 
in the ratio between cavalry and infantry were major signs of the beneficial 
changes that took place during the reign of Aleksey.38 His opinion is further 
supported by V. Volkov and N.L. Volkovkiy who emphasize the importance of 
firearms distribution and the development of gun-wielding infantry during the 
seventeenth century.39 
We can, therefore, deduce two main challenges which stood on the way of 
Russia’s military development during the seventeenth century – the general 
struggle toward improvement of the quality of the army and the series of 




The army of Aleksey I was by no means a homogenous one. In his work on the 
Military Revolution in Eastern Europe Brian Davies distinguishes among 
fourteen different types of unit formation in the pre-Petrine Muscovite army.40 
Keep and Volkonskiy tend to summarize these in fewer groups, but in general, 
the army was comprised of three main parts which fell into several subdivisions, 
as described by both Davies and Chernov. 
First there were the “old-style” formations of the noble cavalry and the 
streltsy, the ratio of which, in the course of the seventeenth century, dropped 
drastically in comparison to the regiments of the new formation. Davies divides 
each group into two subdivisions. The nobility (dvoryane) regiments comprised 
of the upper Muscovite and provincial high nobles, on the one hand, and the 
petty provincial nobles, on the other. They formed centuries (sotnya) and while 
the first served in the tsar’s regiment, the second comprised the cavalry units. 
Each of these landlords had to provide a certain number of retainers, armed at 
his expense. As Chernov describes in detail, the armament of these nobles 
gradually changed and by 1675 ninety five per cent of the noble cavalry wore 
light firearms in combination with sabers and were able to carry out both ranged 
and hand-to-hand attacks.41 However, the overall condition of the noble cavalry 
was rather poor due to their low discipline, to the complexity of the logistics, as 
well as to the general trend of cheating the state by hiding their real income or 
sending ill-fitting men for retainer service. They were also ill-prepared for war 
as the compulsory early military practice took part following the summer 
                                                 
38 Chernov, Vooruzhennye sily, 156-87. 
39 V.A. Volkov, Voyny i Voyska Moskovskogo Gosudarstva (Moscow: Eksmo, 2004); Volkovskiy (eds), Vse 
Voyny - Mirovoy istorii, 415-8. 
40 Davies, Empire and Military Revolution, 58-62. 




harvest and for that reason - often got neglected.42 In resonance to these 
embarrassments in performance, after 1654 Aleksey and later Golitsyn tended to 
redirect nobles from the old regiments into the regiments of the new formation. 
This trend explains why the noble cavalry dropped in numbers during the second 
half of the seventeenth century while the number of dvoryane and deti boyarskiе 
grew in the regiments of the new formation.43 
The second significant element of the Muscovite old units was the 
streltsy. These elite infantry units were divided into two main categories – 
Muscovite streltsy and provincial streltsy. The main difference between the two 
was the amount of payment which they received from the state as well as the 
degree to which they could be perceived as “standing” units. While the capital 
regiments received better payment and had more regular military trainings, the 
provincial units were often engaged in farm work in order to provide for their 
families and balance the insufficient funds which the state paid them on yearly 
basis. In general, seventeenth-century Muscovy was unable to provide the 
required funds for an entirely state-funded standing infantry, and that is a fact 
accepted by all scholars who have studied the matter – both western and 
Russian.44 Therefore, the Romanov monarchs decided to apply the same general 
principle through which they financed the cavalry – the allowance of 
agricultural and petty financial activities, which were meant to compensate the 
lack of funds. On this basis, we could define the streltsy as landowning, semi-
standing type of infantry, which differed from the newly formed regular units in 
Western and Central Europe. And while these Muscovite soldiers were of 
greater proportion compared to most western armies, their quality was falling 
behind.45  
The need to improve the field performance of the Muscovite forces drove 
the first Romanov tsars toward the conclusion that a general change in the 
military was required. To respond to the shifting balance of power on the 
western frontier, first Mikhail, then Aleksey began to develop regiments of the 
new formation, which applied the experience, accumulated in the Thirty Years’ 
War (1618-1648). These units were combined with the predominantly national-
                                                 
42Ibid.; Volkovsky (eds), Vsey Voiny, 419-21. 
43 They were 8,000 in 1689 in comparison to the 78,000 soldiers of the new formation regiments. N.L. 
Volkovskiy, D.N. Volkovskiy (eds), Vsey Voiny, 420-21; In 1672 10 per cent of the service nobility were 
enlisted in the old cavalry regiments, while 50 per cent were enlisted in the new formation regiments, see 
Chernov, Vooruzhennye sily, 156-87. 
44 For example, between 1657 and 1682 (25 years), the streltsy did not receive any payment from the state. That 
led to a rebellion during which Sophia, daughter of Alexey, was placed as ruling steward of Ivan V and Peter I 
who were underage at the time. 
45 The first standing cores of Western armies after the Thirty Years War rarely numbered more than 15-20,000 in 
the case of Austria, and fewer than 10,000 in the case of most German states. To the contrary, during the 
sixteenth century the streltsy already exceeded these numbers. France and Spain are not applicable here, since 
these states continued to wage war and did not dismiss their wartime armies for longer periods of time. For the 




based army in which the foreign element was rather insignificant in quantity if 
not in quality.46  
The regiments of the new formation can be divided into four types: 
reytary, gusary (cavalry), draguny (dragoons) and soldaty (infantry).47 As 
mentioned above, the greater and lesser nobility was gradually transferred from 
the old to the new regiments, setting the foundation of the new formation 
cavalry regiments. However, the new units also included the so-called vybornye 
lyudi, who were free men, but not necessarily nobles. They were also given 
lands in return for their service since the state was unable to provide in full their 
annual salaries. Impoverished and landless petty nobles were conscripted into 
the infantry formations as well. 
However, the flow of free men and service nobility was insufficient to 
meet the state’s needs, and enserfed men (datochnye lyudi) were also 
conscripted into the army. They were sent to different regiments than the 
vybornye lyudi and by the time of the Crimean Campaigns (1687, 1689) 
comprised a large portion of the regiments of the new formation. 
The draguny were novelty for the Muscovite army, and their ranks were 
filled in by conscripting entire villages, or by offering service to Cossacks in 
exchange for payment and firearms. During campaigns, the draguny were used, 
together with the Cossacks, as light cavalry, scouts, workers, supporting the 
engineering units in times of entrenchment and siege, or as builders for the 
construction of roads for the army. 
The soldaty were the core of the new formation regiments and comprised 
the main body of Muscovy’s infantry. They were armed, drilled and formed 
according to western standards. When the first regiments began training, foreign 
(nemetskiy) officers were invited from Germany. They included not only 
Germans, but Scottish, Dutch, and English specialists as well. However, with the 
onset of the century, more and more Russian officers began to command the 
soldaty regiments and by the end of Aleksey’s reign the vast majority of the 
upper and lower officer corps was comprised of natives. Like the cavalry, the 
infantry also had to be funded through land grants and many of the soldaty were 
settled in special villages or existing settlements were converted into soldaty 
villages.  
Apart from these four state-supported types of forces, the tsars relied on 
auxiliary units, acquired from the steps of Ukraine, the lands along the Don and 
the Volga Rivers, and Siberia. These units comprised of different tribal bands 
                                                 
46The dissertation lies in the basis of Russian military thought, while western authors tend to emphasize on the 
importance of foreign officers and specialists when they evaluate the Muscovite forces.  
47The reytary were modeled after the cuirassiers, while the gusaryi were influenced by Polish and Hungarian 
hussars. The draguny or dragoons were also borrowed from the West and offered a combination of light cavalry 
and infantry, using the mobility of the first and the firepower of the second. Finally, the soldaty (soldiers) were 
modeled according to the pike and shot principle of western armies (Volkovskiy, Vsey Voiny, 419); Brian Davies 





and several Cossack hosts, which were to a greater or lesser extent subjected to 
the rule of the Muscovite tsar. Kalmyks and Circassians were the biggest ethic 
groups which provided cavalry support to the Russian army, but lesser tribes 
also contributed with soldiers. However, it was the Cossacks who played the 
most significant part. In addition to serving in campaigns, these bands of 
adventurers and frontiersmen were skillfully used by Moscow to control the 
steppe borderlands of the Northern Black Sea and the Volga Basin. They also 
provided horses for the cavalry and garrisoned the forts and defensive lines 
(zasechnoy cherty) which protected Russian heartlands from the raids of 




Though Muscovy was struggling to establish a modern adequate force capable 
of both offensive and defensive activities, this was hindered by the constant lack 
of funds for the army. Both Western and Russian historians agree that during the 
seventeenth century the Muscovite state failed to muster the resources, required 
for its military establishment. Although new taxes were introduced and 
increased, the amount of money, which could be extorted from peasants, was 
rather limited. State monopoly over some of the trading goods, such as salt, furs, 
and vodka, brought considerably more profit to the treasury but still a lot more 
was needed. Unlike smaller German and Italian states, Muscovy could not 
afford the luxury of keeping a small standing regular force. The frontiers, 
thousands of kilometers long, had to be protected at the cost of substantial force. 
To deal with the constant lack of funds, the ruling elite in Moscow 
decided to use the two primary resources of Tsardom – its rather large 
population and the abundance of land.49 The newly created cavalry units were 
compensated with land and often the vybornye lyudi received ennoblement 
when they entered service in the reytary or gusary regiments. This development 
gained them land and serfs which provided the required funds for sustaining the 
mounts and for purchasing new equipment. As mentioned above, the streltsy 
were reimbursed by allowing them to own land and to participate in trade and 
small-scale craftsmanship. The soldaty, on the other hand, were placed into 
individual settlements, which were exempt from certain taxes and received a 
small amount of state funding in exchange for their service.  
The income was based not only on taxation, but also on agriculture 
production and trade profits. However, after the “Time of Troubles” these were 
                                                 
48 More information about the Cossacks and the steppe soldiers will be provided in the Second Chapter of this 
work, see below. 
49 By 1680, the population of Russia was around 14 millionwhile its territory covered more than 9,000,000 km2 
(including Siberia). Russia was the third largest state in the region with regard to population (First was the 
Ottoman Empire with around 30 million and second was France with approximately 18 million, and first or 
second largest with regard to core territory (i.e. without the colonies), exceeded by the Ottoman Empire in 1683 




in a precarious situation. In the 1670s, the amount of agricultural land in the 
fourteen core provinces of the state had shrunk to sixty per cent of its size a 
century earlier.50 After Sweden had conquered Ingermanland during the War of 
1615-1618, Russia was cut from the Baltic trade and Arkhangelsk remained the 
only Muscovite port, opened to European merchants. However, it was frozen for 
half a year, and since the time of Ivan IV, the trade there was dominated by the 
English. Furthermore, the Russians exported only raw materials, timber, hides, 
wheat and iron to the western manufacturers, but they were unable to sell any 
local industrial production. Weaponry, luxuries, even clothes and paper had to 
be imported, as well as spices, sulfur and saltpeter, needed for the manufacture 
of gunpowder. Industry remained underdeveloped and was unevenly positioned, 
mainly around Moscow and the Volga basin cities. Transportation was also 
complicated due to long distances, underdeveloped roads and river networks and 
because during spring and autumn the grasslands turned into marshes, drowned 
by rains and river flows.  
These impediments were also evident during campaigns when shortages 
of supplies and ammunitions were obvious, even though Muscovy was able 
rather slowly to improve its logistics in the course of Aleksey’s reign.51 In order 
to cope with these problems, it was necessary to adopt a general reform of 
logistics and to expand trade and industry. The state also had to systematize and 
unite the many chancelleries (prikazy) which were responsible for the 
maintenance and muster of armed forces in order to ease and accelerate the 
process of army formation and eventually – its performance on the battlefield.  
 
Golitsyn’s reforms in the 1680s 
 
In the context of Russian military development the period that took place 
between Aleksey’s reign and Peter’s rule was most notable for Count Golitsyn’s 
reforms. He was a favorite of tsarevna Sophia and during her regency (1682–
1689) he instituted a series of measures, which were meant to strengthen 
Russia’s military potential in order to cope with Tsardom’s new international 
role in the Holy League.52 
Following the disaster of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1676-1681, the 
authorities in Muscovy decided that certain measures had to be taken in order to 
improve the field performance of the Muscovite forces. The first step was to 
transform all nobles (dvoryane and deti boyarskiе) into reytary and kopeishchiky 
regiments while everyone who was not part of the gentry had to be enlisted in 
                                                 
50V.I. Moryakov, Istoriya na Rusiya IX-XVIII vek (Sofia: Paradigma, 2007), 179. 
51The performance of the Russian army was far better during the Thirteen Years War (1648-1661) in comparison 
to the Smolensk War (1631-1634). However, during the Crimean campaigns the lack of provisioning was again 
evident.  
52Following the “Eternal piece” (1686) between Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania, the tsardom was obliged to join 
the military effort of the Holy League against the Ottoman Empire in what was to become the War of the Holy 




the soldaty regiments. Also, fellow-villagers of the soldaty were recruited as 
prokormshchiki. They had to maintain soldier’s lands and households and to 
provide food for the soldaty while the latter were on a campaign. 
The second change included the reorganization of the urban garrison 
troops – the provincial streltsy, the Cossacks and the gunmen (lyudi 
pushkarskogo china). All men from these categories, fit for regimental service, 
had to be enlisted as soldaty. An exception was only made for those, who did 
not receive payment by the state, but were refunded through land. These soldiers 
could choose to serve one year as regimental troops (for which they received a 
soldat’s annual salary) or - one year as urban units, during which time they 
needed to earn money from their lands. Only the Moscow streltsy were kept 
intact, but their regiments were fixed at 1000 men each. The reform also 
affected the military ranks of the streltsy officer corps, replacing the golov with 
a colonel (polkovnik), the polugolov - with a lieutenant colonel (podpolkovnik) 
and the sotnik - with a captain (kapitan). The core territories of Muscovy were 
divided into nine military districts and each provided a certain number of 
soldiers for the state army. Unlike the old system, the new areas (razryady or 
okruga), included not only the borderlands but the inner territories as well.53  
On paper, the army of 1680 was comprised of the following elements: 41 
soldaty regiments – 61,288 (37 per cent); 21 regiments Moscow streltsy – 
20,048 (12 per cent); 26 regiments of reytary and kopeishchiki – 30,472 (18.5 
per cent); four Circassian regiments – 14,865 (9 per cent); supporting troops and 
urban garrisons - 37,927 (23,5 per cent); or 164,600 in total. These forces had to 
be backed by the Cossack Hetmanate with a further 50,000 increasing the total 
strength of the army to 214,600.54 The infantry was 49 per cent of the entire 
army. However, when we exclude the auxiliary troops from Ukraine, this per 
centage goes up to 72 per cent, which means that Muscovy’s army was no 
longer the cavalry force from the previous century. 
In addition to these changes, Golitsyn reformed the number of prikazy, 
responsible for the upkeep of the army. He established three new chancelleries – 
Razryadniy prikaz, Reytarskiy prikaz, and Inozemskiy prikaz, which had to 
replace the old ones. However, the jurisdiction of the new prikazy was rather 
chaotic and they exceed their authority in certain districts and regions.55  
On the whole, the Golitsyn reforms were able to bring some consolidation 
in the army. However, they did not resolve the main problems, but rather swept 
them under the rug. The previous formations were not disbanded or reformed in 
means of armament and training, but were merged with the new formation 
regiments. This brought down the morale and quality of the new units. The lack 
of centralization and coordination among the military prikazy was reduced, but 
                                                 
53 The nine districts we as follows: Moskovskiy (Muscow), Severskiy (Seversk), Vladimirskiy (Vladimir), 
Novgorodskiy (Novgorod), Kazanskiy (Kazan), Smolenskiy (Smolensk), Ryazanskiy (Ryazan), Belgorodskiy 






not removed and, as the Crimean Campaigns demonstrated, Muscovy once again 
had to reform its forces in order to improve the army’s field efficiency – a goal, 
pursued ever since 1613. 
The military evolution of Muscovy, up until the reign of Peter, calls for a 
general reapproach by Western military historians. It is essential to understand 
that Muscovy had its unique path of development, influenced by the geopolitical 
location of Russia. Contrary to the common belief, the events, often referred as 
Military Revolution, did take place in Russia generally at the same time as they 
did in the rest of Europe. The difference came from the background upon which 
the foundations of Russia’s military power were built. Nevertheless, firearms, 
standing units, recruitment of native troops instead of mercenaries and the 
application of specific tactics of siege and field combat were successfully 
applied.56 By 1689 Russia was able to muster the second largest army in 
Europe.57 This force was as good as many western armies, and it was certainly 
superior to most of its enemies. Therefore, when Peter I ascended the throne his 
task was not to create an entirely new army out of scratch, but only to build on 
the foundations, established by his predecessors. 
 
1.4. The Petrine Army 
 
The overall success or failure of Peter’s reforms is the main topic of the 
historical debate regarding Russia’s military power during the first quarter of the 
eighteen century. There are two points of view. The first argues that under Peter, 
Russia formed a strong, well-organized standing army that was drilled and 
equipped according to European standards and was far superior to its eastern 
counterparts. This idea is defended by C. Duffy in his work on Russia’s military 
development and also in R. Hellie’s article on the Petrine Army.58 Both works 
supplement each other presenting a concise picture of Russia’s military 
establishment since the reign of Aleksey I Romanov. The main weaknesses of 
Duffy’s approach are that it is too general and lacks a precise description of 
Russia’s forces. Hellie’s article is helpful in tracing Russia’s military 
development originating in the seventeenth century, but emphasizes too much 
on the continuity and rather neglects the innovations, made by Peter. These 
works are further supported by Russian historiography, which vigorously 
preserves the idea of a regular, standing army, created by Peter the Great. L.G. 
Beskrovnyy, K. Tatarnikov and V. Lystsov argue that Russia did develop a 
                                                 
56 Introduced as early as 1653, when most other armies in Europe still consisted mostly of mercenaries, see 
Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar, 80-92. 
57 For a comparison of Russia’s army to those in Western Europe; see Table 3 in the Appendix for the current 
chapter. 
58 C. Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power, 1700 – 1800 
(London: Routledge, 1981); R. Hellie, “The Petrine Army: Continuity, Change and Impact”, Canadian-




modern, European-style army under Peter and that this army was equal to its 
European counterparts.59  
The other side of the debate is taken by Peter’s critics. They claim that 
there was no such thing as regular standing Russian army under Peter. 
According to them, Peter’s military reforms were a response to military 
problems rather than a general strategy for army reformation. The chief 
proponent of this theory is W. Fuller who, in his book on Russian warfare during 
the Romanov period, argues that the Russia's military was far from the mighty 
war machine described in the above-mentioned works.60 He gives a very critical 
overview of Peter’s military reforms and plans and concludes that in means of 
resources, development of society and government, Russia was quite unable to 
produce not only a regular but also a standing army. L. Hughes accepts Fuller's 
theses. In her book on Russia in the Age of Peter the Great, she repeats Fuller’s 
ideas, although her narrative lacks Fuller’s sharp criticism.61 Another critical 
study of Russia’s army under Peter is written by J. Keep. In his book Keep 
summarizes key issues and features of the Petrine army and opens a debate on 
the real quality of the Russian army during the first quarter of the eighteenth 
century.62 Furthermore, he gives exclusive statistical data on the expenditure of 




Most accounts of Peter’s military reforms begin with his early years and relate 
the future steps, taken by the Tsar, with the experience gained from the 
organization and training of the two “playtime” regiments – Semyonovskiy and 
Preobrazhenskiy.63 However, this is quite controversial. First and foremost, 
Peter was just a teenager who, like all young boys, had a romantic idea about 
war. Though he took his war game activities seriously, it would be too naïve to 
assume that his inspirations for an imperial army came only from a series of 
field games with several hundred of his companions.64 Another possible reason 
for his inspiration for military reforms was his “Grand Tour” in Europe when he 
                                                 
59 L.G. Beskrovnyy (ed.), Poltava: K 250- letiyu Poltavskogo srazheniya; sbornik statey (Moscow: Akademia 
nauk, 1958); L.G. Beskrovnyy, Russkaya armiya i flot v XVIII veke (Moscow, 1958); K.V. Tatarnikov, Russkaya 
polevaya armiya 1700-1730. Obmundirovanie i snaryazhenie (Moscow: Lyubimaya kniga, 2008); V. Lystsov, 
Persidskiy Pokhod Petra I: 1722 – 1723 (Moscow, 1951); It is interesting to note, that Peter I, himself, referred 
to his army as a regular (regulyarnyy) force. 
60 W.C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600 – 1914 (New York: The Free Press, 1992). 
61 L. Hughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great (New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1998). 
62 J. L. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462 – 1874 (Oxford: Calderon Press, 1985). 
63 In Russian they are referred as poteshnye voyska literary meaning “amusement army”. It could even be related 
to toy soldiers that kids play with. The idea that a royal persona should play his war games with real soldiers is 
evident in the practice of “living” chess games, played all over Western Europe during the eighteenth, nineteenth 
and even the twentieth century.  
64 This prince-soldier image is quite close to what chronicles tell us of young Alexander and his hetairoi. The 





visited the most influential Western capitals and was fascinated by the splendor 
and glamour of the “civilized world”. At least that is what most western studies 
presume. The fact is that Peter was truly inspired and amazed only by one thing 
– ships. It suffices to note here that Peter was quite unimpressed by the French 
army when he saw them parading.65 Then it could be assumed that it was not the 
eyewitness of the most developed and sophisticated army that inspired his 
reforms either.66 In reality, Peter drew inspiration for the structure and for 
composition of his infantry regiments from Saxony and Austria. He sent Adam 
Weyde to Dresden and Vienna in order to become familiar with the basic army 
regulations of the two states. These were later translated into Russian and used 
in the process of forming the newly recruited regiments in 1699 and 1700.67 
According to Bobrovskiy it was Peter’s plan for war against Sweden that 
provoked the establishment of a permanent standing army in Russia. On the 
other hand, he notes that the regiments, established between 1699 and 1700 were 
poorly armed and trained and it was not until the disaster at Narva that the true 
process of army formation began.68 Thus, the event that made Peter to realize 
that war games and parades were only the “powdered faces” of eighteen-century 
warfare was the Battle of Narva (1700). In this confrontation the Russians met 
one of the most experienced and well-trained forces in Europe and suffered a 
humiliating loss. The factors for the Swedish victory are examined in detail in 
books dealing with the Great Northern War (1700-1721).69 What concerns the 
current research is that Peter understood that he had to create a coherent, better-
trained force and to equip it with the best possible weapons.70  
                                                 
65 Peter is quoted for commenting on French troops “I have seen dolls, but not soldiers”.  
66 During the Nine Years’ War (1688-1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), France 
possessed an impressive army, probably the best in Europe. It was the genius of the Allied commanders 
Marlborough and Eugene and the multitude of fronts that France had to face that kept the military balance in the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. For an exhaustive account of the French army under Louis XIV, see J.A. 
Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714 (Harlow: Longman, 1999); J.A. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle: The 
French Army, 1610-1715 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); If we accept that the Grand Tour and 
the war games were the main reason for the reforms, we may not but wonder why did Russia enter the Great 
Northern War with an army, that was more or less structured in the same way as was the army under Golitsyn. 
67 P. Bobrovskiy, K dvuhsotlyatiyu uchrezhdeniya regulyarnykhy voysky v Rossiy (1699-1700 po 1899-1900), 
(St. Petersburg: Tipografiya Glavnago Upravleniya Udyalov, 1899), 2. 
68 Ibid., 4; A. Bayov confirms Bobrovskiy’s perspective on the influence of German military manuals, equipment 
and unit structure on the composition of Peter’s newly recruited regiments, but notes that it was the shortage of 
troops after the disbandment of the Moscow streltsy and the Belgorod-line troops that led to the formation of the 
regular regiments between 1699 and 1700. Regarding the influence on Peter’s reform policy, he clearly outlines 
that Peter’s genius was strong enough to succeed in the reforms he had planned on his own. Furthermore, Bayov 
is quite critical toward the foreign officers, recruited by Peter for the training and the command of the new 
regiments; see A. Bayov, Kurs istorii russkogo voennogo iskusstva: Vypusk II, Epokha Petra Velikogo, (St. 
Petersburg: Tipografiya Gr. Skachkov, 1909), 42-3. 
69There are numerous books and articles dealing with the Great Northern War. Almost any account on Russia’s 
military effort under Peter is concentrated on the Northern War. 
70Peter himself comments, that the defeat at Narva should come as no surprise, since his entire army lacked real 
field experience and only the two guard (leyb) regiments had seen any real action during the two Azov 
campaigns – “Zhurnal ili podennaya zapiska blazhennyya i vechnodostoynyya pamyati gosudarya imperatora 
Petra Velikogo s 1698 goda dazhe do zaklyucheniya neyshtatskago mira” (St. Petersburg: Akademia nauk, 




It was the course of the Great Northern War, with its victories, setbacks, 
and defeats that shaped the reform of the Russian army. In early modern Europe, 
the most suitable time to reform a state’s army was during war. It provided the 
opportunity to instantly test against the enemy any new idea and to correct in 
time any shortcomings that occurred. Furthermore, it is the creation of a veteran 
army that is the final goal of any successful army reform.71 Then it is not 
surprising that Peter experimented with different tactics and ideas during the 
course of the Northern War in order to find the exact formula for success. He 
introduced heavy cavalry and later - abolished it. He used different field 
configurations to determine the best way to situate his army on the battlefield. 
Guns of various sizes were used on some occasions to improve the firepower of 
regiments and to find out which caliber is the most appropriate one.72  
Finally, it turned out that Russia’s military development was shaped by 
the very same factors that predetermined the Muscovite military evolution 
during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Logistical issues required the 
development of a mobile army, which could easily transfer over the enormous 
distances between Russia’s separate frontiers. The use of light, mobile cavalry 
by the Turks, Tatars and Kalmyks, as well as the general preference of Peter 
toward light, mounted forces, resulted in the dropping out of the heavy reytary, 
and the creation of a high number of dragoon regiments. The necessity to 
respond to both cavalry attacks and the powerful “gå på” tactics of the Swedes, 
led to the application of mobile field fortification.73 Furthermore, the pike was 
not entirely removed from the ranks, since it was very useful in repulsing 
cavalry charges by the steppe hordes. Therefore, the new Russian army had a lot 
more to do with the old one than Keep’s and Hallie’s studies indicate.74 
                                                 
71 As David Parrott notes, it is not the tactical reforms, but the establishment of a veteran army that makes a state 
powerful at war. When veterans met inexperienced troops, no matter how situated and equipped the later were, 
experience and higher morale always prevailed. Therefore the victories of the Russian army, especially after 
Poltava (1709) were not due only to superiority in numbers, but also to the experience, gained by the Russian 
soldiers. Peter was well aware of this fact and that is the main reason for his desire to defeat the Swedes in any 
possible occasion after the loss at Narva. Russian operations in Estland and Ingria in 1702-1705 served to build 
up experienced regiments and to bring confidence to the soldiers, see Parrott, “Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty 
Years’ War”, 227-53. 
72 For different evaluation of Peter’s “experiments”, see Fuller, Strategy and Power, 56-84. 
73 For account of the heavy cavalry experience in Russia, see Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar, 81-2; Hellie, “The 
Petrine Army”, 239.; The Swedes relied on the experience of their soldiers and preformed a rapid infantry attack. 
They used a series of volleys at around 30 ft. to disrupt enemy lines and then charged home with their bayonets. 
The untrained Russian conscripts proved to be disastrously vulnerable to these charges. Since Peter had to 
response rapidly to the aggressive Swedish offence, instead of relying on morale and drill experience, which 
would need time to develop, he reintroduced the mobile field fortifications. Protected by this wooden palisades 
and trenches, the Russians were able to break the Swedish offence and counter–attack, using volley fire and 
bayonets. Poltava is the classic example of this way of conducting battles. 
74 Both Keep and Hellie refer to the transition of experience, but none of them seems to take into consideration 
the obvious continuum of the streltsy tactics. Furthermore, as noted by Christopher Duffy, most of the streltsy 
were not killed or disbanded, but instead, as experienced troops, they were incorporated in the new infantry 





In general, the infantry was formed into two types of regiments: grenadier 
and fusilier. Initially, grenadiers comprised only separate companies within 
fusilier regiments, but after the Battle of Poltava (1709) these companies were 
merged and formed different regiments of foot. Every soldier possessed a 
musket and was given a uniform.75 In response to the Swedish threat, the 
structure of the infantry regiments changed on several occasions between 1700 
and 1711. Some regiments consisted of larger number of men than others, and 
special task force divisions received units according to their particular goal. In 
1711 and 1712 Peter issued the first regular rules for the number of soldiers 
(shchat) that each regiment should comprise of.76 These regulations changed 
during the second part of the Northern War, but after the ordinance of 1720 the 
numbers were fixed and differed little from those accepted in 1711.77 Unlike 
Muscovite forces, the new Russian army received salaries instead of land grants. 
In peacetime, the regiments were garrisoned in different key cities in Russia.78 
Apart from field units, a large portion of the Petrine army was comprised of 
local militia and garrison troops that served mainly along the southern frontier, 
maintaining fortification lines that span from Dnieper to the Volga.79 Unlike 
regular regiments, the militia was kept on the old principle of land grants, which 
had to provide food and funds for its holders in exchange for their service.80 
                                                 
75During the Narva campaign, the Russian arms varied in caliber and even models. After 1711, with the 
expansion of the gun production facilities, the calibers were somewhat standardized. Nevertheless, calibers 
remained a problem as late as the Napoleonic Wars, when 28 different calibers were reported in the Russian 
army. The quality of the muskets was as high as any produced in Western Europe. The preferred type was the 
French-style flintlock musket. By the end of the Great Northern War, the weapons of the Russian infantry were 
of better quality and in greater quantity compared to the Swedish ones. Apart from the musket, each soldier had a 
bayonet knife, which was attached to the weapon, with a mechanism at the lower part of the barrel. For an 
exhaustive description of infantry armament, see Tatarnikov, Russkaya polevaya armiya, 85-99; Uniforms were 
copied from the so-called German fashion (Nemetskaya moda). They were with plain cut and were developed to 
allow maximal mobility as well as protection from the harsh Russian weather. The colors of the uniforms varied 
according to the regiments and the type of infantry. Uniforms were generally made from cloth, which after 1711 
was produced in Russia. However, a cloth shortage was significant and imports reached as high as 1/3 of the 
total necessary amount. For an exhaustive description of Petrine uniforms, see Tatarnikov, Russkaya polevaya 
armiya, 44-71; A. Konstram, Peter the Great’s Army, vol. 1 (London: Osprey Publishing, 1993), 22-4 with very 
precise illustrations on pages 25-33. 
76According to the ordinance of 1711, there were 42 regiments of foot – 2 regiments of the guard (leyb), 5 
grenadier regiments and 35 fusilier regiments. All in all they numbered 52,164 combatants (stroevay soldaty) 
and 10,290 non-combatants, or a total of 62,454 men, see L.G. Beskrovnyy, Russkaya armiya i flot, 40;  
77The regiments in 1720 were again 42 – 2 guard, 5 grenadier, 35 fusilier – 54,560 combatants and only 3,396 
non-combatants, or a total of 57,956 men, see. Ibid, 41. 
78 For a map of the garrison arrangement of the regiments during the reign of Peter I, see J.P. LeDonne, The 
Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650 – 1831, (Oxford, 2004), 45; After 1724 regiments were named after 
the cities in which they were stationed and recruited. 
79 Many of these troops were formed from the former streltsy, reytary and kopeishchiky, who were disbanded 
from field service after 1700. Therefore, the idea that Peter destroyed or disbanded completely his former army 
is false. In fact, the emperor used these old regiments and companies for training grounds of new recruits, taken 
during the annual recruitments. The only part of the old style army which was completely dissolved was the 
noble cavalry. L.G. Beskrovnyy, Russkaya armiya i flot, 44-7. 
80 The system of settling militia and garrison regiments on the southern frontier was already introduced by 
Aleksey during the seventeenth century. Peter continued the practice and supplemented the frontier with several 
new garrison regiments and new Cossack reinforsments. For an extensive description of the frontier service, see 





The variability of Russian cavalry types must not be underestimated. Even 
though the regular cavalry was comprised exclusively of dragoons, Peter could 
rely on the support of two prominent irregular forces – the Cossacks and the 
Kalmyks. The Cossacks were a frontier-based warrior society that evolved 
throughout the entire early modern period. By the reign of Peter, most of them 
were already settled on the steppe frontiers and were under relatively high state 
control.81 Most of the Cossacks were Orthodox Christians, but there were also 
Muslims since religion was not determinative for the Cossack ethos.82 The 
Kalmyks were, perhaps, the last great horde of Asia. Unlike the Tatars their 
ancestry could not be traced back to the Chingisid Empire and they were proud 
of their heritage.83 They became very useful allies against the Nogais, the Tatars 
and other Central Asian tribes. Still, they could also be a threat to Russia and the 
frontier forces, especially around Astrakhan, where troops were always vigilant 
for sporadic Kalmyk raids.84 Unlike the Cossacks, the Kalmyks were mostly 
Muslim, although some of them kept their old pagan practices up until the 
eighteenth century. In general, Cossack and Kalmyk bands slightly differed in 
their equipment. They were light cavalry units, armed with different types of 
swords and a large variety of guns. They had no standard uniforms or regimental 
flags. Unlike dragoons, they did not receive regular payment, but were rather 
allowed to keep their part of the loot and later - to trade these goods and captives 
in Russian and Central Asian markets.85  
The dragoons were the only regular cavalry in the Petrine army. During 
the early stage of the Northern War Peter decided to trade heavy armament for 
mobility and the ability to fight dismounted. Similarly to Gustav II Adolf (r. 
1611-1632), Peter had a preference for saber charges than to ranged attacks and 
he used his dragoons to flank enemy positions by dealing with enemy cavalry 
and chasing the defeated foes out of the battlefields. Furthermore, dragoons 
were used to form special task forces, which were sent on individual missions.86 
                                                 
81 For a concise narrative on the settlement and the administration of Cossacks, see B.J. Boeck, Imperial 
Boundaries: Cossack Communities and Empire-Building in the Age of Peter the Great (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
82 When it came to war religion was never essential for Russia. As early as the fifteenth century, the Muscovite 
state employed irregular Muslim bands in its forces. During the advance in Siberia, Muslims and pagans were 
often approached as possible allies. During the Persian campaign, the most active ally of Peter was the Sunni 
shamkhal of Tarki. 
83 M. Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500 – 1800 (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2002), 133-46. 
84 A good example is presented during the 1705 Revolt in the Astrakhan region, when the Kalmyks took 
advantage of Russia’s situation and raided Russian territories in the South-East. 
85 Peter tried to limit this practice, but in the end he had to give up, because the state did not have the funds, 
necessary to compensate the Kalmyks for their participation in a campaign. The Cossacks, who were more 
bound with the Russian state had comply with the general regulations, but every now and then, they raided 
enemy territory and earned additional funding by selling the spoils of war or through collecting ransoms. 
86 Gustav II Adolf is credited for restoring the place of the cavalry on the battlefield, after the military 
developments of the sixteenth century had somewhat diminished its role. Both Michael Roberts and Geoffrey 
Parker are proponents of this idea, see Roberts, “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660”, 13-37; Parker, “The 




The dragoon regiments also varied in size and purpose during the first decade of 
the eighteenth century. In 1711 the ordinance, regarding the shchat of the 
different army types, prescribed a total of 33 regiments, numbering 43,824 men 
(34,320 combatants and 9,504 non-combatants), while the size of the regiments 
was fixed at 1,328 soldiers and officers. The new shchat of 1720 brought little 
change to the overall structure. The number of regiments was kept at 33, but the 
grenadier companies were taken out of fusilier regiments and gathered in their 
own regiments, similarly to foot grenadiers. The number of troops per regiment 
was reduced to 1,253, so the total number of dragoons in 1720 was 37,851 
men.87 
The artillery reform was indeed the main army innovation, introduced by 
Peter I. During the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, artillery was not a 
separate type of force, but was attached to field regiments. Furthermore, there 
were neither standard calibers, nor standard materials for guns: some were cast 
from bronze, others – from iron; some were new, others - a century old.88 During 
the Battle of Narva Peter lost his entire artillery train, and though this seemed 
like a disaster, the determined tsar used this loss to build new, up-to-date 
artillery. In 1701 Peter established individual artillery corps, which was 
deployed separately from the infantry regiments.89 Furthermore, as early as 
1697, the Russians introduced the horse-pack mortars – half a century before 
western armies.90 In general, by 1722 Russia possessed an excellent artillery 
train and Russian gunners were considered among the best in Europe. 
The artillery itself was divided into four main elements – regimental, 
field, siege and garrison. Regimental artillery numbered between six and eight 
different types of guns for cavalry and a total of six guns and mortars for the 
infantry. The number of field guns varied from 157 in 1706 to 108 in 1712 and 
again - 108 in 1724. By 1724 the siege artillery comprised of a total of 360 guns 
and mortars.91  
Peter's reforms also affected the officer corps. The establishment of 
military schools, as well as the general desire of Peter to promote as many local 
officers as possible, led to the “russification” of the officer corps. Nevertheless, 
some foreigners remained, especially in the infantry and artillery, where they 
were needed during the rearrangement of these forces. The higher echelon of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Menshikov, prior to the Battle of Poltava. The highly mobile Russian force was able to check the Swedish 
movement and to deny them the ability to resupply. 
87 Beskrovnyy, Russkaya armiya i flot, 41-2. 
88 Paul, “The Military Revolution”, 29. 
89 The first artillery corps was comprised of 4 gunner companies, 4 mortar platoons, bridge and engineer 
companies and a corps of officers. They numbered 674 men in total. The first regular shchat for the artillery was 
issued in 1712 and the corps’ numbers were set at 20 staff-officers, 53 officers, 285 non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs), 984 combatants and 2,217 non-combatants. L.G. Beskrovnyy, Russkaya armiya i flot, 43; This was 
supplemented by the establishment of a standing horse corps to pull the artillery in 1711. It comprised of 1,986 
horses and 1,255 men, see Hellie, “The Petrine Army”, 244. 
90 Ibid; the general search for mobility, demonstrated by Peter was utilized in the west as late as Napoleon. Thus, 
Russia was a step ahead of the West in the beginning of the eighteenth century. 




officer corps was comprised of Peter’s childhood companions (Sheremetev, 
Apraksin, Menshikov) or his foreign tutors (Bruce, Lefort, Gordon). While the 
former were charged with commanding the field army or the navy, the latter 
were placed as heads of the artillery, since ballistics was still a underdeveloped 
discipline in Russia. Nevertheless, Peter established the first military school in 
St. Petersburg in 1704, and it was dedicated to the arts of artillery. By the end of 
Peter’s reign, artillery’s higher echelon also consisted of officers of Russian 
origin.  
Although on paper any soldier could progress through the ranks, in fact, 
the highest positions remained a privilege of the nobility. Moreover, progressing 
officers of unprivileged origins were ennobled after reaching a certain rank. 
Thus, new military nobility came into being, supplementary to the service 
nobility, established by Peter through his administrative reform. By 1722 a 
complicated structure of ranks was developed which was finally systematized in 
the “Table of Ranks of 1722”. In this chart military, official and civil titles were 
equalized to define the honors and hierarchy among them.92 
A major problem of the Petrine army was discipline. Like any other 
recently reformed force, the army of Peter I was comprised mostly of fresh 
recruits with little or none combat experience.93 Most of these soldiers were 
conscripted men, who had never before left their villages and a substantial part 
of them served far away from their homes. Furthermore, like any other early 
modern peasants, Russians were superstitious and placed great emphasis on the 
balance between known and unknown. Thus, when remote from their home, 
they were subjected to fear and superstitious beliefs.94 Apart from the cultural 
shock, problems with inadequate treatment, low or no payment and shortage of 
food also contributed to the large number of deserters.95 Defeats and uncertain 
                                                 
92 For the complete table of ranks, see L.G. Beskrovnyy, Khrestomatiya po Russkoy voennoy istorii (Moscow, 
1947), 143-50. 
93 The same problems could be seen in Western Armies during their formation period in the Thirty Years’s War. 
As David Parrott notes, desertion and logistics issues were the main enemy of seventeenth century armies and 
commanders first had to be good administrators and only after that came the importance of their strategic skills. 
As with Western forces, as soon as soldiers gained experience, general problems with discipline and desertion 
lessened, see Parrott, “Strategy and Tactics”, 240-6; Duffy, Russia’s Military Way, 130-5. 
94 A great gap in early modern Military history lies in the impact of popular culture on the behavior of soldiers. 
Superstitions, rituals, and remains of pagan practices were common among early modern people, especially those 
who came from the rural areas. Folklore and pagan mythology, mashed up with Christianity in order to produce 
a series of myths, tales, and fears, concerning a person, who left home, traveled on uncertain roads and died far 
away from home. In Eastern Slavonic mythology, most evil creatures and the Devil himself dwelled on roads 
and crossroads, or in the ruins of old churches, windmills, etc. other evil spirits were related to violent death and 
inappropriate burial ceremony of a person. Thus, apart from the common reasons of ill-treatment, low or no 
payment and the low moral after a defeat, belief also had their place in the reasons for desertions. 
95 Beskrovnyy analyzes in depth the problem of desertion due to ill treatment of the recruits. They were placed in 
barns, locked in small chambers, sometimes a hundred people at a place. Food and clothes were of constant 
shortage, and diseases were quick to spread. The authorities tried hard to coup with this problem, but the harsh 
methods (between 1700 and 1708) and the later promises of pardon upon their return were of little help. Tattoos 
and signs were placed on the recruits’ arms in order to distinguish them in case they deserted, but these were 





victories were also part of the problem. To cope with this situation, Peter I 
issued a strict and harsh military code. Capital punishment and torture were 
regularly applied to deserters. Another practice was to take relatives as hostages 
in exchange for loyalty on the field.96 Nevertheless, general problems with 
desertion were constant during the first decade of the Northern War. Only after 
the victory at Poltava and the improvement of supply system after 1711, the 
overall morale of the troops rose and the level of desertion fell.97  
 
The sinews of war 
 
An army, no matter how well trained or experienced would not survive a single 
day in the field without an adequate logistical support. In Russia, the need to 
secure the army’s supply was well understood long before the accession of 
Peter.98 In general, the three most essential sinews of war are men, supplies, and 
money.99 Each of these is related to the others, and none of the three could 
sufficiently replace the lack of the other two.100 Peter I was well aware of this 
interrelation and he did everything he could in order to provide his army with 




The greatest problem with logistics in Russia was distance. Since Moscow was 
the center of the state’s supply system, supplies had to be transported from there 
to any frontline. Unfortunately, most fronts were over a thousand kilometers 
away.101 To make things worse, the weather played very negative role in the 
development of logistics. Contrary to the common belief, it was spring and 
autumn rather than summer and winter that were problematic for army’s 
                                                 
96 This medieval practice was generally applied toward nobles and vassal rulers, but Peter expanded it to locals 
as well. When a deserter from a certain village was not captured, the village had to pay a certain fee.  
97 Duffy, Russia’s Military Way, 130-5; Beskrovnyy, Russkaya armiya i flot, 30-1; Problems still existed, but 
that was the case in all armies during this period and the Russian was no exception. 
98 For example, in 1630 the Russians began a careful preparation for the upcoming Smolensk campaign (1632-
1633). Iron and copper were imported from Western Europe, food and munitions were stored in special key 
points on the future route of the army. Diplomatic support was provided, gaining the neutrality of Sweden and 
the Crimean Tatars. In the sixteenth century Ivan IV first secured his army’s abundance with arms, provisions 
and transports and then launched his offensives, see D.L. Smith, “Muscovite Logistics, 1462–1598”, Slavonic 
and East European Review 71, 1 (1993), 35-65; Fuller, Strategy and Power, 3-10. 
99 There is a millennium old debate between military leaders and writers on the exact nature of the sinews of war. 
Any great man who deals with war from Cicero onward had his own perception of what was important for the 
support of war efforts. In general, money, supplies and men are the three most important elements, which are 
interrelated and comprise the general logistics complex. 
100 Money cannot buy everything. A rich (in terms of money) state with small population and pour supplies could 
not maintain a military effort. A numerous population, deprived of full treasury could not wage war for a long 
period. An abundance of supplies without a proper army and a considerable amount of money to pay the prices 
of transport and service is also doomed to failure. The lack of one of the sinews would not hinder the beginning 
of a war, but it will certainly prevent a decisive victory. 
101 LeDonne, The Grand Strategy, 16 - for a map, illustrating the distance from Moscow to the main frontlines 




movement. The rains and the melting snow transformed the steppes into an 
enormous muddy swamp, which was impenetrable on foot. Oxen carts 
constantly stuck in the mud and even horses had problems traversing the knee-
deep silt. Roads were scarce and most of them resembled a dirt trail, drawn by 
the passing carts. The road connecting the new capital Petersburg and Moscow 
was not in good condition. Apart from threatening the security of the new city, 
this resulted in a problematic communication between the administrative 
apparatus, situated in the capital and the supply depots, positioned in Moscow. 
However, Russia was blessed with navigable rivers which made possible the 
connections among most parts of the empire. Peter I was very keen on 
developing river transport and under his direction several canals were dug to 
enhance mobility and supply on the frontiers.102 However, water transport was 
not always a possible solution and Russian forces constantly suffered from 
shortage of particular necessities.103 
If distance could be overcome by different means of transportation, the 
supply of goods and ammunitions brought up other issues. Russia was abundant 
of all kinds of metals and resources, but most of them were still underdeveloped 
while others needed a further development to meet state’s needs. First and 
foremost, Russia needed weapons. Guns, firearms and gunpowder were of a 
constant shortage during the seventeenth century and had to be imported. Peter 
decided to solve this problem by developing a substantial military industry, 
which would transform Russia into a self-sufficient force. The discovery of large 
deposits of iron and copper in the Urals were crucial for fulfilling Peter’s 
ambition. Results were fascinating and by 1725 Russia became the leading 
distributor of high quality iron in the world. Russia’s output surpassed any other 
state in Europe, including England and Sweden.104 The supply of high quality 
iron enhanced the production of weapons, which increased fivefold between 
1700 and 1706.105 By the end of Peter’s reign, however, weapons were still 
imported from England and the Dutch Republic. Obtaining gunpowder for the 
Russian army was also problematic, as its production was in the hands of private 
entrepreneurs, most of whom were of Russian origin. The system of gunpowder 
                                                 
102 For an exhaustive description of the canal projects and their exact purposes, see LeDonne, The Grand 
Strategy, 52-60. 
103 Fuller, Strategy and Power, 37-56; Fuller is biased, since he fails to note that no early modern administration 
could handle with the vastness of Russia. If France, England or Austria were challenged by the same distances, 
their logistics systems would have crumbled. However, regarding the circumstances, Russia preformed 
surprisingly well. Therefore, Russian logistics should always be evaluated on the basis of conditions, distances 
and quantities and should never be viewed outside the context of general early modern development. Doing the 
opposite implies dangerous inaccuracy. 
104 For an exhaustive account of Russia’s iron production, see N.I. Pavlenko, “Produktsiya uralyskoy metalurgii 
v nachale XVIII v.”, in L.G. Beskrovnyy (ed.), Poltava: K 250-letiyu Poltavskogo srazheniya; sbornik statey 
(Moscow: Akademia nauk, 1959). 
105 The production of muskets was 6,000 in 1700 and grew up to 30,000 in 1706. In 1709-1710 this figure rose to 
125,000, see Konstram, Peter the Great’s Army, 34-5; Hellie, “The Petrine Army”, 240; Beskrovnyy presents a 
concise table of firearms production between 1721 and 1751. In 1721 were produced 26,358 firearms in several 
different types; 28,089 were forged in 1737 and 35,951 - in 1747. In addition, thousands of old firearms were 




supply was the following: the state ordered a certain amount of powder; the 
gunpowder manufactories produced it and delivered it to the state reserves; the 
reserves distributed the gunpowder to the required locations, following the 
instructions of the Senate and the Artillery (and later Military) department. 
Nevertheless, gunpowder producers were always short to meet state’s needs. 
There are numerous examples of gunpowder shortages due to the inability of 
private contractors to fulfill state’s orders.106 The main reason for the shortage of 
powder was the lack of saltpeter.107 Throughout his entire reign, Peter sought to 
fix this problem and to find new sources of saltpeter. In 1712 he issued an order 
for the increase of saltpeter production and during the following three years 
several state-owned gunpowder factories were established, most important of 
which were those in St. Petersburg and Moscow. By 1716 their combined output 
was 10,800 puda (176.04 tons) yearly. In 1717 a new system of mechanized 
gunpowder production was introduced, which increased the quality of the 
Russian powder. There were at least six state-owned gunpowder factories by 
1714, which more or less could provide the bulk of the necessary supplies for 
the army.108 
Clothing also became a challenge for the Russian state.109 As late as 1722, 
Russia still had to import 1/3 of the required cloth for the making of army 
uniforms.110 Textile manufactories were insufficient in numbers and their output 
was not of the highest quality.111 The material was imported from England, the 
Dutch Republic and even from the Ottoman Empire. Unlike fabric, leather was 
supplied and manufactured in large numbers and by 1709 Russian leather 
production was able to meet state’s necessities.112 In general, the Russian army 
was more or less sufficiently equipped with uniforms. However, as W. Fuller 
notes, there were still occasions when Peter’s troops were dressed in rags putting 
their tsar and commanders to shame.113 
                                                 
106For data-abundant account of gunpowder production in Petrine Russia, see M. Lukyyanov, “Proizvodstvo 
Porokha v Rossii v pervoy chetveri XVIIIv.”, in L.G. Beskrovnyy (ed.), Poltava: K 250-letiyu Poltavskogo 
srazheniya; sbornik statey (Moscow: Akademia nauk, 1959); The average supply of gunpowder between 1704 
and 1711 was 13 to 30,000 puda (or 489 tons) of gunpowder per year; see Beskrovnyy, Russkaya armiya i flot, 
96. 
107 Ibid. Saltpeter was insufficient and on several occasions the state had to requisition large amounts of saltpeter 
in order to supply the production. On other occasions, producers asked for state funding in order to import 
saltpeter from Western Europe. Apart from the above-mentioned occassions, saltpeter was imported from 
Ukarine or the Lower Volga cities. Beskrovnyy Russkaya armiya i flot , 96. 
108 Beskrovnyy, Russkaya armiya i flot , 97. 
109 By 1709, the Russian field army numbered around 120,000. Each soldier had to be provided with a standart 
set of equipment which cost almost half of his yearly payment; see А.I. Yuht, “Russkaya promyshlenosty i 
snabzhenie armii obmundirovaniem i amunitsiey”, in L.G. Beskrovnyy (ed.), Poltava: K 250-letiyu Poltavskogo 
srazheniya; sbornik statey (Moscow: Akademia nauk, 1959), 211. 
110 LeDonne, The Grand Strategy, 54. 
111 Yuht, “Russkaya promyshlenosty”, 211-5; Yuht provides an exhaustive narrative of the cloth-supply 
problems and provides an abundant amount of data. 
112 Ibid., 219. 
113 Fuller, Strategy and Power, 50. Nevertheless, Yuht provides information that by 1709, despite the problems 
with production and transportation, the state was able to provide for the general needs of the army; see Yuht, 




Another problem with the upkeep of Russia’s army was horse supply. The 
greater part of Russia’s cavalry was mounted on steppe horses, bred by the 
Kalmyks and other Central Asian tribes. Unlike Western European breeds, 
Asian horses were relatively small and could not carry significant loads.114 Apart 
from the desire for better mobility, the lack of bigger horses predetermined the 
limited numbers of the heavy cavalry.115 In harsh winters and when fighting 
outside Russian territory, horses were vulnerable to weather conditions as well 
as to the unknown types of poisonous grass, which often led to the death of 
hundreds of animals. 
According to official numbers, Russia’s cavalry was supposed to have 
42,000 horses (33,000 for combat and 9,000 for transportation) in line with the 
regulations of 1711. As mentioned above, the number of dragoons, serving in 
the cavalry was 42,820 (34,320 combatants and 9,504 non-combatants) in the 
same year. These figures mean not only that there were not enough horses per 
soldier, but also that 1,320 cavalrymen did not possess horses at all. 
Furthermore, each horse was supposed to serve for ten to twelve years before it 
was replaced.116 The regulations of 1720 brought few changes into the picture. 
The number of war horses was raised to 34,000 and the non-combat animals 
were supposed to be 10,000. However, the number of dragoons was also 
increased (37,851 dragoons in 1720), which meant that over 3,000 cavalrymen 
were left without horses. The state tried to establish several “horse factories” in 
the Volga basin to supplement the number of available mounts, but by 1740 this 
system had achieved unsatisfactory results. Therefore, the state had to recruit 
horses from the peasants and the monasteries and also to purchase significant 
numbers from abroad. Still, by the end of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1736-




The levy of additional recruits is the second crucial element in supporting the 
war effort. Conscription, rather than hiring mercenaries, was a preferred method 
in Russia as early as 1630.117 The drafts were based on a system of recruiting 
one soldier from every 10 to 95 households.118 Initial recruitments provided 
fewer people than Peter had hoped and in 1705 was introduced a new recruiting 
                                                 
114 Konstram, Peter the Great’s Army, 9; quoting captain Jeffreyes’ account of the Battle of Holowczyn (1708) 
“twas seldom that we could overtake them, and never but when by chance they came into a morasses whence 
their horses being little and weak could not so hastly carry the out as to escape us”. 
115 Ibid., 11. 
116 Beskrovnyy, Russkaya armiya i flot, 125. 
117 Fuller, Strategy and Power, 1-10. 
118 Hellie, “The Petrine Army”, 249. According to the law, the state was divided into sections of 20 households. 
Each section had to provide 1 soldier fit for battle. This practice was supplemented by additional recruits, levied 
among a larger portion of households. Hence - the great variety between the numbers of households per soldier; 
see Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar, 103-6; Fuller, Strategy and Power, 45-7; For the size of annual recruits, see Table 




system, demanding one soldier from every 20 households. One mounted soldier 
had to be provided from every 80 families.119 In reality, these figures varied due 
to additional levies, corruption and the practice of payment for a substitute. 
There is no consensus among historians on the exact number of recruited 
soldiers.120 Numbers vary between 250,000 and 350,000 for the entire reign of 
Peter. If we accept Beskrovnyy’s extensive examination of documents, a total of 
342,000 men were called for service. Divided along the twenty-four years of 
recruiting under Peter, this gives us an average of 14,250 recruits per year.121 Of 
an available male population of 5,528,742 this figure meant that Peter managed 
to mobilize 6.2 per cent of Russia’s male population.122 If by 1724 the total 
number of soldiers was 253,000, then Peter was able to mobilize over two per 
cent of Russia’s population.123 As Keep notes, twentieth-century countries with 
the same population as Russia had in 1700 were capable of supporting no more 
than 65,000 soldiers.124 Therefore, despite the setbacks and problems of 
transportation and recruitment, Russia achieved exceptional success in 
mobilizing its war potential during the reign of Peter I. 
It was not so much the size of the recruitment but the conditions of service 
that were problematic and led to the high rates of desertion. According to the 
Military Code, recruits had to anticipate in a life-term service in the army. Even 
after this term was reduced to twenty-five years of service, things did not change 
for common soldiers. In general, Russian commoners believed that a soldier 
could only leave the army if he was killed. Moreover, many of the recruited 
soldiers were loosing any hope of seeing their families again.125 This trend led to 
high levels of desertion that are acknowledged even by Russian historians.126 
Since punishment and other measures of preventing desertion were 
unsuccessful, the only way to compensate was by carrying out new recruitments, 
                                                 
119 Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar, 103-6; The recruiting system of 1705 was rearranged in 1708-1709, after the 
administrative reform and the new census of households. Until then, the recruitment was based on the old 
household data, gathered in 1678; V.N. Avtokratov, “Voennyy prikaz (u istorii komplektovaniya i formirovaniya 
voysk v Rossii v nachale XVIII v.)”, in L.G. Beskrovnyy (ed.), Poltava: K 250-letiyu Poltavskogo srazheniya; 
sbornik statey (Moscow, 1959), 232-3. 
120 Keep estimates over 300,000 people for the entire reign of Peter; see J. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar, 107; Fuller 
mentions “at least quarter of a million”; see Fuller, Strategy and Power, 47; Avtokratov estimates that for the 
1705-11 period, 150,000 were recruited; see Avtokratov, “Voenny Prikaz”, 233; According to Bescrovnyy, at 
least 342,770 recruits were enlisted during Peter I’s reign; see Beskrovnuyy, Ruskaya armiya i flot, 23-35. 
121 For a complete summary of all recruitments between 1700 and 1740, see Table 2 in the Appendix for the 
current chapter. 
122 Duffy, Russia’s Military Way, 127. 
123 Brian Davies, accepting J. Keep’s figures, estimates a total of 289,000 soldiers in 1725. Davies, Empire and 
Military Revolution, 161; Keep, Soldiers of the tsar, 138; The figures in the current dissertation are based on 
Beskrovnyy’s account, since the numbers seem more plausible and are generally accepted by modern Russian 
historiography. 
124 Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar, 90.  
125 Duffy, Russia’s Military Way, 130-6. 
126 Avtokratov quotes a case from 1707 in which out of 23,000 dragoons, only 8,000 remained at their position, 




sometimes on several occasions per year.127 The government resorted to taking 
hostages among soldiers’ families in order to secure their presence in the rank 
and file. Harsh corporal punishment was also issued in order to cow the recruits 
into submission. These measures were not uncommon among contemporary 
armies, and as with their western counterparts, in the consecutive decades 
Russian officers would slowly abolish the harshest forms of punishment.128  
The cost of recruitment over the general population was staggering. 
Although Peter managed to provide enough men for his forces, this was 
achieved at a great price. The census of 1710 demonstrated that over 20 per cent 
of Russia’s households, that were extant in 1678, no longer existed while in 
particular provinces this percentage reached 40 per cent.129 Peter ordered this 
new data to be neglected, and further drafts were carried out according to the old 
lists. When censuses were conducted between 1719 and 1723, usually the 
aristocracy hid the exact number of serfs they owned and by doing that - greatly 
hindered the work of the Senate. In addition, the peasants used different means 




While the supply of men and the logistics were matters of organization, the 
provision of funds was an entirely different story. State revenues during the 
early modern period were bond tightly with war expenditures. Like his Western 
European counterparts, caught up in series of wars between 1700 and 1718, 
Peter had to find a solution to the increasing financial burden of his aggressive 
policy.130 In this sense, the Northern War, with its financial and administrative 
needs, served as the main catalyst for the governmental and fiscal reforms in 
Russia. Peter developed a new system of dividing his territories – the 
governorships (guberniya). These military-administrative units served to 
accelerate the mobilization of funds, supplies and recruits for the war effort. 
Furthermore, Peter established the Senate and its relative Colleges to ease the 
legislative burden on the old bureaucracy and to achieve a better and more 
efficient administration.131 The new system helped for the better utilization of 
state’s resources and the higher administration served as Peter’s substitute when 
the tsar was on a campaign. Apart from these liabilities, this new administrative 
apparatus had to elaborate and enact the particular laws and ordinances which 
implied Peter’s further reforms. Thus, apart from the ruler, the Senate and the 
                                                 
127 As mentioned above, after 1711 desertion levels lessened in general, but remained an issue until the end of 
the eighteenth century. 
128 A. Stoyanov, Velikata Severna voyna – Triumfat na Petar I, (Sofia: Millennium, 2015), 42. 
129 These 20 per cent can be split as follows: 4 per cent were taken in the army and fleet; 7 per cent escaped their 
lands; 6 per cent perished; 3 per cent were killed due to different reasons. Beskrovnyy, Russkaya armiya i flot, 
113. 
130 For war expenditure of Petrine Russia, see Table 4 in the Appendix for the current chapter. 




War College were also responsible for creating and applying the new taxation 
and recruitment methods. 
When it comes to war economy, Peter’s reign is distinctive in two aspects 
– the increase in both state revenue and war expenditures. Russia’s income 
under Peter increased almost three times while military spending grew six-
fold.132 Several fixed and extraordinary taxes were imposed to cover the 
expenses and to balance the budget. However, by 1723 it became apparent that 
even the new census of 1722 was not sufficient to regulate the Treasury’s 
problems.133 In 1724 the new soul tax (podushnaya podaty) was introduced, 
replacing the previous household tax.Whether this tax was additional burden on 
the Russian population or was a form of relief as it was imposed per person, not 
per household is still a matter of debate. Though the tax became a main string in 
the state budget, it also raised widespread resentment toward the empire. 
Furthermore, over eighteen provinces suffered from money shortages due to the 
new tax.134 
Although the extraction of more and more funds was supposed to balance 
the books, a deficiency in the amount of payment was present, especially in the 
last years of Peter’s reign, as well as during the rest of the 1720s.135 The great 
burden to the state was due not so much to costs related to combat, but to 
expenses related to maintenance. Since Peter wanted to establish a standing 
force, he did not disband his troops after the end of the campaign season, but 
garrisoned them in different regimental quarters around Russia.136 In comparison 
to military expenditure under Aleksey, the standing army of Peter, which was 
roughly the same size, cost almost five times more.137 Partly, these expenses 
were due to the state's obligation to provide uniforms and armament for the 
troops and partly because the regular soldiers were forbidden to plunder and did 
not have any rights to the spoils of war.138  
By imposing extraordinary taxes in difficult years and by using free serf 
labor, the state was able to keep up with the growing expenditures and by the 
end of Peter’s reign the situation seemed stable. However, as the reigns of his 
successors demonstrate, the burden of the Petrine army was too heavy for Russia 
                                                 
132 See Table 5 in the Appendix for the current chapter. 
133 S.G. Strumilin, “K voprosu ob ekonomike Petrovsko epohi”, in L.G. Beskrovnyy (ed.), Poltava: K 250-letiyu 
Poltavskogo srazheniya; sbornik statey (Moscow: Akademia nauk, 1959), 187. 
134 In 1724, the soul tax comprised over 51 per cent of the state income; see S.M. Troitskiy, “Istochniki 
dokhodov v byudzhete Rossii v seredine XVIII veke”, Istoriya SSSR, vol. 3 (1957), 176-98. 
135 Between 1724 and 1733 a shortage of over 3,200,000 rubles was present on the artillery and the navy. 
Beskrovnyy, Russkaya armiya i flot, 122. 
136 For a map of garrison arrangement of the regiments during the reign of Peter I, see J. LeDonne, The Grand 
Strategy, 45. 
137 G. Parker claims that it was cheaper to keep a standing army, rather than reassemble the regiments for each 
new season. However, Parker studies Western armies only, where the percentage of foreign mercenaries was 
quite bigger and reorganizing regiments each year was indeed more expensive, than it was in Russia, where the 
rank and file was comprised exclusively by natives. Therefore, it was cheaper for seventeenth century Russia to 
keep an irregular force. This was another reason why the “standing army” innovation was postponed in Russia 
until the eighteenth century; see Table 5 in the Appendix for the current chapter. 




and some of Peter’s military enterprises were dismissed or significantly 
reduced.139 
 
Russian tactics and strategy in the age of Peter I 
 
The development of tactics under Peter continued the pattern set by his 
predecessors.140 The development of strategy, however, was brought to a whole 
new level. Indeed, Peter was quite different from his father and grandfather. 
Both of them were able rulers but were not soldiers. Peter, on the other hand, 
sometimes seemed more of a soldier than a ruler. His constant participation in 
campaigns, staff meetings and his personal intervention in the army reform 
made a significant impact on the development of Russian strategy and tactics. 
The Northern War greatly influenced Russian tactics during the reign of 
Peter. In the course of this conflict, Russia faced one of the most formidable 
military powers in Europe – Sweden. While the quantity of Sweden’s army was 
far from the massive forces mustered by France, its quality was 
unquestionable.141 Years of combat experience, a well-organized system of 
recruitment and maintenance, and the constant alert against foreign incursions 
had transformed the Swedish force into a formidable adversary.142 Any illusions 
for easy victory against Sweden were dispersed after Narva and Peter 
understood that he had to create a strong force to break the enemy. As described 
above, recruitment provided a sufficient amount of soldiers and Peter was able 
to form field armies of around 40,000 for each campaign season.143 With 
numbers secured, it was time to concentrate on quality. After the battles in 
Estland and Livonia in the period 1703-1707, it became apparent that Russian 
arms were victorious only when the superiority of numbers was evident. 
Therefore, Peter advised his generals to meet the Swedes only if Russian forces 
were superior in numbers to the enemy. Furthermore, defensive field tactics 
were introduced, to break the aggressive gå på offensive, used by the Swedes. 
After the enemy attack had been faced, the counter-attack was led with bayonets 
and by the mobile dragoon cavalry. In that way, firstly, the Swedish infantry was 
flanked and then the enemy was chased off. To counter the Swedish cavalry 
Russian dragoons dismounted, formed lines and used volleys to disrupt the 
enemy’s attack. Similar tactic was applied while mounted. The firing took place 
when the enemy was 30 ft. away, after which, the sabers were drawn, and a 
hand-to-hand combat was fought.144 In large-scale tactics, the Russians preferred 
                                                 
139 Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar, 175-200; Duffy, Russia’s Military Way, 42-56. 
140 Hellie, “The Petrine Army”, 240. 
141 For a comparative growth of forces in Europe; see Table 3 in the Appendix for the current chapter. 
142 This system was established by Charles XI and was a continuation of earlier practices, issued by Gustav II 
Adolf and Oxenstierna. The new organization established a standing, regular army that was well-equipped and 
well-trained; Denmark and Russia were always looking for an opportunity to strike Sweden during the entire 
seventeenth century. 
143 Hellie, “The Petrine Army”, 247. 




to draw the enemy deep into their territory, harass his army and cut his lines, 
using their mobile dragoons and the Cossacks. Scourged-earth tactics were also 
applied, a famous example being the Poltava Campaign in 1708-1709. 
Peter's overall strategy was concentrated on mobility and offense, though 
on the battlefield he often preferred to wait for the enemy's attack and to carry 
out the combat in a defensive manner.145 After destroying or weakening the 
enemy, a counter-attack was carried out, which was aimed at eliminating the 
opponent. After Poltava, duе to the Ottoman intervention, Russia failed to apply 
this strategy against Sweden. Nevertheless, the Pruth Campaign (1711) itself 
was an example of Peter’s desire to achieve a decisive victory and eliminate the 
Turks as fast as possible. The defeat by the Turks did not change Peter’s 
attitude. He launched offensive against the Swedish domains in Finland and at 
the same time began to clean Poland-Lithuania from the pro-Swedish forces of 
Stanisław Leszczyński.146 Russian troops continued their advance, reaching as 
far as Tönning.147 After the allied territory was secured, Russia launched a final 
offense against Sweden’s mainland and in 1721 finally achieved a victory and 
signed the Treaty of Nystad (1721). The same aggressive offensive was later 
applied against Persia. As it will be analyzed in one of the following chapters, 
Peter planned to penetrate deep into Persian territory and to compel the Shah to 
secede the provinces that Peter desired.  
An essential element in the application of offensive strategy was Peter’s 
intensive use of amphibious warfare. Unlike his predecessors, Peter understood 
the importance of naval superiority and he did a lot to establish and promote 
Russian naval power within all seas accessible by Russia. The secession of Azov 
(1711) to the Turks and the disbandment of the Black Sea navy did not 
discourage him and he continued to position his fleets in the Baltic and Caspian 
Seas. By 1722, Russia possessed a powerful and experienced fleet, capable of 
supporting land forces with both supplies and military assistance.  
 
1.5. The Post-Petrine Era (1724-1739) 
 
Following the death of Peter the Great, Russia entered a period of dynastic 
crisis. The government was focused on the internal policy and foreign policy 
was limited at least until the reign of Anna Ivanovna (r. 1730-1740) who 
managed to consolidate her power at the beginning of the 1730s. The 
overextended size of the army, which placed a major constraint on the state 
finances, had to be reduced and in 1729 one third of the entire army was 
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disbanded.148 Furthermore, the upkeep of the Nizovoy corps on the southern 
Caspian coast increased the expenses to an unprecedented level.149 To cope with 
popular unrest, the government under Catherine I (r. 1725-1727) and Peter II (r. 
1727-1730) continually decreased the amount of the soul tax. They were, 
however, unable to limit the size of annual conscription, since the Nizovoy corps 
consumed more and more recruits each year.150 
With the accession of Anna Ivanovna in 1730, a change began not only in 
the internal affairs of the empire but also in the military. Anna’s reign witnessed 
a reversal in the ratio of Russian and foreign officers since the new empress 
attracted a substantial number of generals and high-ranking officers from the 
German states to secure her position against the influence of the powerful 
Russian families of Dolgorukov and Golitsyn. These new figures brought 
change to the overall structure of the army and their reforms (especially those, 
initiated by Marshal Minikh) sought to establish a “German” manner in the 
structure of the forces. 
The question regarding the post-Petrine army has been analyzed in both 
Western and Russian historiography. B. Davies, C. Duffy, W. Fuller and J. 
Keep, together with L. Beskrovnyy and N. Petrukhintsev define the main trends 
in Russia’s post-Petrine military development.151 While the reign of Peter I is a 
subject of several debates, historiography, as a whole, has reached a consensus 
on the evaluation of the time of his successors. The lack of funds, the rise of 
social pressure and the need for reforming, rearranging and limiting the army 
and its expenditure were the primary issues of St. Peterburg’s policymaking 
process during the tough years between 1725 and 1739. Apart from the internal 
matters, during this period, Russia took part in two major conflicts and 
continued to maintain a contingent in northern Persia and the Caucasus up until 
1735. The disbandment of the majority of Nizovoy regiments lightened the 





Following the death of Peter I a slow, but constant process of limiting the size of 
the army began. As it was mentioned above, in 1729 one third of the troops were 
                                                 
148 Beskrovnyy, Russkaya armiya i flot, 34. 
149 The Nizovoy corps is a term used to describe all Russian troops stationed south of the Terek River. They were 
used as garrison forces for the new territories, acquired by Peter I after 1722. The establishment of Russia’s 
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total recruits, taken in the same period; see Ibid., 209. 
151 N.N. Petrukhintsev, Tsarstvovanie Anny Ioannovny: formirovanie vnutripoliticheskogo kursa i sudyby armii i 




disbanded and by 1732, when the War of the Polish Succession broke out, 
Minikh had to enlist large numbers of serfs in order to reinforce the army’s 
strength. With the wars against Poland, the Tatars and the Ottoman Empire at 
hand, the levels of recruitment rose. The number of men taken into service was 
comparable only to the period around the Pruth Campaign (1711) when almost 
the same amount was taken into service. Only in 1733 a total of over 50,000 
recruits were enlisted152  
In the context of 1730s conflicts Russia’s military élite had a ground to 
experiment with new tactics, armament and even unit types. Minikh tried to 
reintroduce the cuirassiers as a leading cavalry force but met the resentment of 
aristocracy. Another obstacle for the implementation of his ideas was the lack of 
good mounts, which could carry the heavy cavalry into battle. From the planned 
ten regiments only three were created and their functions remained limited.153 
Dragoons remained the main type of cavalry, supporting the infantry, while 
grenadier and fusilier companies continued to comprise the backbone of the 
army.154 
The Tatar and the Ottoman threat in the northern Black Sea Steppe was 
countered by increasingthe size of the Ukraine land militia. It doubled its 
strenght in 1730 and increased twofold once more in 1733. Most of its regiments 
were mounted to cope with the Tatar light cavalry. To fund this new force, the 
military administration settled half of the regiments, granting additional land for 
their upkeep.155 
As a military engineer, Minikh concentrated on the development of 
engineer corps in the Russian army, as well as on the upgrading of the artillery 
with emphasis on siege and mobile field units. These changes led to the 
establishment of separate engineering corps and to the improvement of Russian 
artillery performance during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1736-1739. Along with 
the expansion of the engineers and artillery, a series of fortification 
improvements were made on the zasechnoy cherty, which protected Russia’s 
borders in the south and in the east. In addition, several fortresses were erected 
or upgraded on the western borderline. 
Finally, Minikh’s reforms dealt with the officer corps and the military 
administration. Admission into the officer corps was restricted only to literates 
and promotion of Russian officers was implemented in contrast to the early 
years of Anna’s reign. Higher military education was expanded and by 1737 
Minikh had personally developed a “professional portrait” for each of the 
leading officers in the army. These characteristics were to fascilitate Anna’s 
                                                 
152 See Table 2 in the Appendix for the current chapter. 
153 Davies, Empire and Military Revolution, 169; Duffy, Russia’s Military Way, 47. 
154 A major change in infantry disposition was the disbandment of grenadier regiments and their distribution as 
companies for the fusilier regiments, as was the case during Peter’s early years. Duffy, Russia’s Military Way, 
46. 
155 While under Peter there were 6 regiments of Ukrainian and militia, their number grew to 10 in 1730 and to 20 




decision when promoting different generals and colonels on particular field or 
administrative position. 
In terms of size and unit distribution, the army underwent several changes 
during the 1730s. While in 1730 there were a total of 226,000 soldiers (61,100 
guards; 60,988 infantry; 41,580 dragoons; 66,761 garrison infantry; 4,788 
garrison cavalry; 10,842 land militia; 10,198 artillery; 41,580 Nizovoy corps; 
319 generals) their number slightly increased and in 1732 there were a total of 
230,354 soldiers in service. It is interesting that in 1736, on the eve of the 
Russo-Ottoman War (1736-1739), the number of troops differed little in 
comparison to the “peacetime” army of 1729. The total strength of the army was 
240,405 soldiers in both field forces and garrisons. The field forces were 
generally decreased in comparison to 1732 due to the disbandment of part of the 
Nizovoy regiments in 1735. However, the Land Militia almost tripled in size : 
from 10,842 in 1729 to 27,693 in 1736.156 
Regarding conscription, a total of 308,000 men were enlisted between 
1731 and 1740. This number was roughly equal to the number of men, recruited 
during the Great Northern War.157 The difference is that the war against Sweden 
continued for 21 years while the conflicts during Anna’s reign went on for only 
8 years. A simple calculation defines that the average annual recruitment was of 
38,500 men which is 2.5 times more than the average yearly conscription during 
the Northern War (14,862 men per year). Therefore, though Russia was unable 
to expand its forces in the scale from the previous decade, the Tsardom was able 
to mobilize its human resources at a greater scale. Hence, the Military 
Chancellery’s recruiting efficiency under Minikh surpassed the levels from the 
previous decades  
 
Logistics and funding 
 
The main logistical issues during Peter’s reign continued to trouble the Empire 
during the 1730s. During this decade gunpowder production increased but was 
still on the edge of the minimum required.158 Funding was also problematic, 
especially for the Nizovoy corps and the irregular contingents of Cossacks and 
Asian tribesmen. On the other hand, the reforms of Minikh were able if not to 
decrease army expenses, at least to prevent further increase in the cost of 
maintenance. The soul tax was reduced and even the wartime rates of the takings 
were less than the initial amount of money acquired per person. As a whole, the 
army of 1736 cost almost as much as it did in 1729.159 
As mentioned above, the state was able to recruit a larger proportion of 
men than it did ten years before and this system was further improved due to the 
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better training, received by the recruits. An ordinance of 1730 forbade the usage 
of recruits for any purpose different than military training. This regulation was a 
significant step forward since one of the main reasons for desertion during the 
first decades of the eighteenth century was the unregulated use of soldiers for 
non-combat duties. In addition to the better treatment of troops, which after 
1711 was a constant matter of concern to the state, the ability to muster soldiers 
for the field demonstrated the overall improvement of Russia’s capability to 
mobilize its human potential for war purposes. 
 
1.6. Conclusion  
 
Withn regard to Russia’s military development before 1740, several trends could 
be pointed out. First and foremost, Peter’s reforms and the policy of his 
successors established a regular standing army, the size of which was 
impressive, compared to European standards. This army was still in a 
transitional condition - from a standing, yet semi-regular, force of the “old 
formation” to an entirely regular army of “new formation”. However, following 
the army regulations of 1720, the amount of “settled” units was insignificant 
compared to the overall number of state-funded troops. This trend can be clearly 
seen in the 1730s when only the Ukrainian militia was still more or less funded 
through land grants. While garrison troops received remuneration in land and 
goods, this was done only to overcome shortages in funds and was not an 
official state policy as it was during Aleksey’s reign. All in all, Russia was able 
financially to support on a regular basis the bulk of its forces and the size of its 
army surpassed most of that of its counterparts. 
In relation to size, the army of 1736 was the same proportions as the one 
mustered in 1681. The differences laid in the quality of the troops, the 
improvements made in armament, artillery support and overall uniformity of the 
unit types, as well as in the regular army upkeep, training and quartering. The 
army of Minikh was seven times more expensive than the one, which Golitsyn 
started to reform in 1681. At the same time, its performance was better in the 
same proportion. While the old army was defeated in Crimea and at Narva, the 
new one was able to outmatch Sweden, conquer northern Persia, suppress 
uprisings along the Sothern steppes and finally push back the Ottomans from 
their positions in the Northern Black Sea and the Dnieper basin. Though there 
were many setbacks and misfortunes, mostly due to logistical issues, in the end, 
Russia achieved its goals. 
The other side of the coin was that Russia’s establishment of a regular 
army came at a great price. Over 720,000 men were recruited over the period in 
question to fill in the vacancies due to combat casualties, diseases, shortages of 
food, clothes, clean water and medical care. It is hard to estimate the total 




they were at least 150,000.160 In addition, in comparison to 1678’s figures, the 
conflicts brought a significant decrease of 20 per cent of Russia’s households 
(calculated in 1710). On the other hand, to some extent these numbers can be 
misleading since it was a common practice for both landlords and serfs to hide 
the actual number of people in one household in order to evade conscription and 
taxes. Nevertheless, the toll of wars was high while population growth was 
rather low. The lack of money and the periodical outbursts of impoverishment 
were a scourge for common Russians, who were also affected by harvest failure 
and disease.  
Unlike Britain or the Dutch Republic, who had developed a banking 
system back in the late seventeenth century, such a system remained 
underdeveloped in Russia even after the Seven Years War (1756-1763). B. 
Davies evaluates that Russia was rather a military-fiscal and not a fiscal-military 
state, which used its natural resources to compensate the lack of liquid assets.161 
However, production output increased in comparison to the seventeenth century, 
though it was still barely sufficient to cover army’s minimal necessities. 
Transportation and logistics were also problematic due to the great distances, 
which had to be covered during campaigns. A magazine system was established 
during the reign of Peter, but it could only cover a certain area of operation and 
proved inadequate when the army marched outside Russian territory. On the 
other hand, the trends of combining state-organized logistics and the application 
of private enterprises in order to cope with the material needs of the army, 
indicates a significant number of similarities in comparison to contemporary 
western countries. While the Tsardom was far from completing what D. Parrott 
has labeled the “second stage of a fiscal-military state”, Peter certainly managed 
to transform Russia’s military establishment into a state-dominated army with 
structure and organization, similar to those of France, Britain and Austria.162 
Therefore, Davies’ general assumption that Russia was still struggling to 
organize the waging of war only as a sole response to overwhelming wartime 
circumstances in the manner of late sixteenth-century states, is rather inaccurate. 
Instead, in order to trace the trends of state’s evolution in early modern Russia, a 
more flexible approach for understanding the specifics of Petrine fiscal and 
military transition is needed.163 
The question of whether Russia’s drive toward army reform was 
indigenous or modeled after the trends, developed in Western Europe in the 
seventeenth century has dominated historiography for over fifteen decades. 
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While western historiography and Russian imperial historians share the notion 
that Peter was inspired by his grand tour in the west, Soviet-era historians tend 
to emphasize on the “native” element in Russia’s military evolution. As it was 
already noted, a certain trend of continuity is evident between what Aleksey 
tried to achieve with the introduction of the “new model” regiments and what 
Peter did by reforming the army, inherited by his father and older brother. 
Although Russia’s first emperor was undoubtedly influenced by what he saw in 
France, the Netherlands and Britain, suggesting that Russia would not have 
made the next step in its military evolution without western influence would be 
imprecise. As discussed in the section on Muscovite military development, 
Russia developed its own unique approach toward the introduction of the lattest 
European trends in military development. To put it in other words, western 
military innovations strongly influenced the development of the Petrine army, 
but they were transposed in a specific way in order to answer Russia’s needs. 
Thus, Russia’s army reforms during the first half of the eighteen century were 
rather a unique element of early modern military transformation. 
Until now, historiography has mainly dealt with numbers and idle figures 
on paper and has seldom diverted more attention on the actual performance of 
the Russian field armies during campaigns. Although general data points out that 
the military machine of the tsars needed further development and constantly had 
to be adjusted with funds, reforms and recruits, the campaigns themselves 
present a different story as it will be further analyzed in the main part of this 
dissertation. After calculating the potential of Russia and outlining its military 
evolution, the following chapter will deal with Peter’s main opponents in the 






FRIENDS, FOES AND FRENEMIES IN THE SOUTH 
 
If the period from the end of the seventeenth to mid eighteenth century was a 
chessboard, then opposite Peter’s desire to assert his authority and power over 
vast territory stood important political and military players who were determined 
to put an end to his “march”. 
 The following chapter will be divided into several subsections, each 
dealing with a particular element of the complex geopolitical puzzle that the 
Pontic region from the first decades of the eighteenth century resembled. Firstly, 
the focus will be on Russia’s chief adversary – the Ottoman Empire, a foe as 
determined and as ambitious as the tsarist state itself. Then the main features of 
the Crimean Khanate, as an element of the overall Ottoman military system, will 
be defined. However, the Khanate was a player in its own right and pursued its 
own interests which will also be presented in the current chapter. Next the 
dissertation will outline the development and the downfall of Safavid’s military 
and political power, followed by the establishment of a new force under the 
ambitious and talented Nadir Shah. The subchapter “At the Edge of Empires - 
the Pontic Frontier and its People” will examine the soldiers of the steppe – 
Cossacks, Kalmyks, and Nogais, who were an essential element of the social 
and military ethos of the Pontic frontier and played crucial role in the events, 
which will be analyzed in detail in the second part of the research. Finally, a 
brief overview of the minor Caucasian kingdoms and states would emphasize 
the diversity and complexity of this contested region, destined to attract the 
desires of three mighty empires. 
  
2.1. The Ottomans – an Empire on the Crossroads 
 
Generally, historiography approaches the development of the Ottoman Empire 
in the same way as that of Russia and perceives it as a passive recipient of 
European military innovations and a state, the decline of which was steady and 
irreversible. However, as recent studies in the field demonstrate, the Ottomans 
were neither passive recipient, nor stuck in their backwardness.1 On the 
contrary, there is evidence which prove that the Ottomans played an active role 
in the transformation of warfare in Europe. The following subchapter will 
briefly examine the Ottoman military development during the last decade of the 
seventeenth century and the first three decades of the eighteenth century and will 
aim at proving the active role, played by the Ottoman military establishment. 
The period between the War of the Holy League (1683-1699) and the conflicts 
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between Russia and the Ottomans during Catherine the Great’s reign is one of 
the least studied in the history of the sultans’ realm.2 A handful of works present 
the complexity of imperial transition during these turbulent decades. First and 
foremost, Virginia Aksan’s study on the eighteenth century Ottoman warfare is a 
sine qua non for any research on the topic.3 Further information can be found in 
the exhaustive works of Gabor Ágoston and the thorough study of Rhoads 
Murphey, whose research has done much in clarifying major issues regarding 
the military development of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
The Crescent rises 
 
When referring to the early Ottoman state and its war effort, the theory of C. 
Rogers for the “Infantry Revolution” can be applied.4 As Rogers notes, it was 
the revival of infantry firepower and resistance to cavalry that transformed the 
medieval warfare into the modern art of war. And if in Western Europe this 
process developed as a steady change throughout the thirteenth, fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, in Southeastern Europe this development took a different 
form.5 Briefly, the importance of infantry did not fade during the Early and High 
Middle Ages. Therefore, any state that struggled to impose its influence over the 
Balkans had to establish a powerful infantry. The Ottomans were quick in 
understanding this necessity and in elaborating a response to this new military 
challenge.6 Initially, the Ottomans were prodigies of a semi-nomad society, the 
warfare of which was based on light cavalry units that consisted of volunteers 
and allies of the bey.7 As soon as they came into contact with the Byzantine 
Empire, however, the beys Osman (r. 1300-1326) and Orhan (r. 1326-1362) 
found out that light cavalry could only raid enemy’s territory, but could not 
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4 C. Rogers, “The Military Revolution of the Hundred Years War”, in TMRD, 58-64. 
5 Unlike the West with its chivalry armies, the Balkans had developed a different military system, based on large 
infantry units, supported by light cavalry mercenaries (Cumans, Alans, Turks and Wallachians) and a heavy 
cavalry of service nobility (pronoiarios, bolyari). Due to the large number of fortified towns and the broken 
terrain, warfare, based on mounted power, was inappropriate. However, there is no concise study on Balkan 
warfare in any historical period, prior to the First Balkan War (1912-1913). There are several studies, dealing 
with national military history, but a comparative research which summarizes the different military systems is still 
absent. 
6 It took the West almost 200 years before the “Infantry Revolution” was fully developed. It took the Ottomans 
only 40-50 years to establish a standing, regular infantry, capable of conquering and holding enemy fortresses. If 
there was a revolution at all, it was the Ottoman transformation from a steppe-style, light cavalry army of 
irregulars into a standing, regular force of professionals. 
7 These units are generally known as gazi (raiders). They were considered wartime “companions” of the bey and 
had the right over 4/5 of the spoils (the other 1/5 pencik remained for the bey). The Ottomans were the first to 
elaborate a way of balancing the influence of the gazi and to rein them in, using different administrative and 
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maintain the conquest.8 As early as 1320, the Ottomans began to experiment 
with an infantry force of free volunteers, called yaya. In addition to yaya 
infantry, the beys transformed the cavalry units into a single light cavalry force, 
called müsselem.9 The new infantry proved successful and by 1330 all Byzantine 
fortresses in Asia Minor were conquered by the Ottomans. However, during the 
Byzantine Civil Wars (1341-1347 and 1373-1379), which enabled the Ottoman 
incursion on the Balkans, it became apparent that the irregular yaya infantry was 
insufficient for the conquest of the well-fortified cities and towns of 
Southeastern Europe.10 Therefore, the new Ottoman ruler – Murad I (r. 1362–
1389) decided to reform the infantry and to establish a standing force, capable of 
handling the new challenges. Following the advice of his grand vizier Çandarlı 
Halil Hayreddin Paşa, Murad exercised his right on one fifth of all military 
captives and slaves and used this manpower to create a military contingent, loyal 
only to him. The corps, which came into being, was called “the new army” – 
yeniçeri. As military demands grew, the manpower, provided by the pencik tax, 
was deemed insufficient. Therefore, a new tax – devşirme, was established.11 
The new system was used for recruitment of Christian boys between the age of 8 
and 16, who were converted to Islam and trained to serve the sultan as his 
“slaves” (kul).12 The gathered manpower was used to occupy positions in the 
central administration or to serve in the army as either infantry (yeniçeri) or 
cavalry (sipahi of the Porte). By 1389, the Ottomans already possessed the first 
standing, regular army in Europe, almost 200 years before the Europeans were 
able to establish their own. Apart from the regular forces, a standing army of 
                                                 
8 The process of Ottoman military transformation was similar to the process of Bulgarian transformation seven 
centuries earlier. The steppe horsemen had to develop a reliable infantry in order get a permanent hold over 
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states still held strong military control on their frontiers and were able to support their garrisons. Furthermore, 
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11 Local Christians referred to this tax as “blood tax”. In Pre-1989 historiography, the devşirme is described as 
one of the great atrocities, committed by the Ottomans. However, recent studies by Balkan scholars prove that in 
some cases the recruitment of yeniçeri was not against parents’ will. Furthermore, local population developed 
different measures in order to evade the conscription. Early marriage of boys was the most common method, 
since, according to the devşirme law, married boys could not be recruited. 
12 The term kul represents an honorable position in the Ottoman society. Therefore, the word “slave” in its 
negative context is not the most accurate translation of the term. The usual age for recruitment was between 8 
and 12, with older boys being an exception. Furthermore, married males were exempt from recruitment, which 




service horsemen was created. They were called timariots, and their existence 
was greatly influenced by the Byzantine pronoia system.13  
 The second stage of the Ottoman military evolution was carried out with 
the spread of gunpowder and artillery. European artillery appeared at the end of 
the thirteen century, evolved during the fourteenth century and by the 1430s was 
the new “super-weapon”, which greatly influenced the conduct of both siege and 
field combat.14 The Ottomans were fast to apply the new technology. The first 
records of artillery date back to the reign of Bayezid I Yıldırım (r. 1389-1402).15 
In parallel with the usage of the new weapon, the sultans understood the need to 
establish permanent artillery corps, and by the reign of Murad II (r. 1421–1444; 
1446-1451) regular artillery corps (topçı) was introduced as part of the kapukulu 
ocakları.16 Again the Ottomans were one step ahead of the Europeans in both 
mobility of field and siege artillery and the existence of a regular service. 17 
 The third phase of the Ottoman military evolution was the establishment of 
a military academy. Proponents of the Military Revolution and general Western 
historiography claim that it was Maurits van Oranje and his cousin Willem 
Lodewijk of Nassau who established the first military academy in Europe.18 
However, it turns out that the Ottomans were actually the first. The Enderun 
School was established as early as the mid-fifteenth century to educate the 
devşirme recruits (acemi oğlan) in different disciplines, prime among which 
were the military studies.19 The Ottomans created a military school that provided 
training and practice not only for the leading administrators and commanders of 
the standing army, but also for each soldier. This innovation took place some 
130 years before similar institutions came into existence in Western Europe.20 
 Therefore, by the beginning of the sixteenth century the Ottoman army was 
organized around a stable backbone of regular soldiers, paid and equipped by 
the sultan, trained in a military school and ready to fulfill the expansionist desire 
of their masters. No other army in Europe could match the quality of the 
Ottoman military machine. Thus, the extensive expansion that took place during 
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19 D. Nicolle, The Janissaries, Osprey ‘Elite’ 58, (London: Osprey, 1995), 12-4.  
20 Not to mention that the first military schools in Western Europe were accessible only for commanders and 




the reigns of Selim I Yavuz (r. 1512-1520) and Süleyman I Kanuni (r. 1520-
1566) were not a surprise. The Ottomans were able to defeat and assimilate most 
of their enemies and became a permanent threat in the regions of Central Europe 
and the Mediterranean.21 
 After the death of Süleyman, the Ottoman expansion did not cease. Cyprus 
was conquered in 1573, proving that the Battle of Lepanto (1571) was not as 
decisive as assumed. The Long War with Austria (1593-1606) demonstrated that 
the Habsburgs had managed to establish a better firepower, but the Ottomans 
were fast to follow and, in the end, the sultans’ forces were victorious. Internal 
strife, economic problems and the rise of Shah Abbas I of Persia (r. 1587-1629) 
pinned the Ottoman resources in Asia. Nevertheless, by 1640 the situation was 
under control and westward expansion continued. The Cretan War (1645-1669) 
revealed some of the Ottoman weaknesses. However, relying on better logistics 
and superiority in numbers, once more the Turks were victorious. Finally, the 
conflicts with Poland-Lithuania in the 1670s led to the conquest of Podolia. 
 
The Crescent sets 
 
By 1680 the Ottoman Empire had reached its territorial zenith, stretching from 
Hungary to Persia and from Ukraine to Sudan. The next step was to go beyond 
these borders and once more Austria was the main foe. The history of the War of 
the Holy League (1683-1699) is not a concern of the current dissertation. It 
suffices to note that a massive Christian coalition faced the Ottomans and their 
forces were scattered on three different fronts. The logistical, financial and 
military burden was beyond Ottoman’s resources and the war was disastrous for 
the Empire. Hungary was lost to Austria; Russia took Azov and Venice 
conquered Morea. Usually, the Ottoman defeat in this war is described as fatal 
and irreversible. However, things were not as hopeless as they seemed. The 
Russians were defeated in a subsequent war (1710-1711) and Venice had to 
return Morea in another conflict (1714–1718). The only setback seemed the loss 
of Belgrade and Timişoara regions after the defeat in the Austro-Ottoman War 
(1716-1718). In general, supporters of the “Rise of the West” concept claim that 
the second Austrian victory proved that the Ottoman Empire was no longer a 
threat to western superiority.22 However, in defense of the Ottomans, we must 
note that they faced one of the most experienced armies in Europe, commanded 
                                                 
21The Mamluk Sultanate was annexed in 1517, the Knights Hospitaller were expelled from Rhodes in 1522 and 
Hungary was conquered between 1526 and 1541. Only the Safavids managed to check the Ottoman advance, but 
not before the Porte succeed in conquering Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. One might argue that it was 
the Ottoman threat in the East that led to the fast evolution of the Habsburg armies (the Spanish in particular). 
The struggle between Charles V and Süleyman was certainly one of the reasons that enabled the creation of a 
high esteemed, experienced army in Spain, which later proved its potential in the Netherlands and against 
France. 
22 Black, J., “A Military Revolution? A 1660-1792 Perspective”, in C. J. Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution 




by one of the most talented military leaders of the age.23 As will be noted below, 
the Ottoman army was not as efficient as it was a hundred years earlier and 
unlike contemporary western forces, only half of their rank and file consisted of 
regular soldiers. 
 Apart from the military issues that became apparent in the course of the 
seventeenth century, internal problems also contributed to the decline of 
Ottoman power. Firstly, a great inflation struck the Ottoman economy. As 
Inalcık notes in his article on Ottoman transformations, from the great 
devaluation of the Ottoman currency in 1598 to the seventeenth century, state 
financiers were under great pressure, trying to hold the fiscal policy of the state 
intact. Often salaries had not been paid for months, prices increased and timar 
holders became impoverished.24 Moreover, political strife added to state 
problems a new set of issues. Succession crisis, supported by the growing 
interference of kapukulu ocakları in state affairs, led to a period of opened 
conflict between the yeniçeri-controlled capital and the Anatolian provincial 
governors, who opposed the centralization of the Empire and wanted to extend 
their influence over the sultan.  
 Local governors were supported by the new irregular, gunpowder-equipped 
infantry – the sekban. The sekban demanded to have the same rights and salaries 
as the yeniçeri and wanted to transform their service from irregular basis into a 
regular, standing force. However, the yeniçeri already were a substantial burden 
on state budget and an increase in the size of the regular forces would mean a 
financial crisis for the Empire.25 The state, therefore, began to fight the 
rebellious sekban and by 1658 Anatolia was finally pacified.26 The Ottoman 
Empire was stable, but it missed its chance to take the next step toward a 
regular, modern army. The consequences of this decision were felt severely 




                                                 
23 By 1716 Austria had won the War of the Grand Alliance (1688-1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession 
(1702-1715). Her armies were comprised of experienced veterans, with excellent firing skills and perfect drill. 
This army was commanded by some of the most experienced leaders of the age, among whom was Prince 
Eugene of Savoy, who was one of the finest military leaders in the entire early modern period. 
24 H. Inalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700”, Archivum Ottomanicum 
6 (Mouton, 1980), 311-3. 
25 Murphey, R., Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700 (University College London Press, 1999), 16-7. 
26 Inalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation”, 298. 
27 If the sekban had been transformed into a regular force, once more the Ottomans might have managed to be 
one step ahead of the West. However, the political influence of the kapukulu ocakları, the financial situation of 
the state and the inability to fully develop a general army reform, led to the maintenance of the old system. 
Furthermore, there was no powerful figure in the administration, able to apply the needed changes. Süleyman 
was long dead and the energetic Mahmud II was yet to come. In the meantime, most of the grand viziers and the 
chief “ministers” were devşirme recruits themselves, who would not go against their own. In order to conduct a 
reform, the state had to either elevate the sekban to the status of the kapukulu ocakları or to dismiss the later 
from all their privileges and to level the entire army. Because of political, cultural, economic and military 




The Köprülü inheritance  
 
Unfortunately, there are few studies on Ottoman military system in the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. Most of the works are concentrated on the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Russo-Ottoman Wars in the Age of 
Catherine the Great (r. 1762-1796) and the reforms of Selim III (r. 1789–1807) 
and Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839).28 Furthermore, the Tulip Era (Lale Devri) 
reforms are not researched thoroughly in neither Eastern, nor Western studies. 
Due to these constraints, the following chapter will rely on the data regardingthe 
end of the seventeenth century and will try to incorporate the few available 




All regular forces of the Ottoman Empire were part of the kapukulu ocakları. 
Their privileges, responsibilities and organization were developed during the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and changed little until the reformation of the 
army that took place after 1789. As noted above, the Ottomans were the first to 
create a regular, standing army in Europe and for almost two centuries their 
military power was superior to any other in Europe. However, as the new 
tactical and technological innovations accelerated the military evolution in the 
West, Ottoman power was surpassed and had to catch up with its enemies in 
Europe. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, all of Europe’s major 
powers possessed a regular, standing army, based on experienced veterans, who 
had served in several conflicts, which took place between 1673 and 1721. 
Therefore, the Ottomans were no longer unique, nor superior to European states. 
However, they were neither inferior. As the following two decades proved, the 
Empire was still a formidable power, capable of facing primary states and 
winning a war.29 Furthermore, the Ottomans possessed a superb logistical 
system that enabled them to support their war efforts for extended periods of 
time over vast distances.30 
 It is accepted in historiography that the Ottoman army was unable to follow 
the tactical evolution of western armies, and thus fell behind during the 
seventeenth century. Börekçi succeeds in proving that the yeniçeri were able to 
fight according to the latest firing tactics, developed by the Dutch. Furthermore, 
he presents several sources which suggest that the Ottomans had used volley fire 
                                                 
28 G. Börekçi, “A Contribution to the Military Revolution Debate: The Janissaries Use of Volley Fire during the 
Long Ottoman-Habsburg War of 1593-1606 and the Problem of Origins”, Acta Orientalia Academiae 
Scientiarum Hungaricae 59, 4 (2006), 408–9; Börekçi gives a summary of the works dealing with Ottoman 
warfare. 
29 Tthe conflicts with Russia and Austria in particular (1736-1739) ended with Ottoman victory and retrival of 
several important territories, among which the sancak of Belgrade. 
30 Murphey notes that similar logistical networks were developed by the rest of Europe as late as 1720, and in 




as early as 1597 and suggests that they had used this technique during the Battle 
of Mohács in 1526. Even if the possibility that the Ottomans managed to 
develop the volley fire on their own is rejected, the fact remains that they were 
able to produce the most sophisticated maneuver, known to western armies 
during the early modern period. Apart from the volley fire, the Ottomans were 
“blamed” for their inability to create a firearms cavalry, capable of supporting 
the infantry in battle. In general, the timariots failed to take part in the “arms 
race” with the Austrians and as early as 1602 the grand vizier began 
complaining about the inability of the timariot cavalry to handle the imperial 
infantry. Similar problems became apparent during the Celali revolts in Anatolia 
where local gun-equipped bands of rebels were able to defeat the timariot forces, 
mounted by the capital. However, when in 1724 the Ottomans invaded Persia, 
their troops were supplemented by gun-wielding sipahi.31 This change 
demonstrates that the confrontation with Persia and the rebellions had taught the 
Ottomans an important lesson and their cavalry was, at least partly, equipped 
with firearms in order to expand its ability to operate in the difficult terrain of 
West Asia.  
 Another element, which reveals the real potential of the Ottomans, was 
siege warfare. Ever since G. Parker based a significant part of his Military 
Revolution theory on trace italienne, military historians have labeled this 
fortress “impregnable”. However, during the seventeenth century, Ottoman 
regular infantry, sappers and mining teams in particular, were able to reduce the 
trace italienne fortifications in Hungary and to conquer these citadels in a matter 
of days.32 Symilarly to the performance of the French army in the west, the 
Ottoman experience could be used to counter Parker’s theory.33 Even though the 
Cretan War (1645-1669) demonstrated that the art of siege declined during the 
second half of the seventeenth century, the campaign in Persia revealed that the 
Ottomans still had a considerable potential for taking fortified positions.34 
According to Abraham of Yerevan, the Ottomans besieged Persian citadels from 
“all four sides”, dug trenches and earthworks and carefully moved their guns 
closer and closer to the enemy’s walls.35 When the guns were unable to 
penetrate the walls, tunnels and mines were used to make a breach. Once the 
walls were overcome, the yeniçeri and the irregular infantry invaded the city. 
The tactic was the same as the one applied by western armies. The Ottomans 
                                                 
31 This is a little-known chronicle by Abraham of Yerevan which gives several interesting descriptions of the 
Ottoman army, during its invasion in Persia. Among the reliable data, Abraham speaks of timariots equipped 
with firearms, who comprised a significant part of the Ottoman cavalry; see Abraham of Yerevan, History of the 
Wars, 1721 – 1738, trans. by G.A. Bournoutian (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1999). 
32 Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 105-33. 
33 Lynn, “The trace italienne and the growth of Armies: The French Case”, TMRD, 169-201. 
34 The desuetude of naval power was as essential for the overall lack of success, as was the organization of the 
besieging forces. Once firm command was established in 1667, the course of the siege turned in favor of the 
Ottomans. 




were able to conquer Persian fortresses in a matter of weeks, even though most 
of them were naturally protected by rivers, mountains and broken terrain. 
 Regarding the quality of armament, Ágoston skillfully proves that the 
Ottoman gun industry was quite up-to-date with the developments in Western 
Europe.36 Using experienced craftsmen and artisans from Europe, as well as 
their own capable gunsmiths, the Ottomans were able to adequately supply their 
forces with gunpowder and artillery pieces. Furthermore, handguns were cheap 
and were widely distributed throughout the entire empire.37 In general, the 
Ottoman army did not lack guns and firearms as was previously supposed.38 
 Finally, in order to respond to the growing firepower of the West, the 
Ottomans significantly increased the number of the kapukulu ocakları and 
especially the yeniçeri and the topçi. The army growth is an essential factor for 
the development of early modern armies and it was present in the Ottoman case, 
as well. By 1680, the number of yeniçeri had doubled since the time of the Long 
War (1593-1606), and the number of artillerymen and sappers had grown 
threefold.39 The above-mentioned Chronicle of Abraham of Yerevan is a useful 
source for the way the Ottomans supplied their effort with manpower. Although 
his figures apparently were exaggerated, there is no doubt that the Ottomans 
were able to muster and support a sizable force, equipped with firearms and 




Apart from the state-financed kapukulu ocakları, the Porte relied also on 
irregular volunteers and mercenaries, and auxiliary troops, provided by the 
different “privileged” social groups in the Empire. The two most important 
irregular forces were the timariot cavalry and the sekban infantry.  
 The timariots were a type of service class, who received land in exchange 
for military obligations. According to the annual income of their estates, each 
timariot had to equip not only himself, but also a certain number of armed 
retainers (cebelis). During the seventeenth century, the economic and military 
potential of the timariots declined significantly. Due to the problems between 
the central administration and the provinces, the timariot force began steadily to 
decline, which continued throughout the entire eighteenth century and resulted 
in their final abolition during the reign of Selim III (r. 1789-1807). Nevertheless, 
as mentioned above, the timariots did try to adjust to the new realities of war and 
                                                 
36 Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan, 61-96. 
37 Ibid., 15-60. 
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English imports is exaggerated; see Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan, 42-8; Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 85-93. 
39 For a complete table of the Ottoman army growth, see Table 1 in the Appendix for the current chapter. 
40 Abraham of Yerevan estimates that between 1724 – 1727 the Ottoman army in Persia consisted of more than 
300,000 soldiers; see Abraham of Yerevan, History of the Wars, 46; Even though this figure is exaggerated, it 
shows that the size of the Ottoman field army, sent to occupy Western Persia under the command of Topal 




they adopted, though reluctantly, the firearms. Scholars tend to exaggerate the 
lack of firearms as a reason for the timariot decline. During the Thirty Years’ 
War (1618-1648), firearms proved to be not very effective when used in 
mounted warfare and as a result - a preference for close quarter combat 
developed. It was the growing number of infantry equipped with guns that 
turned the tide of battles. During the wars against Austria, it became apparent 
that cavalry could not break the line formation on its own and needed a more 
substantial support from the infantry. Therefore, the Porte decided to extend the 
size of the firearms infantry.  
 During the Long War it became apparent that yeniçeri alone were 
insufficient to overcome the growing firepower of the Europeans, which led to 
the formation of a new infantry, armed with muskets. The units that came into 
being were called sekban. The sekban was comprised of impoverished peasants 
from Anatolia, Bosnia and Albania. The usage of firearms ceased to be a 
monopoly of the kapukulu ocakları and was also introduced amongst the 
Muslim reaya. However, after the war was over, the sekban demanded to 
become regular troops on the same principle as the yeniçeri. As it was 
mentioned above, this was impossible and a prolonged period of sekban 
brigandage, especially in Anatolia, begun to trouble the Ottoman Empire.41 The 
disbandment of these regiments continued to be problematic up until the 
nineteenth century. Part of these irregulars became the notorious kırcali. Others 
became part of the private armies of the ayan and fought against the regular 
forces of the sultan. The situation was finally brought under control in 1826 
when the yeniçeri were destroyed and the Ottoman Empire established an 
entirely regular army. Still, volunteer units – başıbozuk, were to be used as late 
as the First World War. Abraham of Yerevan mentions irregular peasant forces 
which were an essential part of the Ottoman army during the campaign against 
Persia.42 Auxiliary troops were provided by the local population, both Muslim 
and Christian. These troops were used to cover the logistical needs as well as to 
skirmish and to reconnoiter enemy forces. They were also used to maintain the 
order in the rear of the army. In exchange, these groups were exempted from 
certain taxes, among which - the devşirme. The privileged groups in the Balkans 
became the elite of the Christian peoples in the Ottoman Empire and during the 
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resistance. They armed their fellow townsmen and led them against the ravaging bands of irregulars that stormed 
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The Ottoman logistical system is extensively analyzed by Murphey in his book 
on Ottoman warfare. In the current dissertation only the main elements of 
military support, provided by the state, will beoutlined. As Murphey argues, the 
Ottomans possessed a unique system of supply which was able to maintain 
substantial armies as far as Vienna and Hamadan. This system (menzilhane) was 
based on a network of supply depots, which were prepared in advance to each 
campaign. This system followed the main army roads that traversed the Ottoman 
lands and led to the enemy’s heartland. Crucial points for communication were 
the cities along Via Diagonalis in Europe and along the route from Istanbul to 
Bagdad in Asia.44 As in the Russian case, river transportation was essential for 
supplying the army. Each river was used to transport food, guns and gunpowder 
from the central supply depots to the frontline. River fleets were established on 
the Danube, the Euphrates, and the Tigris Rivers. Smaller ships and boats were 
used on the Hungarian river system, as well as on the Drava and Sava Rivers. 
Apart from naval transport, a variety of land-based means of transportation were 
applied. The camel and the water buffalo were the most widespread animals, but 
ox-wagons were used as well. A common practice was to hire local merchants 
and peasants to assist with the transportation of goods and armament. These 
“recruits” were supervised by the individual logistics section of the kapukulu 
ocakları – the cebeci. Their increased numbers during the seventeenth century 
prove that the Ottomans were well aware of the importance of logistics.45 
 The primary element of army provisioning was the supply of gunpowder. 
As Ágoston argues, Ottoman lands had abundance of materials necessary for 
gunpowder production.46 Saltpeter was found in large quantities throughout the 
entire empire. Wood for charcoal was available in Anatolia and the Balkans. 
Only sulfur was harder to find, and the Ottomans imported it from Venice and 
Persia.47 Gunpowder was produced in mills, dispersed from Hungary to Egypt. 
The main facilities were in Istanbul, Gallipoli, Bor and Timișoara. Smaller mills 
existed in Buda, Belgrade, Thessaloniki, Cairo, Aleppo, and Bagdad.48 The 
provisioning of gunpowder often included the transfer of resources and stocked 
gunpowder from provinces, far away from the theater of war, toward the 
frontline. For this purpose, land transport was preferred instead of naval, due to 
the risk of exposing gunpowder to moisture. 
 Most of the guns and firearms were produced in the Ottoman Empire. 
However, foreign pieces were used as well, either purchased or captured in 
battle. The most common providers of guns were the Dutch and the English, but 
Italians and French also imported their products. Ottoman muskets had good 
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46 Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan, 96. 
47 G. Ágoston, “Gunpowder for the Sultan’s Army: New Sources on the Supply of Gunpowder to the Ottoman 
Army in the Hungarian campaigns of the 16th and 17th Centuries”, Turcica 25 (1993), 75-96. 





quality, sometimes even surpassing that of their neighbours. During the 
seventeenth century Spanish style muskets with matchlock mechanism were 
preffered, but during and after the Holy League War, flintlocks became the most 
common weapons used by the infantry and by some of the cavalry units.  
 Ammunition was harder to supply since the Ottomans lacked a standard 
caliber for their guns and firearms, especially regarding the irregular troops 
armament. However, gunsmiths were capable of producing new pieces during a 
siege which fit the caliber of copious munitions. The problem with munitions 
was not overcome up until the nineteenth century and it had impact on Ottoman 
military failures during the eighteenth century. 
 In addition, certain social groups were expected to provide horses for the 
army. Furthermore, each timariot was supposed to provide his and his 
companions’ horses from his own estate. Thus, unlike the Russians, the 
Ottomans were able to supply themselves with horses from domestic sources. 
Another group – the celepkeşan had to provide goats and sheep for the army as 
well as for the sultan’s household. These people possessed large herds of sheep 
and during the eighteenth century were able to accumulate a considerable 
wealth, especially during military campaigns. As Murphey notes, war was, in 
general, good for merchants and animal herders, since it brought them instant 
profit.49 
 
Continuity and change during the Tulip Era50 
 
Following the devastating defeat in the Holy League War, the Ottoman Empire 
went through several years of internal crisis, marked by the court’s struggle for 
power, which resulted in the deposition of Sultan Mustafa II (r. 1695-1703) by 
the rebellious yeniçeri. The spark of rebellion was set off at the very beginning 
of the eighteenth century when Mustafa II decided to relocate his power base in 
Edirne and to rely more on the timariot class. He planned to do so by shifting the 
existing land control mechanism from a service-held domain to a hereditary one 
and thus to establish the timariot as a new category of troops, whose loyalty 
would serve as leverage for the ruler's reform project. The yeniçeri felt 
threatened by the actions of their master and rose in rebellion. They succeeded 
in defeating the makeshift army of the Sultan near Edirne. Following the 
deposition of Mustafa, the yeniçeri continued their revolt for several more 
weeks, taking full control of the capital. By all means, the entire operation was 
an act, which demonstrated the ability of the kapukulu ocakları to maintain the 
status quo.51 As Acemoğlu and Robinson note, such rebellions were not due to 
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from the great admiration which Ahmed III felt for tulips, especially for those imported from the Netherlands. 




backwardness or conservatism, but were a struggle to preserve and maintain the 
existing order with its benefits and privileges.52  
 From 1703s events onwards, a steady process of consolidation under 
Ahmed III (r. 1703-1730) and a series of viziers began in the Ottoman Empire. 
The governors were intimidated by the 1703 revolt and their intention was not 
so much to reform, but rather to reestablish the “old order”, taking the reign of 
Süleyman I as a model of how things were supposed to work efficiently. There 
were no grand innovations regarding military development, but rather an effort 
to strengthen discipline in the army and to optimize the payment and the 
organization of logistics. By 1700 it was apparent that the fief based timar 
system was no longer adequate to cope with the new European standing armies 
(most notably the Habsburg forces) or with the growing power of the reforming 
Russian state under Peter. The increase of gun-wielding units, especially in the 
infantry, was introduced as early as the Long War and, as it was mentioned 
above, the government struggled to establish infantry auxiliary forces, which 
were to supplement the yeniçeri on the battlefield. The control of these troops 
became troublesome for the state, especially after the local power elites 
(governors, paşas, etc.) began to establish their own provincial forces – a 
process that would be repeated by the ayan during the eighteenth century.53 
 With the apparent decline of the central authority's ability to muster and 
use the provincial forces, the ability of local power brokers to use their potential 
in exchange for privileges became an ever-increasing trend in Ottoman state 
during the eighteenth century. As Aksan argues in her study on Ottoman 
warfare, the first decades of the century in question saw a dramatic increase of 
these provincial armies, funded directly by the state. Between 1683 and 1769 the 
number of local militia (levend), mustered by governors for the state's 
campaigns, rose from 10,000 to 100,000.54 This trend strikingly resembles the 
way the Habsburgs recruited their forces in the course of the Thirty Years War, 
when the state granted local power holders and mercenary captains the 
necessary patents and funds to equip and men armies for the campaigns in 
Bohemia and Germany. Of course, there were differences, but the similarities of 
state military problems, accompanied by strong decentralization trends are 
evident. 
Another aspect of the provincial military organization was the existence 
of local privileged categories of population. In return for tax exemptions, they 
were obliged to support the state with specific provisions or through fulfilling 
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53 Ayan were the new provincial elite, who grew stronger in the context of increased tax farming, used by the 
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acquiring lands from displaced timariots and also by meddling in state affairs as supporters of palace fractions. 
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certain tasks. The tasks included: the maintenance of roads and bridges; working 
on the fortifications of border garrisons; protecting mountain passes and 
struggling with bandits in the densely forest areas of Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria 
and Northern Greece.55 These privileged settlements would, later on, become the 
backbone of the Awakening of Balkan nationalities, providing rich and well-
educated figures, who would struggle to reshape and reestablish national culture 
and identity. With the growth of governors' and ayan’s power, these privileged 
categories would become a source of support for the central authority. The 
government would occasionally arm and finance these settlements, in exhange 
for their fight against the rebellious provincial power brokers, and, later on - the 
notorious kırcali.56 The combination of standing garrisons (yeniçeri), local 
militias (levend) and the categories of privileged local population (martolos, 
voynuk, derbendci, pandur) formed the three-layer system, which was the pillar 
of the imperial military power in the course of the eighteenth century. The 
interrelations between these main blocks of Ottoman military power were 
essential for the preservation of the Ottoman state, troubled not only by external 
enemies, such as Persia, Russia and Austria but also by the increasing number of 
internal problems in the face of the growing provincial power and the 
emancipation of local dynasties.57 
 The second crucial element of Ottoman warfare, both regarding the 
offense and the defense, was the maintenance of roads and fortification systems. 
As mentioned above, the Ottoman forces used six main roads to distribute their 
military power within the primary eyalets of the empire – Anatolia and the 
Balkans.58 These roads were related to the pattern of campaign organization and 
also to the mapping of troop movement outside the borders of the Ottoman state. 
Roads, as Murphey has proved in his study on early modern Ottoman warfare, 
were essential for the upkeep of the army and for the synchronization between 
the local economy and the necessities of the military establishment during 
campaign seasons. This trend continued throughout the eighteenth century. For 
the purpose of keeping military corridors opened, the government empowered 
privileged local settlements, which were mentioned above. An additional 
element to logistics and also to security was the frontier line of fortifications, 
which resembled the ancient chain of fortresses, used ever since the time of the 
Romans. Belgrade, Vidin, Rusçuk (Ruse), Silistre (Silistra), Ibrail (Braila), 
Tulcea, Ismail, Kilya, Hotyn, Bender, Akkirman, Kilburun, Ochakov, Yeni-Kale 
and Azov were the key points on this line, guarding the Danube and the Black 
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Most of them were renegades from the Russo-Turkish Wars (1768-1774 and 1787-1792). the kırcali existed as a 
domestic problem of the Ottoman state ever since the Long War and the introduction of armed local militias. 
Thus, the Balkan kırcali were nothing more than a continuation of the “practice”, which was already set in 
motion in Anatolia during the previous century. 
57 The first decade of the eighteenth century saw the “dropping out” of Tunisia, Algiers and Tripolitania. 




Sea coast from enemy depredations, coming from Austria, Poland-Lithuania and 
Russia.59 To this list it could be added Kaffa and Kerech in Crimea, which were 
used not only to distribute Ottoman influence over the Crimean Khanate, but 
also to protect the Azov and the Black Seas from Cossack pirates. These major 
fortifications were manned by elite yeniçeri, while local labor was mobilized for 
their maintenance. These garrisons were well-armed, supplied and numerous, 
often receiving reinforcements in the event of planned enemy campaigns and 
sieges. 
 The third element of any early modern military endeavor was funding. 
Due to the economic crises during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, 
the old system of self-supplying troops, centered on the timariot institution, 
declined. By the beginning of the eighteenth century the state had to pay to most 
of the soldiers under arms or to negotiate the upkeep of local militias with 
power-brokers from the provinces. The yeniçeri were, as usual, the best and 
most strictly paid troops. They received their wages on a three-month schedule, 
with garrison contingents receiving funds with priority.60 In addition to the cizye 
tax, paid by non-Muslims, yeniçeri garrisons received funds from a number of 
farms, ascribed to their fortresses (ocaklık). Due to the shortage of funds, 
gathered for the Treasury, the state delegated to concrete contractors 
(mübayaacı) the collection of taxes and supplies from local settlements. In time, 
mübayaacı began to collect money instead of supplies and often manipulated the 
amount of cash, goods, pack animals and wagons for their benefit. These 
contractors soon merged with the ayan and the local paşas, forming a distinct 
group of local elites, which were to dominate internal policiy until the reign of 
Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839). As Aksan notes, over time these special taxes, issued 
by these new contractors, became permanent and contributed to the alienation of 
the local population, which was a step toward the emancipation of local 
nationalities.61 
 The three elements described above, outline a pattern in which continuity 
rather than actual change is apparent. The transformation, however, did occur in 
the only military sphere, in which the sultans and their viziers could meddle 
without attracting the attention of the kul - the artillery. The Ottomans, as noted, 
were probably the first in Europe to develop a siege train and maintain a high 
level of expertise in its arsenals and field gun crews. By 1720 it became 
apparent that western evolution in artillery began to overshadow the Ottoman 
military traditions in this field. The Empire’s artillery lacked the edge it had 
during victorious battles such as Chaldiran (1514) and Mohács (1526). Fortune 
helped Mahmud I (r. 1730-1754) to find a western expert, who could modernize 
Ottoman artillery, using his experience, gained during the wars of Louis XIV. 
His name was Claude Alexandre, Comte de Bonneval, but he entered Ottoman 
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history under his Muslim name - Humbaracı Ahmed Paşa. Bonneval arrived in 
Istanbul following the downfall of Damat Ibrahim Paşa. Sultan Mahmud I was 
adamant to continue the old vizier’s reforms as much as he could dare, due to 
the yeniçeri uprising of Patrona Halil and the abdication of his uncle Ahmed 
IIIin 1730.62 
 Bonneval converted to Islam to silence the kul and Shari'a opposition 
toward his goals, which allowed him freedom in shaping the artillery as he 
willed. An engineering school (Hedeshane) was founded in 1734, followed by 
the establishment of a grenadier regiment, which included 32 French veterans, 
who served as NCO.63 Bonneval, who gained experience as a quartermaster of 
artillery in the Habsburg Netherlands, was able to standardize the guns and 
munitions, used by the Ottoman gunners. He was also responsible for the 
increase in the number of guns, allocated to border fortresses and garrisons, as 
well as for the better performance of Ottoman artillery during the wars with 
Persia, Russia, and Austria in 1730s. After his death the ulema suspended the 
school he founded, but a new one, named Bonneval was soon established by 
Mahmud I's successor Mustafa III (r. 1757-1774). 
During the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire experienced a 
turbulent period of military and political transition. This was closely related to 
the state's decentralization, fueled by the downfall of the Classical Ottoman 
order, as deemed under the reign of Süleyman I. This transformation affected all 
aspects of the social, political and military development of the state. Their 
understanding is essential for the accurate evaluation of Ottoman military 
potential, especially when perceived in the context of the growing Austrian and 
Russian military power. 
It is almost impossible to calculate the actual size of the Ottoman forces 
during the eighteenth century. As noted by Virginia Aksan, the Ottoman 
archives may never be recovered in their entirety.64 Scraps of information do 
exist here and there, and the current dissertation would provide a summary of 
this data.65 What is obvious is the ability of the Porte to muster and march large 
armies again and again in the course of the eighteenth century. The number 
80,000 is constant, being visible in the Pruth Campaign, the Persian Campaign, 
Topal Osman Paşa's campaign against Nadir Shah in 1732, as well as during the 
Russo-Turkish War (1736-1739). Although Marquis de Marsigli provides us 
with substantial volume of numbers for the Ottoman and vassal contingents, 
these figures are related not so much to the eighteenth-century realities, but 
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rather to the War of the Holy League. Therefore we should approach these 
numbers with great caution.66  
Further understanding of ayan evolution and the transformation of local 
privileged categories will undoubtedly clarify the trends in power transition, but 
also in the way the Empire's military potential functioned on regular basis. The 
comparative approach should also take into consideration the different way, in 
which Russian and Austrian armies evolved in the course of the Succession 
Wars, as well as the Great Northern War. The following sub-chapter will 
concentrate on the second major military and political factor, which influenced 
the development of the Pontic Steppe – the Crimean Khanate.   
 




The Crimean Khanate remains one of the least studied cases in European 
historiography. The interest on this subject rose only in the last two decades in 
the context of frontier studies and the new place of the Pontic Steppe and its 
inhabitants in the overall history of the continent. The current thesis will only 
outline the main features of the Crimean Khanate and its role for the expansion 
of Ottoman military power, and thus, only a few select sources will be taken into 
consideration. First and foremost, Brian Davies provides an exhaustive 
illustration of the Khanate's structure and military organization in his work on 
the warfare and societies in the Black Sea.67 Davies' account is further expanded 
in an article by Victor Ostapchuk who presents an interesting case study on 
Tatar campaigns in the mid-sixteenth century by building upon existing primary 
sources. Finally, Brian Willaims' recent study on the Crimean Tatars' role in the 
Ottoman military system sheds further light on the role, played by the Khanate 




The arrival of the Mongols in Eastern Europe in the mid-thirteenth century had a 
devastating impact on the existing political order and led to a rapid 
reformulation of societies in the mainly Slavonic regions of present-day Russia, 
Ukraine, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. With the turn of the fourteenth century, 
Chinggisid power, transfered through the Golden Horde, slowly reshaped, 
influenced by the adoption of Islam, as well as the incorporation of local 
administrative practices, merged with the original Mongolian heritage. By the 
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year 1400, the Horde's power stabilized and formed central authority with 
peripheral tributaries, most of which were the principalities of the former Kievan 
Rus. With the growth of Lithuanian power in the western rims of the Eurasian 
Steppe, the Golden Horde had to abandon some of its front positions in Ukraine 
and tried to distribute its influence over the Russian states, which were already 
looking for options to overthrow the Horde's suzerainty. 
It was in this context when some of the southern Tatar clans (Shirins, 
Barins, Argins, and Kipchaks), situated in Crimea, aligned themselves and 
established an independent realm, which existed outside the shadow of the 
Horde's authority.69 It is hard to pinpoint accurately the beginning of this 
process, but by 1440, it was well on its way. The emancipation of the Crimean 
Tatars was led by Haji Girei (r. 1441-1466), a powerful Tatar noble of 
Chinggisid descendant, who was able to unify the clans and to create a khanate 
for himself, capturing Crimea and parts of the adjacent steppe.70 Haji was quick 
to realize that in order for his realm to survive, powerful allies had to be found 
and soon fate smile upon the “adolescent” khanate. In 1453 Mehmed II the 
Conqueror, one of the most prominent warrior-rulers of his age, took 
Constantinople, ending a millennium of Byzantine existence. The sultan was fast 
to evaluate the situation in the Black Sea region and decided to continue the 
Ottoman expansion against the Genoese positions in Crimea and Anatolia. In 
1454 a large fleet of 56 vessels and many troops was sent against Kaffa.71 Haji 
Girei decided to support Mehmed's effort, hoping to gain the powerful Ottoman 
state as an ally. Although the siege was unsuccessful, it brought together the two 
countries, laying the foundations of a long, but turbulent alliance, which would 
last until the last decades of the eighteenth century. 
The real watershed in the relations between the Crimean Tatars and the 
Porte came ten years later when following the death of Haji Girei, the local elite 
began a prolong struggle for the throne, which resulted in an all-out civil war, 
lasting for a decade between 1466 and 1476. Soon the confrontation attracted 
the attention of foreign powers and led to their interference. Both the Genoese 
and the Ottomans sought to promote their candidates, often shifting their bet 
from one Tatar mirza to another. In the end, Mengli I Girei (r. 1466, 1469-1475, 
1478-1515) emerged victorious and with the assistance of Mehmed II asserted 
himself as the single ruler of the Khanate. The support of the Ottoman ruler, 
however, came at a price. Mehmed demanded that henceforth the Tatar nobles' 
choice of every ruler would be approved by the Porte. Such a development 
opened the doors for direct Ottoman influence not only on the ruler himself but 
also - on the leaders of the separate clans, who struggled for the patronage of the 
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sultan in exchange for their vote and support for Istanbul's policies in the 
Khanate. 
Further Ottoman influence on the Crimean realm was asserted through 
direct expansion. In 1475 a powerful fleet, bearing elite troops and heavy 
artillery, arrived in Crimea and quickly subdued local Genoese garrisons, ending 
the Italian presence in the Black Sea region. A chain of strategic fortresses was 
captured and refortified, giving Istanbul direct presence of power, which could 
be used to daunt local elites and project imperial policies on the northern 
frontier. Additional Ottoman garrisons were established in the Crimean 
Peninsula (Perekop, Kozlov, Arabat and Yenikale), as well as the delta of the 
Don River, where the old Genoese fort of Tana was reestablished as the key 
Ottoman strongpoint of Azov. 
However, the pressure, which the Ottomans administered on their Tatar 
allies, must not be overestimated. It was not an actual military threat, but rather 
the Porte reminded its friends in Crimea what would be the consequences in 
case of disobedience or infidelity. Most frequently the Turks used bribes, gifts 
and promises of lucrative raids to seduce the Tatar elite into obeying the will of 
the Empire. The Khans at Bakhchisarai were constantly blandished with 
expensive gifts and it became a custom for the sultan to send a set of valuable 
tokens before any campaign, in which the Crimean horde would raid for the 
benefit of the Ottomans.72 Additional subsidies were regularly paid to the 
prominent clan leaders, upon which fell the choice of the next ruler and who 
possessed sizable forces and influence.73  
 The relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Crimea has been 
compared to many different cases – either by the way Egypt and Tunisia were 
incorporated in the sultan’s realm or by the way the relations with Wallachia and 
Moldavia were regulated. Williams would even go as far as to seek a 
relationship scenario, similar to the Polish-Lithuanian case of the late fifteenth 
and early sixteenth century.74 In the words of B. Davies, apart from the military 
obligations to be a friend to the sultan's allies and enemy to the sultan's foes, the 
Khan remained sovereign over his own domains, minting his own coins, and 
collecting his own tribute from Poles, Muscovites, and other nomadic peoples of 
the Kipchak Steppe.75 In addition, Tatar loyalty was not as adamant, as one 
might assume. In periods of economic crisis, when raiding was needed or on 
occasions, when Tatar political and military interests diverged from those of the 
Ottomans, the Khanate would act on its own. The appeasement of local nobles 
and the general population for mounting raids were the main reasons why 
Crimean rulers acted against the desires of their sovereigns in Istanbul. Still, in 
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most of these cases, the Porte would reprimand the turbulent khans by exiling 
them and placing new, more reliable candidates on the throne of Bakhchisarai.  
 
A confederation of hordes 
 
The structure of the Crimean state has been, more or less, a puzzle for scholars, 
due to the shifting nature of nomad habitations, and the turbulent manner in 
which different clans and ulusy (domains) changed their pastures and areas of 
operation. The internal political ethos of the Crimean Khanate was never a 
stable one. During the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, a series of shifts 
within the Don-Volga-Ural Steppe occurred, which led to the transition of some 
clans from the eastern to the western frontiers of the Pontic Steppe. The Nogais, 
who inhabited present-day western Kazakhstan, slowly moved westward, 
pushed by the advancing Kalmyks. The first wave of newcomers, known as the 
Lesser Nogais, entered the Pontic Steppe in the sixteenth century and soon came 
into the orbit of Crimea and submitted to the rule of the Chinggisids in 
Bakhchisarai.   
Due to the constant pressure from the Cossacks along the Volga and the 
Don rivers, as well as in pursuit of more lucrative frontiers for raiding, part of 
the Lesser Nogais resettled westward, establishing their presence in the Budjak 
and the Edisan.76 This motion created lesser hordes, subjected to the Crimean 
Khan, stretching from the Danube Delta to the Volga River. In the 1630s, the 
picture once again reshaped. The Kalmyks, driven away by the Qing expansion 
and the rise of the Kazakhs, invaded the Lower Volga, driving beforehand a new 
wave of Nogais – the Greater Horde. The new Nogai diaspora settled along the 
Kuban and the Don rivers while more and more Nogais from the former 
domains of the Lesser Horde moved west to join the Budjak and Edisan Tatars. 
With the advent of the eighteenth century, the lands, dominated by the 
Crimean khans, became less and less spacious. With the growth of Muscovite 
power under Aleksey I Romanov, and the establishment of the Cossack 
Hetmanate as a separate entity during the Khmel’nyts’kyi revolt (1648–1657), 
the lesser hordes were pushed back toward the coastal areas. The establishment 
and expansion of defensive lines, drawn by the Muscovites to limit nomadic 
raids into their territories, began to repay the vast efforts, invested by the 
Russian state. In addition, the rise of the Kalmyks, as a separate, more or less 
autonomous power, proved to be a significant challenge to the Crimean 
authority. Although for most of the seventeenth century the khans were able to 
sustain diplomatic relations with the Kalmyk tayishis, with the strengthening of 
Russo-Kalmyk relations under Peter I and Ayuka Khan (r. 1672-1723), the 
                                                 




power balance in the steppe once again shifted.77 Moreover, the Khanate was 
placed on defense positions due to the growing expansion of Russia in the south. 
 
Foe to your enemies – the Crimean gear-wheel in the Ottoman war mechanism 
 
In their three hundred years of service, the Crimean Tatars contributed more to 
the Ottoman military system than did any other of the sultan's non-Turkish 
subjects.78 The value of Crimea's military potential for the success of Ottoman 
expansion in Europe is beyond doubt. For over two hundred years Tatar forces 
were an essential element of the successful Ottoman strategy for defeating 
eastern and central European adversaries. While the main Ottoman forces served 
as a shock force, labeled for shattering enemy armies in pitched battles, the 
Tatars were the backbone of the auxiliary forces. They were used to harass and 
devastate the countryside, cut lines of support and communication, and destroy 
any smaller enemy contingents, which strayed away from the main body of 
troops, such as foraging parties and late reinforcements.  
The central issue when studying Crimean warfare is to determine the 
actual size of the forces in service of the khans, which were available for 
campaigning. Contemporary accounts usually tend to overestimate Tatar forces 
with figures reaching 200,000 or even 400,000.79 In reality, numbers were far 
lesser. The actual size of mobilized Tatar forces was closely related to the 
figure, which was going to lead the endeavor. Thus, the Khans would marshal 
the most impressive armies, reaching up to 80,000 men for a single campaign 
(usually the number revolved around 50,000), while lesser leaders such as the 
kalga-sultan-s or the nuraddin-s would command smaller contingents of up to 
10-20,000.80 Another factor, which predetermined the size of the army 
assembled, was the actual aim of the campaign. Raids for booty and depredation 
would demand lesser numbers than actual military campaigns in support of 
sultan's forces.81 
 Once the aim was set, a call to arms (nida) was issued, urging the warriors 
of the lesser hordes and the main Crimean ulusy to mobilize according to the 
khan's demands. The calls, aimed at the mobilization of the Khanate's full 
potential, were usually mandatory for all males between fifteen and seventy.82 
As Davies notes, with the weakening of the khan's influence during the 
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seventeenth century, raiding initiatives and calls for mobilization became the 
instruments of beys and mizras, who strived to assert their interests and 
policies.83 Mobilization was usually carried out in remarkably short periods - 
between ten days and a month, but usually within two weeks.84 All soldiers were 
required to bring with them food and supplies, three horses and their armament. 
Each set of five men received a cart for the transportation of their equipment and 
provisions.85 The equipment of the soldiers was diverse, depending on their 
social status and personal wealth. Common warriors wore simple clothes, made 
of wool and sheepskin and used padded leather jackets as a sort of protection in 
combat. Wealthier Tatars had chain mails and conical helmets. The weapon 
diversity did not significantly change during the existence of the Crimean state. 
Sabers, short spears, horse-hair lassos and the composite bow were the main 
elements in Tatar's armament. Muskets, although known and in used in the 
Khanate, were reserved only for the khan's infantry contingents (consisted of 
yeniçeri and local mobilized Crimeans) and were perceived as rather clumsy for 
being used from horseback. Artillery pieces were only brought during major 
campaigns when pitch battles were expected. These were organized into artillery 
trains (top arabacısı), and smaller pieces were placed on armored wagons in the 
familiar Hussite fashion, adopted by most Central and Eastern European 
armies.86  
 Once mobilization began, troops were expected to gather at certain 
strategic locations, depending on the direction, in which the perceived campaign 
would venture. The most usual spot for a gathering of the whole army was e 
Perekop, from where raiders could march either westward against Poland-
Lithuania, Moldavia, and Wallachia, north – against Russia and the Cossacks, or 
to the east – facing the Kalmyks, Circassians, and Persians. The Ottoman 
fortresses at Kinburn, Ochakov, Yenikale and the stronghold of Azov presented 
other favorable locations from where raids could be launched eastward. Invasion 
routes were projected in such a fashion as to circumvent the main Muscovite 
defensive lines in Ukraine. Campaigns were launched eastward, reaching the 
Don or the Volga rivers and then swung northward, aiming at Tula, Ryazan, and 
Kazan or directly against the Russian capital. For campaigns in the west, the 
Tatars either aimed at Kiev or crossed the river Bug, when raiding north they 
either aimed against Bar or marched south toward the Pruth to enter Moldavia.87 
 Climate and seasons determined the organization of raids and campaigns. 
By far the most profitable season was the time of harvest since the border troops 
of the land militia were preoccupied with harvesting their crops. The abundance 
of forage and food also enabled the Tatars to keep offensive raids for longer 
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periods of time.88 Winter was the other period during which the Tatars struke 
their foes, taking advantage of the fact that the steppe was frozen, along with the 
rivers, which facilitated the crossing of the vast expanses. Also, the winter 
season corresponded with the abundance of festivities, celebrated by Catholic 
and Orthodox Christians, giving plenty of chances for surprise attacks. 
Apart from these seasonal raids and campaigns, Tatar forces (comprised 
of an ever-increasing proportion of Nogais, especially during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries) engaged in prolonged military campaigns, supporting 
Ottoman war efforts. It could hardly be pinpointed even a single European 
campaign, carried out by the Porte after 1476, in which Tatar contingents were 
not present. The khan's warriors marched in Vienna along with Süleyman in 
1529 and again in 1683. They assisted the Turks during the Long War, and also 
in their struggle against Persia, marching to the east as far as the Caucasus. With 
the intensification of Polish-Ottoman conflicts during the seventeenth century, 
the Crimean forces were aimed at the Commonwealth’s lands more often than 
ever. The War of the Holy League was the climax of Tatar support and the 
campaigns engaged the entire potential of the Khanate. The advent of the 
eighteenth century did not bring any significant change. As it would be analyzed 
later in the dissertation, the forces under Devlet II Girei (r. 1699-1702; 1709-
1713) were of vital importance for the victory over Peter at Pruth, and later on, 
during the War of 1735-1739, the Crimeans bore the primary burden of the 
conflict, absorbing substantial part of Russian military activities. 
The Crimean Khanate played essential role in the establishment and 
upkeep of Ottoman military presence on the Northern Black Sea. It did, 
however, play an even greater role as autonomous power broker, able to shift the 
scales of any conflict in the Pontic Steppe. The political and military prestige 
and influence of the Khanate remained formidable throughout the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries and it was only in the late 1730s that the Tatars’ ability to 
muster and organize their forces for raids and campaigns were significantly 
diminished by the growing power of imperial Russia and their Cossack and 
Kalmyk allies.  
As it would be analyzed in the following chapters, the Tatars were an 
essential element of the Ottoman military mechanism, particularly regarding the 
security and protection of the empire's northern borderline. The well-organized 
and seasoned warriors of the steppe were pivotal for any successful campaign in 
Ukraine, Podolia, Budjak, Edisan or the Kuban Steppe. In a century, in which 
the Ottoman Empire, as already noted, experienced problems with mobilizing its 
military potential, the Tatars provided a considerable proportion of the Porte's 
armies and maintained the war efforts beyond the limits of Istanbul's power 
projection.  
                                                 




Having reviewed the main features of the Ottoman military system and its 
key gear-wheel – the Crimean hosts, the following sub-chapter will examine the 
other essential protagonists in the tale of Russia's southern expansion. No doubt, 
the first and most notable of them is the Safavids’ Empire.  
 
2.3. An Empire Reforged – Safavid Persia and the Rise of Nadir Shah 
 
The eighteenth century Ottoman warfare is scarcely studied, but there are even 
fewer works dedicated to the Safavid art of war. In general, there are two main 
articles by L. Lockhart and M. Haneda, which deal with the military 
establishment of the Safavids.89 These earlier works are partially supplemented 
by the articles of M. Axworthy and R. Matthee.90 Some piece of information 
could also be found in the work of W. Floor.91 A recent study by K. Farrokh 
presents considerable amount of details on the matter and examines with greater 
precision the wars with the Ottomans and Russia.92 Finally, the article on the 
Safavid army in Encyclopedia Iranica gives an overview of the problem, but it 
does not provide many details.93 The theme about the general decline of Persia 
during the first decades of the eighteenth century is studied in the works of 
Matthee and Foran.94 Similarly to the previous part, this sub-chapter aims at 
presenting a balanced approach toward Safavid military power, rather than 
giving full description of the different unit types of the Persian army. Safavid 
“backwardness” has strengthened its position in historiography even more than 
the Ottoman case. According to most of the above-quoted works, the Safavids 
did not possess any artillery and gunpowder weapons were used on rare 
occasions and served merely as palace decorations. However, the narrative of 
Abraham of Yerevan tells us a different story. By using his work as a starting 
point, the dissertation aims at presenting a rather different image of the Safavid 




When in the beginning of the sixteenth century Shah Ismail I (r. 1501-1524) 
created his state, he mustered his armed forces around the core of an irregular 
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force – the qizilbash. The qizilbash (red hats) were a military force, comprised 
of Turkoman tribal horsemen. Each of the tribes had its leader, and they served 
as the wings of the Safavid forces. In addition, the army of Ismail was 
supplemented by Çagatay and Kurdish irregular forces, most of them, fighting 
on horseback.95 All sources and historical works agree that prior to the Battle of 
Chaldiran (1514) the Safavids did not use guns or firearms. The disaster, caused 
by the Ottoman firepower, however, was a lesson that Ismail was fast to learn. 
By 1516 appeared the first artillery pieces and soldiers equipped with firearms. 
Although their number was not significant, they became the backbone of the 
Safavid infantry force and during the following century rulers used them in 
order to invigorate their reform policy. Apart from the Turkoman qizilbash and 
the gunpowder infantry (tufangchiyan), the shahs relied on their royal guards 
(qurchis). Although their numbers were not formidable during the early Safavid 
period, they were well-trained and equipped and were the only regular troops in 
service of the shahs.96 During the reign of Tahmasp I (r.1524-1576), the size of 
the tufangchiyan and the artillery corps increased, supplemented by the 
establishment of a new type of army – the ghulam (slaves). These troops were 
recruited among the Christian population of Caucasus (Georgians, Armenians, 
and Circassians) and were used to balance the influence of the qizilbash forces. 
The transformation from irregular tribal force into a standing army was 
successfully completed by Abbas I (r. 1587-1629). He reduced the strength of 
the qizilbash in half and regulated the structure of the ghulam and tufangchi-
aqasi (the former tufangchiyan) forces. He also reformed the artillery corps and 
transformed it into a formidable force. 97 
 After the death of Abbas, the Safavid military power experienced a period 
of decline. It was during Abbas II (r. 1642-1666) when stabilization was 
achieved. However, during his reign the artillery corps was practically 
abolished. While older historiographical researches have related this abolition to 
backwardness and disregard toward the value of artillery, Matthee argues that it 
was economic issues, and the general peace on Persia’s borders that attributed to 
the decline of the gunpowder forces.98 Furthermore, after in 1639 a peace treaty 
was signed with the Ottomans and a stalemate was achieved at Qandahar with 
the Mughals, the only major enemy left was the tribal force of the Uzbeks, who 
did not possess artillery or guns. In addition, Persia’s geography was an obstacle 
for the development of an adequate artillery force. There were no navigable 
rivers and the land routes were through mountains and narrow passes, which 
made even basic soldier movement an arduous task. Unlike the Ottoman 
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Empire, Persia lacked the basic resources for the production of gunpowder. 
While there were sulfur deposits, saltpeter and charcoal were hard to find and 
had to be imported. Weapon foundries were also few, the biggest being in Lar. 
The narrative of Abraham of Yerevan, however, tells us a different story. 
During the Ottoman invasion in 1724, several cities were able to equip a 
considerable amount of “musketeers”.99 Furthermore, Abraham states that 
Persian citadels were well supplied with cannons, which were used to fend off 
Ottoman raids. He also deliberately compares the Safavid forces with those of 
the Afghans, who did not have guns and had to capture enemy strongholds by 
negotiating with the defenders. Another interesting fact is that the Safavids 
already possessed zamburak camel gunners, even before Nadir Shah (r. 1736-
1747) reformed Persia’s military system in the 1730s.100 One last piece of 
evidence that the Safavids recognized the importance of gunpowder weapons 
could be derived from the siege of Baghdad (1638). In his concise description of 
the siege Murphey estimates that after in 1623 Abbas I captured the city, the 
fortifications were upgraded and were designed to allow the deployment of 
20,000 troops, armed with muskets.101 Thus, it could be stated that firearms were 
introduced in Safavid Persia at a larger scale than has been previously assumed.  
However, by 1722 the Safavid military power was in regression. Lack of 
governmental initiative and the decline of tribal forces, combined with the lack 
of able field commanders led to the general disintegration of the army.102 
Resistance against the Turks and the Afghans was carried out by local garrisons, 
supported by the population. It was not until Nadir Shah entered into the service 
of Tahmasp II (r. 1722-1732) that a reinvigoration of the armed forces was 
carried out.103 Therefore, when Russia invaded the Caspian shores, it did not 
meet a united empire, but a checkered set of semi-autonomous local governors, 
switching their allegiance to whoever was most powerful in the given moment.  
When analyzing the facts, two distinct notions can be derived. Firstly, 
Persia did possess regular troops, but they served as palace guards, and their 
number was insignificant, compared to the size of the yeniçeri. Secondly, the 
Safavids recognized the importance of gunpowder as early as 1516, only 14 
years after the emergence of their state. From that year on, guns played an 
important role in Safavid warfare, reaching their peak under Abbas I. In general, 
the Safavid army was less regularized than the Ottoman and the arsenal, 
possessed by the Persians, was far less impressive than that of the Ottomans. 
Nevertheless, the theory of Safavid backwardness should be reapproached. 
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There is sufficient evidence that guns played far greater role in Safavid art of 
war than was previously assumed. However, after the disaster at Gulnabad 
(1722) and the capture of Isfahan (1722), the Safavid army rapidly vanished as 
force. Only local garrisons and urban militias were still resisting the invading 
armies of Ottomans, Afghans and Russians. Persia would have to wait half a 
decade before Nadir Shah would begin his process of modernization. Though 
this process did not give the Persians a decisive edge over the Turks, it did bring 
both empires on the same level and left the commanders' abilities determine the 




Unlike the Ottoman Empire, Safavid Persia was not blessed with long-standing 
military routes. The harsh terrain, the severe temperature variations and the lack 
of water in many parts of Persia, made it a country that was hard to control and 
govern. As Matthee notes in his article, Persia was divided into a number of 
regions due to the predominantly mountainous terrain of the Iranian Plateau.104 
The capital of Isfahan was separated by mountainous ridges and deserts from the 
ports of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. Roads crossed the broken terrain 
and were often impassable during winter season. Furthermore, the nature of the 
terrain prevented the development of cart transportation, which greatly limited 
the supply of the armies. Then it is no surprise that the Safavid preferred 
mounted troops, which could carry their supplies and did not need a baggage 
train.105 As noted before, the Safavid Empire lacked the resources to produce 
sufficient quantities of gunpowder, which also limited the use of firearms. Also, 
deposits of metals were scarce and were often located in border regions, which 
meant that they were hard to develop and maintain. Persian forces lacked the 
necessary logistics to build a substantial infantry force. The terrain, which 
prevented the movement of larger artillery pieces, also determined Persians’ 
preference for avoiding pitched battles and sieges and relying on ambushes and 
raids. On the other hand, each invading army met the same limitations even on a 
greater scale. The Chronicle of Abraham of Yerevan is abundant with examples 
of how Ottoman and Afghan troops were unable to proceed with their 
campaigns for days and often had to change their route, due to landslides and 
narrow passes. 
Food and water supply was also problematic. The main grain production 
was concentrated in the plains around Isfahan and the Caspian Sea. Also large 
herds of sheep and goats were bred in the mountains. However, combining these 
two sources of food was not an easy task, due to the problems of transportation. 
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Furthermore, there were no major rivers or lakes, which could serve as a water 
supply. The transportation of water was also hard, primary due to the high-
temperature varieties in the desert and to the half-desert environment of the 
Iranian Plateau.  
 
Interlude - the downfall of the Safavid Empire  
 
Before analyzing Persia's military development and potential under Nadir Shah, 
the process of political, economic and military collapse of the late Safavid state 
will be examined. It is essential to understand this age of regression in order to 
fully grasp the context of Nadir Shah's rise as well as the historical context, 
which enabled Russia and the Ottoman Empire to interfere in Persian affairs for 
over a decade. 
Historians, who study the issues of the Safavid period in Iranian history, 
are still unsure when exactly the decline of the Safavid Empire began. Some 
point out that it started after the death of Abbas I the Great in 1629, others claim 
that the downfall of the Safavid begin after the reign of Abbas II (r. 1642-
1666).106 It could be even speculated that it was not until 1694 that the process 
of decline became irreversible. What all historians agree on is that there are 
three main reasons, which brought down the Safavid dynasty – political, 
economic and military. 
The first and most often quoted reason is the general incompetence of the 
last two Safavid shahs – Sulaiman (r. 1666–1694) and Sultan Husain (r. 1694–
1722) as political leaders of Persia. Both of them are regarded as drunkards and 
womanizers, who had little interest in state affairs and who have been entirely 
subjugated to their advisors and more importantly – to the struggling fractions 
within the harem.107 All available contemporary sources support this thesis.108 
Both father and son are known for spending most of their time in the harem, 
drinking with courtiers or hunting. There are two famous cases, describing the 
dullness of Sulaiman. According to Muhammad Muhsin, Sulaiman is said to 
have spent seven years in the harem, without leaving it.109 On a second occasion, 
when Sulaiman was told about the possible advance of Ottoman armies toward 
Tehran, the Shah said that he did not mind, as long as they left him the capital 
Isfahan.110  
                                                 
106 For an overview of the historiographical debate on the Safavid crisis; see Foran, “The Long Fall of the 
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It would be far too convenient, however, to blame the incompetence of the 
last two Safavid shahs for the downfall of Persia. Before accusing them of not 
being devoted enough to state affairs, a closer look at their personal life should 
be taken. Both Sulaiman and Husain were raised in the tradition, developed by 
Abbas I, that the heir apparent should be locked in the harem and not allowed to 
hold any offices until he inherits the throne.111 The first twenty or so years of the 
two rulers’ reign passed in an endless joy and carelessness, surrounded by 
women and eunuchs, who would flatter the monarch, without providing any 
critical judgment or guidance. Therefore, the two princes were completely 
unprepared for the hard task of ruling one of the most powerful states in Asia. 
The lockdown in the harem became a modus vivendi for the last two Safavids. In 
this matter, they were not too distinct from the Ottoman sultans since Süleyman 
the Magnificent, who also spent their time in the harem or hunting and had little 
to do with governing. However, the difference lays in the quality of the ruling 
apparatus. If Late Safavid Persia had a few good ministers in the period 1640–
1730, the Ottomans were fortunate enough to be governed by some of the ablest 
grand viziers.112 The illustrious Köprülü family and the Tulip Age viziers proved 
capable enough to maintain the Ottoman power and even expand the empire 
further or reconquer most of the lands, lost after the devastating peace of 
Karlowitz (1699). The Köprülü-s, however, were fortunate to have the full 
support of the sultans. In Persia, some viziers were selected for their qualities 
but were left without political backup by the ruler.113 The appointment of 
ministers was shah’s duty, but due to their harem-centered existence, the last 
Safavids were dependent on their favorites, who were the real distributors of 
patronage in the court.114 New viziers had to act in the context of constant 
political struggle between the fractions of the Safavid court.115 The swift change 
of favors brought high level of instability and insecurity inside the court, which 
crippled the decision-making process and the state control.116 It must be noted 
that some effort was made to stabilize and strengthen the state and due to wise 
measures the Safavid dynasty was able to survive until 1722. However, these 
steps toward stability were continually hampered by struggle for political power 
and the antagonism of rival fractions at the heart of the Empire.  
Apart from the swiftly changing ministers, two other general fractions 
strongly influenced the ruler – the harem and the ulama. The late Safavid harem 
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was a huge institution. It comprised of more than 5,000 women and thousands of 
servants. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, during a pilgrimage to 
Meshed, the harem and its servants numbered 60,000 people altogether.117 Inside 
the harem, there were numerous fractions, each trying to place its candidates in 
the administration of the state. These fractions allied themselves with different 
ministers and advisors and controlled them to achieve their goals. An example 
for the power of the harem is the fact that since the 1670s Persia was governed 
not by a council of ministers, but by Privy Council of the shah, comprised of the 
most influential eunuchs in the harem.  
The third main fraction, struggling against the others, was the ulama. The 
Shi’i clergy had a crucial role in Safavid Persia because the state was organized 
on the principles of theocracy. The Shah was regarded as the incarnation of the 
Hidden Imam, and thus, he was perceived as the leader of all Shi’i Muslims. 
Nevertheless, using the weakness of the last two shahs and the instability within 
the court, the ulama managed to place itself above the authority of the shah, 
taking away his “divine” functions. The authority of the ruler was greatly 
undermined. Another problem, created by the conservative Shi’i imams, was the 
persecutions which they issued against Armenians, Jews and the Sunni 
Muslims.118 These led to a series of revolts and also strengthened the position of 
the Ottoman and Russian empires, which proclaimed themselves defenders of 
Sunnis and Christians within the Persian Empire. Following the persecutions, 
most of the tribes and small states in the Caucasus, which were previously under 
Persian supremacy, transferred their allegiance to Persia’s western and northern 
neighbors. 
All these struggles for the right to distribute patronage had one main 
effect – they greatly vitiated the ability of the central authority to govern the 
realm. The swift change of ministers, governors and local magistrates led to 
instability of the political and administrative foundations of the Safavid 
Empire.119 Threatened by constant shifts of the ruling elite, local governors 
aimed at securing their power by achieving autonomy. By the end of the 
seventeenth century uprisings and disobediences was constant feature. 
Regardless of the many adverse factors, the Empire managed to subject all 
insurrections and revolts for an extended period of time. It was only after the 
two other factors for the Safavid’s decline emerged that the Empire crumbled. 
Although the general incapacity of the last Safavid shahs contributed to the 
downfall of their empire, it would be an exaggeration to blame them solely for 
the crisis that struck Persia at the beginning of the eighteenth century. 
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The second main reason for the downfall of Safavid Persia was the state’s 
economic crisis and its main consequence – the weakening of the army. This 
issue concerns several historical studies. In his article on the downfall of the 
Safavid dynasty Foran develops the idea that the inability of Persia to go beyond 
its mediatory position in the trade between Europe and Asia, combined with the 
high inflation, characteristic for all countries during the seventeenth century, had 
a devastating effect on Persia’s economy. His thesis is supported by R. Ferrier, 
who studies the impact of European trade on Safavid economy.120 Ferrier 
concludes that the outflow of money from Persia to India combined with the 
devaluation of the Persian monetary system and the decline of silk exports to 
Europe after 1680 led to general crisis in Persia’s economy. A third source of 
information on the decline of Persia’s economy is V. Lyststov.121 Using 
contemporary Russian sources, he concludes that Persia’s income from silk fell 
threefold between 1710 and 1722. However, Lystsov relates this decline to the 
destabilization of the Persian state and the inability of the Empire to gather its 
taxes and fees due to lack of control over the provinces. These points are all 
confirmed and extended in R. Matthee’s study on the decline and fall of the 
Safavid Empire. According to his latest research, it was a combination of poor 
monetary policy; political fragmentation within court; reduction in the flow of 
funds and goods due to hoarding and short-sighted religious policy that spelled 
the doom of the Safavid state.122 
In general, Persia suffered from being solely a mediator in the trade 
between Europe and Asia. Exports of raw silk and cloth could not make up for 
the large sums that the Empire was paying for luxury goods brought by Dutch, 
English and later French merchants.123 Furthermore, the seaborne trade between 
India and Europe turned out to be faster and safer than the overland trade route 
through Persia and the Ottoman Empire. The political distortion of the Persian 
provinces strengthened this trend even further. The income of Persia dropped 
steadily until it reached its lowest level during the reign of Husain. To make 
things worse, Shah Husain was firmly devoted to architecture and began 
constructing palaces, parks, and mosques. The money for these expensive 
building projects had to be found elsewhere since the treasury was empty. In the 
late years of Sulaiman and during the entire reign of Husain, tax farming and 
sale of offices became standard practice. As it is well known, both methods of 
funding lead to a high level of corruption and are also responsible for the low 
quality of the administrative apparatus.124 
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Finally, the inability to provide finances for the army led to the 
disintegration of Persia’s military power. The armies were often disbanded due 
to lack of money or because governors and generals mustered a force, which 
was armed and supported inadequately. The constant shift of positions in the 
high command of the army destroyed any opportunity for a consistent strategy to 
handle the worsening situation on all frontiers of the empire.125 The inability to 
muster armies led to the humiliating necessity of begging local rulers to gather 
their forces for the protection of the empire. The most famous example is King 
Giorgi XI of Kartli, who managed to organize a 30,000 Georgian army and to 
suppress the revolts in Baluchistan and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the shah had 
to beg him personally and give away titles to receive the help of the Georgian 
king.126 
Apart from the above-examined three primary factors for the decline of 
the Safavid Empire, a fourth one could be added – the worsening geopolitical 
situation in Persia. All of Persia’s neighbors were eager to exploit the weakness 
of the Safavid state and their political development allowed to be carried out an 
aggressive policy against Persia.127 The first to strike a blow against the 
weakening Persian state were its former client states – Baluchistan and Oman. 
The Baluchi tribes ravaged Persia’s southern provinces on several occasions and 
the Oman pirates conquered some of the most important naval bases in the 
Persian Gulf and disrupted significantly the naval trade between Persia and the 
European merchant companies.128 The next wave of anti-Persian raids came 
from the dependent tribes of Caucasus and Afghanistan. Urged by the Shi’i's 
religious persecutions, the Sunni tribes overthrew the Safavid suzerainty and 
began raiding Persia - pillaging the cities and disrupting the trade. The final 
strike came from Persia’s most dangerous enemies – the Ottoman Empire and 
Russia. Both states were looking to exploit the weakness of Persia and to 
conquer as much as possible in order to achieve their economic and strategic 
goals. 
The combination of these four major factors made it impossible for the 
Safavid Empire to resist. The political, military and economic problems were 
interrelated, and an influential figure was needed to handle the grievous 
situation. However, after the weak and undetermined rule of Sulaiman, Persia 
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was headed by another weak and indecisive shah, who did not possess the traits, 
necessary for imposing a strong will over the collapsing administration. If after 
the disastrous rule of Shah Safi (r. 1629–1642), the stability of Persia was saved 
by Abbas II, the reign of Husain, with its many mistakes and problems, sealed 
the faith of the Safavid dynasty. Husain did not possess the necessary will or 
skills to reform his realm, and the disintegration of the Safavid Empire became 
inevitable. 
 
The army of Nadir Shah 
 
Following the collapse of Safavid rule, Persia was shattered into several semi-
autonomous regions, which resisted foreign invaders on their own. Under the 
banner of the last Safavid – Tahmasp II from the Afsharid dynasty – Nadir Shah, 
began to reestablish central authority and to reshape the scattered pieces of the 
former military ethos. Nadir Shah was a reformer in the same sense as Peter I – 
a ruler in desperate need of reforging his army, which had been soundly defeated 
by its enemies. It was evident that the Ottomans were the most eminent threat 
for Persian security. They possessed the largest army to invade Persia and were 
well accustomed to fight on Iranian terrain, or at least better accustomed than the 
Russians. The Afghans, occupying a substantial part of the former Safavid 
realm, were not as dangerous as the Ottomans, but were still a force to be 
reckoned with. On the other hand, their numbers were limited, and they had 
proven their inability to fight sieges or to conduct prolonged campaigns outside 
the frequent raids. Russians, on the contrary, were a mystery. Safavid Persia had 
never fought a war against the Northern Empire, nor had it met a European-style 
army on a grander scale. Nadir Shah made a significant and profound choice – 
to let the Russians occupy their Caspian forts and concentrated his efforts 
against the other invaders. Like Peter, he did not hesitate to copy good practices 
from his enemies. Ottoman military ranks and unit structure was presented on 
smaller scale in order to update and upgrade the older Safavid structure. 
Musketeers were introduced en masse, using Ottoman-style handguns, while 
cavalry practice was borrowed from the Afghans, who received Persian ranks.129 
What Nadir Shah did was not so much to reinvent the Persian army but to 
reinforce the old one by implementing new useful ideas, taken from his enemies. 
He was more of an elaborator rather than an inventor of military practice. His 
genius laid in his ability to pick his entourage, inspire his troops and, most of all, 
in his sheer tactical and strategic talent, which elevated him as one of the most 
successful Asian warlords of all time.  
The final result of Nadir’s reforms was the establishment of a standing 
army consisting of 200,000 troops and supporting personnel which was divided 
into two main bodies – cavalry and infantry. The cavalry consisted of the royal 
                                                 




cavalry, as well as additional troops from different regions of Persia – Khorasan, 
Azerbaijan, Baluchistan, Afghanistan and even from the khanates of Central 
Asia. The infantry was comprised of three main bodies –heavy musketeers 
(jazayerchi), light musketeers and troops armed with spears, halberds, bows and 
swords. They entered combat in this particular order, giving primacy to the 
gunmen and using the traditional infantry as a final resolution or as a reserve, 
which was to be deployed at crucial moments on the battlefield.  
Apart from these two main bodies Nadir Shah promoted an artillery corps, 
comprised of a combination of standard heavy artillery and camel-mounted light 
artillery pieces, called zamburak. As mentioned above, the zamburak existed 
during the Safavid era, but it was Nadir Shah who brought them forward and 
deployed them with success during his campaigns against the Ottomans and the 
Mughals.  
In terms of logistics and supply, Nadir Shah created several gun foundries 
and arsenals around the empire (the main were in Isfahan, Merv and 
Kermanshah). The state also funded the purchase of horses for the army and 
provided each horseman with a state-bought mount.130  
The cost of war was to be covered by ever-increasing taxation, which 
landed a critical blow on the already crumbling Persian economy. Although 
during his lifetime Nadir Shah succeeded in building and keeping a formidable 
army, which was better than its enemies on every front, his death brought a 
general collapse not only for his army but for Persia itself. The amount of funds, 
necessary for the maintenance of a 200,000 strong force were beyond the scope 
of the Persian Empire, which lacked the economic, administrative and resource 
bases, on which to build and maintain a standing regular army in the manner of 
Europe and Russia.  
Unlike the Ottoman army, which was controlled by a stable, centralized 
state, between 1722 and 1726 the Safavid forces were left without central 
command. Local garrisons and urban militia lacked the supplying system, 
provided by the state. Local governors were looking after their own interests and 
often concluded agreements with the invaders. On the other hand, where 
resistance was organized, the local population was able to equip a considerable 
amount of firearms and used them actively against the enemies. The crisid in 
which Persia was must not be exagerrated, since only three years after the 
capture of Isfahan by the Afghans and the Northwestern provinces by the 
Ottomans and the Russians, Shah Tahmasp II, with the assistance of Nadir Shah, 
was able to rebuild the Persian army. Its strength grew almost 18 times between 
1725 and 1733.131 This dramatic increase was followed by an impressive quality 
growth as well, with guns and artillery introduced on an unprecedented scale. 
For some time Nadir Shah was able to maintain a standing army with high esprit 
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de corps and armed as good as any of its opponents. Combined with the tactical 
and strategic genius of its master, the army of Nadir became an instrument for 
victories and conquest. The lack of civil, economic and administrative reforms, 
however, spelled doom for the grand army. Following Nadir Shah's death, the 
pressure on the treasury became unbearable and only in a couple of years the 
strong and victorious army was only a distant memory, shadowed by the reality 
of Afghan resurrection and Ottoman revival in Iraq.  
As it was noted above, the idea that the Persian lacked firearms and 
regarded them as useless should be reconsidered in order for the real image of 
the Safavid military machine to be illustrated. Similarly to the Ottoman and 
Russian cases, scholars should bear in mind the geopolitical issues of a given 
country, when analyzing its potential. In the case of Safavid Persia, Matthee and 
Farrokh have certainly made a good effort, which will hopefully be followed by 
scholars of Iranian history. 
Having reviewed the imperial powers, who opposed Russia’s bid for 
mastery in the Pontic region, the following sub-chapter will focus on the other 
important element, crucial for understanding this turbulent and complicated 
region – the frontiersmen. 
 
 
2.4. On the Edge of Empires - the Pontic Frontier and its People 
 
Apart from the three regional powers – Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Safavid 
Persia, the Crimean Khanate, as noted, was the only more or less settled society 
of the steppe. Apart from Crimea existed several quasi-political entities, which 
shaped the social and political background of the Pontic frontier. These societies 
– the Cossacks, the Kalmyks and the Nogais, shared large number of similarities 
regarding the relations they sustained with imperial authority. Their 
resemblances make it necessary to review them as a whole, with the notion of 
pointing out significant similarities and differences in order to establish the 
primary pattern of the frontier-Empire relations, which were essential for the 




Since the end of the Cold War, Western historiography has produced a concise 
and well-written amount of secondary literature, which opens the debate on the 
development of frontier societies in the Pontic region. On the other hand, it also 
shares a new, intriguing perspective what the ethos of these people was, and 
how did their relations with the powers in the region (especially Russia) shaped 
their fortunes. One of the most detailed works is that of Michael Khodarkovsky, 
whose approach and comparative description of the variety of peoples inhabiting 




the topic of frontier warfare and societies.132 Another invaluable source of 
information, regarding Cossacks, in particular, is the work of Christoph 
Witzenrath. In his study of Cossack society and the way it was affected by 
Moscow’s policy, Witzenrath unravels an elaborated structure, in which 
economic gains and interests are used as the welding of society.133 Cossacks 
remain the essential focus of most scholars of the topic, since the primary 
sources, available for their history, is abundant in comparison to the materials, 
available for the Nogais and Kalmyks. Boeck's study on the Don frontier in the 
Age of Peter I tells the story of imperial effort to tame and handle the semi-
autonomous frontiersmen and tap their potential for the benefit of Russia's 
expansion.134 The study of Thomas Barrett on the Terek Cossacks provides a 
case study, focused on the relations between one of the frontline Cossack hosts 
and the local population in the North Caucasus region in the context of Russia's 
imperial expansion during the eighteenth and the first half of nineteenth 
century.135 Regarding the Kalmyks, a brief introduction to their history and their 
settlements along the Volga River can be found in U. Erdniev's research on 
Kalmyk ethnography and history.136 
 
A Socio-political puzzle 
 
Following the Time of Troubles, the newly established Romanov dynasty began 
to assert its power and influence along the Volga River, trying to strengthen its 
grip on the steppe between the rivers Don and Yaik (Ural River).137 These 
territories were initially inhabited by some Cossack hosts, who, in general, 
acknowledged the tsar as their sovereign, as well as the powerful Great Nogai 
Horde, which controlled the lands between Yaik and the Lower Don. Tensions 
among local forces, as well as constant raids into Russia, were a scourge for the 
tsarist authorities who had no actual means to assert their sovereignty over the 
turbulent frontiersmen. Before the successful war with Poland-Lithuania (1654-
1667), after which Moscow was able to strengthen its hold over the Cossacks, 
the tsars could hardly count on any military leverage outside the walls of their 
Volga garrisons, the chief of which was Astrakhan. 
The Nogais, most of whom were Muslims, were likely to join forces with 
the Crimeans and Bashkirs, and even with the Khans of Bukhara and Khiva, 
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rather than serve the interests of the Muscovite state.138 It was precisely such an 
alliance that Russia came to fear the most and the voevodas of Astrakhan 
struggled hard to bring disunity among the Nogais, playing the different mizra-s 
and their fractions against one another. This strategy achieved an unexpected 
result in the 1620s, when, following the death of Khan Ishterek, his successors 
engaged into a kind of civil war to determine the new ruling elite. In the end, 
there was no single winner, and the weakened fractions were left to lick their 
wounds while the Don and Terek Cossacks were encouraged to attack the 
weakened Nogais. This situation, favorable for the Muscovites, was soon to 
change with the arrival of a new Asian Horde – the Kalmyks. 
A factor, which contributed to the Kalmyk migration, was the rise of the 
Kazakhs, whose raids began to torment Kalmyk settlements in what is now 
Central Kazakhstan. Driven forward by their enemies in an early seventeenth-
century repetition of the Völkerwanderung, the Kalmyks firstly settled on the 
eastern banks of the Yaik River, and later crossed it, entering the Eastern Volga 
Steppe. From there, they launched a series of raids against Russia, the weakened 
Nogais and went westward as far as the Perekop in Crimea, forcing all local 
parties to unite in order to cope with the new threat. A combination of hastily 
forged coalitions was able to overpower the Kalmyk hosts and drive them across 
the Yaik by the mid-1630s. This success was, however, short-lived. The 
inability of Muscovy to project its power properly into the Volga basin and to 
protect the Nogais from Kalmyk depredations urged the later to join forces with 
the Crimeans and the Dagestani. Nogais ulusy were moved westward, most of 
them concentrating on the Kuban River, where a significant part of the once 
great Horde was to live until the Age of Catherine the Great. Others sought 
refuge in Crimea and some even joined the Budjak Horde in what is now south-
western Ukraine. In any case, the scattered Nogais had no choice but to turn to 
the Muscovites and raid their territories, as well as the lands, controlled by the 
Cossack hordes. 
To cover its southern flank and secure the hold on the Volga Steppe, the 
tsars sought a new strategy. They allowed the Kalmyks to settle on both sides of 
the Volga River and concluded a series of contracts with them, stipulating that 
the Kalmyks were to cease raiding Russian lands in exchange for carte blanche 
to strike at the Tatars and Nogais. The Kalmyks were also to cooperate and 
support Russian military campaigns in the Pontic region and also to restrain 
from keeping diplomatic connections with other states, most importantly 
Crimea, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia. As Khodarkovsky notes in his work, 
this was easier said than done. Kalmyk raids were to continue in the 40s, 50s 
and even 60s of the seventeenth century. The pressure on Russian frontier lands 
was only loosened a bit after the Kalmyks received a guarantee that none of 
them would be forcefully converted to Orthodox Christianity and after they were 
                                                 




allowed free trade in Muscovite cities and towns in the Volga valley (the so-
called Lower Cities) as well and Moscow itself.  
The unreliable Kalmyk aid was not enough to guarantee imperial interests 
in the Pontic Steppe, and the tsars opted to have additional leverage to spread 
their influence over the region. After a series of military and diplomatic 
advancents against Poland-Lithuania achieved by Tsar Aleksey, the 
incorporation of the Cossacks became an essential part for the establishment of 
the Russian government. The acquisition of Left-bank Ukraine, as well as Kiev, 
was used to incorporate the Hetmanate as an integral part of Muscovy. Although 
the Cossacks would keep their autonomy as late as the Great Northern War, 
constant steps were undertaken to secure their allegiance and obedience. The 
restrictions of raiding on Crimean and Ottoman territory, as well as on the 
Zaporozhian Sech, combined with the ever increasing need for Russian 
subsidies, made the Cossack bands more and more dependent on Muscovite 
financial aid. The lack of local manufacturing, especially arms production, as 
well as the low level of farming, made the hosts compound to follow imperial 
dictate in exchange for guns, grain and grants. Nevertheless, in the course of the 
seventeenth century, the Cossacks demonstrated their resolve to follow the 
economic interests which lay at the heart of their Personenverbands, rather than 
the machinations of their Muscovite puppeteer wannabes.139 The clearest 
example of this trend was the conquest of Azov, which was carried out by the 
Cossacks in 1637 when their river flotilla stormed the unprepared Ottoman 
garrison and captured the town. Muscovy, unwilling to risk a war with the Porte 
(after their humiliating defeat in the Smolensk War) withdrew its support and 
left the frontiersmen to their destiny. In 1642 the Turks regained Azov, 
following the peace they concluded with the Safavid Empire, but Cossack raids 
in the Black Sea continued throughout the seventeenth century, with some 
remarkable episodes, such as the siege of St. John Monastery near Sozopol 
(1629), in present-day Bulgaria. During this event, a force of 150 Cossacks, after 
sacking the Black Sea coast, sought refuge on the island of St. John, barricading 
themselves in the monastery. Here they became surrounded by a large Ottoman 
fleet, bearing 4,500-5,000 yeniçeri on board, which laid an eight-day siege to the 
monastery. The advent of an auxiliary flotilla (some 4,000 men on 80 vessels) 
was able to breach the Ottoman encirclement and the Cossack chayka-s 
sailedvictorious and overburdened with booty. Following the incident, Ottoman 
authorities razed St. John Monastery since Cossack pirates repeatedly used it as 
a base of operations.140 
With Cossacks and Kalmyks proving unreliable of enforcing imperial 
policy, Muscovy decided to act on the notion that if you want a job to be done 
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well you should be involved personally. Following the lengthy peace after the 
war with Poland-Lithuania (1632-1634), Aleksey Romanov decided to invest 
substantial amounts of manpower and funds in the establishment of defensive 
lines (zasechnoy cherty) along the Volga frontier, slowly, but steadily moving 
the southern border of the Russia realm toward the Caspian Sea. To man these 
new defenses, the tsar nurtured a steady flow of serfs, fleeing away from their 
masters’ lands. Instead of returning them to their rightful owners, the central 
authorities granted the serfs small tracts of land in exchange for military service, 
thus establishing a frontier militia, which was already mentioned in the previous 
chapter. Although neither aggressive nor quick, the policy of creating a firm 
military frontier, similar to that forged by the Habsburgs in Hungary, proved to 
be the lasting solution that brought Russian dominance over a region, in which 
ethnicity, military and political interest and religion were mashed up into a 
boiling caldron of trouble. 
During the final decades of the seventeenth century, the situation in the 
Pontic Steppe began to shift once again. The rising power of the Kazakh Horde, 
as well as the continuing pressure of the Qing expansion, troubled the Kalmyks 
who began to probe for options to expand their trade and diplomatic liaisons 
with Crimea, Dagestan, and Bukhara. These diplomatic activities strengthened 
the resolve of the central government, now headed by Peter I, to assert direct 
military control even further in the south. Besides, Ayuka, the new Khan of the 
Kalmyks, certainly seemed disenchanted with Muscovite imperial designs and 
gave signs of following a separate political path. All this was about to change. In 
1696, following an unsuccessful first attempt, Peter was able to acquire Azov 
from the Ottoman Empire. This victory tripped the power-balance at the Don 
basin and urged the Kalmyks once again to align themselves with the Russians. 
In the following campaign of 1697, the Kalmyks proved essential for the 
protection of Azov and their cavalry, led personally by Ayuka Khan, was used 
to keep the numerous Nogai horsemen in check.141 
Peter I asserted Russian authority by conquest. Thereafter, he managed to 
reform the administrative structure of his realm, while simultaneously struggling 
against Sweden. The establishment of governorates (guberniya) in 1708 initiated 
a process of steady political centralization in the lands of the Muscovite 
Tsardom, which in 1721 was transformed into the Russian Empire. By that time, 
the Astrakhan Governorate had been established as a separate entity (1717) to 
buttress Russia's presence in the Pontic Steppe. Artemiy Volynskiy, an 
experienced diplomat who had served Peter both as an envoy and a field 
commander, was bestowed the governor's office and immediately began to 
assert his prerogatives upon the Kalmyks, the Nogais, and the Cossack hosts at 
Don, Terek, and Yaik rivers. Volynskiy’s policy was efficient and resulted in 
strengthening Russia's grip on the steppe, especially after the death of Ayuka 
                                                 




Khan. With the intensification of the struggle for power, the governor of 
Astrakhan played the Nogai scenario from the previous century by severing the 
different fractions of the Kalmyk Khanate. The strife and instability significantly 
weakened the Kalmyks, and voices were spoken out for departing and returning 
to the Oirats’ ancestral lands to the east. Troubled by the notion of a possible 
alliance between the Kalmyks, Crimeans, and the Kazakhs, the government in 
St. Petersburg decided to compromise. Furthermore, the process of Kalmyk 
incorporation had already begun and the prospect of the departure of these more 
or less predictable neighbors only to be replaced by new Asian Horde was 
daunting. In addition, the establishment of the Tsaritsyn defense line and the 
strengthening of the Terek line following the Persian Campaign meant that the 
Russians were now in full control of Kalmyk migration. Still, it was cheaper to 
compromise with the choice of a new khan. In 1736, in the context of growing 
tension between the Russians and the Ottomans, Donduk-Ombo was chosen as a 
suitable heir to the Kalmyk heritage. In turn, he provided continuous support for 
Russia's military efforts. 
While Kalmyk autonomy was kept, although consistently limited in 
economic and diplomatic aspect, the case with the Cossacks took a rapid turn 
following the rebellions of hetmans Kondraty Bulavin (1707-1708) and Ivan 
Mazepa (1709). Bulavin's Rebellion was ill-organized and ill-managed, striking 
not so much against the established political order, but against the figure of Peter 
himself. Thus, a limited number of followers were gathered. In combination 
with the harsh winter conditions and the lack of allies, the rebellion was 
supressed by mid-1708, without achieving anything significant. Even so, Peter 
was furious because his authority was challenged by a simple Don Cossack 
ataman.142 Before he could take firm measures, another Cossack rebellion 
sparked.  
After repeatedly being abandoned by Peter in the course of the Swedish 
invasion of Ukraine, losing some 15,000 men in less than six months, Ivan 
Mazepa became disillusioned with Russia's friendship. Followed by a small 
number of loyal Cossacks, Mazepa deflected to Karl XII's army, hoping to gain 
Swedish support for the recognition of Cossack autonomy in Ukraine. 
Unfortunately for Mazepa, and the rest of the Cossack hosts, Peter was able to 
eradicate the Swedish army at Poltava, and was free to turn his undivided 
attention to the troublesome Cossacks. Although advised to abolish all Cossack 
privileges, the Tsar decided to appear as a generous and forgiving sovereign. 
Peter did not limit the economic autonomy of the Cossack but secured their 
submission to the military necessities of the Russian state. In exchange for 
keeping their exclusive rights and tax concessions, the Cossacks had to accept 
that the time of voluntary service to the State was over. From now on, the 
Cossack hosts were subjected to mandatory quotas, demanded by the Russian 
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military, or had to pay fines in case of manpower shortages. This was first 
demonstrated in 1711 in the context of the Pruth Campaign when the Don Host 
not only gathered the greater part of the troops it was required to provide, but 
also paid an indemnification of 970 rubles for the number of servicemen who 
were absent from the levy.143 
 
Khans, hetmans and the Empire 
 
Apart from the process of frontier indoctrination into Russia’s political order, 
there was the question of authority. Asserting sovereignty over their turbulent 
frontier subjects had been a matter of utmost importance for the Moscow grand 
princes and tsars ever since the fifteenth century. As already noted, the 
government tried to implement a combination of methods in order to impose its 
will over the Cossacks, Nogais and the Kalmyks, which included: direct military 
pressure, economic dependence and forging of military symbiosis against 
common enemies. In this pattern of interrelation, it was essential for the rulers in 
Moscow to be deemed by their frontier dependents as legitimate overlords. This 
was achieved either by the notion that the tsar was the representative of the 
Christian Lord on earth, when it came to the Orthodox Cossacks, or that the 
ruler of Muscovy was, in fact, the “great white Khan”, who took the Golden 
Horde’s fallen mantle, in the Steppe Hordes’ perspective.  
For most of the seventeenth century, Russian tsars had trouble asserting 
their direct political dominance over the frontiersmen. The Muscovite state 
lacked the military leverage to cow the inhabitants of the Pontic region into 
submission or even to impose the developing serfdom system, which dominated 
Russia Proper. The government tried to manipulate local authorities with gifts 
and bestowments of regal insignias in order to impose the idea that political 
leadership in the Frontiers had to be recognized by the authorities in Russia. It 
wasn’t until the reign of Peter I that this line of conduct transformed from 
wishful thinking into reality. As noted above, the arrival of royal armies on the 
Lower Don and the overpowering of Cossack rebellions allowed Peter to turn a 
new page in frontier-imperial relations and to establish a new pattern of 
subordination between the government and the local authorities.  
As already noted, the chief administrative measures were, aimed at the 
Cossack Hetmanate. Following the victory at Poltava, Peter I asserted his right 
to approve any chosen hetman before he came into office. Apart from that, 
Russian authorities, represented by the Kievan governorate, put pressure on the 
hetman to appoint favorable men in charge of the regimental districts, of which 
the Hetmanate constituted. Peter stepped even further by personally interfering 
in the choice of the hetman himself. As Boeck demonstrates, while studying the 
                                                 




Don hosts, Cossack elites had to obtain the patronage of high-ranking Russian 
administrators in order to secure their leading positions in the Hetmanate.144 
In the case of the Kalmyks, state pressure had to be applied more 
delicately, since the Khanate, although far from its prime, was still a substantial 
force on its own, and the service of the Kalmyk cavalry was valued above that of 
the Cossacks, as demonstrated in the Azov Campaign in 1697.145 It was not until 
the death of Ayuka Khan in 1724 that the government seized the opportunity for 
a direct intervention into Kalmyk internal affairs. By using the control over the 
pastures north of Tsaritsyn, the imperial authorities decided to bully the 
Kalmyks into accepting the Russian candidate for the throne. Without consulting 
with the Kalmyk nobles, and especially to the tayishi-s closely related to the late 
Ayuka Khan, the Russian opted to abolish the khan title and replace it with a 
viceroy of their choice.146 The authorities in St. Petersburg decided to place their 
trust on Dorji-Nazar – a pro-Russian figure, who stood in the middle of the line 
of succession. To the dismay of the imperial officials, Dorji-Nazar refused to 
alienate the Kalmyks by pressing his claims. Furthermore, there were voices for 
the departure of the Kalmyks to Crimea. Daunted by a possible steppe alliance, 
the tsarist government accepted a compromise candidate - Cheren-Donduk.147 
Russia exercised its influence again in 1732 to protect Cheren-Donduk from his 
popular nephew Donduk-Ombo, who claimed the throne for himself. Donduk-
Ombo, along with a substantial number of followers, departed toward Kuban. In 
the context of rising tensions between Crimea and Russia, and the fact that the 
Empire was preoccupied with the War of the Polish Succession, St. Petersburg 
once more had to step down. All of Donduk-Ombo’s demands were satisfied, 
and he returned to the main ulusy.148 
The imperial administration had greater success in subduing the Cossacks. 
The reig over the frontiersmen was done by the abovementioned practice of 
extensive patronage combined with the increased commitment of the Russian 
military in strengthening its control over the southern borders. In 1728, to secure 
his position as hetman, Daniil Pavlovich Apostol signed the so-called 
Reshitelynye punkty, which stipulated that the hetman will henceforth receive his 
authority from the sovereign rather than the century-old practice of election by 
the Cossack officers. All matters of foreign policy had to be approved by the 
emperor, and only border disputes could be handled by the hetman, who, 
however, was to keep them in accord with Russia’s diplomatic obligations. 
Regarding military matters, the hetman was subjected to the field-marshal of the 
Russian army. He was also forbidden to employ more than three mercenary 
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regiments in his service. In administrative terms, the members of the Cossack 
Hetmanate’s council of commanders (which served as both Cabinet and ruling 
regulatory body for the existing regimental districts) were to be elected by the 
Russian government. In addition, tax revenues, collected within the Hetmanate 
borders were to be transferred into the Imperial Treasury. The juridical rights of 
the Hetmanate and the Russian subjects were equaled in terms of landowning, 
but henceforth, serfs were prohibited from settling down in the territory of the 
Hetmanate.149 And if this measure was not sufficient, the next step of imperial 
authority institutionalization cemented Russian power over the Cossacks. In 
1734, following the death of Daniil Apostol, Empress Anna decided not to hold 
elections for a new hetman but instead created the Governing Council of the 
Hetman Office. This was a six-member administrative body, headed by a 
Russian government representative, along with two imperial figures and three 
Cossack leaders. The Office ruled Ukraine on behalf of the Empire until 1750 
when Empress Elisaveta (r. 1741-1762) appointed one last hetman – count Kirill 
Grigoryevich Razumovskiy, who held the office until 1764 when Catherine the 
Great abolished the Hetmanate and incorporated it into Russia.150 
 
Soldiers of the steppe 
 
The essential value of frontiersmen, for Russia’s policy, was their military 
prowess. Constantly thriving on raids, “little war” and defense of border 
garrisons, the very ethos of the frontier people was war. Military hierarchy 
served as the basis of the frontier societies, with commanders of a 100, 1,000 or 
10,000 men becoming administrative and political leaders as had been the 
practice in the Mongol Empire and the steppe realms which had preceded it. 
Such was the case with the Crimean Khanate, the Nogais and Kalmyks. Their 
khans and lesser princes (tayishi) led separate hosts into single raids or overall 
campaigns with the status of the endeavours determined by the rank of the 
respective leader. In the case of the Cossacks, where clan loyalties were replaced 
by the relations of the Personenverbands, the commanding officers were elected 
by their followers. Moreover, the officers elected their superiors on the same 
principle. This autonomous system of self-control contradicted the imperial 
desire to implement its influence, and, as noted above, Russian authorities 
sought different means to subdue their frontier allies and dependencies.  
While the military abilities of the Cossacks remained legendary for most 
of the time, their well-deserved glory was earned in constant confrontation with 
the Crimean Tatars, Ottoman sipahis and Polish hussars. Nevertheless, as later 
examination of Russian campaigns will prove, the Kalmyks were in no way 
inferior to their Hetmanate counterparts. In fact, during the Russo-Ottoman War 
                                                 
149 Reshitelynye punkty (http://litopys.org.ua/rigel/rig21.htm - accessed on 29.01.2016). 





of 1736-1739 it was the Kalmyks who gained the most notable victories against 
the Crimean contingents. With no substantial military industry, the frontier hosts 
had to count on continuous Russian support regarding guns, munitions and 
funds. This gave great leverage in the hands of the imperial administration and 
allowed the government to bargain its political and administrative objectives in 
exchange for more substantial subsidies. The principal military export, apart 
from manpower, was horses, which were bred in the Pontic Steppe and between 
the rivers Volga and Yaik. Horsepower was in constant scanty during the 
Sothern Campaigns and sometimes authorities had to issue and organize several 
musters of animals to meet the needs of a single year of campaigning.  
Regarding battlefield functions, the Cossacks and Kalmyks served as 
scouts but also as shock cavalry, supplementing the regular dragoon regiments. 
Unlike the dragoons, however, Peter, and later Minikh, relied solely on the 
frontiersmen to intercept and raid enemy bases of operation and settlements in 
the steppe and Dagestan. The Cossacks and Kalmyks earned the trust of the 
supreme command firstly, because they gained victories on enemy territory and 
secondly – because much of their payment came from the loot they gathered 
from the state’s opponents. 
 
2.5. The Caucasians 
 
The Caucasus is a classic example of a frontier region, on which multitude case-
studies can be carried out in order to understand the complicated nature of 
frontier societies and the patterns of their development. Ever since Antiquity 
Caucasus served as the watershed between the grass sea of the Eurasian Steppe, 
populated by a variety of tribes, and the more settled and centralized kingdoms 
and empires which rose and fell as ages passed by. Petty mountain kingdoms, 
tribe confederations and lone city-states emerged and dwindled while they were 
struggling to retain their independence and to survive in the midst of the 
constant clashes between nomads and empires. This tremendous duel began with 
the Cimmerian invasion of Assyria in 705 BC and continued up to the early 
modern period. During the first half of the eighteenth century the Caucasus was 
more or less as divided as it is today. Georgians occupied the western parts of 
the region, forming several petty kingdoms that fell under the influence of the 
Ottoman and Safavid empires, which used them as buffer states in the religious 
and political depredations of each other. These were the states of Imereti, 
Kakheti, Kartli and Mingrelia, which were also flanked by several lesser 
Georgian states that were tight up in a complex scheme of interdependencies.151 
The Georgian principalities were the closest thing to an early modern state that 
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the Caucasians were able to produce. There was some form of national 
governance such as tax collection and laws, but the medieval feudal system was 
kept intact, and the gentry possessed a considerable amount of rights and 
privileges. Georgian lands also included the larger towns and cities in the region 
such as Tiflis (Tbilisi), Gremi, Telavi and Kutaisi, but by the late seventeenth 
century, these territories became depopulated due to constant warfare, famine 
and deportation of serfs. Information on the economic and social development of 
these states is scarce.152 Manufacturing and commerce, in the European and 
Ottoman sense, were almost non-existent since border conflicts were constant 
and most of the trade routes through the Caucasus were blocked by native 
mountain tribes. Goods were produced only locally, and export was probably 
insignificant. Monetary policy was offset by natural barter, and the only 
economic centers remained the fairs. Only slave trade seemed to flourish thanks 
to the constant flow of prisoners and captives emanating from strife and 
confrontation in the Georgian lands.153 The only other valuable export of the 
Georgian kingdoms was its battle hardened troops, who served mainly under the 
banners of the Safavid Empire. Georgian troops were used as an infantry core of 
field armies and were reported to wield guns, along with other weapons. Late 
Safavid rulers employed approximately 15,000 Georgians in campaigns against 
the Afghans in central Asia. The Georgians performed well, given the 
experience they had accumulated while they were fighting similar foes in the 
Caucasus. 
Unlike the divided kingdoms of the Georgians, the other large Orthodox 
group in the region, the Armenians, did not possess a state of their own. The 
territories, populated by the Armenians, were divided between the Safavid and 
the Ottoman empires according to the treaty of 1639 which split Armenia in half 
between the two states. The stability that ushered in the following decades 
provided the basis for reinvigoration of economic and social life in the once 
devastated and contested areas. Armenian merchant families, who spread their 
networks across the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, were able to 
monopolize a large share of the inland trade between the Far East and the 
West.154 Penetrating as far as India and Malaya, the Armenian diaspora was able 
to accumulate considerable amount of goods, specie and prestige. With regard to 
trade inside Persia and between the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf, the 
Armenians were in a position from which they were able to compete and even 
overshadow the trading companies of England, the Netherlands and Portugal. 
Commercial ties with Russia also strengthened with the advent of the 
seventeenth century. In exchange for a golden throne, given to tsar Aleksey by 
the Armenian merchants in Persia, the Russian monarch allowed the Armenians 
                                                 
152 Population of Kutaisi had fallen to only 1000 in 1670, and the once rich coastal towns were inhabited by only 
a few hundred each. R. G. Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, ( Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994), 52 
153 Ibid., 48-52. 





to monopolize the silk trade between Persia and Russia and also permitted the 
construction of a port on the Volga River to serve as their еntrepôt in Russia.155 
Growing economic and cultural potential led to the formation of a national idea 
of independence from both Muslim monarchies. Russia was perceived as an 
essential ally in this cause, but negotiations were also conducted with the 
Papacy. However, by 1739 the only actual attempt to assist the formation of an 
independent Armenia was Peter's Persian Campaign, and that failed miserably in 
regard to the Armenian cause. The lack of state and the preference for commerce 
over strife led to the fact that Armenians did not possess an army of any kind. 
Their territories were fully incorporated into the Safavid and Ottoman empires, 
and local garrisons comprised of imperial troops. With the demise and collapse 
of Safavid rule in the 1720s, Armenians began to self-organize in order to 
protect their settlements against raging bands, Caucasian tribes and invading 
Ottoman troops. In 1723, the Armenian Catholicos (head of the Armenian 
Church) Asdvadzadur promised Peter to raise an army of 60,000 to support the 
Russians in case they cross the Caucasus and enter into Armenia. Although this 
figure is debatable, Armenian merchants were able to arm and pay for the 
protection of their cities as it is evident from the work of Abraham of Yerevan. 
Although they did not manufacture guns and weapons, the Armenians possessed 
both the money and the trade links to supply armament from both the Ottoman 
and the Persian empires and even beyond. Their lack of political structure, 
however, prevented the organization of a capable body of troops which could 
have any chance of fending off the depredations of the Muslim conquerors. 
The last vital and significant element of Caucasian ethos were the 
mountain tribes and petty states, which were situated on the slopes of the high 
mountain and in the territories north of the Caucasus, as far as rivers Terek and 
Kuban. While most of these people were Sunni Muslims, there were frontier 
societies, which still exercised some pagan practices. Some of these societies 
even followed the Islam, but in in its unorthodox form, which included some 
practices from the Shi'i branch and even from Christianity. Sects, sufis, and 
other mystics, as well as the existing pre-Islamic tradition, played a substantial 
role in the formation of the frontiersmen’s perception of the world. The 
Caucasian lands resembled an even more decentralized version of the Crimean 
khanate: with a ruler, who had almost no authority outside his stronghold and 
clans who were strugling against each other, while trying to keep imperial 
influence away from their lands. Ottomans and Safavids claimed some degree of 
suzerainty to the Caucasian tribes, but it was more a pretense rather than an 
actual authority. The economy was non-existent apart from the slave trade and 
the exchange of booty and goods, pillaged from one another or during raids on 
the lands of Georgia and Armenia. With the advent of Russia, following the 
conquest of Astrakhan, the Circassians, who had remained Orthodox, separated 
                                                 




from the other predominantly Muslim mountain groups, but neither of them 
willingly obliged to imperial authority. It was impossible to sustain organized 
armies. The Caucasians formed bands of several hundred men that bore 
resemblance to the Ottoman gazi and the early Cossacks. They lived in small, 
non-permanent settlements, which the Russians referred to as gorodki (literary 
meaning miniature towns). These settlements were protected with a moat or had 
no fortifications and most of the buildings were no larger than tents. On one 
occasion, when Russian troops tried to pursue the Caucasians into such a village, 
the entire population simply left it and fled to the mountains only to return after 
the departure of the tsar's troops.  
Regarding loyalty and support, the Georgians and the Armenians were 
willing to accept Russian help and authority, but only to a certain degree and 
with concessions from Russian side. As it turned out, as late as 1739, Russia was 
unable to penetrate the inner part of the Caucasian land and thus, from the very 
beginning, any actual cooperation between Russian and local troops was 
doomed to fail. Nevertheless, the Caucasian Christians continued to rely on the 
tsar as the leader of Eastern Christianity and the main figure, who could bring 
unity and independence from the century-long Muslim domination. Unlike their 
settled neighbors to the west and south, the Caucasian frontiersmen were 
suspicious of and even hostile to Russia and deemed it as simply another 




Russia’s marches south were destined to meet a large variety of adversaries and 
only a few friends, with part of the later providing only reluctant assistance to 
the imperial cause. Russia’s policy in the Pontic region developed hand in hand 
with the understanding of the southern frontier and the people who inhabited it. 
As already demonstrated, Russian authorities would build up their experience by 
combining diplomatic measures with administrative methods and military 
pressure. This worked in the case of the Cossack and Kalmyk hosts, which were 
slowly incorporated into the imperial system. The settled societies – the 
Ottoman Empire, Persia, and the Crimean Khanate, had to be studied carefully, 
and the foreign policy, conducted toward them had to be woven with more tact 
rather than pressure. 
Both the Ottoman and the Safavid empires possessed a substantial 
military potential, which could be mustered to protect home territories as well as 
their client states. While by the end of the seventeenth century Persia began to 
fall into a state of extensive decline, the Ottoman Empire was able to survive the 
dramatic setback following the War of the Holy Leagueand to rebuild its 
military potential to meet the challenges of the eighteenth century. Persia, 
although weakened demonstrated its vitality under the decisive leadership of 




powerhouse, capable not only of defending the heartlands of the empire but also 
of striking its neighbors with stunning success. 
As for the petty borderland states of the Caucasus, their existence became 
more and more problematic with the assertion and strengthening of the imperial 
control. The events in 1722 and 1723 demonstrated that rapid shifts were to be 
expected not only in borderland states’ allegiances but also in those of the 
empires. Russia would easily exchange Georgia and Armenia for the control 
over the Caspian coast while the Ottomans were more than willing to let the 
northerners ravage Crimea while their possessions in Budjak and Kaffa were left 
unharmed during the War of 1736-1739. This salvaging of local political and 
military resources for the profit of grand strategy had an undermining effect on 
the frontier societies, which led to their eventual downfall in the late eighteenth 




PART II - THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGNS 1695-1739 
 
Having outlined the military basis on which Russia and its contemporaries stood 
during the period in question, the dissertation will study the Southern 
Campaigns, carried out by the Petrine army and its successors. Through these 
military efforts, the effect of western-style army reform on the performance of 
the Russian forces can be traced. In addition, the the dissertation will evaluate 
Russian military operations in an environmentalien to contemporary European 
warfare as summarized by authors such as Black, Duffy, and Parker. The 
following chapter will be divided into several sub-sections, each dealing with a 
different campaign from the first march against Azov in 1695 to the final 
gunshot of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1736-1739. Primary and secondary 
sources will be discussed accordingly and each subsection will be divided into 
several topics: sources and historiography, historical background and line of 
events. These will be followed by a detailed analysis of the principal 
components, defining Russia's military performance: level of logistics, speed of 
movement, decisiveness of military action, the abilities of the military leaders 
and the overall potential of the state to mobilize its resources for the conduct of 
war. Following the examination of each military effort, the chapter's overall 
conclusion will pinpoint the main trends in Russian military potential, related to 
the Petrine reforms and demonstrated by the actual performance of the army in 
the south. 
 
CHAPTER 3  
THE FIRST CAMPAIGNS (1695-1711) 
 
During the reign of Peter I, Russia entered a new stage in its administrative and 
military evolution. This phase, as noted above, was dominated by trends of both 
continuity and change. The process of conquering and assimilating the vast 
expanses of the Eurasian Steppe was and still is one of the main elements of 
Russian domestic and foreign policy. The patterns of expanding, fortifying and 
further extending the limits of the Empire are clearly visible since the time of 
Ivan IV and can be traced as late as the October Revolution, after which the 
Soviet Union dramatically changed the mechanism by which Russia’s influence 
was distributed in the steppe territories. Peter followed the footsteps of his 
ancestors, but also struggled hard not to repeat their mistakes. He was 
determined to modify and upgrade his state and army in order to achieve better 
and long-lasting results. Whether he was successful or not is a notion yet to be 










The fortress of Azov was the last (or the first, depending on the perspective) 
еntrepôt on the maritime trading route between the Pontic Steppe and the 
Mediterranean region. Following a long hiatus during the late Antiquity and 
most of the Middle Ages, it was repopulated again in the thirteenth century. The 
territory, known by then as Azaq (the Low Lands), was given to the Genoese by 
the Khans of the Golden Horde. The Italian merchants established a colony, 
which they named Tana (or La Tana, referring to River Don's ancient name – 
Tanais). In the 1470s, Tana, as well as Kaffa and Kerch, were conquered by the 
Ottoman Empire, following a period of rapid Black Sea expansion during the 
reign of Mehmed II and his illustrious grand vizier Gedik Ahmed Paşa. The 
vizier was able to defeat and expel the Genoese from Crimea and the Azov Sea 
and to establish Ottoman presence and superiority over the Pontic Steppe and 
Circassia. It was during the same time that the Crimean Khanate fell under 
Ottoman suzerainty, and the Gireis had to submit to the will of Constantinople in 
exchange for patronage and military aid. The Ottomans were fast to recognize 
the importance of the Don delta and the strategic value of Tana. They erected a 
mighty fortress, which was manned by a yeniçeri garrison. The new military 
base renamed Azak became the breaking point for any Cossack expedition in the 
Black Sea. The restless Don Cossack pirates were lurking on Ottoman 
commerce in the Pontus, and Azak stood as a bastion of Constantinople’s 
interest in the northern corners of the Black Sea. The Cossacks were able to 
occupy the town briefly, transforming it into a naval base for predatory raids in 
the Black Sea. However, their requests for support from the tsar were without 
success, for neither Mikhail Romanov nor his Aleksey I were willing to risk a 
war against the Ottoman Empire. Finally, in 1642, the Ottomans reestablished 
their presence and a swift effort of buttressing the fortress was made. The walls 
were repaired and renovated following the pattern of trace italienne, with 
additional forts being built on the two sides of the Don River. Apart from 
guarding the trade, Azak became a valuable lodgment for Ottoman and Tatar 
operations against the Cossacks, and after Russia's expansion in the 1650s - 
against the Muscovites themselves. Following Knyaz Golytsin's failures against 
the Crimean Khanate (1687, 1689), Azak became a focal point of Muslim raids 
against the Belgorod line and the Cossack gorodki on the Don and Volga rivers. 
Between 1689 and 1694, Russia and its Cossack allies were in defense. Finally, 
in 1694, following a series of military drills and maneuvers in the so called 
Kozhukhovskiy pokhod (Kozhukhov Campaign), Peter decided to opt for an 
offensive strategy. During these military exercises, the poteshnye voyska were 
placed against the old soldat and streltsy units, while the noble cavalry was used 




Peter concluded that the exercises were successful and that the army was, 
indeed, ready to face the Ottomans in an open battle. In addition, control over 
Azak would secure Russian presence on the Lower Don and serve as leverage 
against the “turbulent” steppe population, especially the Kalmyks and their 
leader - Ayuka Khan, who consistently sought to promote independent foreign 
policy, which contradicted Muscovite interests. Reassured of the potential of his 
army to strike hard and fast, Peter was convinced of the eminent success of his 
endeavor. He soon put his words into action and began planning for his military 




There are several primary sources, which deal with Russia's expedition against 
Azov. First and foremost is the diary of General Patrick Gordon, who led a one-
third of the Russian army into the campaign.1 It is invaluable for its depth and 
details, regarding troop movement, covered distances, and the exact dates of 
events during the march south. Gordon also provides details regarding the main 
problems, whith which the army met in the course of the expeditions. These 
details are not present in official dispatches and the campaign journal and can 
only be trace via P. Gordon’s narrative. A second useful source of information is 
the campaign journal of Peter I, which includes data on the weather, as well as 
the preparations, carried out prior and during the expedition.2 It is tha main 
source through which the movement of the forces along the Volga River can be 
traced. Finally, there are several letters, which elucidate the course of events, 
most notably between Peter I and Fyodor Apraksin, and also, a report from the 
Habsburg envoy Otto Anton Pleyer to Emperor Leopold I (r. 1658-1705). Pleyer 
took part in the first Azov campaign and in the military drills, which were 
carried out during the previous year.3 
The campaigns themselves are described in detail in Ustryalov's work on 
Peter's rule, as well as in the narrative of Lieutenant-General P. Bobrovskiy in 
his history of the 13th guards’ Regiment.4 The regiment was among the units, 
comprising Gordons's corps in all three campaigns. The date to date 
development of the Azov expeditions is also presented in the chronological 
index of the Russian army and navy operations.5 Soviet historiography in the 
face of Porfiryev adds to the imperial tradition, by emphasizing on the native 
developments and neglecting the foreign influence on the development of Peter's 
                                                 
1 M.R. Ryzhenkov (ed.), Patrik Gordon - Dnevnik 1690-1695 (Moscow: Nauka, 2014). 
2 Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1695-1703 (St. Petersburg, 1853). 
3 The letters are quoted in N. G. Ustryalov, Istoriya tsarstvovaniya Petra Velikogo. Poteshnye I Azovskie 
pokhody,, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1858). 
4 For Ustryalov; see ibid.; P.O. Bobrovskiy, Istoriya 13 Leyb-grenaderskagoYerevanskogo Ego Velichestva 
polka za 250 let, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1892).  




army.6 A concise, contemporary narrative of the campaign is given in Brian 
Davies's work on the warfare, state and society in the Black Sea Steppe.7 
 




Peter carried out a meticulous preparation, outlining in detail the number of 
troops, necessary for the campaign. Field-marshal Boris Sheremetev 
commanded a 120,000 strong force, comprised of Cossacks, streltsy and frontier 
garrisons.8 This large army was to assemble in Belgorod and march against the 
Crimean Khanate in order to block any attempt from the Tatars to relieve Azak 
from the planned siege. Apart from its screening purposes, it also had to occupy 
the mouth of River Dnieper. Peter’s plan was to capture this area in order to 
isolate Crimea from the Ottoman footholds in Budjak, Jedisan, and Podolia.  
The capture of the fortress of Azak was entrusted to a selected task-force 
of some 30,000 soldiers and 200 pieces of artillery, under the joint command of 
Generals Patrick Gordon, Fyodor Golovin, and François Lefort. Among their 
forces, Peter included four of the “playtime” regiments – Semyonovskiy, 
Preobrazhenskiy, Lefortovskiy, and Butyrskiy. The main body of the army was 
comprised of the polki novogo stroya (the foreign-style regiments introduced 
during Aleksey’s reign) and streltsy. In addition to the troops and weapons, 
Peter issued an order for 20,000 artillery shells to be included as well as 
gunpowder and other supplies. The army was split into three separate parts. 
One-third under Gordon, comprised of streltsy, soldaty from Tambov and the 
Butyrskiy Regiment, had to march from Tambov, following the left bank of the 
Don River and to blockade the fortress until the arrival of the main body of the 
task force.9 Its strength was 9,393 troops, 43 guns, and ten mortars.10 The second 
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Voeenoe izdatelstvo, 1952). 
7 B. Davies, Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe (London and New York: Routledge,  2007) 
8 “A report from Pleyer to Emperor Leopold I, 1st January, 1696” in Ustryalov, Istoria, 569; This number is 
“paper strength”, the actual number of soldiers under Sheremetev was probably lesser, due to shortages of men 
from conscription, as well as deserters. The numbers would fall even lesser in the course of the actual campaign 
due to supply shortages and further desertion.  
9 On 21st February 1695, Gordon notes that “as soon as possible, a force of 10 000 strong, including 5-6,000 
Cossacks should be sent by land in order to reach and blockade Azov”; see Gordon, Dnevnik, 323. The Cossacks 
were assembled and sent in advance. According to the overall plan, Gordon's infantry should merge with the 
Cossacks upon arrival and form a vanguard of 15-16,000 men. 
10 In March, when Gordon began his expedition from Moscow, the Butyrskiy Regiment numbered only 900 
men;; of whom 894 reached Tambov see Bobrovskiy, Istoriya, Apendix, 32, 77. There, further 11 regiments 
were added – 4 soldaty regiments, raised fresh in Tambov (3,879 men) and 7 streltsy regiments (4,620 men). The 
total being 9,393 (Gordon miscalculates them to be 3,384 in his notes – Ibid., 78); 31 of the 43 guns were 
falconets, the other 12 - howitzers; 6,000 puda (98,280 kilograms) of gunpowder and over 4,600 shells and 4,000 
grenades were issued for the artillery. All these, together with the soldiers’ belongings, were to be transported by 




corps, numbering 6,922, was placed under Golovin.11 It included the 
Preobrazhensky Regiment in which Peter commanded the bombardier company. 
Finally, Lefort led the largest portion of the army – around 13,000 soldiers. 
Golovin and Lefort's forces were accompanied by a combined artillery train 
amounting 104 mortars and 44 guns of a different caliber.12 Their forces had to 
follow the Volga downstream, debark at Tsaritsyn and head toward the Lower 
Don, where the two had to join Gordon's corps. To ship the 20,000 strong 
contingents, a total of 1,250 boats had to be assembled at Moscow.13  
In addition to the military supplies, Peter issued a decree on the food 
rations, which had to be prepared and delivered in advance for the army's march 
south. The gorodok of Panshin was chosen as main supply base. It was situated 
on the lower Don, northwest from present-day Volgograd, near the town of 
Ilovlya. Funds were diverted from the Treasury to the Khazan to pay for the 
supplies, bought from ten contractors, responsible for the implementation of the 
tsar's orders. Peter’s extensive preparations were aimed at preparing the ground 
for his substantial force to march upon Azov in a surprise movement and, if 
possible, to capture it quickly, leaving no option for the Ottoman forces to react. 
The great number of goods, supplied in advance was supposed to provide the 
Russian forces with enough provisions for the barren steppes of the lower Don, 
where an army, as large as the one assembled, would hardly survive without 
them. Peter was determined not to allow the same mistakes, which ruined 




Having issued all the orders and projected all the plans, Peter's generals set his 
will into motion. At 4 p.m., on the 8th of March 1695, the Butyrskiy Regiment of 
Patrick Gordon left Moscow on its way to Tambov. Gordon covered the distance 
from Moscow to Tambov for 11 days and arrived at the southern city on 19 
March.14 Here he waited for the assembling of the seven streltsy and began 
forming four soldaty regiments out of the local population. His task proved 
onerous since the money, which should have been gathered in advance (12,000 
rubles), were still not available, and Gordon was forced to send several letters to 
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12 These were transferred on 8 vessel groups (pauzok) totaling 39 boats (strugi); 36 of the 44 guns were cast in 
the Netherlands (pishscaley gollandskikh). In addition to the guns and mortars, there were 19,974 bombs and 
shells for the guns (some 6,000 especially for the Dutch guns), 2,360 barrels of gunpowder (for artillery and 
handgun purposes), as well as additional saltpeter, sulfur, bullets and spare parts for the guns. Altogether, the 8 
vessel groups carried a total of 61,754 puds (1,011 tons) of munitions and guns; see Ustryalov, Istoriya, 562-4. 
13Khronologicheskiy ukazately, 1. 
14Altogether, the Butyrskiy Regiment covered some 350 versta (371 km.). The average daily speed of the 
regiment was 33.3 km., which was considered fast for the standards of the Age. As it will be later observed, 
outside the densely populated areas, the movement of the troops was obstructed by terrain, weather and the 




Moscow, urging for funds.15 The acquisition of transportation proved to be a 
further predicament for the progress of the campaign. It was not until 21st April 
when Gordon was finally able to provide all the wagons, carts, and boats, 
necessary for the transportation of guns, munitions and men across the Don 
Steppe, which was also broken by countless streams and several rivers.16 The 
specifics of the terrain required the Russian force to halt its further advance and 
wait for the rivers to return to their stream beds. In addition, Gordon had to wait 
for the screening force of Boris Sheremetev to move southwards in order to 
block the possible Tatar movement and hide the Scotsman’s vanguard 
maneuvers. General Gordon had to wait in Tambov until the very end of April. 
On the 23rd, Gordon's corps finally left Tambov and began preparations for the 
crossing of the Lipovitsa River, where the general ordered the construction of 
five bridges. The army was able to traverse the river on 1st May and continued 
its way to the south. Gordon ordered his troops to move on war footing through 
the marshes and the broken terrain.17 The movement was quite slow, due to the 
bad condition of the roads and the necessity to construct new bridges over any 
larger river or stream the army had to cross. Existing infrastructure was used as 
well, but on several occasions older bridges crumbled under the weight of 
Gordon's supply train. With the reluctant assistance by the Cossacks, Gordon's 
army was finally able to reach Azov on the 27th of July 1695, only a day before 
the main force under Golovin and Lefort arrived.18 The whole plan for an 
advanced force, which had to reach and blockade Azak prior to the siege, thus 
fell apart. In the meantime, the Ottomans were able to send reinforcements via 
the Black Sea. Apart from the usual garrison of the fortress – some 3,000 men 
(two-thirds of which were yeniçeri), another 3,000 came, transported on four 
ships, each carrying 500 men.19 Also, a cavalry unit, consisting of 500 men, was 
placed outside Azov to do reconnaissance. 
While Gordon was slowly dragging his forces through the difficult terrain 
of the Eurasian Steppe, Lefort and Golovin boarded the massive river fleet on 
                                                 
15 21st March, Ibid., 330; By 12th April, on Peter's order, were sent 15,000 rubles . 
16The streltsy proved to be quite troublesome with their constant demands for more transportation vehicles and 
for insisting on less work on building boats and rafts. At the end, Gordon had to negotiate with the local Cossack 
leaders in order to build the required number of vessels. The provision of horses was also a nightmare. Out of 
750 serf horses, inspected by Gordon between 1st and 25th April, only 28 were fit for service; see Gordon, 
Dnevnik., 337-411, 5-25th - April; Bobrovskiy, Istoriya, 77. 
17The movement formation was as follows: The baggage train was in the middle of the convoy. James Gordon 
commanded the right flank with 3 soldaty regiments, lined up in 62 rows (sherengi). The right flank was held by 
4 streltsy regiments, set in 65 rows. The rearguard consisted of 1 soldaty, 1 streltsy and the Butyrskiy Regiment, 
along with the staff; see Ibid., 80. 
18 “The Cossacks wanted to prevent me from reaching Azov before the arrival of the main army and did all they 
could to embarrass my daily marches...”; see Gordon, Dnevnik, 359,18th June, 1695. 
19 Gordon, Dnevnik, 360 – 21st June 1695; For the yeniçeri in Azov see R. Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 1500-
1700, (University College London Press, 1999), 55; Murphey notes that the yeniçeri contingent, which was 
stationed in Azov, numbered 2,272 men. Since by definition the yeniçeri were border troops (apart from the 
Constantinople units), it can be accepted that the proportion of yeniçeri was kept in 1695, especially since the 
Empire was at war and strategic garrisons had to be kept at any cost. It is quite possible, that a considerable part 




30th April and set sail for Tsaritsyn. The unfavorable wind kept the fleet at bay 
for several days. However, following Peter's words, the greatest problem for the 
progress of the expedition were the incompetent sailors and workers, who called 
themselves “masters”, but there was a stricking difference between the name and 
their actual work was. Besides, the overloading of the supply vessels, carrying 
the munitions and guns hindered the movement forward. The main forces were 
stalled in Nizhniy Novgorod until 27th May. The large fleet finally reached 
Tsaritsyn on 7th June and continued on foot toward Panshin, where it arrived 
four days later, on 11th.20 The army finally reached the countryside near Azov in 
28th, and Peter himself arrived in Gordon's camp on the next day, greeted with 
salutes from the artillery. 
On the 30th of June, Gordon, leading his regiments, as well as 7,000 
Cossacks, met an Ottoman-Tatar force that blocked his advance toward Azak. 
After a brief battle, the enemy attacks were repelled by the Russian infantry and 
artillery, and Gordon drove the Turks back to Azak. He quickly established a 
fortified camp in front of the town and started digging trenches. This action 
eliminated the danger of the arrival of the main Russian force, which established 
a camp in the following days. Lefort and Golovin finished their deployment on 
3rd July when the siege batteries were finally set in place. Peter was the first to 
open fire from one of Gordon's cannons.21 The bombardment by the entire 
artillery began several days later while the generals and the engineers were 
arguing over the best option for digging a contravallation line.22  
In the meantime, Russian forces were struggling to capture several 
watchtowers, east of the fortress, to cover their right flank and also to secure the 
road from Panshin, from where munitions and supplies were transferred. The 
first one was captured on 14th July by a party of 200 Cossacks who were able to 
sneak their way into the tower’s vicinity and to overwhelm its garrison. That 
same night, a Dutchman – Jakob Jansen, who had converted to Orthodox 
Christianity and became a member of Peter's artillerymen, deserted to the 
Ottomans and revealed to their commanders – Murtaza Paşa and his subordinate 
Murad Bey, the position of all Russian forces. Using this valuable information, 
on the next morning the Turks launched a sortie, taking advantage of the streltsy 
guards' unpreparedness. In the midst of the summer day’s heat, when the 
Russians had the habit to take a nap, the Ottomans launched an attack on the 
trenches of General Leford, which were still incomplete and had not yet 
connected to Gordon's defense perimeter. The streltsy, who were protecting this 
sector, along with the sixteen batteries, were thrown in disorder. Jacob Gordon, 
who commanded the battery, was able to hold his position but was finally forced 
to retreat. Before the whole defense broke down, General Gordon led his men 
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into a counterattack, chasing the Turks back to the moat of Azov. Here, 
Gordon's attack was met by a counter charge of the yeniçeri, who broke the 
Russians, sending soldaty and streltsy alike into a rout. Gordon, who refused to 
leave his position until the very end, eluded captivity by chance, due to his sons' 
last minute actions. The yeniçeri were able to beat Gordon's men back to their 
trenches, capturing part of the Russian field fortifications. After three hours of 
fighting, the Turks were finally driven back. The Russians lost some 4-500 
killed and at least as many wounded.23 Seven guns were captured and taken by 
the Ottomans, and several others were damaged. The Turks lost between 500 
and 600 killed or wounded. Peter reprimanded the captains and colonels of the 
streltsy regiments, who failed their task to protect the fortifications. It was not 
until the end of July that the Russian trenches were finally completed, and the 
left flank of the army was protected from further Ottoman and Tatar sorties. In 
the meantime, Russian officers and nobles began urging Peter to assault the 
walls of Azov. Accrding to Gordon's assessment, the desire for an assault came 
from men who had no understanding of what an assault meant and who just 
wanted to return home as quickly as possible.24 In any case, the efforts of 
Gordon to dissuade the tsar from a premature rush towards the walls of Azak 
failed. It was proclaimed that each volunteer for the assault would receive 10 
rubles, and officers could hope for additional rewards. 2,500 Cossacks 
volunteered right away while the soldaty and the stretsy were not so much 
enthusiastic. In the end, the required 4,500 men were assembled, and a 
preparation for an assault on 5th August began. As Gordon puts it, all that was 
left for him was to follow the collective opinion in order not to be blamed for 
any further delays.25 
The assaulting forces were divided into three columns. The first, led by 
Gordon, included the Butyrskiy and the Tambovskiy regiments. It had to take 
the bastions, located to the left of Gordon's position. A second column had to 
charge to the right, storming the fortifications near the Don River. Finally, a 
third party, comprised of Cossacks, had to sail up the river and attack the 
fortress upstream. Streltsy regiments were placed between the three columns to 
protect their flanks. The night before the operation, a Greek from Azov was able 
to desert to the Russians and to meet Gordon. The deserter reported that the 
Azak garrison was reduced to just 1,300 out of 6,000. According to the Greek, 
most of the Turks had died out of disease and of their wounds. However, the 
defenders were able to set counter mines against the Russian trenches. General 
Gordon demanded a personal meeting with the tsar to postpone the assault. The 
information about the small number of defenders had a different impact on 
                                                 
23 Gordon lists the casualties as follows: 3-400 killed, among which 2 captains, 4 lieutenants and 5 standard-
bearers. Jacob Gordon, two colonels, one lieutenant colonel, twenty other officers and around 500 were wounded 
in action; see Gordon, Dnevnik, 376-8, 15th July 1695. Bobrovskiy quotes Gordon but claims 400 killed, along 
with 12 officers, and up to 600 wounded, along with 24 officers; see Bobrovskiy, Istoriya, 88. 
24 Gordon, Dnevnik, 383, 30th July, 1695. 




Peter's judgment. He became adamant that now was the time to strike. Gordon 
had no chose but to comply.  
The charge began at dawn on 5th August. The Butyrskiy and Tambovskiy 
regiments were thrown into attack, although they did not have any ladders to 
climb the walls. They stormed the bulwarks but came under heavy fire. In the 
meantime, the poteshnye regiments on the right flank under Golovin remained 
motionless, failing to support Gordon's attack. Further left, the 400 Cossacks 
debarked from their boats, stormed the fortress, but with no zeal whatsoever and 
were quickly repelled. After the first failed attack, they retreated to their vessels. 
Gordon was left alone in the center, taking fire from all Ottoman positions. By 
the time the Cossacks left their halfhearted assault, Gordon's men were reduced 
to one-third, the others - being dead or wounded. Since he got no words from 
Peter and that his men were hard pressed, Gordon sounded the retreat. The 
Turks had suffered no more than 200 dead and wounded while the Russians had 
lost a total of 1,500 soldiers and officers. The assault was a complete disaster. 
However, no reprimands were given on the next day. The only significant 
development in the siege in late August was the capture of two Turks, who, after 
interrogation, revealed new information on the status of the garrison. The new 
report showed that only one-third of the original garrison was wounded, sick or 
dead (that left 4,000 able to fight, which is quite different from the 1,300, 
reported by the Greek deserter several days earlier). Unlike the old information 
from 4th August, the captives revealed that the garrison had an abundant supply 
of food and munitions.26 These figures explain how the Ottomans were able to 
launch almost daily sorties, killing several and wounding dozens of men. The 
surprised Russians were seldom able to wound the enemy. The siege works were 
also progressing chaotically and slowly. By mid September, the Russians had 
failed in several attempts to detonate mines under the moat and the walls of 
Azov. In Golovin's section, the mine was detonated on a wrong spot and instead 
of blowing the enemy positions it destroyed a considerable part of Golovin's 
trenches.27 The second attempt to blow up the defenses took place on 25th 
September, followed by a new assault on the walls. Again, Gordon expressed 
doubts about the success of such actions and once more his protests were 
silenced by the common desire for a breakthrough.  
Once again the army was segmented into several units, each responsible 
for a particular task in what was supposed to be a massive, coordinated 
endeavor. The extreme left flank was held by a river flotilla of Cossacks, 
supported by the Semyonovskiy and Preobrazhenskiy regiments. Next to them, 
                                                 
26Gordon, Dnevnik, 389, 13th August 1695; Thanks to these captives Gordon found outwhat was the exact 
number of the enemy, who fell during the assault on 5th.  
27 Bobrovskiy, Istorya, 84; Golovin's engineers were able to dig under the bastions in front of their positions, but 
the 83 pud mine was detonated closer to Russian trenches on advise of Adam Veyde (who then served as a 
colonel in the Preobrazhenskiy Regiment and later became general). Due to this mistake, 30 people, among 
which two colonels and one lieutenant colonel, were killed, and around 100 were wounded; see Ustryalov, 




the corps of Lefort had to attack the opposing Ottoman bastions in order to draw 
fire away from the poteshnye units and the fleet, as well as from the main 
direction of the assault.  Gordon's troops again had to storm the middle section 
of Azov's southern wall, after the detonation of a mine, which laid in a tunnel, 
dug by the Russians. Golovin's troops would rush to the right of Gordon's men, 
supporting another Cossack force, moving on the extreme right. The detonation 
of Gordon's mine had to be the signal for the beginning of the assault. Since all 
regiments were to take part in the attack, the camp had to be protected by the 
Cossacks, who had to monitor the surroundings for a relief attack on behalf of 
the Tatar cavalry.28  
The attack began at 3 o’clock in the afternoon. Two mines (93 puda) were 
detonated, followed by several mines, fired at the defenders. However, the 
counter mines, set by the Ottomans, came into use and considerably diminished 
the effect of those of their Russian counterpart. In addition to the smaller scale 
of damage done to the ramparts, the countermine led to considerable casualties 
among the Russian troops.29 In any case, the mine was able to break a hole in the 
defense, wide 37.6 meters (20 sazhen). Gordon's troops rushed toward the 
breach, storming the moat and the outer ramparts. Their charge was supported 
by Lefort's forces. They were, however, unable to find a suitable spot for their 
assault and instead turned right, merging with the streltsy and soldaty, who were 
already fighting the Turks in the center. The defenders, who were able to 
concentrate their manpower at the breach, counterattacked. 400 yeniçeri, led 
personally by their ağa, made the streltsy form bulwarks in the moat. There, the 
Russians panicked, and chaos broke among their ranks. Gordon, seeing the 
fruitfulness of the attack, retreated with his forces to the closest trenches. In the 
meantime, the Cossacks, supported by the two poteshnye regiments on the 
furthest left were able to penetrate the defenses. Gordon, learning of this 
development, commanded the second charge at the enemy. His regiments 
reached the moat, but were countered by a hail of grenades and salvos from the 
yeniçeri and had to pull back. Finally, upon Peter's orders, Gordon sent his men 
for a third time, again without success. In the meantime, The Cossacks, along 
with the troops from Semyonovskiy and Preobrazhenskiy regiments, under the 
command of Fyodor Apraksin, were able to seize some of the defenses of Azov 
near the Don River. Their position, however, became precarious when Gordon's 
troops stopped pressuring the Ottoman defenders, who immediately transferred 
men to the west sections. Apraksin, who did not receive any assistance from the 
rest of the army and was pressed by the Ottomans, had to withdraw. The assault, 
which once again was a failure, was halted, and the Russians returned to their 
positions.  
                                                 
28Apart from the 500 Ottoman horsemen, additional Tatar units arrived and supported the harassment on the 
Russian lines and trenches. They totaled some 3-4,000 men; see Gordon, Dnevnik, 396, 11th September 1695. 




A 3,000 strong garrison was left to protect the newly established Fort 
Novosergievskiy gorod, which served as a starting point for further attacks on 
Azov. The rest of the army broke camp on 2nd October and began its march back 
toward Tsaritsyn. They were followed by a Tatar force of some 3,000 who 
attacked the Russian column on 3rd October, killing and wounding dozens and 
taking many men into captivity. It was Gordon's Butyrskiy Regiment which was 
able to withstand the charges and drive off the enemy. The withdrawal of the 
Russians was additionally troubled by the cold weather and the lack of supplies. 
Otto Anton Pleyer reports to Leopold I that along the road, many soldiers laid 
dead due to the frost and the lack food while steppe wolves were feasting on the 
dead.30 Peter's first attempt southward had failed miserably. 
 
The performance of the Russian army 
 
While following the course of the First Azov Campaign, several features have to 
be pointed out. First and foremost, a number of problems can be distinguished 
related to the human factor behind the Russian effort. As Gordon notes on few 
occasions in his diary, the troops under his command were inexperienced as 
were the officers.31 Unlike the Ottoman forces, comprised chiefly of the elite 
yeniçeri infantry, most of Peter's troops were either semi-regular streltsy or 
hastily assembled soldaty. As Bobrovskiy notes, only the four “new-model” 
regiments – the poteshny Semyonovskiy, Preobrazhenskiy, Lefortovskiy and 
Gordon's Butyrskiy regiments were of some considerable value, as proven in the 
drills the previous year. The rest of the army was of dubious quality “even given 
the fact that they were to fight the Turks”.32 Lack of experience was also 
combined with a lack of motivation and failure of discipline. The extremely long 
time necessary for the digging and establishing of a complete trench-line was 
precarious. It wasn't until September that Lefort's entrenchments were finally 
finished and linked to Gordon’s. Thus, it took more than two months to 
complete this essential task for any siege of the Age. In the meantime, Ottoman 
sorties were able to exploit the flaws of Russian defenses and inflict 
considerable damage to the besieging army. Further proof of troop 
incompetence comes from the fact that the sentries were surprised and 
overwhelmed by the defenders on several occasions, of which the 15th of July 
sortie being the most notorious example. Given the scale of the task, Peter 
should have considered engaging more men in the siege. Even though his forces 
outnumbered the defenders 5 to 1, their total number was insufficient to 
blockade Azov fully and fend off attempts at reinforcing the fortress. 
                                                 
30 Pleyer, “Report” in Ustrqylov, Istoriya, 582. 
31 For example, the journal entry for 4th August 1695 in Gordon, Dnevnik, 385-86, where the general evaluates 
the lack of experience and preparedness of his soldiers and officers for the following assault.  




Commanding officers were not immune to misconduct and mistakes. 
Gordon and Lefort's lack of cooperation became apparent on several occasions, 
as well as Golovin's inability to mobilize his men during the assaults or to 
support his companions in battle. The failure to build a circumvallation, as well 
as the lack of experience on such important matters as where and how properly 
to detonate mines, reveals a general lack of engineering skills among the 
Russian military elite. Peter is also to blame. The Tsar decided to sit most of the 
siege out, leaving the task to a joint command of three, equally-ranked generals. 
This proved disastrous, since the lack of coordination, as well as a single will, 
directing the effort, revealed its flaws during the two failed assaults. Peter's role 
as a military éminence grise could be explained with the lack of experience and 
the fear of failure during his first military endeavorIt was failure in south that 
brought down Golytsin and Sofia in 1689, after the devastating results of the two 
campaigns against Crimea. Therefore, it seems legitimate that Peter wanted to 
see how the expedition would progress. In case of success, he would step up, 
being part of the expedition and claim glory and prestige for his role. In the 
event of failure, he would step back and blame his generals, who, he would 
gracefully pardon, giving them a second chance. This scenario would repeat 
itself four years later during the Narva Campaign. Apart from his inefficient 
strategic commitment, the tsar also demonstrated his youthful thirst for 
decisiveness.33 In both 5th August and 25th September assaults, it was his desire 
for a quick endgame that drove Russian troops to the point of breaking. 
Neglecting Gordon's experience, Peter chose to trust his closer but unpracticed 
companions. What strikes is the lack of reaction from Lefort toward the rash 
tactics, favored by the tsar. Being an experienced soldier, he should have 
demonstrated more will and supported Gordon's proper evaluation. Gordon is 
erroneously labeled indecisive by Soviet historiography, a thesis, which is 
repeated in Davies's work.34 The Soviet argument insists that instead of laying 
siege to Azov, Gordon lost precious time building a dock on Koysug River, 
north of Azak, where he would receive supplies via the Don River. In the 
meantime, Davies notes, that the Turks were able to reinforce the garrison. This, 
however, was not the case. Gordon did, in fact, station his forces on the Koysug 
and built a dock for purposes of supply. His intention, however, was to build it 
as closer to Azov as possible. His effort was sabotaged by the lack of 
cooperation on behalf of the Cossacks who lost several days before being able to 
scout adequately the area for a spot, stationed nearer Azak and more suitable for 
port.35 Davies’s account regarding the failure to intercept the reinforcements is 
                                                 
33 Peter was 24 at the time. 
34 Davies, War, State and Society, 184; Davies quotes E.I. Porfiryev, Petr I osnovopolozhnik voennogo iskusstva 
russkoy regulyarnoy Armii i flota (Moscow: Voennoe izdatelstvo, 1952), 38-9. 




also incorrect since the garrison of Azov was strengthened as early as March 
when Gordon was yet in Tambov.36 
The lack of reliability on behalf of the Cossacks was to hinder Gordon's 
march ever since his arrival in the Pontic Steppe. The Cossacks proved 
halfhearted in their support even though the general brought with him an official 
proclamation from Peter, demanding full support and assistance to his army. As 
plainly as Gordon puts it, the Cossacks would not cooperate until the tsar would 
arrive with the main army. They were reluctant to clash with the Tatar or 
Ottoman forces unless the proper number of Russian troops was present. They 
did prove their value during the second assault of Azov, but still - the lack of 
initial action, as well as the indecisiveness of the skirmishes with the Tatar 
forces, acting in the Russian's rear - diminished their overall contribution to the 
1695 effort. 
The second feature that should be noted are the logistics. The first 
impression is of massive provisioning of food rations and military supplies, 
which Peter demanded for the campaign.  A closer look at the figures should be 
taken. According to an official report, the tsar required a total of 180,000 liters 
of sbiteny, 540,000 liters of wine, 140,000 fishes, 163, 000 kilograms of meat, 
etc. Though these numbers are impressive, it must be taken into account that 
these provisions were supposed to feed 30,000 men. Moreover, each person 
would receive 18 liters of wine, 6 liters of sbitny, 4 ½ fishes, 5 ½ kilogramas of 
ham, 1.3 kilograms of butter and 4.3 kilograms of salt. Assuming that the daily 
ration per soldier was 400 grams of meat, 100 grams of butter and a cup (200 
ml) of wine, this means that the above-mentioned supplies would suffice for 90 
days (the wine), 30 days (the sbitny), 14 days (meat), 13 days (butter) and 11 
days (fish). Alcohol would probably have to replace water at some point, given 
the fact that the campaign takes place during the summer heats, as well as 
bearing in mind that at that time the Don Valley was not abundant with water, 
suitable for drinking. All in all, Peter had calculated a half month's share of 
supplies for his troops, and it took two weeks only to place the batteries 
correctly in front of Azov. The troops would have to rely mainly on additional 
supplies, which had to be brought down the Volga or the Don rivers with fleets 
of riverboats. In the context, the idea of Gordon for building a second naval 
dock on river Koysug seems even more appropriate. Securing the lines of supply 
was also problematic. It was not until mid-July that the Russians were able to 
take some of the watchtowers, held by Ottoman troops, turning them into their 
strong points. Even so, the Tatar and Ottoman cavalry units continued to harass 
the supplies of the besiegers. As the withdrawal from Azov demonstrates, food 
                                                 
36 Gordon, Dnevnik, 360-1, 21st June 1695: “The Greek [deserter] had come to Azov for the purpose of trading in 
January. On his arrival, the garrison consisted of 3,000 troops. In March, a paşa named Murtaz arrived with 





was a substantial problem for the Russians throughout the campaign, since in the 
end they were dying out of hunger. 
Apart from food itself, transportation proved to be another point of 
logistics' misconduct. As early as April, Gordon was suffering from the lack of 
carts and wagons to transport his troops as supplies. Things reached a point 
where the streltsy were refusing to march unless the general would not meet 
their requirements for additional transportation.37 Similar problems were 
encountered by Peter, regarding the riverboats which had to transfer the army 
from Moscow to Tsaritsyn. Even though over 1,200 vessels were required, the 
cargo proved to be overwhelming for the small river rafts and the longboats. In 
the end, the main force was significantly delayed since the headwind made 
navigating in the Oka and Volga rivers almost impossible. In addition, upon 
reaching Tsaritsyn, it turned out that the number of horses, required for the 
transportation of supplies, was quite insufficient, and only 500 animals were 
available.38 The same problem was faced by Gordon in Tambov, where no more 
than 28 out of 750 horses, recruited from the serfs, turned out to be fit for 
service. Thus, on many occasions, soldiers had to carry the munitions and 
supplies together with their belongings, which significantly reduced the speed of 
the army. Gordon's force provides an example. While marching only with the 
Butyrskiy Regiment, the General was able to achieve an average speed of 33 
kilometers per day. However, with the growing of his army and supply train, and 
with entering the marshy plains of Eastern Ukraine, crisscrossed by rivers and 
streams, the army speed dropped to an average of 15 kilometers per day. The 
river flotilla under Golovin, Lefort and Peter did not do much better. 
As Brian Davies puts it, the manner in which Peter, Gordon, Golovin, and 
Lefort conducted their First Azov Campaign (1 May–1 October 1695) shows 
some effort to learn from the logistical errors that had undermined both of 
Golitsyn’s Perekop expeditions.39 On the other hand, the military conduct also 
demonstrates that the military drills and maneuvers, carried out by Peter in 1694 
were simple field war games, which had little to do with actual fighting. Lack of 
coordination, the Peter’s reluctance to assume the overall command or pass it to 
a single person, as well as the inadequacy of the logistics prove that Peter was 
on the right track, but a long way lay ahead before the expected results could be 
reached. The next campaign carried out in the summer of 1696 would reveal the 
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38 Porfiryev, Petr I osnovopolozhnik voennogo, 37. 








Following his departure from Azov, Peter wrote letters to the king of Poland-
Lithuania (at the time it was Jan III Sobieski) and to the “emperor of Rome” 
(kesariya rimskago), Leopold I that the Russian army was able to conduct a 
large-scale campaign, against the “enemies of Christendom”, taking several 
fortresses on the Dnieper River and conquering a few outpost on the Don 
River.40 The tsar had to admit his failure to capture Azov due to lack of guns, 
munitions and capable engineers.41 Peter hoped, in his own words, and as God’s 
will, he would be able to capture Azov next year, descending on the fortress 
with a larger army. To fulfill his goal, Peter asked the Polish to strike harder the 
Ottomans in the west and of the Austrians - to provide him with able engineers, 
who would assist his artillery crews.42 Such words, coming from a proud and 
strong-willed man like Peter demonstrate the frustration he had felt during the 
last days of September 1695. Although he conducted preparations, meticulous 
in his perception, the whole endeavor had failed miserably, blasted by the 
incapability of Russian engineers and the lack of synergy between the 
commanding generals. Lessons, however, were learned and this time, Peter 
assured his allies and probably himself that the tsar would walk away with 
victory.  
Peter began preparations for the next campaign only a week after his 
return from the previous one. On 27th November 1695 a military council was 
held, including generals Lefort and Gordon, as well as several high-ranking 
boyars from Peter's inner circle – Streshnev, Troekurov and Naryshkin families, 
which helped Peter assert his power in 1689. During the council, Peter laid out 
the main reasons for his lack of success – the inability to surround Azov 
accurately, the lack of fleet, which would block the Don's mouth and prevent 
Ottoman reinforcements from Azak, and finally – the absence of a single 
commander, undertaking the siege and responsible only to Peter.43 The first step 
was to choose overalla leader for the following year. His name was Aleksey 
Semyonovich Shein. Shein was Russian noble of an ancient heritage.44 His 
grandfather, Mikhail Shein led the Russians in the ill-fated Smolensk War 
(1632-1634), after which he fell from grace and was sent into exile. Aleksey 
Shein was able to return to favor during the regency of Sophia and took part in 
the two Crimean Campaigns, after which he changed side and placed his 
                                                 
40 The Information was not quite correct, because Sheremetev had to abandon most of his gains when retreating 
back to Russian held lands. 
41 Ustryalov, Istoriya, 257. 
42 Messengers were also sent to Venice and Berlin, asking for coordinated actions against the Turks. 
43 Bobrovskiy, Istoriya, 87. 





fortunes with Peter. He was elevated for commander of the guards’ regiments, 
in which amploa he took part in the First Azov Campaign.  
According to E. Porfiryev, Peter chose Shein, because he could use him as 
a façade, behind which the tsar would maintain personal command.45 However, 
knowing what happened at Azov in 1695 and four years later at Narva, 
Porfiryev's idea can be elaborated. To put it in other words, Peter again picked a 
stunt double, who would take credit for any failure, or step back, overshadowed 
by his master's glory in case of victory. This is further confirmed by his original 
choice of overall commander – Knyaz Mikhail Alegukovich Cherkasskiy. 
Cherkasskiy was an elder man, close confidant of Peter's mother Nataliya 
Narishkina, who served as a voevoda of Novgorod and Kiev in the 1660s and 
1670s. By the time of Azov, however, he was far from his prime and would 
serve well for the tsar's purpose. Cherkasskiy's ailing health, however, 
prevented him from joining the campaign and Peter was obliged to use Shein, 
another officer, whose rise to prominence was closely linked to that of Peter. 
The second point of matter was the necessity for a naval force, which was 
to blockade the Don River. Peter proclaimed himself ship-master and appointed 
Leford Admiral. Several companies of the Semyonovskiy and Preobrazhenskiy 
regiments were attached to Lefort's command as a naval regiment.46 It was 
responsible for the manning of 30 galleries and over 1300 boats, which were to 
transfer the army southwards.47 The flotilla had to be built and ready to sail by 
March 1696. The idea of a new navy, constructed out of the blue, was, in any 
case, strange. Peter possessed no practical knowledge of shipbuilding and 
neither did his subordinates. Lefort himself was a Geneva-born Swiss, whose 
closest connection with water was the famous lake near his hometown. 
Nevertheless, Peter, stubborn and ambitious, urged the matter forward. To 
provide the required know-how, foreigners, mainly Dutch and Englishmen were 
brought in and settled in Preobrazhenskoe and Voronezh to supervise and plan 
the construction of the vessels.48 In addition, the tsar mobilized a considerable 
number of smiths and carpenters, as well as snipers, gathered from his realm on 
                                                 
45 Porfiryev, Petr I osnovopolozhnik voennogo, 42. 
46 The naval regiment consisted of 4,000 troops, part from the guards regiments, part provided by recruitment. 
They were divided into 28 companies; see Ustryalov, Istoriya, 261; Porfiryev, Petr I osnovopolozhnik voennogo, 
42. These 4,000 were headed by 94 officers; see V.G. Ruban, Pokhod boyarina i bolyshago polku voevody 
Alekseya Semenovicha Sheina k Azovu, vzyatie sego i Lyutika goroda i torzhestennoe ottudy s pobedonosnym 
voinstvom vozvroshchenie v Moskvu (St. Petersburg, 1773), 32. 
47 Bobrovskiy (Istoriya, 87) estimates that over 1,000 boats were required; According to Ustryalov, Peter 
demanded that 1,300 boats, 32 to 36 meters long and 4.7 to 5.65 meters wide (Istoria, 260); Almost the same 
amount is repeated in Porfiryev's work (E.I. Porfiryev, Petr I osnovopolozhnik voennogo, 42). Porfiryev 
elaborates on the numbers – 1,300 boats 30 to 35 meters long and 5 to 6 meters wide, in addition 300 seagoing 
boats and 100 wooden rafts. 
48 Most of them were acquired “willingly or unwillingly” from the port of Arkhangelsk, where Apraksin served 
as governor; see Ustryalov, Istoriya, 259, quoting a letter by Peter to Apraksin. According to the letter, Apraksin 
was to recruit Dutch and English seamen, who were anyhow trapped in Arkhangelsk for the winter, while the 
White Sea was frozen. These men were to be sent to Voronezh and Preobrazhenskoe in order to support the 





an unprecedented level.49 Quality and determination overcame the laws of logic 
and by the end of March a fleet consisted of 23 galleys, two galleasses, and four 
branders were ready to sail down the Don River.50 As with the choice of Shein, 
Peter bestowed admiralship on Lefort – a man with no knowledge of sailing, a 
mere puppet, leading his fleet and convinient to take any blame in case of 
failure. 
Together with the preparation of a naval force, Peter set forth the 
reestablishment of the land army. For that purpose, a proclamation was read 
throughout Moscow, urging all servicemen to fulfill their duty and also calling 
for volunteers (okhotniki) among the local population. Ustryalov claims that the 
latter were in abundance, since there were a lot of hungry and poor townsmen 
and serfs, who sought the army as a place where they could find food, clothing 
and shelter. Several days later, on 13th December, a large number of serfs left 
their masters’ estates and enlisted in Preobrazhenskoe, while their women and 
children settled on the tsar's property there.51 The Cossacks hetman Mazepa was 
ordered to send no fewer than 15,000 men to Azov, while B. Sheremetev, 
voevoda of Belgorod had to dispatch a contingent of 10,000 divided into seven 
regiments under the command of General Karl Rigeman. The call for troops, 
proclaimed at the end of November resulted in the following numbers. The 
servicemen from Moscow provided 3,816 men, 3,500 of whom were organized 
into 37 cavalry companies, the commanders of which were chosen from their 
ranks. The other 316 were designated to perform supporting duties in the 
irregular forces and the supply train. They were also assigned as watchmen in 
the camps. Thirty soldaty regiments were raised, numbering some 32,590 men 
along with streltsy regiments, numbering 9,597 troops.52 Apart from the 15,000 
Cossacks, provided by Mazepa, the Don Cossacks had to raise additional 5,000 
footmen and horsemen. The Kalmyks were to send 3,000 horsemen while 500 
men had to be supplied by the Yaik Cossacks and the Lowland streltsy. Thus, 
the total number of the army, which had to march on Azov, was 69,735 men.53 
                                                 
49 More than 20,000 men worked at the dockyards and on the caravans bringing materials; see Porfiryev, Petr I, 
42. 
50 E.V. Tarle, Russkiy flot i vneshnyaya politika Petra I, (Brask, 1994), Chapter II 
(http://rumarine.ru/books/4/Evgeniy-Tarle_Russkiy-flot-i-vneshnyaya-politika-Petra-I/ - accessed on 
16.02.2016); Porfiryev, Petr I osnovopolozhnik voennogo, 42; Porfiryev gives some details about the ships. The 
largest galley had 38 vessels, 5 cannons and a crew of 173 men. The galleasses were larger, carrying 36 guns 
each. 
51 I.A. Zhelyabuzhskiy, “Dnevyie zapiski” in Rozhdenie Imperri (Moscow: Fond Sergeya Dubova, 1997); Later 
on, after the war with Sweden had begun and when Peter set forth his reforms, the aristocracy was keen on 
discouraging him from performing such allocations of serfs. 
52 Ustryalov estimates a total of 38,800 soldaty. This is the only figure, which differs from Ruban's account; see 
following note. 
53 Ustryalov puts the total at 75,000, while Ruban states that 64,735 “soldiers on foot and horse” comprised the 
army under Shein; see V.G. Ruban, Pokhod boyarina, 56. Ruban, however, does not take into account the 5,000 
Don Cossacks, raised by their hetman Frol Minaev, who are listed in Ustryalov. If these Cossacks are applied to 
Ruban's account, then the number rises to a total of 69,735 soldiers. Ustryalov gives a total of 75,713 troops. 
However, he notes that “details on the complete composition of the army can be found in Ruban's description of 




The soldiers from the soldaty and the streltsy regiments were divided into three 
corps led by Gordon (14,150), Golovin (13,738) and Rigeman (10,299).54 
Additional 4,000 men were issued as infantry in Lefort's fleet. The army had to 
be gathered and prepared for departure before 20th March 1696 and to arrive at 
Cherkassk no later than 1st May.55 What is important to note is the disproportion 
between streltsy and soldaty in the composition of the infantry. While in the 
first campaign the streltsy were the predominant percentage of the footmen, in 
the second - Peter switched the emphasis on the soldaty, which now comprised 
over two-thirds of the infantry. This could easily be explained by the flaws and 
problems, which the streltsy demonstrated not only during their march south but 
also with their battlefield performance during the siege, especially concerning 
their guard duties and lack of zeal during charges and counter charges. The 
proportion of cavalry was also raised. While only 5-6,000 of the 30,000 at the 
First Azov Campaign were horsemen (a fifth), now there were aroundd 23,500 
mounted troops in Peter's army (constituting over 30 per cent of the total force). 
Again most of them were Cossacks. Apparently Peter constructed a force, 
which was better suited not only for carrying out the siege but also for the 
protection from Tatar raids on the flanks and rear. 
The letters to Vienna and Berlin proved fruitful. Leopold I, who excused 
himself with the preoccupation of his engineer corps in Italy and Hungary, was, 
despite all, able to send artillery Colonel Cassimir de Gragen, along with two 
                                                                                                                                                        
however, state a source for the listed numbers. In addition, the figures, mentioned in his book, account for no 
more than 63,117; see Porfiryev, Petr I, 43. 
54 In detail: Gordon’s force consisted of the Butyrskiy Regiment – 995 men (35 officers and staff and 960 
soldiers); Four Tambov regiments – 4,298 men (198 officers and staff and 4,100 troops, 1,025 for each 
regiment); Two Lowland (Nizovoy) regiments – 2070 men (35 officers and staff and 2,000 troops – 1,000 per 
regiment); Two Ryazan regiments – 2,067 men (67 officers and staff and 2,000 troops – 1,000 per regiment); 
Moscow streltsy regiments - 1st – 681 men (10 officers and 671 streltsy), 2nd - 842 men (11 officers and 831 
streltsy), 3rd – 618 men (9 officers and 609 streltsy), 4th – 781 men (10 officers and 771 streltsy); 5th – 581 men 
(9 officers and 572 streltsy), 6th – 667 men (9 officers and 658 streltsy), 7th – 585 men (9 officers and 576 
streltsy), or a total of 67 officers and 4,688 streltsy. Altogether, Gordon commanded 13,748 soldiers and 402 
officers and regimental staff members. 
Golovin's force: Preobrazhenskiy Regiment – 810 men (35 officers and staff and 775 soldaty); Nizovoy 
regiments: from the Kazan prikaz - 1st – 1,031 men (30 officers and staff and 1,001 soldaty), 2nd – 1,031 men (31 
officers and staff and 1,000 soldaty), 3rd – 1,031 men (31 officers and staff and 1,000 soldaty); Ryazan 
Regiments from the Inozemnyy (foreign) prikaz - 1st – 1,032 men (32 officers and staff and 1,000 soldiers), 2nd – 
1,034 men (34 officers and 1,000 soldaty); Vladimirskiy Regiment – 776 men (32 officers and 744 soldaty); 
Novgorodskiy Regiment – 500 men; Smolenskiy regiments: 1st – 1,013 men (13 officers and 1,000 soldaty), 2nd 
– 507 men (7 officers and 500 soldaty) - altogether – 245 officers and 8,520 soldaty; Streltsy regiments: 1st – 959 
men(12 officers and 947 streltsy), 2nd – 932 men (12 officers and 920 streltsy), 3rd – 633 men (9 officers, 624 
streltsy), 4th – 883 men (11 officers, 872 soldaty), 5th – 683 men (9 officers, 674 streltsy), 6th – 883 men (11 
officers, 872 streltsy) – altogether – 4,909 streltsy and 64 officers. In total, Golovin commanded 13,429 troops 
and 309 officers. 
Rigeman's force: Efremovskiy Regiment – 1,724 men (28 officers and staff and 1,696 soldiers); Livenskiy 
Regiment – (31 officers and 1,650 soldiers); Voronezhskiy Regiment – 1,579 men (29 officers and staff and 
1,550 soldiers); Dobrinskiy Regiment – (27 officers and staff and 1,570 soldiers); Usmanskiy Regiment – 1,645 
men (28 officers and staff and 1617 soldiers); Kozlovskiy Regiment – 1,563 men (15 officers and staff and 1,548 
soldiers); Starooskolyskiy Regiment – 511 men (20 officers and staff and 491 soldiers); altogether – 10,122 
soldiers and 178 officers; see Ruban, Pokhod boyarina, 32-56. Porfiryev gives other numbers – 14,000 for 
Golovin, 14,177 for Gordon and 10,500 for Rigeman; see Porfiryev, Petr I, 43.  




engineers – de Lavalet and Baron Borgsdorf, along with seven miners and four 
artillerymen. Friedrich III of Brandenburg sent two engineers – Georg Rosse 
and David Goltsman, along with four artillerymen. They were supposed to 
reach Smolensk in April. They finally came to Azov at the end of July, and 




The campaign began on 1st April, after a harsh winter and incessant rains and 
storms in March, which prolonged the time, required for the preparation of the 
fleet. Nevertheless, by the beginning of April, the weather considerably 
improved and the Don River, overflowed due to the rains in March, was ideal 
for sailing downstream. The first unit to move southward was Gordon's corps, 
or, at least, part of it, comprising of four streltsy regiments and the Butyrskiy 
Regiment, altogether 3,500 men.57 They had to board the large number of 
vessels and to escort munitions and guns, needed for the siege. The military 
equipment had to be stored at Novosergeevskiy fort, while food supplies had to 
be allocated at Korotoyak, from where the food would be transported to Azov.58 
Gordon's men along with additional 4,000 marines, embarked on one galley and 
104 riverboats, and departed from Voronezh on 23rd April, a week after Lefort's 
naval expedition59 Two days later he was followed by Golovin with the 
Preobrazhenskiy and Semyonovskiy regiments, and later on - by the rest of the 
army under Shein. Unlike Gordon's troops, the bulk of the land force was to 
travel on foot to Azov, via the Don Valley. Detached from the main force, 
Rigeman's corps of seven regiments moved out of Voronezh in order to serve as 
rearguard. Following the land force, several segments of the fleet departed 
during the first week of April. 
Unlike the previous march south, which lasted over two months, this time, 
Peter's forces were able to reach Azov in only five weeks or so. Gordon arrived 
first under the walls of Azak on 16th May, just three weeks after departing from 
Voronezh and by the beginning of June was followed by the rest of the army, 
coming in segments. Peter, who commanded the naval vanguard, reached the 
Lower Don only a day after Gordon, although the tsar had left Voronezh ten 
days later than the general.60 During the sailing south, on 8th May, Peter issued 
                                                 
56 Ustryalov, Istoriya, 269. 
57 Ibid.; According to Bobrovskiy, the streltsy were 2,474 men of which 128 were officers; see Bobrovskiy 
Istoriya, 88. This leaves the Butyrskiy Regiment with 1,016 officers and troops. Bogoslovskiy estimates a total 
of 3,474 men under Gordon, which leaves 1,000 soldiers and officers in the Butyrskiy Regiment; see M.M. 
Bogoslovskiy, Petr I. Materialy dlya biografii, 1672-1697, vol 1 (Gospolitizdat, 1940) 303. 
58 There were around 94,000 ton of wheat and grains; see E.I. Porfiryev, Petr I, 44.These were transported on 73 
boats, departing from Korotoyak on 27th April; see Bogoslovskiy, Petr I, 304 and 309. 
59 Ustryalov, Istoriya, 269; Khronologicheskiy ukazately, 3. 
60There seems to be a major dissonance between the sources. According to a note in Ustryalov (Istoriya, 272), 
Gordon Reached Azov on 14th May, Shein on 19th May and Lefort on 23rd May. However, a page later he 
contradicts, noting that Gordon and Peter came under Azov on 18th May (Ibid. 273); According to 




the first naval regulations for his sailors. These included: the order of command, 
the strict line of communications, which was to be maintained,  the necessity for 
coordination between vessels, and a ban on any shift from the predetermined 
course. Failing to report for duty during battle, helping another ship in distress 
or diverting from the course in the face of the enemy were all crimes, 
punishable by death.61   
The flotilla vanguard and Gordon's troops coordinated their movement 
upon reaching Cherkassk and then departed for Azov, carrying with them guns 
and shells, stored from the previous expedition. In the meantime, Peter received 
a word that a Cossack band of 250 men attacked three Ottoman galleys in the 
mouth of the Don River. Although the Cossacks lost only four men and were 
able the do some damage to the enemy vessels, the boards were too high for a 
successful boarding and retreat was sounded, leaving the Turks' ships at sea. 
These vessels were carting provisions for the garrison at Azov and Peter 
decided to seize them as fast as possible. According to the plan, designed by the 
tsar, Gordon would travel downstream Don and fortify his position on Kalancha 
Island, where the previous year Dolgorukov's fort was built, while Peter would 
attack with the galleys, take the Ottoman vessels and transport the captured 
provisions to Gordon's position. Gordon, heaving mustered his men early in the 
morning, went according to the plan and by noon on 18th was able to retake 
Kalancha Island and thus block any attempt by the Azak garrison to assist the 
vessels at the Don's mouth. Gordon had left with his Butyrskiy Regiment as 
well as three streltsy regiments while the fourth boarded the nine galleys under 
Peter. A Cossack force, mounted on 40 boats, accompanied the tsar. The fleet 
was to travel westward and engage the Ottomans. Following a brief expedition 
on 19th May, Peter returned to Novosergeevskiy fort and left a Cossack force of 
250 men to observe the sea. The reason for this was because a larger Ottoman 
fleet had arrived, and the tsar did not want to risk an open battle.62 The 
following night, an Ottoman convoy of 13 transport vessels (tunbas) and 11 
small ships, manned by yeniçeri tried to sail upstream to reach Azov.63 As it 
turned out several days later, the Ottoman fleet was comprised of 13 galleys, 
along with the above mentioned 13 cargo ships and 11 small vessels (ushkol). 
The Cossacks under Minyaev were able to sink nine cargo ships and to capture 
one. The Ottomans also lost two galleys – one burned by the Cossacks and one - 
scuttled by themselves. The Cossacks were able to capture over 300 artillery 
shells, 5,000 grenades, 450 muskets and 86 barrels of gunpowder. Large 
quantities of grain, vinegar, rice, bread and wine syrup were also acquired along 
with a significant amount of cloth. Twenty-seven Turks were taken into 
                                                                                                                                                        
date 18th May for Gordon's arrival at the Novosergeevskiy fort, after reaching Cherkassk on 14th May. The same 
date appears in Bogoslovskiy, Petr I, 312. 
61 Ustryalov, Istoriya, 271; Bogoslovskiy, Petr I, 310-1. 
62 Bogoslovskiy, Petr I, 314; Ustryalov, Istoriya, 275. 




custody, revealing that a total of 800 reinforcements were to join the Azak 
garrison.64 The victory was celebrated with gunshots from the Russian ships. 
On 26th May Shein arrived together with Lefort's marines and ships, 
bringing the bulk of the Russian army in position for opening the trenches 
against Azov. Two days later, Rigeman's corps along with several thousand 
Cossacks also reached Azov, ending the major deployment process. The center 
of the Russian position was held by Golovin with the guards’ regiments and the 
main artillery batteries. On his left Rigeman stood with his seven regiments and 
4,000 Cossacks. The right flank was held by Gordon and his son Jacob, along 
with their soldaty regiments and streltsy. Shein broke camp at Golovin's 
position. On 7th June, the two forts, which according to Peter’s order had to 
block the Don River west of Azov, were finished and the army was ready to 
proceed with the siege. The trenches were opened on that same day and four 
days later the main body of the Russian fleet blockaded the mouth of Azov with 
22 galleys. Unlike the previous year, when Azak was strengthened with 
additional reinforcements, in 1696 the commander in chief of the fortress – 
Hassan Bey, received the promised 4,000 troops with a delay from Istanbul. It 
seems that the slow motion of Russian advance the previous year had misguided 
the Ottoman authorities, and the speed of the new Muscovite offensive was 
significantly underestimated. The biggest problem for Peter's army lay at the 
hands of the nuraddin sultan, the leader of the Crimean Tatars, who was able to 
join forces with the Nogai Horde at Kuban and to march north to relieve Azak. 
They raided the Russian fortifications for two weeks, but thanks to the lessons 
learnt in the previous years, the Muscovites were able to repulse the enemy with 
considerable ease. On 24th June the Moscow noble cavalry engaged a segment 
of the Tatar Host, striking a decisive blow, which allowed the besieging forces 
to continue their work on the fortress.65 In the meantime, by 16th June, Azov 
was finally fully circumvallated and a combined bombardment of all batteries 
began. In addition, at the mouth of the Don River, the Russians were able to 
repulse three landing attempts by the 4,000 Ottoman reinforcements, sent from 
Istanbul. This made any hope for the salvation of the garrison impossible. 
Nevertheless, success was not instant. While organization, transportation 
and deployment had considerably approved since last year, the siege works had 
not made significant progress. The failure to build up mining galleries was so 
grand that during 1696's siege the Russians decided not to use them at all. 
Again an assault was envisioned. Gordon, contrary to the common opinion, was 
obliged to begin the erection of an earthwork, which had to cross the ditch, 
reach the walls and even outgrow them, allowing the artillery to fire at Azov 
over its walls. Altogether 15,000 soldiers were daily used for the new project, 
with front units regularly engaging the Azak yeniçeri, who were trying to 
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sabotage the earthwork.66 After a hard work under the blazing summer sun, a 
battery of 25 cannons was placed on the rampart following the directions of 
Gordon. On 15th July the engineers of Leopold I finally arrived at Azov, 
putting their minds into action.67 Gordon's 25 cannon battery was rearranged 
and strengthened with six additional guns in order to inflict larger damage on 
the walls rather on the town behind them. After several days of bombardment, 
on 17th July, Gordon's men were able to capture a bulwark, exposed by the 
concentrated Russian fire. Any Ottoman resistance was quickly silenced and the 
Russians were able to fortify their new position. On the next day, acting on their 
own will, a force of 2,000 Cossacks under Frol Minaev and Ivan Lizogub was 
able to overcome a bastion, situated near Don, capture it and even to try to take 
over the central citadel.68 Their final assault was repulsed, but the Cossacks 
were able to occupy the bastion. Hassan Bey was left with a single option – 
surrender. 
Azov surrendered on 19th June. The paşa gave to Shein and Peter 16 flags 
and the town keys. 3,000 strong Ottoman garrisons, with their full armament, 
departed the fortress on a small flotilla of Russian galleys and boats, 
commanded by Adam Veyde. The Turks were escorted to the sea, where the 
Ottoman navy picked them. Ten regiments entered Azov to occupy the town, 
followed on the next day by the entire army. The Cossacks took advantage and 
tried to plunder Azak, but apart from kitchenware and private belongings, there 
was no treasure left for looting in the ruined town. The army remained in Azov 
until the end of July, when, one by one, the regiments and corps began to 
departure. A division of 6 soldaty and four streltsy regiments (8,305 men in 
total) was left under the command of Knyaz Pyotr Grigoryevich Lyvov.69  
 
The performance of the Russian army 
 
It is evident that the Russians performed better the second time, since they were 
able to capture their objective – Azov. However, the question remains to what 
extent they were successful. According to Russian historiography they were 
quite successful. Russian literature from both Imperial and Soviet Eras is 
                                                 
66 Bobrovskiy, Istoriya, 91. 
67 Ruban, Pokhod boyarina, 120. 
68 Ustryalov, Istoriya, 288; According to Ustryalov, boredom and lack of supplies was the major trigger for the 
Cossacks assault.  
69 Ruban, Pokhod boyarina, 161-8; In Detail: 1 regiment out of Lefort's marines – 30 officers and staff and 1,009 
soldiers under the command of Colonel Aleksey Vasilyev; From Gordon's force: a regiment from Tambov and 
the Lowland recruits – 31 officers and 1,169 soldiers under Colonel Ivan Vilomov; Ryazan Regiment – 17 
officers and 500 soldiers under Colonel Efim Efimov; Streltsy regiments - 1st – 11 officers and 677 streltsy under 
Colonel Feodor Afanasyev; 2nd - 9 officers, 563 streltsy and 149 soldaty under Colonel Ivan Ivanov; From 
Golovin's force: 1st regiment – 28 officers and staff and 1,105 soldaty under Colonel Vilim Vilimov; Ryazan 
Regiment – 16 officers and 500 soldaty; Moscow streltsy: 1st regiment – 10 officers and 808 streltsy under 
Colonel Afanasiy Alekseev; 2nd regiment – 9 officers and 621 soldaty under Colonel Tikhon Khristoforov; From 
Rigeman's force: Belgorod Regiment – 30 officers and 1,013 soldaty under Colonel Ivan Ivanov; Altogether – 




abundant with examples of the great effort which enabled substantial results in 
limited time in order to manifest the rise of a new military power. Either due to 
the adamant will and vision of the great “master”- the tsar, or to the large 
potential of the masses, used by the aristocratic class, Russia elevated itself a 
level higher. The colossal involvement of laborers in the construction of the 
fleet which appeared out of nowhere, the speed with which the army reached 
Azov – twice as fast as it did in 1695, as well as - the short period, separating 
the opening of the trenches (16th June) and the capitulation of Azak's garrison 
(18th July) are all evidences of the major transformation, which was 
accomplished for only a winter thanks to one determined monarch.  
With regard to the army movement, the main difference between the 
campaign of 1695 and 1696 is the point of departure. In the previous 
expedition, Peter launched his fleet from Moscow, traveling via river Oka all 
the way down the Volga River to Tsaritsyn, roughly 2,500 kilometers. The fleet, 
transporting the bulk of the army, the entire siege train, as well as most of the 
resources, required exactly 38 days (from 30th April to 7th June) in order to 
reach Tsaritsyn. All in all, Peter's fleet had covered 65 kilometers per day, while 
Gordon marched 15 kilometers per day after departing from Tambov. In 1696 
Peter traveled roughly 900 kilometers from Voronezh to Cherkassk, covering 
the distance for 11 days, or to put it in other words - marching 80 kilometers per 
day. This was significantly faster than the previous campaign, although this 
time there was no major issues with the weather. The same distance had to be 
covered on foot by the main army under Shein. The Russians performed twice 
as good, reaching up to 30 kilometers per day. Regarding movement speed, the 
Petrine force did achieve significant progress compared to the previous year. 
Planning of the routes, as well as placing the main supply bases was also better 
thought about. Voronezh, which controlled the middle Don, was excellent port, 
from which an expedition southward could be launched. Also, Peter picked the 
time accurately, waiting for the late winter and early spring rainfalls and storms 
to pass, and at the same time using the overflowed river, without risking the 
ships. Taking note of the overburdening of the boat flotilla in 1695, Peter and 
his generals were wise enough to transport the main army on foot and to use 
ships only for the few navy-transported troops, as well as to issue a demand for 
more vessels for the transportation of munitions and armament. All in all, over 
1,500 vessels were used in comparison to roughly 1,200 the previous year. 
However, in 1696 most of the river boats (strug) were commissioned in larger 
size than the former, which traversed the Volga River in 1695. This allowed for 
a greater cargo, without slowing or hampering the movement.  
The supply of the army was another important feature upon which the rate 
of success when it comes to military transformation could be measured. The 
main difference comes from the fact that the provisioning of the army was 
transported separately from the main force, using the Volga River. The 73 




from their departure from Korotoyak. The Russians did their best to provide 
more horses for the transportation of supplies from the Volga to Don rivers 
(over 800 animals were provided, compared to fewer than 500 in the previous 
year). Unlike the information about the previous year, the exact amount of the 
provisions is not known. Around 94,000 tons of grains and wheat were 
provided. It can be estimated that each soldier would receive 13 kilograms of 
grain and wheat which are the rough equivalent of 1,500 pieces of bread. Even 
if a man consumed single bread per day, this still left an abundant amount of the 
most fundamental food a soldier requires.  
The next feature that should be pointed out is the establishment of a navy. 
All in all, approximatelly 30 vessels were built, along with over 1,300 boats and 
rafts. 20,000 men were gathered, involving carpenters, builders, and especially 
serfs. It is misleading to think that no such thing previously occured in the 
history of Russia. The first Russian wind-guided vessel – the Frederick was 
built in 1636 and sent to the Caspian Sea to protect its trade routes. It was, 
however, destroyed by a storm. The second famous ship – Orel, was a frigate, 
based on the Dutch pinnace model. It was built in 1667 for the same purpose as 
the Frederick, but in 1669 Orel was sunk by the rebellious Cossacks, who 
captured Astrakhan under the command of Stepan Razin. Apart from the ships, 
the Russians were quite skilled and accustomed to building riverboats of 
different scale. As the campaign of 1695 demonstrated, the Tsardom could 
provide over 1,200 vessels for a considerably short period. Therefore, the high 
number of boats, built in Voronezh, though still impressive is not surprising, 
given the fact that Peter had mobilized any able boat-builder and carpenter 
available in the realm. The acquisition of foreign sailors from Arkhangelsk 
increased the number of skilled and semi-skilled personnel significantly. 
Combine that with the abundance of materials, as well as people, able to carve 
wood for the purpose of sailing, then the establishment of thirty vessels over a 
period of five months would not seem as astonishing as it could be presumed.  
Finally, there is the central element of capturing a fortress – the siege. 
When the Russians reached Azak in mid-May, they were astonished to find out 
that the Ottomans had not destroyed the siege works, constructed under the 
guidance of Gordon the previous year.70 This gave Peter's men the chance to 
reoccupy their old positions and spend considerably less time in entrenching. 
Given the fact that Dolgorukov's fort on Kalancha Island was still standing and 
that a strong garrison existed at Novosergeevskiy fort, the prospects for 
upcoming success were far brighter. Peter did not settle for what he had 
received as a gift from destiny. The Kalancha fort was rebuilt and strengthened 
with additional guns. Two new fortifications build along the Don River, to the 
west of the town, possed a considerable number of cannons on their own. 
                                                 
70This had a lot to do with the fact that the 3,000 strong Ottoman garrisons had to protect Azov and observe the 
Russian enemies at Novosergeevskiy fort, who were of equal number. Since no reinforcements arrived prior to 




Finally, due to the larger number of men Peter brought, Azov was eventually 
circumvallated and cut from any source of supplies and reinforcements. 
Nevertheless, it turned out that the art of siege craft was still lacking. As already 
noted, mines were discarded as too dangerous, given the results from the 
previous year. After half a month of futile bombardment, assault seemed to be 
the only way, although Gordon protested vehemently, as he did the previous 
year. 15,000 men were preoccupied with the construction of a monumental 
earthwork, which would allow the army to fire at Azov over the walls (like the 
siege of Masada). In the meantime, front units confronted the garrison. As late 
as 15th June, there were no prospects of near victory. Then a miracle occurred. 
The arrival of the Austrian engineers and gunmen, though underestimated or 
neglected by Russian historiography, turned out to have a crucial role for the 
success of the siege.71 Only two days after Leopold I's men came into action, 
the first breaches of the main walls were achieved, followed by successful 
penetration in the southwestern section of the fortress. Two days later, the 
garrison capitulated.  
While the Russians were undoubtedly able to reinvigorate their effort, 
mobilize their potential and achieve a stunning out-performance of their 
previous attempt regarding logistics, movement and troop deployment, there 
were still some elements of the military organization, which needed to be 
polished. Above all, engineering was in precarious condition. It was evident that 
Peter's army lacked talented siege masters, who could take down enemy 
fortifications. While Patrick Gordon did possess some knowledge on the matter, 
his skills were more a product of a long military experience, rather than of 
particular training. While Peter did not need an engineering “rock-star”like 
Vauban, he could surely use men with the abilities of Grage. Though he was not 
a popular figure in the Habsburg army, he was still competent enough to 
capitalize on the chaotic preparations, arranged by the Russians upon his 
arrival. Peter's later reforms would emphasize on the training of an engineer 
corps, but it was not until the failure at Narva and the rough first two years of 
the Great Northern War that the Tsar decided to approach the matter more 
decisively.  
The structuring of the land forces was also an issue of concern. What the 
First Azov Campaign had hinted was that the large variety of different troop 
types burdened the performance of the army. Peter took some steps in that 
direction by reducing significantly the number of streltsy in comparison to the 
soldaty from the semi-standing regiments. Nevertheless, the lack of a permanent 
force was evident in the performance of the army during field battles and in the 
protection of the entrenchments. The best results were achieved either by the 
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Davies, who uses the former as his main source of information. Only Bobrovskiy acknowledges their important 




permanent standing regiments of the toy army (poteshny voyska) – 
Preobrazhenskiy, Semyonovskiy, Lefortovskiy and Butyrskiy, or by the 
Cossacks, who, though were not regular troops, were engaged in constant “little 
war” in the steppe, facing Ottoman garrisons and Tatar war bands. Again, it 
would require the humiliation of the grand Russian army at Narva before Peter 
would dare to dismantle and reshape his army.  
 
3.4. The Third Azov Campaign (1697) 
 
Following the successful capture of Azov, Peter began to plan his next big 
endeavor – the Grand Embassy. The idea to travel around Western Europe to 
study and understand the latest trends in the military, naval and administrative 
developments was not a novelty in European history. However, the usual 
practice was to send agents to conduct the observation and bring back the 
required data. Peter, always eager to test his abilities and to acquire firsthand 
knowledge, decided to leave Russia, to travel incognito, and venture around the 
Old Continent. In the meantime, his generals would have to figure out how to 
proceed with the southern campaign, following a general design, laid down by 
Peter. The tsar urged for the construction of a naval base in the Azov Sea, as 
well as for strengthening and extending Russia's grip on the lower Don. The 
Third Azov Campaign has received far less attention than the previous ones 
since Peter was absent. Still, it is a crucial point in projecting imperial power 
southward and should be included in any conclusive study of the period. 
 
Reforging Azov and the establishment of a southern navy 
 
On the day after Azov capitulated to the Russians, Peter began to restore the 
fortress. All the earthworks, batteries, and trenches were dismantled. The repair 
of the walls, as well as the bulwark and bastion, which the Russians captured on 
17th and 18th July 1696, also started. Engineers were assembled the task of 
surveying Azak and making a plan for reestablishment and further fortification 
of the town. Knyaz Lyvov was ordered to provide an inventory list of the 
captured military equipment in Azov and the Lyutik fort. Apart from the 
number of handguns and munitions, the Russians acquired 127 cannons of 
different caliber – 96 in Azov and 31 in the Lyutik.72 These were redistributed 
among the main fortification and the supporting outer forts. Three days later, on 
23rd July, a plan was brought to Peter. As it turned out, an upgrade of the 
fortress would consume a considerable amount of time and resources, and it 
was decided that only repairs of recent damage would be carried out. 
Rebuilding the fortifications took the army almost a month, and it was not until 
the end of August that Peter's forces were finally able to depart northward. 
                                                 




Simultaneously with the rebuilding of Azov, Peter began to investigate the 
Lower Don and the Azov Sea for a suitable location for the establishment of a 
naval base. After four days of sailing, the tsar and his generals finally spotted a 
suitable area. This was “rocky coast with cliffs and a deep sea level, which also 
possessed a spring with clear water”.73 It was called Taganrog. Here, Peter 
would develop the first real naval base in Russian history, giving birth to the 
Imperial Navy, which was, though slowly, to change permanently the balance 
of power in the Black Sea region.  
The location was idle since the Don would quickly overflow for most of 
the year, being overburdened by the high tides of the Azov Sea. Such natural 
obstacle could not be overcome, and a base, placed in the sea itself would prove 
far more practical. Since at the time Peter possessed only 26 battleships – 2 
galleasses and 24 galleys, it was decided that more had to be built if Ottoman 
naval supremacy was to be thwarted. As it turned out, the Treasury was left 
empty, and no money could be spared for the building of ships. To provide 
funding, the Duma was assembled, and the boyars voted for the establishment 
of “kumpanstva” (companies), each including several noble families and each 
being obliged to build one ship in 1697 and one - in 1698. Altogether, the Duma 
voted that 52 kumpanstva were to be established. Apart from these figures, 
Peter demanded new ships to be built in his absence. In total, the kumpanstva, 
along with the Admiralty and the Palace Department were to finance the 
construction of 80 vessels: one bombardier vessel, six galleys and 60 
brigantines for the Azov Sea and other ten ships for the Caspian Sea. The Azov 
vessels were to be constructed in Voronezh while the Caspian – in Kazan. Two 
years later, when Peter returned from his Grand Embassy, the results were not 
as good as he had hoped. Work was not carried out with the vigor expected by 
the tsar. Money and materials were insufficient and in the end, Peter was able to 




In the winter of 1696, the Russians began preparations for a new march south. 
No one in Moscow doubted that the Ottomans would try a counter-offensive, 
aimed at the capture of Azov. In the absence of Peter, Shein took again overall 
command of the army, while Rigeman and Gordon were to command the 
infantry. Gordon used the winter months to equipt his troops with new uniforms 
and to pay a wage to his soldiers, amounting to three rubles per soldier of the 
lower ranks and the NCO-s. When the spring came, Gordon was sent as a 
vanguard force, marching south along with 136 officers and 4,000 soldiers from 
the four Tambov soldaty regiments and the Butyrskiy Regiment. The main army 
                                                 




under Shein numbered 35,167 troops, over 12,000 of which were cavalry.74 At 
the beginning of April 1697 both army segments were ready to depart from 




Both Gordon and Shein left Moscow on 6th April. Gordon's troops had been 
sent in advance on 7th March, while their baggage train left Moscow on 12th. By 
mid-April the Butyrskiy Regiment reached the Sosna River, where Gordon 
caught up with them, still waiting for the four Tambov regiments, which arrived 
with a significant delay on 8th May. Shein reached the Urazova River on 9th 
May where he joined the main supply train and on the next day continued his 
march to Azov.76 Somewhere east of Belgorod the two armies merged and 
continued their unified march south, crossing many rivers and streams, staying 
vigilant for any enemy movement. After crossing the river Aydar, the main 
army continued its progress toward Azov, while Gordon and his regiments were 
sent forward by Shein to act as a vanguard on the Donets Valley. Gordon's task 
was to reach Myortvyy Donets opposite Azov as soon as possible, repair the 
fleet there and establish a postal service to coordinate the movement and the 
objectives of the Russian forces.77 Gordon finally reached Azov on 26th May, 
and while en route, he received dispatches that an Ottoman force was heading to 
the fortress. The Crimeans, on the other hand, did not participate in the 1697 
campaign, since at the time famine ravaged Crimea.78 Five days after Gordon, 
Shein also reached Azov and entrenched his forces on five hills, south of the 
fortress. By mid-June, Rigeman had brought the 4,000 Cossacks from Don and 
Ayuka Khan, the Kalmyk leader, brought his 3,000 horsemen. An interesting 
note by Gordon mentions that the Kalmyks received 200 sheep and 20 ovis each 
week for their food.79 
While waiting for the arrival of the enemy, Shein ordered his men, 
following the directions of the engineer la Valet, to construct another fort south 
of Azov and also to implement the plans for upgrading the main fortress, as laid 
down the previous year. Hornworks, ravelins, and additional earthworks were to 
                                                 
74 There were 9,571 reytary, kopeishchiky and servicemen of Moscow (cavalry), at least 10 regiments of soldaty 
(11,885 men), 5,817 streltsy (again some 10 regiments at least), 3,825 Don Cossacks, 1,066 Circassians and 
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75 The four Tambov regiments were to travel separately from Tambov, while Gordon with the Butyrskiy 
Regiment would depart from Moscow.  
76 There seems to be a mistake in Bobrovskiy's text, since the only river with a similar name is a small stream, 22 
kilometers long in the vicinity of Arkhangelsk.  
77 Bobrovskiy is quoting Gordon's diary. 
78 Bobrovskiy, Istoriya, 94. 
79 Ibid. Gordon's diary for 2nd-16th June,1697; On average, this meant some 8-9 tons of meat per week, if an 





be erected, along with counterscarps. Gordon's troops were sent to build the 
new fortifications from the northern part of Azov, next to the Novosergeevskiy 
fort.  
It was not until the first days of July that Shein received valuable 
information on the size of enemy forces. While previous rumors as usually 
exaggerated the actual size of the opposing side, a Cossack party under atman 
Aksen Boldyrev was able to cross the Kuban and investigate the enemy 
positions. As it turned out, the Nogais had joined the Ottoman effort, 
accompanied by the Kuban Tatars, as a Kalmyk ranger reported on 17th July. 
The entire enemy force was roughly 22,000 strong garrisons, with 2,000 
horsemen acting as a vanguard.80 
The Tatars' first attack came on 20th July, when the enemy vanguard 
pushed its way into the Russian camp, killing several and taking some more into 
captivity, before being driven back by the Russian infantry. Shein decided to 
pursue the Tatars and ordered his army into battle, going out of the 
encampment. The Tatar vanguard linked with the main force – 12,000 cavalry 
and 5,000 infantry and the enemies continued their attacks on the Russians.81 
The engagement continued for 4-5 hours, with several Tatar charges being met 
and repulsed by Russian artillery and infantry fire.82 Shein, though 
outnumbering the enemy, decided not to risk an attack, which would expose his 
position to the enemy horsemen and held his ground instead. Having suffered 
2,000 dead, the Tatars finally disengaged and retreated to the Kuban Steppe, 
unable to reform or continue their campaign on Azov. Russian losses are not 
mentioned but probably they were substantially fewer. The overall result of the 
engagement was that the Ottomans decided to recalculate their strategy and 
project their main forces against the forts on the lower Dnieper, which were 
taken by Sheremetev in 1695 and 1696.  
Until the beginning of August the Russian army remained stationed at 
Azov. After that Shein began to send his regiments to home. Ayuka Khan was 
the first to depart, receiving a ruble per each Kalmyk and additional gifts from 
the Khan and his nobles. Shein himself left on 8th August, leaving behind part of 
the streltsy to supplement Azov's garrison. Gordon with his men joined 
Dolgorukov at the Belgorod Line (cherta) to strengthen Russian position in the 





                                                 
80 Ibid. 
81 Khronologicheskiy ukazately, 4. 
82 Gordon estimates that it was 4 to 5 hours of fighting; Shein, who places the beginning of the battle at 11 a.m., 
uses the term “several hours”, while the Khronologicheskiy ukazately indicates that the whole engagement, along 
with the earlier Tatar incursion probably continued for 10 hours; see Khronologicheskiy ukazately, 4; 




The performance of the Russian army 
 
The main difference between the final Azov Campaign and the military actions 
of 1695 and 1696 derives from the fact that Peter I was not present. The army, 
however, was subordinated to a single commander – the voevoda Shein, which 
clearly suggests that the errors of split command were overcome following the 
successful siege of Azov in 1696. Shein was right to choose Patrick Gordon as 
his second in command, owning the Scotsman's experience with the terrain as 
well as the execution of marches and fighting against the Turks and Tatars, 
which Gordon had faced since 1687.  
Unlike the first two marches under Peter, there is no sufficient 
information about the exact road and speed of the Russian army. Bobrovskiy 
notes that there was a substantial delay on behalf of the Tambov soldaty 
regiments under Gordon. While not as fast as the movement in 1696, the speed 
of the Russian army was more or less the same as that in 1695. The fact, that the 
bulk of the forces were transferred on foot instead of using multiple ships, like 
in the previous year, contributes to the delay. Nevertheless, the Muscovite army 
was able to deploy at Azov before the enemies could organize any assault or 
siege.  
However, the defensive tactics applied by the Russians have to be pointed 
out. Instead of risking a march against the Tatar and Nogai positions around the 
Kuban River, Shein decided to entrench himself at Azov and wait for the 
enemy. Two primary factors could easily explain this. First and foremost, 
without Peter being present, Shein did not dare to risk an offensive, which could 
end with a fiasco, similar to Golytsin's failure against Crimea in 1687 and 1689. 
Secondly, there was nothing else to gain south of Azov. Apart from the 
Ottoman stronghold of Kaffa, the steppe south of the Don River was desolated 
in relation to cities or fortresses, which could be held and maintained to achieve 
expansion. Even if Shein moved against the Tatars and Nogais, he could only 
push them further south or drive them east to Circassia. In any case, his troops 
would march through harsh, waterless grassland with no hope for enough 
supplies. This situation would have ended either with inglorious retreat 
somewhere in July due to insufficient food and provisions, or with the trapping 
of the Russians, surrounded by the enemy cavalry. This would have been a grim 
prospect, similar to the Crusaders' downfall at Hattin, or Crassus' disaster at 
Carrhae.  
Regarding the actual Battle of Azov (20th July 1697), this campaign was 
also carried out carefully and without risking any chances. Shein took up a 
strong defensive position and waited for the enemy charges to drain the energy 
of the Tatars and Nogais. The Russians were in a better position – they could 
have remained in their camp for months without any need to strike out. If the 
Tatars were to achieve anything they had to charge their enemy's positions. 




In any case, the attack on the Russian camp was a military folly. As the result of 
similar raids in 1695 and 1696 demonstrated, the mounted forces of the Tatars 
were more or less useless against the fortified Muscovite camps. Only in a 
combination with the Ottoman infantry they could stand any chance of success. 
Thus, the engagement must be viewed in the context of Tatar frustration due to 
their inability to either subdue the Russians by a surprise raid, or ambush them 
in an open battle. By all means this was the same driving emotion, which made 
the Cossacks storm Azov on several occasions during the two sieges, even 
though no orders for such actions were given. In any case, the deployment of 
the Russian army suggests two things. Firstly, the Muscovite infantry was able 
to stand firm in the face of enemy charges, driving off infantry and cavalry with 
considerable success. Secondly, Shein did not put too much trust in his cavalry, 
since the later was used merely to hold the army flanks, with no information 
suggesting that there would be Russian mounted counter-attacks against the 
Tatars and the Nogais. Finally, the victory was won only after the Tatars 
disengaged and left southward, while the Russians remained masters of the field 
but did not initiate a persecution, probably fearing possible traps – a tactic, very 
common for a retreating steppe army. Thus, Shein, though not a military genius, 
was able to achieve victory simply by patience and caution and to obtain all of 
the campaign's goals. 
The Third Azov Campaign was as successful as the second one and 
demonstrated that the Russians were quickly learning their lessons, regarding 
steppe warfare and the execution of military marches on the Lower Don. While 
until 1687 Muscovy was on the defensive, using the military lines (cherta) to 
thwart Tatar raids with some success, the reforms of Aleksey and Fyodor, and 
the energy of Peter demonstrated that it was Russia, which from now on would 
go on the offensive. While movement and logistics had to be further improved, 
it was evident that the Russian army of the last decade of the seventeenth 
century was far superior in handling their task in the steppe than their ancestors 
during the first half of the same century or at the time of Ivan the Terrible. The 
increased usage of artillery and handguns had a lot to do with the greater 
success of the Muscovite troops not only in sieges but also when facing the 
enemy in the open field. In fact, it was the artillery that allowed Gordon to 
repulse the Ottoman-Tatar force before the first siege of Azov and again the 
cannons proved crucial for Shein's success in 1697. The experience acquired 
from the foreign engineers regarding siege warfare should not be 
underestimated, even though it was the Great Northern War and the sieges of 
Sweden's outposts in Ingria and Livonia which forged the Russian artillery as a 
substantial element of its military machine. The war with the Ottoman Empire 
wore on until 1701 with no significant action taking place between the two 
sides, since the Porte’s forces were preoccupied with the last Habsburg 
offensive in the Balkans. Following a devastating defeat at Zenta (1697), the 




strike back north and had to submit to Peter’s will, surrendering Azov and its 
surroundings as well as several forts on the lower Dnieper under the Treaty of 
Constantinople (1700). 
 




The Pruth Campaign is an essential, although not a decisive, part of the Great 
Northern War. Following an initial setback after the failure at Narva (1700), 
Russia was able to gain momentum, while Karl XII (r. 1697-1718) was 
preoccupied with the conquest of Poland-Lithuania. Simultaneously with 
Sweden's unbroken chain of successes in the south, Peter was able, by 
mobilizing the full potential of his realm, to mount a series of offensive 
expeditions and sieges, which brought down Scandinavian control over Ingria, 
Estland and Livonia. By 1706, when Karl triumphed in Poland, Peter became 
master of the North, driving the Swedes from Karelia as well. In 1707, Karl XII 
decided to invade Russia and to deal a decisive blow to the last remaining 
enemy of the Triple Alliance.83 In 1708, the Swedes had finally subjugated both 
Poland-Lithuania and Saxony and Karl could focus his entire effort to the East. 
In midsummer 1708 the Swedes crossed the borders of Russia and tried to 
provoke the Russians into a decisive battle. Peter, however, decided to apply a 
different strategy. Scourched-earth and constant maneuvering were used to 
torment and outperform the enemy. The tsar was well aware that his army was 
no match for the Swedes, and an open battle could prove disastrous for his 
cause. The winter, Russia's oldest ally, came to aid. The harsh weather of 
November to March 1708/9's proved to be one of the chilliest in European 
history. The Swedish army was decimated by frost, hunger, and disease, unable 
to conquer any firm hold in Russia. To worsen things further, following a 
Russian success against a Swedish vanguard at Lesnaya (8th October 1708), 
Peter was able to push his enemies deeper south, away from their supply 
centers. By April 1709, Karl's army was in full retreat toward Ukraine.   
The wounded king saw no choice but to try to obtain a permanent holding 
and besieged Poltava. While he led the siege, the field army was placed under 
Lewenhaupt to meet the relieving force, commanded by Peter and his generals, 
among which Boris Sheremetev and Aleksandr Menshikov. Lewenhaupt, 
thwarted by the poor condition of his army and the psychological pressure of a 
possible failure, was unable to demonstrate his full potential and the troops 
under his command were soundly defeated by the Russians. Three days after 
Poltava, the bulk of the Swedes were captured at Perevolochna (11th July 1709). 
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in 1701 Denmark was thrown out of the war. By 1708, Sweden had conquered almost the entire Commonwealth 




Of over 40,000 Swedes which stepped in Russia in 1708, only 15,000 remained, 
and they all fell into captivity, denying Sweden of the most battle ready element 
of its military machine. Karl XII, however, was able to run away and retreat to 
the Ottoman Empire, finding haven at the fortress of Bender. In 1710 Peter 
demanded from Ahmed III to hand over the Swedish king to the Russians. In 
turn, Karl was able to convince the sultan to strike the Russians in order to 
restore what he had been lost under the treaty of Constantinople. In November 
1710 Ahmed III broke off diplomatic relations with Peter and proclaimed war, 
sending Tatars and Zaporozhian Cossacks against the Russian lands in Ukraine. 
Peter was adamant in his response – war was to be fought, and the Ottomans 
had to be defeated decisively. His recent victory over Sweden, the beginning of 
the full-scale reform of his army and the victories over the Ottomans in 1695-
1697 were all factors, contributing to Peter's aplomb. The Ottomans had to be 
taught a lesson and Russia was to try to benefit from any future success by 
expanding its authority over the Pontic lands and even stretching further south - 




The Pruth Campaign has been studied in detail by the Russian historiography 
from the nineteenth century onward. Primary sources include Peter's campaign 
journal, as well as the Memoirs of Peter Henry Bruce, who served under the tsar 
during the march south.84 Another valuable source is the memoirs of Jean 
Nicolas Moreau de Brassey, who was part of the Russian army, as well as the 
notes of Just Juel, Denmark-Norway’s ambassador to Peter.85 The official 
histories of the Guard's regiments also provide substantial information on the 
campaign.86 Peter’s expedition in Moldavia has also been researched by Soviet 
historian Porfiryev.87 Recent insight is provided by Brian Davies in his study of 
empire and Military Revolution in Eastern Europe.88 A brief overview is 
presented in Nikolay Shefov's book on Russian battles.89 A recent article by 
Aleksandr Kulinich provides a short, yet exhaustive source, regarding the 
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preparations and the deployment of Russian forces in 1711.90 Kulinich gives a 
valuable new perspective on the organization and functioning of the Petrine 
army on campaign. He also tries to dispel some of the myths, regarding the 
conduct of the campaign, which have predominated Russian historiography in 




Immediately after the Ottoman Empire proclaimed its desire for war on 10th 
November 1710, Peter began to plan for the upcoming year and the measures he 
had to take in order to deal with the new threat south. The military engagement 
with the Ottomans would surely bring a wave of Tatar raids in Ukraine and 
Belarus, as well as a possible new attack on Azov, which was de jure granted to 
Russia according to the Treaty of Constantinople, following a de facto 
occupation in 1696, as noted above. The Ottoman Empire, which was able to 
overcome its military embarrassment following the War of the Holy League, 
had replenished its Treasury while the government was headed by a war party, 
supported by the sultan.91 The warmongers in the Istanbul court sought for 
opportunities to reconquer the lands, lost under the treaties of Karlowitz (1699) 
and Constantinople. Russia, entangled with a hard-fought war against Sweden, 
seemed to be the perfect target.92   
Peter's plan was to mobilize his resources and establish a massive body of 
troops which was to march south through Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldavia. The 
next step would be to reach the Danube and to block any Ottoman attempt to 
cross the great river. In the meantime, Russian contingents would assist the 
rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia in their uprising against the Ottoman 
authorities. If things had gone according to plan, all Ottoman lands north of 
Danube would have been occupied by Russia until the end of 1711, while a 
series of uprisings would have ignited among the Orthodox Serbs and the 
Montenegrians as Peter hoped.93  
                                                 
90 A.A. Kulinich, “Deyatelnosty russkogo komandovaniya v Prutskom pokhode 1711 goda”, Istoricheskie, 
filosofskie, politicheskie i yuridicheskie nauki, kulyturologiya I iskusstvovedenie. Voporsy teorii i praktiki 5, 43 
(Gramota, 2014), 109-13. 
91 It is interesting to note, that the Ottoman Empire and Russia had reached an agreement on their dispute about 
the future of Karl XII and in the beginning of 1710 a treaty, promoting a 30 year-long piece, was signed. The 
shift in the Ottoman position took place after the warlike Baltacı Mehmed Paşa, a royal eunuch, became grand 
vizier in the summer of 1710. Backed by the French diplomacy and the aspirations of the Crimean khan - Devlet 
Girei, the new vizier was able to convince Ahmed III that war was the best solution for the Empires’s problems, 
regarding the lack of prestige of the central authority, following the Holy League War; see Kulinich, 
“Deyatelnost russkogo komandovaniya”, 109. 
92 Later the Ottomans would fight against Venice (1714) and the Habsburg Empire (1716-1718), being able to 
reconquer Morea from the Serene Republic, but suffering a new military humiliation by the forces of Eugene of 
Savoy and loosing Serbia to the Austrians.  
93 Whether Peter was aware or not, between 1688 and 1689, the Orthodox and Catholic Bulgarians rebelled 
twice, rising against the Ottomans in support of the Habsburg armies fighting in Serbia. The Habsburgs were 
unable to support these rebellions and they were soon suppressed by the Ottoman army, initiating a series of 




Peter’s first task was to gather his forces and rearrange his strategy for the 
upcoming campaign season. While 1710 was dedicated to the capture of 
Livonia and Riga in particular, 1711 required the distribution of Russian troops 
on several fronts. The main emphasis was the southern front against the 
Ottomans. Here Peter allocated his main army. The tsar decided to concentrate 
his forces in three main columns. The first one, under Golitsin, would serve as a 
vanguard and secure the route via Dnieper toward northern Moldavia, and 
establish a chain of supply depotes along the way, preparing food and 
provisions for the main army, which were supposed to suffice for four months. 
For his task, Golitsin was to head a force of 10 dragoon regiments and to 
receive the tsar’s permission to extract provisions from Belarus and Western 
Ukraine. 
The main army under Sheremetev comprised of the cavalry and infantry 
units, distributed along the Livonian and Estland frontier. Sheremetev had to 
gather these forces and march south through Smolensk and Slutsk, and continue 
south to the Dnieper. Then Sheremetev had tocapture Iaşi – Moldavia’s capital, 
and muster as many supplies and men as possible.  
Finally, Peter himself had to lead the bulk of the infantry and the artillery, 
and to catch up with Sheremetev at Iaşi, from where the Russian united force 
would march further south and block Ottoman attempts for crossing the Danube 
River. Speed and surprise were the main elements of the Tsar’s strategy. Peter 
emphasized the need to act as quickly as possible and keep the initiative in 
Russian hands. He wanted to see Russian forces in Wallachia by May or early 
June. Peter estimated rightfully that it would take only a few weeks for the 
Ottoman army to march from its gathering center – Edirne to the Danube, less 
than 400 kilometers north from the old Ottoman capital.94  
A second force, under Apraksin, aided by the Don Cossacks and the 
Kalmyks was to march toward Azov and strengthen its garrison in case of 
possible Ottoman incursions. Finally, a 15,000 strong corps had to be sent to 
Pomerania to assist the Danes and the Poles in the capturing of Sweden’s 
strongholds in the key Baltic region. 
As the memoirs of Moreau de Brassey reveal, Peter’s plan was to 
construct a formidable, yet flexible force, separated into four main divisions, 
along with a considerable number of cavalry, formed into two dragoon units, 
which could act separately as a covering force or as a vanguard of the main 
army. The artillery was detached as a separate unit, under General Bruce. The 
main infantry force – some 48,800 men were allocated amongst four infantry 
divisions (11,200 men divided into eight regiments of 1,400 soldiers in each 
division), headed by the generals Weyde, Repnin, Hallart, and Dansberg. The 
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two dragoon divisions (there were 8,000 troops into eight regiments of 1,000 in 
each division) were commanded by generals Carl Ewald von Rönne and Janus 
von Eberstadt. Peter, acting as a lieutenant-general was to command the guards’ 
regiments (Preobrazhenskiy, Semyonovskiy, Astrakhanskiy and 
Ingermanlandskiy, a total of 15 battalions or 15,000 men), along with a 
bombardier and a cannon company (altogether 1,500 men) and a horse guard, 
comprised of 300 reytary (heavy cavalry). Additional troops under Menshikov 
were detached from the main army, serving as garrison troops for the Moldavian 
capital Iaşi. According to de Brassey, the main army was further supplemented 
by 10,000 Cossacks and 6,000 Moldavians, bringing the total number of men to 
95,800.95 However, these figures represent the official statistics of the army 
before its departure south. As Porfiryev notes, the Force under Sheremetev was 
devastated by plague during its march through Latvia and Lithuania, and in the 
following months many more perished from heat and diseases.96 The idea that 
each regiment in the divisions was in full strength is debatable as the troops 
were assembled in great haste from winter quarters and garrisons, scattered 
throughout Livonia and Ingria. In fact, upon reaching the Pruth River in July, 
what left of the initial force, gathered in March, was no more than 37,538, with 
additional 10,000 sent forward under Rönne and several thousand left under 
Menshikov at Iaşi.97 Thus, by the time Peter finally reached the borders of 
Wallachia, he had lost up to 32,000 men: some left as garrisons along the way, 
but most - perished due to hunger, dehydration or diseases. Shefov argues that 
Peter marched with 50,000 from Ukraine, while Porfiryev estimates that there 
were 51,000 troops under Peter and Sheremetev at Iaşi, from which 5,000 were 
the ill-trained and equipped Moldavians. The artillery consisted of some 122 
cannons in different calibers. 98 
While the Russians were preparing their forces, the Ottomans did not 
stand idle. Baltacı Mehmed Paşa, the architect of the anti-Russian policy, took 
personal command of a massive force, gathered in Thrace. The sources provide 
very different figures regarding the total Ottoman strength. Peter Bruce 
estimates that a total of 200,000 Ottomans and Tatars took part in the 
campaign.99 Porfiryev comes to a conclusion that there were 120,000 Ottoman 
                                                 
95 Zapiski brigadira Moro-de-Braze (http://militera.lib.ru/memo/french/brasey/01.html - accessed on 
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troops (62,000 infantry of which 20,000 yeniçeri and 58,000 cavalry, most of 
which sipahis) and 70,000 Tatars under Devlet Girei, which concentrated at 
Bender and joined the Ottomans before their first engagements with Peter’s 
troops in the lower Pruth. The Turks’ artillery train, according to Porfiryev, 
consisted of 444 cannons.100 Kulinich, using Ottoman sources, provides more 
realistic figures, and estimates that the Ottomans were around 100,000 in total, 
accompanied by 35,000 Tatars and a great artillery train – probably of 407 
cannons.101 Shefov briefly notes that the entire Ottoman army at Pruth amounted 
to 150,000 men.102 Further details are provided by Brian Davies who combines 
Ottoman sources and the figures given in the work of Virginia Aksan on 
eighteenth-century Ottoman wars. Davies estimates that a total of 40,000 
Crimean Tatars were concentrated at Bender and marched to join Baltacı Paşa at 
the Pruth. According to Davies, the grand vizier would master a force of some 
120,000 of which 57,000 were cavalry (20,000 sipahi and 37,000 cebelis-s and 
volunteers) and 63,000 infantry (23,400 yeniçeri from Rumelia and Egypt, 10-
12,000 cebecis and 20,000 levends from Bosnia and Albania). Half of the Tatars 
had to screen the Russian movement and harass the Petrine army as often as 
possible. 
The initial disproportion between the two armies was not as problematic 
for the Russians as it would later prove to be. Almost 100,000 troops were 
supposed to march south in order to coup with the opposing forces of 135-
160,000 Turks and Tatars. Also, the Russians could muster additional troops in 
Azov and Ukraine and use them to divert the Tatar Host away from Moldavia. 
What misled Peter in his choice of strategy were three main factors – the 
logistics, the reconnaissance of the route ahead and the faith that a revolt in 
Wallachia and Moldavia would break out and that at least 50,000 rebels from the 
Principalities would join the tsar’s army. As it turned out, these main elements 
of Peter’s campaign plan turned out to be fallacy. 
 
The Balkan factors 
 
Before analyzing the actual development of Peter’s southern march, several 
factors, which played a considerable influence on the political and military 
developments in the Balkans and the Danube region, must be noted. 
First and foremost, Peter’s hopes rested on the Romanian Principalities of 
Wallachia and Moldavia, which had been vassals of the Ottoman Empire since 
mid-fifteenth century. As early as 1709, the prince of Wallachia - Constantin 
Brancoveanu (r. 1688-1714), had secretly promised his support to Peter. 
Brancovenau hoped to use Russia in order to evade the growing Austrian 
influence and thwart a possible preemptive move from the Sublime Porte, which 
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could try to impose its own puppet in Bucharest. Using his Orthodox faith as 
key to winning Russian support, Brancoveanu continued to encourage a possible 
Russian incursion south of the Dniester River. The central issue for the 
Wallachian prince was his rivalry with the Moldovian ruler Dimitrie Cantemir 
(r. 1693; 1710-1711), who served as the main Russian ally in the region. 
Brancoveanu did not want to risk his throne to the possibility that Cantemir 
could betray him to the Turks. The Wallachians acted cautiously and did not 
want to reveal openly their support to Peter’s cause.  
Dimitrie should not be perceived as Machiavellian type of prince who 
would betray his fellow Christian for the pure aggrandizement of his power and 
influence. In fact, Cantemir himself was a victim of Brancoveanu’s political 
games. In 1693, when Dimitrie was to inherit the princely title of his father 
Constantine, Brancoveanu used his influence in Istanbul to dethrone Cantemir 
and to place a close friend of his – the phanariot Constantin Duca, as the ruler of 
Moldavia.103 It was not until 1710 that Cantemir was finally able to regain his 
father’s throne. Then, it is no surprise that Dimitrie was perceived as a threat by 
Brancoveanu. In the eyes of Peter, however, both princes were viewed as 
valuable allies, and it was possible that the tsar failed to notice the deep mistrust 
and even animosity between the Romanian rulers.  
Regarding the rest of the Orthodox lands, Russia was to receive even less 
support. A possible major uprising of the Serbs never took place, with only 
sporadic activities by armed bands, limited to the mountanious region of 
Shumadija. The Montenegrians also rose against the Ottoman authorities, 
hoping to receive funds and help from Russia and Venice. However, this never 
happened and in mid-1710, Sava, the prince-bishop of Montenegro had to 
negotiate peace with the Porte. In the spring of 1711 the levend-s from Bosnia 
and Albania overwhelmed the last remaining rebel bands or simply drove them 
high into the mountains, where the usually dwelled. As for the Bulgarians, their 
earlier rebellions were decimated with a great ferocity. In the late 1680s the 
western lands of Moesia and Macedonia were ravaged during the final days of 
the Karposh’s rebellion (1689) and the Chiprovtsi uprising (1688). Prior to these 
rebellions, the Bulgarians had risen in the old capital of Tarnovo under a 
Russian, named Rostislav, who claimed to be a descendant of the last ruling 
dynasty – the Shishmans. Finally, in 1690, a Bulgarian war-band leader – 
Strakhil took advantage of the Austrian offensive against Belgrade and raised a 
unit of 200 men, joined by 4,000 Hungarians, Bosnians and Serbs. After Strakhil 
evaded the Ottoman siege of Nish, he was able to return to the Ottoman Empire 
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Romanian ruling elite. This is the reason why around 1715, both Moldavia and Wallachia were bestowed to 




and to raise a new band of brigands in 1711, acting in the Strandzha region in 
modern day Southeastern Bulgaria. His actions were directly related to Peter’s 
campaign south, but the small-scale guerrilla could not alter in any way the 




The march of the Russians began in March, when Sheremetev left his winter 
quarters in Livonia and began to traverse the broad plains of Belarus and 
Western Ukraine. Because he had to gather his forces from various locations, 
Sheremetev’s column was stretched and moving slower than Peter had 
anticipated when he laid his plans for the campaign. While still in northwest 
Ukraine, Sheremetev’s forces were befallen by early spring storms and heavy 
rainfalls, which transformed the prairie into an endless marsh, resulting in what 
Russians referred to as rasputitsa. The usual speed of the army decrised several 
times and even couriers, of whom Peter insisted on bringing back and forth 
regular reports on Sheremetev’s movement, reduced their speed from the usual 
eighty kilometers per day to less than forty.104 Frustrated by the delay of 
Sheremetev’s action, Peter rearranged his orders. The Field-marshal had to 
gather only the dragoon regiments and march forward to the Dniester. The 
infantry from Livonia had to catch up with Sheremetev’s troops at Iaşi along 
with the new recruitments, which Peter brought with himself from Smolensk via 
Lutsk. Moreover, Sheremetev was supposed to establish supply depots along his 
way, using the acquisitions, gathered earlier by Golitsin, and to provide further 
supplies if necessary. While Sheremetev was slowly dragging his forces through 
the East European marshes, the Tsar concluded a series of negotiations with 
Dimitrie Cantemir, which resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Lutsk on 13th 
April. According to the treaty, Moldavia would become a vassal of Russia and 
Cantemir would assist Peter with provisions and men on his way to the Danube. 
In return, Russia would guarantee Moldavia’s autonomy and recognize Cantemir 
as a legitimate ruler. Prince Dimitrie had crossed his own Rubicon by signing 
the treaty. The Porte perceived such actions as high treason and they were 
punishable by torture and death.  
On 7th May, Peter sent a new dispatch toward Sheremetev. The Knyaz had 
to gather what cavalry he could muster, along with two of the guards’ regiments 
and travel to the Danube with great haste in order to outmaneuver the advancing 
Ottoman forces and to prevent them from crossing the great river. Sheremetev 
had to either seize the Ottoman bridgeheads or destroy them. Peter stressed the 
need to win over the support of the Wallachian and Moldavian rulers. 
Furthermore, the Tsar expected the Field-marshal to reach the Dniester on 15th 
May, cross it and prepare pontoon bridges for the bulk of the army.105 What 
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followed was one of the worst executed orders in the history of warfare. Instead 
of moving his men rapidly, Sheremetev took his time cautiously and advanced 
by 6 kilometers per day, reaching Bratslav on 16th May (according to the initial 
plan, he was supposed to be there in mid-April). On 12th May, he received an 
order to send forth a corps volante of some 900 dragoons and mounted 
grenadiers, which were supposed to reach the Moldavian capital Iaşi and raise 
the locals in Russian support. Only upon reaching Bratslav Sheremetev finally 
sent the chosen troops ahead, but insisted they should not ride their mounts, but 
march on foot next to them. This resulted in development which might seem 
comic or tragic, regarding the point of view. The corps volante managed to cross 
a total of 12 kilometers in the following five days, reaching the unthinkable 
speed of 2.5 kilometers per day.106 The bulk of the Knyaz’s forces left Bratslav 
on 18th May only to reach Iaşi two weeks later, on 5th June. Their movement was 
continuously screened by a force of 15,000 Tatars, who had moved out from 
Bender. At the same time, the corps volante finally reached the Dniester, 
building a bridge to cross the river. The detachment was attacked by 4,000 
Turks, Tatars and the Polish allies of Karl XII, who tried to destroy the Russian 
vanguard. The Russian troops were able to take a good defensive position and to 
fight back the enemy forces which finally retreated to Bender. By the time 
Sheremetev had left Bratslav, the corps volante had finally crossed the Dnieper. 
While the Russians were followed by their Tatar “tail”, Sheremetev decided to 
appease Dimitrie Cantemir’s pleas for military aid and sent forth a detachment 
of three dragoon regiments and two companies of grenadiers, who had to to ride 
to Iaşi and occupy the city. The reinforcements reached the Moldavian capital as 
late as 29th May, just six days before Sheremetev’s main force. Thus, it took the 
Knyaz a month just to traverse a distance of no more than 260 kilometers (an 
average of 8.5 kilometers per day). By the time Sheremetev reached Iaşi, the 
Ottomans had crossed the Danube (on 1st June) and their forces marched 
upstream to meet the Russians and cross the smaller rivers and streams before 
being caught up by the enemy vanguard. Peter was frustrated, noting to 
Sheremetev: “I am amazed by your slowdown!”107 The failure of Knyaz 
Sheremetev to achieve his campaign goals not only allowed for a massive 
Ottoman army to cross freely the biggest obstacle on its route, but also cost 
Russia its primary military support – the Wallachians. In April Constantin 
Brancoveanu had gathered an army of 40,000 men and allocated it on the 
Wallachian-Moldavian border, waiting for the Russians. The Prince of 
Wallachia had only a single option – to join whichever army reached his 
position first. When news came that only the vanguard of Peter’s army had 
arrived at Iaşi while the Ottoman forces were advancing in their entirety, 
Brancoveanu was left with no possible choice – he had to keep his throne and 
his head.  
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Sheremetev learned about the Ottoman progress on 8th June and decided 
to halt his forces at Iaşi and wait for the main army under the tsar. Another 
crucial mistake was made. Instead of rushing forward to destroy the existing 
bridges on the Pruth or, at least, sending a vanguard with this task, Sheremetev 
decided to stand idle and leave the whole initiative in the hands of the Turks. His 
decision was strongly influenced by the fact that Cantemir was able to gather 
only 5-6,000 ill-equipped and trained men, and that no further provisions had 
been brought up by the Moldavians, whose land, as it turned out, was plagued 
by draft, bad harvests, and swarms of locust.108  
Peter, leading the main force of infantry, reached the Dniester on 12th 
July. Frustrated with Sheremetev for his poor choice of actions, the Tsar 
summoned a military council on 14th July. The council quickly split into two 
fractions. The so-called nyemtsi were: Hallart (Peter’s chief strategist), Weyde, 
Bruce and Rönne, who advised Peter to cease his advance south and wait for the 
Ottoman army in his current position. 109 Their position was buttressed by the 
fact that a march further south would expose the army to flanking attacks from 
the Tatars. Peter did not have exact details on the size or whereabouts of the 
enemy forces and could easily fall into a trap. On the opposite side were the 
Russian generals, led by Sheremetev, who insisted that a halt at Iaşi would 
betray the Orthodox cause and would leave Wallachia and Southern Moldavia to 
the mercy of the grand vizier and his army. Peter’s compatriots urged their ruler 
that a move against Bender, as suggested by Hallart, would only result in the 
escape of Karl XII while gaining no particular advantages for the Muscovite 
cause. Peter decided to support the “Russian” camp, and at first his decision 
seemed right since he received an embassy of Wallachian nobles, assuring the 
tsar that Brancoveanu would join him in open rebellion. It seems that these 
nobles were either bribed by the Ottomans to lure the Tsar or were misinformed 
on the latest decisions of their prince. All parts of the Petrine army finally 
merged on 28th June and began a march south, following an attack from some 
20,000 Tatars on Sheremetev’s trenches. After an initial enemy breakthrough at 
one of the pickets, the Tatars were repulsed by the combined fire of both 
infantry and artillery. Upon marching south Peter, reassured by the Wallachian 
nobles, decided to send a corps of 5,000 dragoons under Rönne, supported by 
5,000 of Cantemir’s Moldavians. Rönne had to march south, surpass any 
advancing enemy columns and strike deep into Wallachia, supporting 
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Brancoveanu in his supposed revolt.110 The rest of the army, under Peter, was to 
continue along the Pruth, seeking traces of the enemy forces.111 
On 5th July, Peter finally sent a reconnaissance detachment of 1,000 
mounted grenadiers and two Moldavian guides to scout the route ahead and to 
try to retrieve data about the size and the location of the enemy forces. The 
detachment was intercepted by the screening Tatar force and a quarter of its staff 
was wiped out during an observation of one of the bridges on the Pruth, built 
earlier by Sheremetev. The rest of the troops retreated and on the next day Peter 
arranged a new vanguard under Janus von Eberstedt and de Brassey. They had 
to gather most of the available cavalry (some 5,000 strong), along with 32 guns 
and to go forth to destroy the bridges which the Ottomans could use to cross the 
Pruth. A day later, the vanguard came across the Ottoman bridgeheads, only 20 
miles south of Peter’s main position. Instead of attacking the enemy as ordered, 
Janus, claiming that he had met 50,000 Turks, began retreating in a defensive 
formation. Ottoman and Tatar vanguard forces came out of their bridgehead 
fortifications and attacked the retreating Russians. Eberstedt’s forces were able 
to maneuver swiftly into a favorable defensive position. Using a combined fire 
of their dragoons and the artillery, the Russians were able to beat back the 
enemy forces and continue their march north. There, at dawn on 8th July, they 
merged with the main army, though they were again under attack by a 
formidable detachment of Ottoman cavalry.112 As their retreat was covered by 
the divisions of Sheremetev and Hallart, the forces of J.von Eberstedt were able 
to capture some of their pursuers. One of them, a Tatar, gave away information 
concerning the Ottoman forces which had crossed the Pruth. According to the 
captive, Baltacı Paşa had only managed to transfer one-third of his cavalry, 
while the bulk of the Ottoman army was still struggling to cross the river.  
Wasting no time, Sheremetev and Hallart advanced with their divisions in 
attack formations, pushing the enemy forces away from the Russian positions. 
At that point the Russians could have organized a massive offense against the 
Ottomans, beating their troops during the crossing of Pruth as Eugene had done 
at Zenta. Peter, however, was misled by Janus’ report of 50,000 enemies who 
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had already crossed the river and decided to take a defensive position. At the 
same time, Baltacı Mehmed Paşa was struggling to organize and speed up the 
transfer of his troops, which seemed to be demoralized and not ready for a battle 
as the Russians expected. It was not until the morning of 9th July that the 
Ottomans were finally able to gather their entire army for the upcoming battle.  
Meanwhile, on the night of 8th July, Peter held a new military council, on 
which it was decided that the army should retreat northwards cautiously, 
following the Pruth. The current position of Peter’s forces was ill-suited for 
defense, since it was at the lowest point of the terrain, surrounded by hills and 
forests, which could be used by the enemy. The Tatar captive mentioned that the 
vizier could position 160 guns, which were not brought during the previous day. 
With only 122 cannons at his disposal, Peter could not risk to be exposed to 
enemy bombardment from the surrounding countryside, as his own position 
would render Russian long-range artillery and they would not be as useful as 
needed.  
The Russians began their retreat at night, carefully observed by the 
Ottoman-Tatar force. During the next half day, the Petrine forces suffered from 
the scorching summer heat and the constant raids of the enemy cavalry on its 
dragging baggage train, protected by the guards’ regiments. At 5 p.m. the 
Russians reached an elbow on the Pruth near Stănileşi and had to halt their 
march, as they were fully surrounded by the Ottoman and Tatar forces, which 
had positioned on the nearby hills.113 The Russians had to dig fast to entrench 
their position, with the baggage train rounded up at the back as a wagenburg, 
while the divisions of the army took defensive positions in front of it. Only half 
of the Russian front was buttressed by a low-level earthwork, while the northern 
sector, facing the Tatars, was protected by a line of sharpened wooden stakes 
(rogatky) prepared in advance by the Russian infantry before their march south 
of Iaşi. The only fortune for the tsar’s forces was that the enemy artillery was 
still dragging on, and the Ottomans had only a few mortars, as new guns were 
arriving gradually. The lack of proper tactics, displayed by the grand vizier 
aided the Russians. Instead of waiting for his artillery to arrive and properly 
shell the enemy positions, Baltacı Mehmed Paşa went on the offensive, using his 
yeniçeri, shaped in a wedge formation, without any support from the Ottoman 
artillery. The second grave mistake of the Ottomans was that they attacked only 
a single section of the Russian defense – the positions of Hallart’s division. If 
they had used the numerical superiority to penetrate the enemy line at several 
points simultaneously, the ragtag Russian defense would have collapsed.114 
Instead, Hallart’s soldiers were able to deploy in defensive stance, fire a storm 
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of salvos at the advancing enemy, while Peter rearranged the army, throwing 
more regiments at the point of contact and redeploying his artillery to maximize 
the firepower of his defenses. The ensuing carnage resulted in over 5,000 
yeniçeri being killed or wounded while the Russians lost only 2,872 men, half of 
whom were wounded.115 With the fall of the night, the other infantry units 
arrived and the Ottomans finally arranged their entire artillery. It was, however, 
too late for a new offensive, for the yeniçeri were weary and their esprit de corps 
had dwindled on the bayonets and salvos of the Russian infantry and guns. The 
Ottoman artillery, on the other hand, began to bombard the Russian position. 
Peter called for a new military council, which had to decide the fate of the 
Muscovite army. 
Peter sued for the only possible solution – ceasefire. The Russians were 
badly mauled by starvation, lack of provisions and munitions, as well as 
hundreds of non-combat casualties, caused by the physical exhaustion of the 
troops. The Russians had no knowledge of the situation in the Ottoman camp, 
where the yeniçeri refused to charge the enemy positions, and where diseases 
and heat were taking between 300 and 400 men each day.116 The first Russian 
proposal was drafted by Sheremetev and called for the reconfirmation of the 
Treaty of Constantinople (1701). The vizier and Devlet Girei were not inclined 
to even discuss such terms and renewed the bombardment of the Russian 
positions. Several hours later, the tsar sent a new emissary – Pyotr Shafirov, 
who, accompanied by Captain Ostermann and several interpreters, carried 
conditions which, if implemented, would significantly reduce the effect of 
Peter’s victory at Poltava. Shafirov was to offer Livonia back to Sweden, even 
including Pskov, if necessary. Peter would recognize Stanisław Leszczyński (the 
Swedish pawn, installed on the throne in Warsaw by Karl XII in 1706) as the 
rightful king of Poland-Lithuania and return to the Ottomans all towns and 
fortresses, taken by the Russians after 1695, including Azov. These terms signal 
the significant degree of despair that had overtaken Peter’s mind at that point.  
To the Tsar’s relieve, the grand vizier would demand peace, based solely 
on the Ottoman interest, with the cause of Karl XII sweped under the rug, along 
with his failed promises for stronger Swedish military presence in Poland. 
Baltacı Mehmed Paşa pursued his master’s interests and included no demands 
regarding either Livonia or the destruction of St. Petersburg, of which the 
Swedish King dreamed. Instead, the grand vizier concentrated on regaining the 
lost lands on the northern Black Sea coast and on decreasing Russian political 
influence in Poland-Lithuania and the Zaporozhian Host. Although not all of 
these terms came into being, by 1713, after two more declarations of war on 
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behalf of the Ottomans, Russia finally returned Azov and destroyed the arsenal 
at Taganrog, and at the same time the Tsar evacuated his troops from Right-bank 
Ukraine. The Pruth Campaign, which ended in a tactical stalemate turned out to 
be a strategic Ottoman victory, rendering Peter’s early policies toward the Black 
Sea utterly useless. 
 
The performance of the Russian army 
 
The Pruth Campaign was the first major setback in Russian military enterprise 
on the Black Sea frontier since Golytsin’s fiasco in 1689 at Perekop. Unlike the 
lover of his older sister, Peter would not come out of the fight without any 
political consequences. Russia lost its hold on the Azov Sea and was forced to 
destroy its only military and naval base south of Voronezh at Taganrog. The 
Black Sea ships were not sunken, but sent north to Voronezh via the Don, from 
where they could, in practice, be sent again southwards to retake Azov, but still, 
they would have to go along way.  
Although politically and chronologically the Pruth Campaign has been 
well studied by historians, especially in Russia, the evaluation of the actual 
performance of the Petrine army has usually been left behind, since it would 
trigger too much criticism, adding to the already existing negative notions, 
regarding the Tsar’s probably biggest military failure.117 Only recent studies by 
Vodarskiy, Davies and Kulinich have begun to pose questions about the actual 
degree of success and failure, demonstrated by the Muscovite forces. The 
evaluation of Peter’s opponents is a topic of a different debate and the study of 
the eighteenth-century Ottoman army is a field for future analysis. Regarding the 
performance of the Russian army, measured by the progress of Peter’s military 
reforms, two main trends of discussion could be pointed out – the battlefield 
performance of the troops and the organization of the army (logistics, command, 
and planning). 
The battlefield performance of the Russians was their main strongpoint, 
since the higher percentage of engagements was won by the Petrine army. The 
first evidence of the Russian military prowess was the siege of Belaya Tserkovy 
at the end of March (25-26th), when a regiment of only 500 troops and an 
indefinite number of Cossacks fought off an invading force of Tatars, 
Zaporozhian Cossacks, and Poles, under Devlet Girei’s son. After two daring 
sorties, the Russians were able to fight off the superior enemy, losing only eight 
men to a few hundred of the enemies.118 In the following collisions, almost 
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always the Russians gained the upper hand. The vanguard, sent by Sheremetev 
in May, was able to beat back a far greater Tatar force, as was the case with the 
forces of Eberstedt which faced the Ottoman-Tatar vanguard on 8th July. The 
Russians were again successful on the afternoon of the 8th while Sheremetev and 
Hallart drove off the Ottomans, who were pursuing Ebestedt. Finally, Peter’s 
army was able to repulse all enemy raids during the exhausting march on the 9th, 
after which the Russians were able to halt the offensive of at least 20,000 
yeniçeri – the best units available under Baltacı Mehmed Paşa. The grudging 
acknowledgement, made by the Polish leader at Pruth – Poniatowski, as well as 
his Swedish allies in the face of Lieutenant-general Axel Sparre, only serves to 
sum up that Peter more or less had accomplished what he had struggled to 
achieve with his reforms: “the [Russian] army is a regular army and the Turks 
cannot surpass it in firepower and will lose heart and accomplish nothing”.119  
Despite the ailing mistakes, made on a strategic level, the Russian’s 
tactical performance was beyond doubt superior to that of their enemies. 
Lessons learned in Livonia, Ingria and especially in the winter of 1708/9 against 
the Swedes have been understood, if not by most of the generals, at least by the 
regular troops of the rank and file. The chaos, evident in the fighting against 
similar enemies at Azov, was replaced by a strict and regulated execution of 
maneuvers and concentrated fire. The panic and lack of synergy between the 
separate units, which tormented the Petrine forces at Azov and later at Narva, 
was exchanged for a proper coordination and the ability to redeploy adequately 
even under direct attack.120 The resilience, sometimes due to sheer physical 
stubbornness, was to become a trade mark of the Russian infantry, which was 
going to win awe from its enemies and allies during the Seven Years War (1756-
1763) and later during the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815).  
If the rank and file could take the credit for the more or less honorable 
field performance, the primary stress of the criticism should be aimed at the 
people organizing and marshalling the Petrine army. At first glance, the entire 
responsibility for the Russian military failure could be thrown on Eberstedt for 
his inability to destroy the Ottoman bridgehead at Pruth, or on Sheremetev, for 
                                                                                                                                                        
Cossacks and 5,000 Poles. Juel’s account was based on the vocal narrative of Grigoriy Ivanovich Angelkov – the 
brigadier who fought off the enemy raid. The fact, that Angelkov held the rank of brigadier means that the forces 
under his disposal were bigger than a regiment, which was commanded by a colonel. Thus, Angelkov could 
indeed have only 500 regular troops, but the Cossacks under his command must have been at least twice as 
many. It must be noted that Belaya Tserkovy was the last garrison west of Kiev, protecting the most important 
Russian city in Ukraine. It is hardly plausible, that Peter had left it protected by only a handful of men, especially 
given the fact that Karl XII was still close by in Bender. The fact that the Tatars were commanded by one of 
Devlet Girei’s sons – the khan of the Budjak Horde means that the Tatars against Belaya Tserkovy could not 
have been as many as the troops under his father at Pruth. It can only be speculated on the exact number of 
troops that besieged the garrison, but they probably did not exceed 10,000 in total, given that there were at least 
2,000 Russians and Cossacks against them. This still gave the attackers a 5:1 advantage. 
119 Quoted in B. Davies, Empire and Military Revolution, 120. This comment was made prior to the yeniçeri’s 
attack on the Russian camp in the afternoon of 9th July. Poniatowski and Sparre advised the grand vizier to 
blockade the Russians and starve them. 
120 This was already evident at Narva, when Sheremetev’s infantry executed an excellent maneuver to break the 




his numerous delays along the way south. Things, however, were a bit more 
complicated than that. As Kulinich notes in his article, the failure of the Pruth 
Campaign began on the first day of its planning.121 The entire logistic scheme 
was based on the misleading conception of Peter that sufficient provisions could 
have been gathered from the population of Ukraine and Belarus. As it seems, 
Peter failed to acknowledge the fact that only a year before, these very lands had 
been devastated by the ravaging Swedish forces, during their desperate march 
toward Moscow and later on – toward Poltava. What the Swedes did not gather, 
the Russians took to feed the grand army, mustered by Peter to screen his 
opponent’s maneuvers.122 A year later, the local population was still struggling 
to reinvigorate the agriculture, while simultaneously was trying to pay the 
annual taxes for support of the Tsar’s aggressive policy in Livonia and the siege 
of Riga. During the Pruth Campaign Peter required from the same people to 
provide for four months, for a third consecutive year, this time for an army of 
almost 80,000 men. Golitsin, who was charged with the task, expressed his 
concern on several occasions, noting that the volumes of provisions, envisioned 
by the tsar were impossible to achieve. By the spring of 1711, only 13,000 
quarters of bread were gathered, along with 6,000 sheep, 2,400 horses, and 
4,200 oxen.123 To clarify the numbers, the 3,000 Kalmyks, fighting under Azov 
in 1697 would consume 300 sheep per week. The animals, gathered by Golitsin 
would have been enough for 3,000 men for 20 weeks – the exact time, required 
by Peter. The trouble came from the fact that Peter’s army numbered 79,000. As 
for the bread, a quarter was the daily portion for a single soldier.  
There was also a lack of warhorses – the constant scourge of the Russian 
logistics under Peter.124 In May, Knyaz Dolgorukiy’s dragoon regiments did not 
have enough horses, and some 2-300 men had to march on foot.125 The similar 
problem must have troubled Sheremetev in June when he forbade his dragoons 
to ride their animals, which were probably exhausted by the summer heat and 
were insufficient in numbers. The hope that the Moldavians and the Wallachians 
would provide further supplies on the spot would prove to be a chimera. 
Moldavia had been devastated by droughts and swarms of locust, which 
destroyed even the small quantities of grain that the locals were able to collect. 
While Peter was negotiating the armistice with Baltacı Mehmed Paşa, the latter 
sent part of his supplies to the ailing Russians - 180 tons of bread, ninety tons of 
rice and over three tons of coffee.126 During their return march north, the army 
was so exhausted that it marched only two hours a day.127 
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Given these circumstances, it is a small wonder that the Russians were 
able to march the tremendous distance of over 1,200 kilometers, and to be able 
to fight well enough as they did not lose any major engagement.128 Though the 
army covered this space for four months it was still a feat.129 This was a distance 
of which western armies did not need to concern, given the distances between 
the main supply centers and the frontlines. In comparison, the Ottomans had to 
march 400 kilometers from Edirne to the Danube, which was still a long way to 
go, compared to the movement of French forces during the contemporaneous 
War of the Spanish Succession. The Turks would also benefit from their long-
standing logistics system, closely linked to the obligations of the local 
population.130 A further problem for the movement of the Muscovite forces was 
the lack or even the absence of road infrastructure, as well as the limited amount 
of drinking water. Most of the march in Moldavia went through an area, which 
Dimitrie Cantemir described as a desert.131 To sum up – the combination of bad 
logistical planning, the problems with the weather (great number of rainfalls and 
storms in the spring and blistering heat in the summer), as well as the lack of 
proper infrastructure, contributed to the slow progress of the Russian army, and 
led to a significant number of casualties, exceeding the combat loses in a ratio of 
at least 10:1. 
Last but not least, the performance of the commanders should be judged. 
Regarding Davies, the main reason for the failure of the campaign was the 
native noblemen-generals, serving under Peter. The so-called “foreign” party 
(nyemtsi) was the one giving better advices. In contrast, the too stubborn and not 
so competent leaders of Peter’s Muscovite clique repeatedly failed to obey their 
direct orders and demonstrated lack of good decision-making. Such perception 
of the campaign is as erroneous as the desire of Russian historians to blame the 
Romanian princes for misleading Peter and failing to support his cause. Indeed, 
Sheremetev was the one among Russian generals bearing the greatest 
responsibility, as he was the one to keep the vanguard regiments and he was the 
person who had to establish a proper chain of supply depots for the bulk of the 
army and also to prepare a series of bridges along the way. Though Sheremetev 
did demonstrate a certain lack of decisiveness and resolve, the Knyaz was 
limited in various ways by the logistical factors already clarified above.  
The small number of pack animals and horses for the cavalry, as well as 
the permanent lack of provisions, were a constant scourge for the movement of 
Sheremetev’s division. When we add the 15,000 – 20,000 Tatars, regularly 
screening his movements and threatening his flanks, the picture of the sluggish 
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advance transforms into a process of bitter struggle to carry on marching against 
all odds. It is true that at certain points of the campaign the Knyaz did not act 
with the required skill, but this only complemented the already existing 
problems, and was not a primary factor which hindered the Russian progress. 
The same can be said about Janus von Eberstedt’s actions. Though being one of 
the so-called “foreigners”, Eberstedt was not immuned to the mistakes of his 
Russian colleagues. During the episode of 8th July 1711, Eberstedt’s ill-thought 
decision to retreat rather than to attack was the direct reason for the encirclement 
of the Russian army at Stănileşti. As for the advice of Hallart that Peter should 
take Bender instead of marching south, Davies expresses the notion that such a 
move might have won Peter the war.132 According to Davies, such an offence 
could have brought Karl XII into Russian hands or, at least, Peter could barter 
Bender for Azov in consecutive diplomatic negotiations. This idea, however, is 
far from flawless. First and foremost, Bender was far less significant than Azov 
and Ahmed III, a sagacious politician, would have never opted for such a deal to 
be made. Furthermore, the rhetoric of Sheremetev, regarding Karl XII's possible 
escape as soon as the first Russian units appeared in sight was very correct. 
Though the king of Sweden was by no means a coward, he was determined to 
win over the foolhardy Ottoman support but if he had fallen in Russian hands he 
would not have achieved his goals easily. The march against Bender would have 
denied the Russians any opportunity to attract local allies and would have left 
the Moldavians and Wallachians to the mercy of the grand vizier. The situation 
should be rethought through the eyes of the contemporaries. While Bender 
promised a hard-fought siege with doubtful consequences and no possible allies, 
the march to the Danube held the possibility of tens of thousands local 
reinforcements, as well as the probability of better provisioning for the starving 
army.  
No analysis of the strategic flaws of the Pruth Campaign would be full 
without turning attention to Peter himself. The tsar’s major mistake came from 
his adverse judgment of the resilience of his fellow Orthodox Christian rulers on 
the Danube. While in no way Panslavist, as Davies incorrectly notes, Peter was 
seeing himself as a unifying figure of the Eastern Christians, who bore the 
legacy of Rome and Constantinople, and who was the only great, independent 
Orthodox monarch in the world. The religious rhetoric, however, is not as 
convincing, as the practical necessities for more men and supplies and for 
gaining a better strongpoint against the Ottomans.133 Peter did take into 
consideration the possible scenario of marching against Bender and ultimately, 
he made the right decision to go further south. Capturing Moldavia and 
Wallachia and setting his army on the borders of the Ottoman heartlands would 
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have been of far greater strategic value, than marching a thousand kilometers 
only to besiege a fortress in the middle of the Jedisan Steppe. 
Peter’s other main flaw came from his lack of perception regarding the 
resources his state could muster, as well as from his wishful thinking towards 
the movement of his army from Livonia to Wallachia in just three months.  As it 
was mentioned above, in 1695 and 1696, his army needed no less than two 
months to deploy to an area, which was just at the borders of Russia Then the 
army was less massive and had a greater number of cavalry. During all Azov 
Campaigns, river transportation proved crucial for the speed of the Russian 
progress. In Moldavia, however, Peter could not count on even a single vessel, 
and all munitions, food, and baggage had to be transferred to foot. In addition, 
the army had to march through one of the most unfavorable regions in Europe – 
the Pripyat marshes. Even during World War II, while planning operation 
Barbarossa, the German General staff avoided to send troops through Pripyat 
and to use the marshy countryside as a border, separating the Army Groups 
Center and South. Peter would demand a daring and over the top feat of his men, 
both from the ordinary soldiers and the generals, organizing the whole 
enterprise. As noted above, the fact that the Russians we able to reach the Pruth 
in the first place was already a small wonder, owing to both the resilience of the 
army and the Tsar’s will to go forth with his plans. It was a march achieved not 
due to, but, rather, despite of the logistics. 
Although the political results of the campaign were rather disastrous for 
Russia, the field experience, gained by the troops and the officers proved crucial 
for Peter’s further campaigns during the Great Northern War. Without the Pruth 
example, Russia’s later engagements in Holstein and Schleswig would not have 
been possible, and neither would the conquest of Finland. The lessons of 
combining navy and land forces for mutual support, as well as establishing a 
solid chain of magazine and supplies, although learned the hard way, proved 
invaluable for the development of Russian strategic thought in the long run.  
 




So far, Russian historiography has perceived the Kuban Campaign as a 
secondary endeavor, aimed at supporting Peter's expedition in Moldavia by 
diverting the forces of the Kuban and Crimean Tatars and their local allies. 
According to the old-school theory, the army of P.M. Apraksin (brother of the 
famous Admiral F.M. Apraksin), was set in motion only to act as a divertion, 
which was to draw a substantial number of enemy forces away from the western 
theater of operations. Recent research, however, has focused on the notion, that 
the Kuban Campaign was an independent offensive. It was aimed at countering 




main forces of Crimea. Moreover to assert and extend Russian control over the 
steppe south of Azov and also to link Peter's domains with the Circassian allies 
of St. Petersburg. The size of the invading force, the timeline of the campaign, 
the overall results of the incursion, as well as the way Peter perceived the 
offensive, point to the fact that it was not a mere distraction, but rather an all-out 
commitment. Ever since the end of the Holy League War, the Crimean Khanate 
has continuously hosted raids against Russian possessions in Ukraine and along 
the Don. The acquisition of Azov was also related to constant confrontation with 
the Kuban Host. Thus, the upkeep of a substantial garrison was required in order 
to secure Russia's newly incorporated territories. Apart from the purely strategic 
factors, a campaign against the Kuban Host was also perceived necessary due to 
the substantial number of renegade Cossacks who sought asylum under the 
Nogai Host following the uprisings in 1704 and the Mazepa rebellion. These so-
called Nekrasovtsy were further supplemented by the old-believer 
(staroobryadny) Cossacks, who denounced the tsar's authority. The 
incorporation of these renegades and their purging was an essential element of 
Russian policy along the Volga and the Don for the whole of eighteenth century, 




Apraksin's campaign along the Kuban River has received insubstantial attention 
from scholars of the period outside of Russia. The bulk of available data can be 
extracted from a number of articles, published in several periodicals. The 
primary source on the subject is General Nikolay Brandenburg's publication 
from 1867.134 This text is based on a primary source – the “Posluzhnogo spiska 
Kubanskogo pokhoda”, drawn by Count Apraksin himself in 1711. This 
document includes a substantial number of notes, regarding the preparation of 
the campaign, as well as names of officers and troops, participating in it. 
According to Brandenburg's own evaluation, only one-fourth of the whole text is 
of any particular use - regarding the development and outcome of the 
campaign.135 Additional information can be acquired from modern scholars, 
dealing with the Kuban expedition. Yu.V. Priymak has contributed with two 
recent papers, regarding the preparations, historical context and development of 
the Kuban Campaign, demonstrating critical approach toward the existing 
sources and the notions, established by Brandenburg.136 He presents a 
revisionist, with regard to Soviet-era works, perspective on the logistics, 
organization and conduct of the Russian army.The campaign is briefly presented 
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from Tatar perspective in an article by O.G. Sanin, who aims at presenting the 





Following a series of winter and spring raids, carried out by the Crimean Tatars, 
Peter I decided to retaliate along the entire southern front. Apart from the force 
operating along the western front, the Tsar designated a second army to be 
gathered in central Ukraine and operate along the Dnieper in order to advance 
against the Perekop. This force was bestowed to Buturlin and Skoropadskiy, 
who were unable neither to muster the perceived forces, nor to attack Devlet 
Girei's army in such manner, as to divert his forces away from the Moldavian 
theater. The second army, which had to operate outside the scope of Peter's 
direct command, was the one designed to act toward the Kuban. Its creation was 
not a mere response to the Tatar incursions in the early months of 1711. The 
Kuban expedition was meticulously prepared by Peter himself as early as the 
first days of January 1711.138 The task of commanding the offensive was given 
to Count P. M. Apraksin, governor of Kazan. His forces were supposed to 
operate along the Volga, collecting reinforcements on their way south and to 
link with the Kalmyks under Ayuka Khan at Tsaritsyn. Apraksin took his time 
for the preparation of his main forces in Kazan and set sail along the Volga 
River on 13th May 1711, ahead of some 2,987 troops.139 In addition to these 
soldiers sailing along the Volga, a cavalry force was sent by land, trough 
Sinbirsk and Saratov. There were a total of 3,566 horsemen, of which 200 were 
sent toward the Kama River, probably to purchase additional horses for the 
campaign.140 Apraksin arrived in Tsaritsyn on 30th May 1711 and waited there 
for the arrival of Colonel Richter, who came from Astrakhan ahead of 1,113 
troops from the Astrakhan Regiment. The soldiers (some 20,474 strong) were 
quartered in Tsaritsyn to wait for the Kalmyk forces, which arrived on 27th 
June.141 Brandenburg makes an interesting note that some of the Kalmyks were 
even wearing heavy armor, probably mimicking contemporary s. The number of 
regular foot and cavalry units was further supplemented by 1,000 Yaik 
Cossacks, and a number of deti boyarskiе and inozemtsy ( foreigners) bringing 
the overall strength of Apraksin forces to 13,888 men. When it combined with 
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the Kalmyk contingent under Ayuka's son Chakdorjap, the Kuban army 
increased to 34,362 strong. 
Further diplomatic measures, undertaken by Knyaz Aleksandr Bekovich-
Cherkasskiy provided the support of the Kabardian clans, which were drawn 




Apraksin left Tsaritsyn on 3rd July 1711 ahead of his combined forces, advised 
by two generals and 5 adjutants. His army was to proceed to Azov and enter the 
Kuban Steppe from there, crossing the Don close to the key fortress. 
Brandenburg has meticulously listed the day to day route from Tsaritsyn to 
Azov, an advance, which took thirty four days of marching.143 The march was 
carried out in twenty nine stages, covering 816 kilometers or roughly 28.1 
kilometers per stage, which was quite an impressing speed, especially given the 
nature of the terrain.144 The fact that the Tsaritsyn-Azov route had become a 
vital military highway probably did buttress the army's ability for rapid 
progression, given the established communication lines and the well-studied 
roads, water sources and pastures, which were in constant use since 1695. 
 The army arrived at Azov on 5th August and remained there for ten days 
in order to replenish its supplies and to give rest to the troops. The march was 
resumed on 14th August. Here it is essential to note that by the time Apraksin 
reached Azov the Pruth Campaign had already ended. He, however, had not 
received any news about the signing of the peace treaty between Russia and the 
Porte, in which an article was included regarding the Kuban Host and the 
suspension of any Cossack or Kalmyk incursions in its territories. According to 
Russian sources, Apraksin became aware of the treaty in mid-September and 
continued his operations until then, as if the war with the Ottomans and Tatars 
was still ongoing. Whether this is true or the Kuban Campaign was continued as 
a form of retaliation and revenge for what had happened in Moldavia is still a 
matter of open debate. 
 In any case, the Kuban valley represented a tempting target with its 
abundance of livestock and rather limited defenses. According to contemporary 
Ottoman sources, the fortifications, held by the Porte apart from Taman, were in 
desuetude, with insignificant number of troops guarding their half-demolished 
walls.145 The overall strength of the Kuban Host's forces, along with the 10,000 
renegade Cossacks and staroobrydny, was some 23,000, most of whom were 
poorly armed and ill-trained. Artillery was practically non-existent outside the 
walls of Ottoman fortifications and even there, the number of available guns was 
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insignificant. Apraksin would enjoy the advantage of both numbers and quality 
– a rarity in the context of Russo-Ottoman confrontation throughout history.  
 The initial stages of the campaign were rather devoid of events. For two 
weeks the Russians marched through barren, lifeless steppe, without 
encountering any resistance whatsoever. On 26th August, approximately 160 
kilometers north of the Kuban River, Apraksin separated his forces in two 
columns. The vanguard contingent, commanded by Colonel Ivan Lyvov and 
consisting of 18,460 men, moved forward with the idea to prevent the 
concentration of enemy forces following a series of skirmishes with the Nogais 
on 24th. The only major enemy concentration was vanquished on 29th near the 
Kuban River, with 5,000 of the Tatars drowning in the river and almost 22,000 
falling into captivity (women and children included). The Kalmyks and the 
dragoons were able to wipe out the entire force of the nureddin-sultan – some 
12,000 men, killing all but 700 who were listed among the overall number of 
captured.146 Along with the decisive victory came the opportunity for unopposed 
plunder. By the end of August, Apraksin was able to acquire 2,000 camels, 
39,200 horses, 190,000 cattle and 227,000 sheep.147  
 After devastating the entire Kuban valley, Apraksin marched northeast 
along the river and then back to Azov through the Kuban Steppe. It was in the 
beginning of September that the Russians received news of a 4,000 Nogai force, 
returning home after a raid in the Ukraine during the early months of the 
summer. A strong detachment of Kalmyks was sent forward and the Nogais 
were badly mauled, losing all of their booty, along with several thousand 
Russian captives, who were freed by the Kalmyks. A few days later, the main 
force under Count Apraksin was attacked by 7,000 men, led by the nureddin-
sultan himself. Of these, 3,000 were the Nekrasovtsy Cossacks. The battle 
between the two forces took place on 6th September and ended with a new 
decisive Russian victory, which significantly weakened the Kuban Hosts’ 
capacity to raid in the following years. However, it was at this point that Count 
Apraksin received the news of the disaster at Pruth and decided to end his 
offensive in haste. The possibility of a new, larger Tatar force, coming from the 
west to relieve the Nogais was vexing and the Count would not risk to be cut off 
from his main supply base. He retreated in good order towards Azov and then 
traveled further north to Tsaritsyn, finally reaching Kazan on 29th December 
1711. 
 
The performance of the Russian army 
 
Apraksin's campaign along the Kuban was probably the first successful military 
endeavor, carried out in such proportions by the Russian state against the Pontic 
nomads. The operation’s decisiveness and positive results were in striking 
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contrast to the performance of the armies of Golytsin during the offensives 
against Crimea in 1685 and 1687. The devastating results of the latter were 
probably among the reasons why Peter did not want to risk a direct expedition in 
the steppes for two and a half decades. The fact that the Tsar was willing to send 
a force of such proportions forward meant that a substantial military self-esteem 
had been acquired after the successful campaign against Sweden in 1708-1709 
and the suppressing of the Mazepa uprising.  
 Lessons from the three Azov Campaigns have apparently been well 
learned and Peter opted for a small-sized, regular force, with no substantial 
artillery or baggage train attached to it, supplemented by a considerable number 
of local specialist troops – the Kalmyks. The usage of small-scale, independent 
units was to prove very successful in the following military expeditions, both in 
Persia and against the Crimean Tatars. What the Kuban Campaign clearly 
demonstrates is that high-quality, limited-quantity military units were far better 
suited for achieving considerable success against mobile and evasive enemies in 
comparison to massive, slow-moving armies, drawn in the fashion of European 
standards of the Age.  
 As with the overall conduct along the Pruth expedition, Russian forces on 
the Kuban performed excellently, winning every engagement with the enemy. 
Discipline was high, battle orders were well executed and the insignificant 
number of casualties – 31, demonstrates that Apraksin and his men enjoyed a 
considerable advantage in terms of quality with regard to their opponents. A fact 
stands out - that the Count's forces were always superior to their enemies in 
terms of numbers with the combination of mobile, offensive tactics and the 
correct disposition of forces. This is a clear indication of not only better military 
capabilities with regard to the previous expeditions, but also of a buildup in the 
tactical and strategic thinking of Russian generals. While Shein was reluctant to 
risk an open battle with the Kuban Host in 1697, Apraksin managed to strike his 
opponents one at a time, defeating the entire Kuban Host in three separate 
instances and denying them any chance of concentration.  
 Logistics prove to work quite fine during the Kuban Campaign. Although 
the army passed through tracts of uninhabited, waterless regions, there are no 
indications that sickness, hunger or lack of drinkable water posed any problem 
for Apraksin's advance. There are no certain figures regarding the size of the 
baggage train or the way provisions were prepared and distributed during the 
march to the Kuban River and back. The fact that the army managed to keep its 
strength and to proceed in a rather unprecedented marching speed throughout 
the entire campaign, on the other hand, indicates that the Kuban expedition was 
probably the best organized in terms of army supply for the entire period 
analyzed in this dissertation.148 The combination of high marching speed and 
                                                 
148 Even after entering the barren steppe, Apraksin’s men would continue their advance with a medium speed of 




excellent upkeep leave no place for doubt in the ability of Count Apraksin to 
organize and manage his forces. 
 Although military success in the east was overshadowed by the Pruth 
disaster, the Kuban Campaign should be regarded as one of the finest examples 
of Russian military capability during the first decades of the eighteenth century. 
The pattern of using a second army in the east to open another front against the 
Ottomans and their local allies would become a condicio sine qua non for future 
campaigns up until the First World War. During the Russo-Ottoman War of 
1736-1739, General Peter von Lacy would follow Apraksin's steps in operating 
with a small-scale, mobile force and extracting considerable gains while keeping 
losses generally low. Another valuable (in Russian terms) example, set by 
Apraksin and followed by commanders in the generations to come, was the 
devastation of steppe countryside and the destruction or acquisition of the 
nomads' main source of income – their cattle. Although not as significant as 
territorial gains, the destruction of the nomadic economy would devastate the 
Hosts' potential for waging offensive wars against Russia and in general 
attributed considerably to the long term success of St. Petersburg in subduing 




The review of the early Southern Campaigns has outlined several essential 
trends of the development in the Russian army, which remained fundamental for 
its further evolution. First and foremost, the rank and file would constantly 
improve their discipline, military skills and would enjoy increasing superiority 
over local opponents. Secondly, the military and administrative apparatus would 
try to plan each consecutive campaign on the basis of previous experience, the 
disaster at Pruth serving as an important example. The launching of Russia’s 
campaigns in Germany and Denmark after 1713 would have been impossible 
without the experience, gained during the campaigns in Moldavia. The basic 
idea of how offensives should be undertaken and which main objectives should 
be set in order to overcome Tatar and Ottoman resistance was also outlined 
during these early confrontations with the Porte and its minions. Whether Russia 
and its administration – civic and military, were able to capitalize on the 
experience accumulated between 1695 and 1711, is a subject of the following 
pages of this dissertation. 
Following the defeat at Pruth, Peter transferred his attention exclusively in 
the Baltic region. His expeditions in Finland and the campaigns against 
Schleswig and Bremen were followed by the slow-motion of the Great Northern 
War’s final years. In 1716 Peter began to probe for suitable means to exert 
Russian influence toward Inner Asia and sought a possible way of establishing a 
land route to India and to the lucrative trading networks of the Far East. The 




of Knyaz Bekovich-Cherkasskiy convinced the Tsar that the route to India went 
through Dagestan. Before the ink had dried on the peace treaty with Sweden, 






 THE PERSIAN CAMPAIGN (1722-1724) 
 
Peter’s campaign in Persia is probably the least studied element of the tsar’s 
military endeavors. The following subchapter would try to present a concise 
description of Russia’s Caucasian adventure as well as a detailed evaluation of 
the factors, which influenced the performance of the Petrine army. Regarding 
the dissertation itself, the description of Peter’s march south would serve as the 
primary contribution of the research. 
The march to present-day Azerbaijan and Iran was the final stage of 
Peter’s military activities and was the first one carried out after the military 
reforms of the tsar had been fully completed. The campaign along the shores of 
the Caspian Sea was the first European expedition to this region since the time 
of Alexander the Great. Before describing in details the Russian preparations 
and activities, some notes are necessary, regarding the decline of the Persian 
political and military power, which enabled not only Russia but also the 
Ottoman Empire and the Afghans to try to carve out substantial chunks of the 
ailing Safavid state. The political situation in the Caucasus is a direct 
consequence of the developments that took place in the Safavid state, which 
were discussed in a previous chapter. 
 
4.1. Historical Context - The Power Vacuum in the Caucasus 
 
Power and control are very fluid terms when it comes to the Caucasus. Ever 
since the Middle Ages, greater powers have tried to establish their suzerainty 
over the region. Byzantines, Arabs, Turks, Persians and later Russians all 
launched offensives in the mountainous region, hoping to gain control. 
However, none of them succeeded in establishing a centralized local 
administration that could rein in the tribal chieftains and local princes. In most 
of the cases, empires had to rely on bribes, patronage or puppet-rulers in order to 
exercise their policy in the Caucasus region. The broken terrain, combined with 
the high ethnic diversity of the population, made it impossible for one country to 
extend its control over the entire area. Religious and ethnic animosity was often 
the reason for the shift of imperial boundaries, and greater states were unable to 
maintain their position in these remote, mountainous lands. This led to a 
perpetual power-vacuum that escalated in times of instability of some of the 
empires, which claimed suzerainty over the region. 
Following the disintegration of Safavid power during the second decade 
of the eighteenth century, the people of the Caucasus decided to take matters in 
their own hands. Local tribe leaders and governors overthrew the authority of 




had grown weary of the ever-increasing taxes and the religious persecutions of 
the Shi’i clergy and rose in support of their local rulers, who promised religious 
tolerance and lower taxation.  
As a consequence, several “rebellious” states emerged in the Caucasus 
region. The most powerful of them was the union of the Lezgins – Caucasian 
tribes, unified by their common ancestry and the Sunni faith. They ravaged the 
provinces of Shirvan and Gilan and defeated local supporters of the shah. The 
Lezgins hoped to receive Ottoman support and thus - to protect their autonomy. 
The correspondence between their leaders and the grand vizier Ibrahim Paşa is 
one of the main primary sources, regarding the period of the Persian Campaign.1 
Several governors in Shirvan proclaimed themselves independent and 
sought the support of the Ottoman or the Russian Empire in order to secure their 
position. The most prominent of them was Shamkhal Adil Girei, who controlled 
most of the present-day Dagestan.2 Adil Girei carefully chose his allies among 
the warring parties and gave his support to whoever had the strongest force in 
the region. He opted to ally himself with Peter I and to help him with the 
conquest of Derbent and the establishment of the Svyatoy Krest fort on the 
Kuma River. Another powerful local ruler was Sultan Mahmud of Utamysh.3 He 
had a 12,000 strong army of Kabardians and Tatars and was allied with the 
Lezgins.4 Unlike the Shamkhal, Mahmud was a supported the Ottomans and 
hoped that the Sublime Porte will acknowledge his authority in the Caucasus. 
Apart from the Muslim local leaders, several Orthodox factions existed. 
The most influential was that of the king of Kartli – Vakhtang VI (r. 1716-
1724). He rose to power after his father Giorgi XI became the supreme 
commander (beglerbeg) of the Persian army in 1700. When the Lezgins ravaged 
Shirvan and Gilan in 1717, Vakhtang gathered a 60,000 strong Georgian army to 
subject them.5 However, the advisors of Shah Husain, jealous and frightened of 
Vakhtang’s power, convinced the Shah to order the disbandment of the 
Georgian army. The Georgian prince had to obey and to return his army to 
                                                 
1, C. Lemercier-Quelquejay, “An Unpublished Document on the Campaign of Peter the Great in the Caucasus”, 
Journal of the Royal Asian Society, vol. LIV (London, 1967), 174 – 8. 
2 Aadil Girei was the shamkhal of Tarki and served as the governor of Dagestan for the Safavid Empire. His 
family name “Girei” suggests a relation to the ruling dynasty of the Crimean Khanate. Such a relation could 
prove to be very important for the shamkhal, since he could use it to secure his protection by the Crimean 
Khanate and thus - by the Ottoman Empire. Whether such a family relation is possible is a question that would 
be hard to answer. It is known, however, that the Crimean royal house – the Gireis married to Caucasian royal 
families in order to extend their influence in the area and block Russia’s advance south during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Thus, a possibility remains, that the shamkhal of Tarki was indeed a relative of the 
Crimean Khan. A further proof of a relationship is the fact, that although the shamkhal allied himself with 
Russia, there was no punitive expedition against his territories neither by the Lezgins, nor by the Ottomans. 
3 Peter Henry Bruce refers to him as “sultan Udenich”; see P.H. Bruce, Memoirs of Peter Henry Bruce, Esq. - a 
military officer in the services of Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain, containing an account of his travels in 
Germany, Russia, Tartary, Turkey, and the West Indies, &c, as also several very interesting private anecdotes of 
the Czar, Peter 1 of Russia (Dublin, 1783), 327-8. 
4 Ibid. 




Kartli, but proclaimed that he would offer no further support to the Persians.6 
During the Afghan invasion of Persia (1721), Vakhtang sent several embassies 
to Peter I in which he promised his allegiance in order to obtain the Tsar’s help. 
The second powerful Orthodox faction was that of the Armenians, headed by 
their Catholicos Asdvadzadur.7 Armenians held a very influential position in 
Safavid Persia, since most of the leading merchant families were Armenian.8 
During the Afghan invasion, the Armenians took control of Yerevan – a key 
point in controlling the route from Georgia to Persia and from Anatolia to the 
Caspian Sea. Supported by Russia’s diplomacy, Vakhtang and Asdvadzadur 
reached an agreement and gathered a 40,000 strong army to help Russia’s 
invasion. The Georgian-Armenian alliance threatened the interests of the 
Ottoman Empire and the Sublime Porte decided to support the Lezgins and the 
Sultan of Ultamysh against the Caucasian Christians. 
By the time Russia decided to launch its offensive, the Caucasus region 
was significantly destabilized and fractured into several small states and 
independent tribal territories. During the winter of 1721/2, both Ottomans and 
Russians sought to gain the support of the local power-holders in order to 
strengthen their strategic position. On the other hand, local factions intended to 
use the strength of the neighboring empires to achieve their goals. The inability 
of Russia, Persia, and the Ottoman Empire to assert direct control over the 
Caucasus predetermined the outcome for the local power-holders. Once again, 




Regarding the historiography of the Persian Campaign, there are only three 
works that analyze in detail Peter’s southern project. The earliest is written by 
the Soviet historian V. Lystsov, who studied the campaign as a political and 
economic continuity of the Petrine policy, following the Northern War. 9 The 
second book is Lockhart’s narrative on the fall of the Safavid dynasty.10 
Lockhart places Peter’s campaign in the context of the expansionist policy, 
carried out by the Afghans under Shah Mahmud Hotaki and the Ottomans under 
the grand vizier Damat Ibrahim Paşa, as well as during the resistance of the 
                                                 
6 He was afraid that if he continued on his behalf, the shah might depose him of his titles. This would have given 
the other Georgian nobles the right to depose Vakhtang, just as they deposed his father. Determined to keep his 
throne, Vakhtang accepted the terms of Shah Husain. For an exhaustive description of the Georgians and their 
relation to the fall of Safavid Persia; see D.M. Lang, “Georgia and the Fall of the Ṣafavi  Dynasty”, Bulletin of 
the School of Oriental and African Studies 14, 3 (1952), 523-39. 
7 Catholicos is a title, equivalent to “patriarch”. The catholicos was the leader of the Armenian Apostolic 
Church. 
8 For the Armenian trade families and their enterprises in Asia; see V. Baladouni and M. Makepeace (eds.), 
Armenian Merchants of the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries: English East India Company Sources 
(Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1999). 
9 V. Lystsov, Persidskiy Pokhod Petra I: 1722 – 1723 (Moscow, 1951). 
10 L. Lockhart, The Fall of the Ṣafavī Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia (Cambridge: Cambridge 




Persians under Nadir Shah. According to Lockhart’s evaluation, Russia wanted 
to counter the Ottoman incursion in the southern Caspian coast, and to expand 
its trade towards Central Asia and India. The newest work on the Persian 
Campaign is written by the Russian historian Igor Kurukin.11 Kurukin’s primary 
purpose is not so much to describe the military endeavour itself, but rather to 
study the Russian occupation of the South Caspian provinces. Nevertheless, he 
dedicates a substantial part of his work to clarify the main problems and 
developments in the context of Peter’s southern policy. 
Apart from these main works, several other articles devote some attention 
to Russia’s Caspian expansion. In his article on the Ottoman Empire, Russia, 
and the Caspian Sea, Benningsen takes a pro-Ottoman position, strongly 
criticizing Russia’s inability to maintain its expansion in the Caspian area.12 He 
also tries to prove that the Ottoman Empire was not as weak as preserved by 
Western historians and that during the first quarter of the eighteenth century it 
was the leading power in the Near East. Some additional information could be 
found in Lemercier-Quelquejay’s preface to the letter from the grand vizier 
Damat Ibrahim Paşa to Daud Beg of the Lezgins.13 Quelquejay gives a brief 
overview of the events, which took place in the context of the above-mentioned 
letter. However, he outlines that without giving any evaluation of the relations 
between Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Persia.  
 
4.3. Preparations for the Campaign 
 
The Persian Campaign of Peter the Great was anything but spontaneous. After 
1715 when the outcome of the Northern War seemed predetermined, Peter 
began to follow more closely the events that took place in the Caspian Sea area. 
14 At first, his attention was drawn to the possibility of establishing Russian 
control in Central Asia by subjecting the khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. 
Further information on gold deposits in the lands along the Amu Darya River 
strengthened the determination of the Tsar. However, as the course of events 
between 1714 and 1716 proved, Central Asia was still far from Russia’s reach. 
Expeditions sent to establish forts on the eastern coast of the Caspian failed. 
They were met by a firm resistance from the local tribes, as well as by the 
inability of the state to supply these bases with provisions and ammunitions. 
Furthermore, the Tsar underestimated the local forces. Russia’s expeditions 
numbered no more than 3,000. Against them local rulers and tribal chiefs could 
                                                 
11 I.V. Kurukin, Persidkiy pokhod Petra Velikogo. Nizovoy korpus na beregakh Kaspiya, 1722-1735 (Moscow: 
Kvadriga, 2010). 
12 A. Benningsen, “Peter the Great, the Ottoman Empire and the Caucasus”, Canadian-American Slavic Studies 
8, 2 (1974), 311-8. 
13 Lemercier-Quelquejay, “An Unpublished Document”, 174-8. 




assemble hosts of between 10,000 and 50,000.15 With such numerical 
superiority, guns and firepower had little impact and Russian forts were swept 
away by the Asian hords. After the disastrous mission of Knyaz Aleksandr 
Bekovich-Cherkasskiy in 1716, Peter decided to transfer his attention to the 
disintegrating Safavid state.16 The first embassies to the Safavids were sent as 
early as 1714, hoping to obtain better possibilities for the Russian traders. 
However, their efforts were countered not only by the Persian authorities but 
also by the Armenian merchant community. A new embassy under Artemiy 
Volynskiy was sent in 1717. His official mission was to negotiate the right of 
Russian merchants to trade in all Persian markets. However, he was also 
instructed to gather information about the main trading routes, the income of the 
provinces, and the military potential of Persia. Volynskiy spent two years (1717-
1719) in Persia and upon his return to Russia he reported to Peter that the 
Safavid Empire was ready to be conquered and that it would take only a small 
unit of regular soldiers to subject a major part of it with ease. As time would 
prove, he was correct, as the main enemy of Russia would not be men but nature 
itself.17   
However, until the end of the Northern War, any plan for a campaign in 
Persia remained only on paper. When in 1721 the Treaty of Nystad was finally 
signed, Peter found his hands free to redirect his effort southward. Nevertheless, 
Peter’s desire for war must not be overestimated. As late as June 1722 (one 
month before the expedition began), the emperor was still hesitating because the 
hasty preparations had to be carried out in a matter of months, instead of 
spanning over a year.18 The main reasons for his concerns were the Afghan 
invasion of Persia (1721), and the fear that the Ottomans could intervene and 
take control of the Caspian coast.19 
The army was hastily assembled and included veteran infantry regiments 
from the war with Sweden, seven dragoon regiments as well as a body of 
irregular horsemen, comprised of Cossacks and Kalmyks. While the exact 
number of troops is still debatable, the realities of logistics as well as the short 
period for preparation did not allow for a great number of men to be mustered. 
Probably the Russian army did not exceed 50,000 men, including officers, 
artillerymen, and servants.20 However, concerning Persia’s diminished power, as 
                                                 
15 Kurukin, Persidskiy pokhod, 27; S.M. Solovyev, Istoriya Rossii s drevneyshikh vremen 17-18, IX (Moscow, 
1963), 349; Bruce, Memoirs, 149. 
16 The whole expedition was decimated by the local nomadic tribes, united under the khan of Bukhara. Only few 
Russians managed to survive the slaughter. The only account of the massacre, which reached Peter, was told by a 
Russian officer, who was enslaved and bought by some Kalmyks, who later exchanged him for ransom in 
Astrakhan, see Kurukin, Persidskiy pokhod, 27-8 ; Solovyev, Istorya Rossii, 352. 
17 As Kurukin notes, the major Russian successes in this campaign were achieved by small, mobile forces; see 
Kurukin, Persidskii pokhod, 97. 
18 Peter was proclaimed “emperor” on 22nd October 1721, following the end of the Northern War. 
19 The Ghilzai leader Mahmud Hotaki had launched his forces against Persia in 1721. After defeating the Persian 
forces twice in 1721 and 1722, his army besieged the capital Isfahan. 
20 The exact army strength of the Russian force is still a matter of debate. Older works (Beskrovnyy, Lockhart, 




well as the limited objectives of the campaign, Peter’s forces were quite 
sufficient.21 Furthermore, local leaders were suspicious of each other, and it was 
unlikely for an anti-Russian coalition of Dagestan tribes could be formed.22 
 
4.4. The Persian Campaign 
 
Boarded on the only significant fleet in the entire Caspian Sea, the Russian army 
left Astrakhan on 18th July 1722 and set sail to the fortress of Terki – Russia’s 
sothernmost possession. However, problems did arise as soon as the fleet 
entered the Caspian Sea.23 The fleet lacked compasses, and only a few 
experienced navigators were available.24 Thus, confusion occurred, and the 
entire fleet reached Tarki as late as 27th August 1722. After the provisions were 
replenished and further instructions were sent by Peter, the fleet continued its 
way south. 25 
On 27th July 1722 the army reached Agrakhan bay and on the next day, 
the emperor ordered a landing to be carried out. Again, the misleading 
information which had stated that Agrakhan was the most suitable landing spot 
led to confusion. Due to the shallow waters of the bay, the ships were unable to 
reach the coast and the soldiers had to carry their supplies, armament and other 
baggage on their backs, walking in waist-deep water.26 The landing operation 
took the entire day, and the Russians were fortunate that there was no enemy 
force to face them. As soon as the army was on dry land, Peter ordered a 
fortified camp to be erected for the protection of the landing area and of the 
fleet, which was anchored in the Agrakhan bay. The fortifications were built 
                                                                                                                                                        
which 22,000 were infantry, 9,000 were dragoons, 20,000 - Cossacks, 30,000 – Kalmyks and 5,000 – sailors. 
Lockhart repeats the same figures, but instead of 30,000 Kalmyks, he estimates that there were 20,000 Kalmyks 
and 35,000 Tatars, bringing the total of Russian force at 111,000. Peter Bruce in his Memoirs notes that there 
were 33,000 infantry, 7,000 dragoons, 20,000 Cossacks and 40,000 Kalmyks, estimating a total of 100,000 men. 
However, Lystsov, who is supported by Kurukin calculates that the Russian army did not exceed 50,000. 
Lystsov states the following numbers: 21,495 infantry, 8,757 dragoons, 16,300 Cossacks and 4,000 Kalmyks or a 
total of 50,552. Acccording to Kurukin, there were 18,602 infantrymen, 8,786 dragoons, 16,300 Cossacks and 
4,000 Kalmyks or 48,057 in overall. The later figures seem far more plausible as Kurukin and Lystsov had better 
evaluated the sources. Furthermore the logistics support of a hundred thousand men seems impossible, taking 
into consideration the local specifics of Dagestan. For a comparison of the given army figures, see Table in the 
Appendix for the current chapter. 
21 To this day there is no evidence that Peter made any plans to go beyond Baku, when he sailed from Astrakhan 
on 29th July 1722; see Kurukin, Persidskiy pokhod, 58. 
22 As early as 1720, the most prominent Dagestan ruler – Adil Girei the shamkhal of Tarki swore his allegiance 
to Peter. The rulers of Aksay, Ultamysh and the Qaitaq still hesitated, but did not express hostilities toward the 
Russians. 
23 The dates of the campaign are given in Old Style in order to avoid errors in transferring them to the New Style 
dates. The text uses the dates, listed in the Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722 and 1723 (St. Petersberg, 1855). 
24 P. Bruce, Memoirs, 310; Except for the crew of the Soymonov-Verden expedition (1721), there were no other 
sailors, familiar with the Caspian Sea. Thus, the fleet scattered and it took two days before all ships managed to 
reach Tarki on 5th August. 
25 The most important note was sent to the shamkhal, with an order to prepare carts for the army as well as to dig 
wells along the expected army route through his territory, see Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722, 51. 




considerably fast and by 4th August, the army was ready for departure.27 A 
garrison was left to protect the camp, and the main bulk of the army marched 
toward the Sulak River.28 There, on 6th, August Peter met with shamkhal Adil 
Girei and the Sultan of Aksay. Both confirmed their allegiance to Peter and 
supplied the army with additional carts, oxen, and food.29 After the meeting, the 
shamkhal returned to Tarki, and the sultan of Aksay rode back to his lands. On 
7th August the Russian army began crossing the Sulak River, but a great storm, 
which lasted four days, raised the water level. The army had to rebuild their 
camp far from the river. Furthermore, the two bridges which were built for the 
crossing had to be supplemented by other two. To construct the additional 
bridges, a band of Cossacks was sent upstream the Sulak in search for boats. It 
was not until 11th August that the army crossed the river and continued its march 
to Tarki.  
After crossing the Sulak River, the Russians entered in the lands, 
governed by the shamkhal. Here they did not meet any armed resistance and the 
only troubles on their way were the hot weather and the insufficient water 
supplies. The march to Tarki took only two days and in the early afternoon of 
12th August, the army entered the city and formed a camp near one of its 
suburbs.30 Peter stayed in Tarki for three days, giving his army some rest, during 
which he enjoyed the hospitality of Adil Girei. On 16th August the army broke 
camp and continued its way toward Derbent, which already acknowledged Peter 
as its overlord and was ready to open its gates to the advancing Russian force.31  
Two days after leaving Tarki, the Russians entered the lands of Mahmud 
of Utamysh. Peter sent three Cossacks and an envoy to negotiate his army’s 
passing and to ask for supplies and help with the transportation. However, 
Mahmud was not as hospitable as Adil Girei. The envoy was sent back with his 
nose and ears cut and the three Cossacks were killed and dismembered. Hours 
after Peter received this news, Mahmud appeared ahead of a 10,000 strong army 
and confronted the Russian vanguard.32 Peter’s troops were already prepared and 
began a skirmish with the enemy. Thus, began the only major engagement 
during the campaign. While the Russian infantry drew the enemy’s attention, the 
Cossacks and the dragoons launched a flanking attack and appeared behind the 
enemy position. Surprised by the cavalry attack, the army of Utamysh retreated, 
                                                 
27 For a map of the campaign routes for 1722-23; see Map 2 in the Appendix for the current chapter. 
28 The garrison consisted of 200-300 regular troops and 1,500-1,600 Cossacks; see Table 6 in the Appendix for 
the current chapter. 
29 See Table 8 in the Appendix for the current chapter. 
30 Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722, 59. 
31 Already in Tarki, Peter received a letter from his emissary to Derbent – Naumov, that the local deputy-
governor had accepted Peter’s offer and was ready to hand the city to the Russians; see Lockhart, The Fall of the 
Ṣafavī, 183. 
32 The exact number of the Utamysh forces varies between 6,000 and 12,000 men. In the journal, Peter states that 
the enemy forces engaged in the battle were firstly preserved to be 5-6,000, but when the Cossacks and the 
dragoons returned after chasing the enemy off the field, the total strength of the Utamysh forces was estimated at 
10,000. Peter Henry Bruce claims that the sultan of Utamysh had a 12,000 strong army; see Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 




closely pursued by the Russian cavalry and by part of the infantry. Finally, late 
in the same day, the Cossacks and the dragoons reached the capital of Utamysh, 
took it and destroyed 600 houses, taking between 30 and 40 prisoners.33 The 
army of Mahmud lost between 600 and 700 men while there are no mentioned 
casualties among the Russians.34 Peter’s evaluation of the local soldiers was that 
if they had the discipline of a regular force, no army would have been able to 
subdue them.35 
Having scattered the forces of Utamysh and destroyed Mahmud’s capital, 
Peter marched his troops south, toward Derbent. A day before he reached the 
city, a messenger came from Baku, stating that this town also accepted Peter’s 
manifest and was ready to surrender itself to Russia.36 The emperor entered 
Derbent in the afternoon of 23rd August 1722. He received the silver keys from 
the deputy-governor and stationed his army in the city’s fortress, as well as in a 
camp, south of the main settlement. While in Derbent, Peter ordered the 
strengthening of the fortifications and made arrangements for a garrison to be 
established. Two days later, an event that greatly influenced the future of the 
campaign occurred. A great storm arose on the evening of 24th August and 
continued in the early hours of 25th. As a result, twelve of the supply-ships, 
coming from Astrakhan, were sunk. Though there were no casualties, part of the 
supplies was lost, and the flour for the soldiers’ bread was damaged and had to 
be baked into sukhari.37 The news of Peter’s army marching back had a 
substantial impact on local leader’s policy. Sensing the Russian weakness, 
Mahmud of Utamysh allied himself with the Usmi of the Qaitaq and with Daud 
Beg, the chief of the Lezgins. Together they mustered a 20,000 strong force that 
began to follow Peter’s retreating army. Russia’s allies also changed sides. The 
sultan of Aksay refused to sell supplies to the Russians while the shamkhal slew 
Russian envoys in his capital. Later he submitted to Peter’s will only after the 
Russians reached Tarki. Peter’s retreat also left his main Christian ally in the 
area – Vakhtang of Georgia, without any support. Faced with internal struggle 
and the advance of a powerful Ottoman army, Vakhtang had to leave Tiflis 
(Tbilisi) and to seek shelter in Russia. Russia lost its only ally in the Caucasus 
and had to rely only on its forces and the variable loyalty of its Muslim allies.38  
                                                 
33 Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722, 119. 
34 P.H. Bruce states that a dragoon platoon was killed by a Utamysh ambush, but this information is not 
confirmed by official Russian documents; see Bruce, Memoirs, 330. 
35 Bruce, Memoirs, 333; Peter further remarked that local fighters were very weak when fighting as a coherent 
force and were fast to scatter. When, however, they fought in a single combat, they struggled desperately and if 
captured committed suicide by cutting themselves with daggers and swords; see Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722, 11. 
36 The manifest was written in three languages – Tatar, Turkish and Persian by the former prince of Moldavia 
Dimitrie Cantemir, while the Russian army was in Tarki. Cantemir accompanied Peter in his march south. 
37 The sukhari are a type of dried bred, separated in rations. They were baked by the soldiers themselves in field 
ovens, dug in the ground. Russian troops used sukhari long before Peter came to power. During the Northern 
War they were an essential part of the soldier’s diet. 
38 The story of Vakhtang’s downfall is told by Abraham of Yerevan in his “History of the Wars 1721-1738”. 
Vakhtang was proclaimed traitor by Tahmasp II of Persia for allying with Russia and was attacked by his cousin 




As soon as Peter returned to Astrakhan on 5th October 1722, he 
immediately began issuing orders for the following year. A considerable amount 
of boats had to be constructed along the Volga ports from Tver to Nizhny 
Novgorod.39 In addition, the army had to be resupplied with horses, due to the 
great number of animals, which perished during the summer offensive.40 Fresh 
recruitment had to be carried out, and Peter planned to concentrate additional 
20,000 men in St. Cross fort in order to launch an early campaign in 1723.41 
However, the diplomatic development, which will be analyzed later in the 
dissertation, made some changes to Peter’s initial plans. The concentration of 
Ottoman forces in Erzurum and the Ottoman ultimatum that the entire Shirvan 
had to be incorporated into the Sultan’s Empire called for quick action. More 
importantly, in October 1722 Isfahan was conquered by the Afghans and rumors 
whispered that Mahmud Hotaki was on his way to Tabriz and the Caspian shore. 
On 4th November 1722 a new expedition, the preparations for which were 
swiftly carried out in October, was sent to Resht under Colonel Mikhail 
Shipov.42 His task was to capture Gilan’s principal port and counter any Afghan 
incursion in the area for as long as possible. This time, Peter decided to rely on a 
small task-force. Shipov was placed in command of two battalions, boarded on 
14 vessels.43 His forces had to establish a landing base near Resht, in a place, 
where supplies could be easily sent from Astrakhan or St. Cross fort. The next 
step was to take control of the city of Resht and its fortress.44 The fleet reached 
the Gulf of Anzali on 5th December 1722. Shipov’s forces established a fortified 
position – Fort Peribazar at the mouth of the gulf and began to negotiate with the 
governor of Resht – Mehmed Ali Beg. While Shipov did not achieve much, the 
effort was saved by Russia’s ambassador in Persia – Semen Avramov.45 He 
managed to talk Mehmed Ali Beg into allowing the Russian force to enter Resht 
in order to protect it from the Afghans and keep it in the name of Tahmasp II. 
                                                                                                                                                        
late autumn of 1722. Constantine conquered Tiflis on behalf of Tahmasp II, but several months later he was 
deposed by the advancing Ottoman forces, which conquered Tiflis in 1723. Vakhtang was to follow the fate of 
Dimitrie Cantemir of Moldavia; see Abraham of Yerevan, History of the Wars, 1721 – 1738, trans. by G.A. 
Bournoutian (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1999), 14-7. 
39 Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722, 90: 30 transport-ships (Heckboot), 6 large boats, 30 smaller boats, 30 smaller 
vessels (boats). The first thirty vessels were named botov which can be translated as “boats”; the other 30 were 
named shlyupki which means a smaller type of boat. 
40 Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722, 193. 
41 Kurukin, Persidskiy pokhod, 92. 
42 On the 24th October 1722 Peter received message from Resht that the local governor and the people had agreed 
to accept Russian protection. However, as soon as news of Peter’s retreat reached the city of Resht, the situation 
changed, as Shipov was to find out; see Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722, 19. 
43 Between 24th October and 4th November 1722 Peter stayed in the home of Admiral Apraksin and held constant 
military councils. During these meetings the plans for the following months were laid down, as it is evident from 
Peter’s actions on the 4th November when he sent several dispatches, regulating the preparations for the winter 
and spring activities; see Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722, 91-3, 180-94. 
44 Kurukin, Persidskiy pokhod, 85-6. 
45 Negotiations were not going well and Mehmed Ali Beg even began mustering a force in order to expel the 




The conquest of Resht was celebrated with great joy by Peter, who organized a 
feast in St. Petersburg.46  
The situation in Dagestan and Gilan remained calm throughout the 
winter.47 In March Tahmasp II’s envoy to Petersburg – Ismail Beg, came to 
Resht. He was sent to negotiate a treaty with Peter, according to which the Shah 
would recognize Russia’s conquests in exchange for Russian support against the 
Afghans. However, by the time Ismail Beg reached Resht, Tahmasp had made 
up his mind and sent a special messenger with new instructions. Fortunately for 
the Russians, Avramov was vigilant and able to slow down the messenger until 
Ismail Beg was already on his way to Peter. Nevertheless, the local population 
in Resht did not want Russian presence in the city and by April 1723 Governor 
Mehmed Ali Beg armed the citizens and decided to attack the Russians. Colonel 
Shipov monitored carefully Mehmed Ali’s actions and managed to fortify his 
garrison in the old Russian caravansary. On 4th April 1723, the citizens of Resht 
laid siege on the caravansary. During the night, Shipov, personally leading three 
of his units, made a sally and dispersed the crowd. However, the news of the 
accident was alarming, and Peter dispatched reinforcement under brigadier 
Vasiliy Levashov, who was to take command of the Resht garrison.48 Levashov 
reached Resht on 9th June 1723 and quickly asserted full control over the city. 
The next step of the plan, designed in October 1722 by Peter and Admiral 
Apraxin, was the capture of Baku. Satisfied with the success of Shipov’s strike-
force, Peter decided to send another considerably small unit to accomplish the 
task. Brigadier Matyushkin was placed in charge of four regiments.49 
Matyushkin’s expedition was, however, significantly delayed, because he had to 
wait in St. Cross fort for additional vessels from Astrakhan to arrive. The 
operation, which was scheduled for the spring, finally took place in July. 
Matyushkin tried to negotiate the surrender of Baku, but its governor refused. 
Urged by the emperor’s orders, as well as by the need to land the troops, 
Matyushkin began bombarding the city. After four days of cannonade and a 
successful landing manoeuvre of the Russian forces, Baku capitulated and 
Matyushkin positioned a strong garrison in the city. Although frustrated by the 
offense’s delay, Peter was very pleased with the news of Baku’s fall. He 
elevated Matyushkin from brigadier to lieutenant-general and placed him in 
charge of the entire Caspian theater.  
While the army was marching, the Russian diplomacy was fighting its 
own war. The young ambassador in Istanbul – Neplyuev did his best to calm the 
Ottoman government. He claimed that Peter’s actions were not set against the 
                                                 
46 It was referred as Schastlivoy prikhod (The Fortunate Arrival). Peter celebrated by issuing fireworks and 
special prayers in several monasteries in the capital. Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1723, 11. 
47 Strengthening positions and transferring troops according to the emperor’s will were the only active 
developments. The Muslim forces in Dagestan ended their raids and the population of Resht still feared of the 
Afghans. 
48 2,000 troops and 24 cannons – Lystsov, Persidskiy Pokhod Petra I, 129; Kurukin, Persidskiy pokhod, 90. 




Ottomans, but were designed as a punishment for the brigands in Dagestan, who 
robbed the Russian merchants in Shamakhi.50 The grand vizier Damat Ibrahim 
Paşa was no fool and was well aware that Russia desired to establish a firm hold 
on the Caspian coast. This contrasted the Ottoman interests in the area. The 
vizier was able to play his cards well and accepted Daud Beg of the Lesgins as a 
vassal of the Ottoman Empire.51 Daud Beg was proclaimed governor of Shirvan 
and the Porte gave an ultimatum - Russia must retreat to the Terek River and 
remove any fortifications and garrisons, established by Peter. The complicated 
diplomatic struggle, which also involved the ambassadors of England and 
France, continued until 1724. However, these negotiations are not a subject of 
the current dissertation.52 Instead, only several crucial moments will be pointed 
out, which have been part of a debate, regarding the entire development of the 
1722-1724 conflict. 
Firstly, according to Benningsen’s article, Peter was intimidated by the 
Ottoman demands, and it the ultimatum given by the Porte that made him retreat 
from Derbent and return to Astrakhan.53 However, as all other works on the 
issue point out, it was logistics, rather than diplomatic pressure, which 
compelled Peter to sail back to Russia in October 1722. As the Russian position 
in the negotiations clearly proves, Peter was more willing to fight a war against 
the Ottomans, instead of withdrawing from Dagestan. As Lockhart and Lystsov 
point out, Russia was adamant in its position that no Ottoman presence will be 
established on the Caspian coast. If the Ottomans gain access to the Caspian, 
this would enable them to contact the Muslim tribes in Central Asia and use 
them against Russia. Peter was indeed worried by such a perspective, and he 
demanded from the governor of Astrakhan that no Ottoman or Crimean envoys 
should reach the Kalmyks or any other nomads. Furthermore, Russia’s 
preparedness for war must not be underestimated. In the spring of 1723 over 
22,000 Cossacks and regular troops were already concentrated in St. Cross 
fort.54 Further forces were sent to strengthen the garrisons at Derbent and 
Resht.55 In addition, Peter sent a call to arms to the Cossacks of Ukraine and 
Don and was ready to redirect the entire army to the border with the Crimean 
                                                 
50 In 1721 the combined forces of Daud Beg and Ahmad Khan (leaders of the Lesgins and the Qaitaq) pillaged 
Shamakhi and took goods, worth 500,000 rubles from the local Russian merchants. This accident was used as a 
pretext by Peter to launch his campaign; see Lockhart, The Fall of the Ṣafavī, 177-8). 
51 In the spring of 1723 Daud Beg, Mahmud of Utamysh, Mehmed of Aksay and the Usmi of the Qaitaq made a 
secret agreement with Aadil Girei of Tarki to send an embassy to Istanbul in order to place their lands under 
Ottoman suzerainty; see Lystsov, Persidskiy Pokhod Petra I, 131. The letter from Damat Ibrahim Paşa, 
accepting Daud Beg as a vassal and urging him to act against the Russians, is given in Lemercier-Quelquejay, 
“An Unpublished Document”, 174 – 8. 
52 For an exhaustive description of the Ottoman-Russian negotiations; see Lockhart, The Fall of the Ṣafavī, 212-
37. 
53 Benningsen, “Peter The Great”, 311-8. 
54 Lystsov, Persidskiy Pokhod Petra I, 140. 
55Derbent was reinforced with 1,200 Cossacks, two infantry battalions and 20 guns and Resht was supported by 
Levashov’s 2,000 troops and 24 cannons. In total, by July, 1723, Russia had some 38-40,000 troops concentrated 




Khanate. It is safe to say that by August 1723 the total Russian potential could 
have been mustered and ready to defend the borders. Furthermore, there was a 
considerable amount of frontier troops, permanently concentrated on the 
southern frontier.56 Thus, Russia was ready to risk a war. What could have been 
the outcome of such a conflict or how Peter could finance a conflict with such 
proportions is a whole different story. 
The second issue which is a subject of debate is the Ottoman preparedness 
for a large-scale conflict. Accordin to Lockhart, Damat Ibrahim Paşa was a 
peace-loving man, who wanted to reform his state and avoid further conflict. 
Also, his master Ahmed III – a very avaricious man, did not wish to spend funds 
on effortless conflicts. As Lockhart concludes, this duo was reluctant to risk war 
with Russia and doubted whether to intervene in Persia at all.57 However, this 
cheerful story of an art-loving vizier and a cautious sultan though pleasant is to 
some extent naïve. As Ibrahim Paşa’s actions during the negotiations with 
Russia and with the Dagestani tribal leaders demonstrate, he was not willing to 
allow any Russian incursion in the Caspian and was ready to pursue his goals. 
As already outlined in a previous chapter, the Ottoman Empire still had the 
potential to defend its interests. Ottoman forces, mustered for the advance in 
Persia, numbered no less than 50,000 and were well supported by artillery.58 
More troops could be sent by ships to the Azov Sea in order to threaten Russia’s 
southern borders. Apart from that, the Ottomans could count on the support of 
the Crimean Khan, who could still muster some 70-100,000 horsemen and also 
on the Muslim faction in the Caucasus, with its 20,000 force. Ottoman 
diplomacy was also firm in its position and was ready to fight Russia for the 
control of Dagestan. In the end, it was the mediation of the French ambassador 
in Istanbul – Jean-Louis d’Usson, Marquis de Bonnac that helped to avoid the 
conflict.59 Or at least that is Lockhart’s point of view. 
Paralles of the situation could be found in modern history. There is a 
remarkable resemblance between the Russo-Ottoman tension and the several 
crises that marked the Cold War between the USSR and the USA. Both states 
were “superpowers” in the Caucasus region, and both states had the potential of 
gathering some of the largest wartime armies in Europe. They had overlapping 
strategic and economic interests, and supported local factions, using them as 
                                                 
56 There were some 70,000 garrison troops, most of which were concentrated on the southern frontier; see the 
Appendix of Chapter I. 
57 Lockhart, The Fall of the Ṣafavīd, 213. 
58 The Ottoman forces were concentrated in Erzurum in the spring of 1723 and marched east, conquering by the 
spring of 1724 the two most important fortresses in the Caucasus – Yerevan and Tiflis. Soon after, Tabriz, the 
gate to Inner Persia, was also taken. Another army entered Hamadan from Iraq under the Paşa of Bagdad. By the 
end of 1724, Western Persia was already occupied by the Ottomans. Though, as it was outlined in part I, chapter 
2, Abraham of Yerevan overestimates the Ottoman numbers, it is doubtless that the Porte was able to sent at least 
80,000 men in Persia. Compared to the approximately 40-50,000 Russians, the Ottoman presence in the region 
was considerably larger; see Lockhart, The Fall of the Ṣafavī, 255-73; Abraham of Yerevan, History of the Wars, 
17-37. 




tools in their grand strategies. In 1722 there was no European power that could 
serve as a mediator between these two states, not to mention a single 
ambassador, who was deprived of his government’s support.60 Thus, the 
influence of the British resident in Istanbul – Abraham Stanyan over the policy 
of Damat Ibrahim Paşa must not be overestimated. In general, Lockhart tries to 
prove that European powers exercised almost the same influence in the Near 
East as they did during the early nineteenth century. This, however, was far from 
the truth. Neither Russia nor the Ottoman Empire were as dependent on Western 
Europe as Lockhart supposes. It can be argued that the war between the 
Ottomans and the Russians was not fought solely because these states decided 
not to fight. It was not so much the actions of de Bonnac and Stanyan but the 
complicated economic and military state of the two empires, which 
predetermined the outcome of the conflict. Both Peter and Damat Ibrahaim 
knew that a direct conflict between Russia and the Ottomans would lead to an 
economic crisis. 
It is true that the two eastern colossi could raise vital forces, but the 
question was - for how long. The money and the resources, needed for a full-
scale war were hardly present in Istanbul and St. Petersburg. The Ottoman 
Empire had just ended a 35 year-long period of wars and for Russia, it was 
jumping from one major conflict into another.61 Thus, it was not so much the 
real war, but the possibility of one, that was the playground of the Russian and 
the Ottoman diplomacy. In reality, both states were unwilling to fight, just as 
were the USSR and the USA, but their leading policy-makers were very good at 
playing their cards. The game of bidding with military preparations finally 
ended in the summer of 1724, after both states had conquered their primary 
objectives and an effective repartition of Persia took place.62 The final treaty 
resembled very much the outcome of the first partition of Poland-Lithuania by 
Russia, Prussia, and Austria in 1773.63 And if the Russo-Ottoman “Cold War” 
was slow to develop in the winter of 1723/24, the Russo-Safavid relations took a 
more rapid progression. As noted above, Avramov, Russia’s ambassador to 
Persia, was able to trick Ismail Beg, the Persian envoy to St. Petersburg, and 
deprive him of his master’s final instructions not to conclude piece with Peter. 
Ismail Beg continued his way to Russia and reached Astrakhan in March 1723. 
Peter ordered Artemiy Volynskiy to delay Ismail Beg and to bring him to 
                                                 
60 As. L.Lockhart notes in his narrative, de Bonnac acted on his behalf, since Paris was not willing to intervene 
in the Russo-Ottoman conflict. It was in October 1723 that Louis XV finally decided to support his ambassador 
by giving him a carte blanche; see Lockhart, The Fall of the Ṣafavī, 220, Note 1. 
61I am referring to the War of the Holy League (1683-1701), the Russo-Ottoman War (1711-3), the Ottoman-
Venetian War (1714-8) and the Austro-Ottoman War (1716-8); The Great Northern War. It was preceded by the 
Russo-Ottoman War (1686-1700) in the context of the War of the Holy League and the two campaigns against 
Crimea (1687; 1689). 
62 For the Russians – Derbent, Baku and Resht; For the Ottomans – Tiflis, Yerevan and Tabriz. 
63 One might argue that Russian diplomacy had a good background of partitioning other states, based on the 




Petersburg later in the summer.64 Following the fall of Baku, Peter finally met 
with Ismail Beg. After a series of lavish feasts and celebrations, a treaty was 
concluded between Russia and Persia.65 According to the treaty, Persia had to 
give up all Caspian provinces to Russia, including Astrabad, where no Russian 
soldier had ever set foot. In exchange, Russia was to provide military aid to 
Tahmasp II and help him in case of war against a third party.66 In reality, 
Tahmasp II never ratified this document, and the occupation of the Caspian 
provinces was carried out without the approval of Persia. However, until Nadir 
Shah expelled the Afghans in 1729, none of the factions, struggling for the 
Persian succession, had the strength to remove Russia from its newly acquired 
territories. 
The Struggle for Persia was brought to an end in 1724 or at least, so it 
seemed. The Ottomans and the Russians were able to partition their neighbor’s 
lands and to conclude an agreement. The “Cold War” between the two empires 
ended and both states were satisfied with the outcome. It is hard to measure who 
won the most. Both Peter and Damat Ibrahim managed to fullfil their primary 
goals. Russia had to abandon the Orthodox population of the Caucasus to the 
Ottomans and exchange their allegiance for the volatile loyalty of the population 
of Gilan and Dagestan. It was also uncertain whether the newly-conquered lands 
would pay off for the vast resources, invested in their acquisition. Howeverfor 
the time being, Russia received what she came for, and Peter managed to 
transform the Caspian into a mare noster. Any full-scale evaluation of the 
Russian effort in Persia would require a further, in-depth research of the Russian 
occupation and the developments, which led to the treaties of Resht (1729) and 
Ganja (1735), which ended Russia’s presence in the Southern Caspian region 
and returned the borders between Persia and Russia to the status quo from 1722. 
However, such a study is not the subject of the current dissertation. Here it is 
sufficient to note that Russia managed to establish successfully its presence in 
the Near East.  
 
 
                                                 
64 A. Volynskiy reported to the emperor, that Ismail Beg was ready to sign a treaty according to which Persia 
would secede all Caspian provinces to Russia; see Kurukin, Persidskiy pokhod, 97. Peter, however, decided to 
postpone the signing of the treaty, since Russia’s position in the Caspian was still unstable (Almost 1/3 of the 
troops in Resht were sick and Matyushkin was nowhere near sailing to Baku). Thus, when in the end of July 
1723 Baku finally fell in Russian hands, Peter was ready to negotiate with Ismail Beg.  
65 Kurukin, Persidskiy pokhod, 97-8. 
66 The signing of the Treaty of St. Petersburg was a critical point in the Russo-Ottoman negotiations. Peter did 
not notify his ambassador in Istanbul Neplyuev about the clauses of the treaty. Neplyuev became familiar with 
the text through its translation in one Venetian newspaper. The subsequent scandal was overcome only by the 
mediation of de Bonnac, who was able to convince Damat Ibrahim Paşa that the pact was not aimed against the 
Ottoman Empire. It was perhaps the only situation, in which the personality of de Bonnac proved essential for 
avoiding a conflict. Yet, it is still doubtful whether the grand vizier was ready to start a war against Russia. 
Instead, the scandal gave him the chance to deny any Russian claim made so far and to demand better terms from 
Neplyuev. As it turned out, Peter had to mend his mistake by agreeing to some of the Ottoman terms, most 





4.5. The Performance of the Russian Army 
 
The Persian Campaign is the only one of the conflicts, reviewed in the current 
dissertation, which takes place outside the well-known battlegrounds of early 
modern Europe. Thus, it will be presented with a more detailed description of 
the actual performance of the Russian army, and with an analysis of the non-
military factors, influencing the development of the campaign. This will be a 
deviation from the pattern of evaluation followed so far, but it is necessary in the 
context of the overall contribution, pursued by this dissertation. 
 
The terrain factor – The Caucasus and the Caspian as a battleground 
 
The Caucasus chain is the highest mountain system in Western Asia, with its 
tallest peak - Elbrus reaching 5642 meters. If the Caucasus Mountains have to be 
compared to any similar part of Europe, it would be the Alps. Both mountains 
could be traversed only through a small number of passes and both separate two 
regions, distinctive by social structure and environment. However, the size of 
the mountains and the character of the local population mark the main 
differences between the two cases. The Caucasus Mountains stretch in northwest 
– southeast direction, dividing the river system into three general zones.67 The 
first area includes the rivers, which flow north and enter the Caspian Sea. These 
rivers serve as the natural southern border of the Eurasian Steppe and can be 
used as a divide between the nomadic Mongolian tribes of the grasslands and the 
mountain tribes of Circassia (Cherkassiya). The second river zone includes the 
streams that flow south-eastward into the Caspian Sea and mark the southern 
border betweeb the mountainous population and the peoples inhabiting the 
Persian mainland. Finally, the third zone includes all the rivers, which flow into 
the Black Sea. These territories are dominated by the settled Georgian societies 
and since ancient times have been the most well-known part of the Caucasus.68 
The region, which is the primary concern of our study, is the second, the south-
eastern zone and more specifically - its northern periphery. These territories are 
dominated by the densely wooded eastern slopes of the Caucasus and the small 
valleys, which are locked between the mountains and the Caspian Sea. It is 
precisely these interrelated coastal valleys, which are one of the three most 
                                                 
67 See Map 3 in the Appendix for the current chapter. 
68 Unlike the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea was connected with Europe and Asia through the Straights of 
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, as well as the Danube, Dnieper and Don rivers. Ever since the Greeks 
established their colonies along the Black Sea coasts (ninth-seventh centuries BC), Georgia (then known as 
Kolkhis or Iberia), was integrated in the trading system of Europe and Western Asia. During the Medieval 
period, due to its links with Byzantium, Georgia participated in the trade routes, which linked the Baltic with the 




important routes for passing through the Caucasus.69 The valleys alongside the 
Caspian coastal road are crossed by small rivers and dry gullies, which break the 
terrain and make it hard for any army to maintain high marching speed. Woods 
and little dales in the mountains are perfect spots for ambushes and standoffs. 
During the eighteenth century the best way to move in this area, was on 
horseback and the best way to transport a baggage-train - was by using pack 
animals. 
The terrain had a high impact on the movement and on the manoeuvres of 
the Russian army. To begin with, Peter had to carefully choose his way south. 
Concerning his goals – the capture of Baku and the establishment of a foothold 
on the western Caspian coast, the Black Sea coastal route was quite unsuitable. 
Firstly, it could transfer the line of operations far from the primary objective. 
Secondly, it could lead the Russians through a territory, which was under 
Ottoman suzerainty.70 Thirdly, the route was far from any Russian supply center, 
and no naval assistance could be expected in the Black Sea. Finally, using this 
road could expose the lines of communication to the attacks of the Crimean and 
Kuban Tatars. The only benefit for Peter could be the support of the Orthodox 
Georgian princes of Imereti, Abkhazia and Mingrelia. However, Peter never put 
too much trust in the Caucasian Christians and thus, there was no reason for the 
emperor to march his army through this route.71 
Peter’s second option was the Georgian Military road. Unlike the Black 
Sea route, the passage through the central Caucasus had its positive sides. It was 
the shortest way to cross the mountains and to enter the valley of the Kura River. 
Once in the valley, the Russians could conquer Tiflis and thus block any 
possible Ottoman advance from the west. Once Tiflis was secured, the army 
could march or even sail along the Kura, to reach the Caspian Sea near Baku. 
Peter wanted to control the mouth of Kura.72 Furthermore, the rich trade center 
of Shamakhi was also situated in this area. Russian goods in this town had been 
pillaged and this incident served as a pretext for the Tsar’s military effort. If 
Peter had wanted to avenge the mistreating of the Russian merchants by the 
Lesgins, he would have taken this route. Although this option seemed tempting, 
the Georgian Military road held several risks. Firstly, there was no Russian base 
on the northern slopes of the Caucasus.73 The nearest Russian position was 
Terki, on the Terek River, approximately 400 kilometers to the north-east. The 
                                                 
69 The other two were the Black Sea coastal road (Beregovoe Shosse) and the so-called Georgian Military Road 
(Voenno-Gruzinskaya doroga), which ran from Vladikavkaz (Ordzhonikidze) to Tiflis (Tbilisi); see Map 4 in the 
Appendix for the current chapter. 
70 Provoking the Ottomans to strike was never part of Peter’s plan. 
71 Solovyev, Istoriya Rossii, 374. 
72 As proven by the expedition toward Resht. During the expedition the fleet, under Soymonov first had to map 
the mouth of the Kura River and only then to leave Shipov’s corps near Resht. 
73 Vladikavkaz was established in 1784 for the purpose of controlling the so-called “Caucasus Gates”. This is a 
system of gorges, which traverses the mountain from north to south, following Terek River upstream and then 
the Aragvi River, until its influx with the Kura River, twenty miles north of Tiflis; see W.E.D. Allen and 
P.Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields –A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921 




territories between Terki and the “Caucasian Gates” were under the control of 
the Circassian princes, who, at least nominally, were subjected to Russia. 
However, these princes often fought each other, separated in parties, either 
supporting the Russians or the Ottomans and their Tatar allies. One such conflict 
took place between 1718 and 1720 and although it was won by the pro-Russian 
faction, the region remained unstable. Even if this obstacle could have been 
overcome, there was a second problem. The so-called “Caucasian Gates”were in 
fact a series of narrow gorges, cut by the upstream of the Terek and Aragvi 
rivers. The passes were often blockaded by snow and landfalls and any army, 
traveling through them could be easily cut off from its supply lines not only by 
nature, but also by the mountain tribes, which inhabited the region, and were 
allies of the Lesgins.74 Apart from all that, the road also hindered the setting of 
communication and supply lines. Until the Kura was reached, there were no 
navigable rivers or established roads, which could ease the traversing of the 
Caucasus. Thus, it could probably take weeks, if not months to transport 
supplies and messages along the route. 
Finally, there was the Caspian coastal road. It followed the Caspian Sea in 
northwest – southeast direction: begining from the Terek river system, 
traversing the narrow valleys around Tarki and Derbent and finally ending at the 
northern periphery of the Kura river system, near Baku. There were several main 
advantages of this route. Firstly, Russia was practically the master of the 
Caspian Sea, being the only state to possess a real fleet in the region. By using 
its fleet, based in Astrakhan, the Russians could deliver supplies along the entire 
route, if there were suitable locations to harbor the ships. Secondly, the fortress 
of Terki – Russia’s southernmost base, controlled the northern end of the route 
and could be used as a logistics center, as well as an operational base for any 
campaign in the region. The Caspian route also had the advantage of not 
crossing the Caucasus at all. It was the only direct way to Baku, without 
traversing highlands. Regarding the population, Russia could count on the 
support of the Terki and Greben Cossacks, who inhabited the region since the 
sixteenth century and were always loyal to the tsar. These Cossacks were quite 
familiar with the terrain and with the nature of the area, as well as the peoples, 
who inhabited Dagestan. The main disadvantage of the Caspian route was that it 
left the western flank of the army opened to attacks from the mountain tribes and 
separated the Russians from their potential allies in Georgia and Armenia. 
After taking these possibilities into consideration, Peter decided to choose 
the Caspian coast. After the operation against Finland in 1713, Peter had a 
preference for amphibious warfare. He believed that only through combining 
land advance with adequate naval support the victory was going to be certain. 
Furthermore, Peter pursued the total control of the Caspian Sea in order to 
affirm Russia as an indispensable part of the trade route between India and 
                                                 




Europe. By establishing strongholds on the western Caspian coast, Peter could 
eliminate any possibility of Ottoman incursion in the area. The relations with the 
local leaders also influenced his decision. The shamkhal of Tarki, the most 
prominent local leader, swore allegiance to Russia in 1718 and promised his 
support if Peter was to march in Dagestan. Furthermore, the city of Derbent 
gave an affirmative reply to Peter’s manifesto even before the campaign had 
started. Regarding his allies in Georgia and Armenia, Peter urged Vakhtang VI 
to take control of Tiflis and unite his forces with the Armenians. According to 
the plan this army had to march south-eastward, capture Shamakhi and merge 
with the Russians near Baku. The Caucasian allies had to avoid any possible 
provocation of the Ottomans. Their main objective had to be to rout the Lesgins. 
After the path had been chosen, it was time to think about the possible ways of 





When Peter decided to expand his realm southward, he planned to use the 
established system of canals and rivers to transport and concentrate his troops in 
Astrakhan. However, once the army went on its way, the possibilities to use 
local infrastructure for the benefit of the army’s advance faded. When the fleet 
sailed from Terki on 26th July 1722, Peter left behind the last safe harbor and 
supply center, available to his forces. Any further operations had to be exercised 
relying on the army’s capacity and the doubtful assistance of the local rulers.  
One thing is certain – there was no road system in Dagestan, or, at least, 
no roads in terms of a network of paved ways, supervised by local authorities. 
The only two significant settlements, which stood on Peter’s way to Baku, were 
Tarki and Derbent. Between these, however, no real road existed, except 
probably, some dirt road, well-trodden by carts and horses. In order to 
understand why local authorities did not construct roads, two reasons must be 
outlined – the frequent conflicts between the rulers, and on larger scale - 
struggle between the empires and the local leaders, who were trying to preserve 
their autonomy.  
With regard to regional conflicts, ever since the Middle Ages warfare in 
Dagestan concentrated on the usage of mounted troops. Bands of horsemen 
served as the main striking forces of the Dagestani warlords in their struggle 
against each other. To better understand the way war was fought in the 
Caucasus, a parallel with similar development in Asia Minor could be made. 
There the predominant forces, prior to the Ottoman conquests, were the gazi 
bands. In a similar fashion, a gazi ethos developed among the Dagestani tribes 
and since there was no major power to conquer or centralize the region, the state 
of play remained unchanged up until the Russian conquests during the 




played part in the preservation of the gazi ethos. Unlike Asia Minor, where a lot 
of forts and fortresses existed, especially in the western parts, in the Caucasus, 
there were no significant settlements, nor any significant fortifications. The 
population lived in a semi-nomadic fashion and could abandon its settlement 
until the enemy had been defeated or had left the occupied territory.75 Therefore, 
“forts” were simple ramparts, consisting of wooden palisades and shallow 
moats. Such fortifications were able to hold a cavalry for some time but were 
still vulnerable to the dismounted charge of the gazi. 
Apart from the local conflicts and the specific art of war, a second reason 
for the lack of adequate road network was the constant struggle of the empires to 
impose their rule over the Caucasian peoples. A well-known fact is that good 
roads are the veins of any imperial power. By using a road system, Persia, 
Russia or the Ottoman Empire would be able to launch punitive expeditions and 
to maintain strong garrisons. Furthermore, roads would make the supply of these 
imperial forces much easier and would thus threaten the autonomy of the local 
warlords. The imperial administration could also use the road network in order 
to collect tolls and taxes and to establish a better functioning bureaucratic 
system. With such a system empire’s official documents would travel faster 
throughout the realm. As for the trade, the population of Dagestan’s main 
trading product was animals – oxen, sheep, and horses, which were sold at the 
big trade centers, situated in the valleys around the Caucasus. Animals, unlike 
goods, did not need a road system to be transported, and thus, there was no 
economic necessity for the local population to maintain a road network for 
trade’s sake.   
How did Peter deal with the situation? When his army landed on 
Agrakhan Bay, Peter’s first task was to establish a fortified camp, which would 
serve as starting point for the new line of communications. His next task was to 
secure the loyalty of Tarki and Derbent, the only sizable settlements in the area 
and to control their vicinities. After these main fortified positions were secured, 
the army had to establish a chain of harbors along the western Caspian coast, so 
that the fleet from Astrakhan could support the troops with supplies and 
munitions. Still there was the question why did Peter prefered the marine 
transportation. There were two main reasons. Firstly, because only Russia 
possessed a fleet in the Caspian, and no enemy force could attack and capture 
the supply ships.76 Secondly, the construction of a road network would require 
                                                 
75 This is exactly what happened during the Russian march south. The population of both Endirey and Utamysh 
managed to leave their homes and retreated deeper into the mountains. When the Russians were gone, the people 
returned and rebuilt their settlements. During the return of the Utamysh population, a surprise attack by a 5,000 
force of Cossacks and Kalmyks caught the local completely off guard and resulted in hundreds of captives and 
the loss of 7,000 heads of cattle. 
76 In the course of the campaign and following the Russian march north, the attacks of the Dagestani horsemen 
proved that the land-based line of communications was quite vulnerable and in order to maintain it, a very strong 
chain of garrisons had to be established. Instead, Peter opted for a small number of garrisons on key locations 




time and funds, which Russia could not currently afford.77 Peter came to the 
logical solution by preferring the naval transport as safer and cheaper. However, 
it turned out, that there was an enemyin the sea against which no eighteenth-




The next factor, which played a crucial role in the development of the Persian 
Campaign, was the weather. When it comes to the climate of Western Asia, 
people often picture vast deserts and rocky wastelands, heated by the merciless 
sun and swept by sandstorms. However, the reality of the Persian Campaign was 
quite different. Thanks to the accurate day to day account of the campaign 
journal of the Persian expedition, the dissertation summarizes the weather 
conditions for most of the Persian Campaign of 1722.78 It turns out that rain and 
storms were as troublesome for the army as was the heat. 
Unfortunately, it cannot be estimated if the climate of the Caspian and the 
Caucasus was the same as it is today, thus, no general assumptions about the 
nature of the weather could be made. However, it is possible to trace what the 
weather conditions were in Dagestan and the Astrakhan province during the 
months of July, August and September. When Peter started his expedition on 
18th July 1722, it was midsummer in the Caspian region. The weather was warm 
and sunny, and for the first three days the army sailed under clear skies. Upon 
entering the Caspian Sea, two storms from the north-east hampered the army 
advance. In the following days the fleet sailed in good weather conditions, 
reaching Terki on 24th July.79 
During the next two weeks, the weather remained hot and sunny, with 
almost no rain. At the beginning of August, when the army left its camp in 
Agrakhan Bay, the weather was extremely hot, and the soldiers suffered during 
their march to the Sulak River. If the heat only harassed the troops on their way 
south, it was storms that stopped the army’s advance. Between 7th and 11th 
August, there was a great storm that raised the level of the Sulak River. The 
water damaged the two bridges, built by the Russians and Peter had to seek 
materials for the construction of two new pontoons. It took four days for the 
entire army to cross the river. After the storm ended, the weather became very 
hot again and tookthe lives of many soldiers and horses. After the army finally 
reached Derbent, a new powerful northern storm destroyed the supply fleet off 
the coast, near the city, and made any further advance to Baku impossible. The 
                                                 
77 Peter was determined to advance as fast as possible, in order to place the Ottomans in a fait accompli and deny 
them the ability to interfere in Dagestan. As for the cost, in 1722 Russia had to spend more than 1,600,000 rubles 
on military costs. The cost for transporting materials, workers and also for protecting their work from local 
tribes’ incursions was immense. The only land-based constructions, apart from forts, were the bridges, build for 
the crossing of several small rivers, which flowed into the Caspian Sea. Except for an ancient stone bridge near 
Buynaksk River, all other crossings required from the army to erect its own pontoon bridges.  
78 See Table 2 and Table 3 in the Appendix for the current chapter. 




army remained in Derbent until early September. When on the 8th September the 
Russians began their return march, the weather suddenly changed. The breezy 
summer evenings were replaced by cold autumn nights, and on 10th September, 
the hills were covered in frost. The weather during daytime also changed, 
becoming cold and cloudy. If the army marched in blistering heat on its way 
south, the troops moved north in cold, harsh weather, swept by wind and storms. 
Finally, the Russians reached the Sulak River at the end of September, but 
unfortunately, there is no account of the climate after 18th September.  
There is no information, regarding the weather during the expeditions 
against Resht and Baku. The Resht expedition was carried out in the winter, and 
it could be guessed that the weather in the Caspian Sea was cold and windy.80 
As for Matyushkin’s capture of Baku, it took place during the second half of 
July 1723 and considering the weather in Dagestan the previous year, it could be 
supposed that it was hot during the four days of the siege. There were probably 
no major storms during the two later expeditions since no reports for sunken 
ships appear in the sources. 
While the cold, harsh weather in September was nothing new for the 
Russian troops, it was the summer heats and storms, which had a greater impact 
on the army. Before the march south began, measures were taken to avoid the 
heat.81 The army stopped several times a day so that the soldiers and the horses 
could rest. Also, the army always camped near rivers or wells, so that the troops 
could slake their thirst. However, the sun was taking its toll. On several 
occasions Peter Bruce notes that the soldiers were exhausted from the heat and 
dropped out. Furthermore, the soldier’s diet also had something to do with the 
heat resistance of the army. Food comprised of bread and meat, water and 
probably wine. However, fruits, which contained the required vitamins were 
absent for the most part of the campaign. During the stay at the Sulak River, the 
army received an abundant supply of fresh fruit, which were devoured with such 
haste that many of the soldiers got sick.82 The uncontrollable hunger could be 
explained not so much with the lack of food supplies but with the exhaustion 
and dehydration of the troops due to the heat. Water was also problematic since 
the rivers flowed through soils with high limestone content. The limestone 
entered the water and made it salty, which increased the soldiers’ thirst and 
made them vulnerable to the heat. 
The sudden change of the weather in the early September also had its 
impact on the soldiers. The veterans from the Northern War were used to the 
cold, but after two months of heat, even they found it hard to adjust. 
Furthermore, according to Bruce’s memoirs, the Russians lacked winter 
                                                 
80 It took almost a month for the fleet to reach Resht. However, the delay was partially due to the exploration of 
the mouth of Kura River, carried out by Soymonov, according to Peter’s orders. 
81 The soldiers were prohibited from staying outside without hats between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.; the troops were 
forbidden to sleep on the bare ground or use grass and reed as their bedding. In addition, drinking alcohol and 
the frequent usage of salty meat were also restricted; see Kurukin, Persidskiy pokhod, 58. 




uniforms during their return march.83 Taking into account the cold nights, the 
exhausting marches and the several evenings in which the army was in full alert, 
it could be supposed that the cool weather also influenced the general extortion 
of the army during its march north.  
In general, the weather was one of the “new” factors, with which the 
Russian army had to adjust to. Considering the specific circumstances, it can be 
concluded that Peter’s army did very well. Similar problems were often among 
the main issues, faced by western armies as late as the Napoleonic Wars. There 
was no eighteenth-century army anywhere in the world that could manage to 
overcome nature’s power. Even during the 20th and 21st centuries, modern 
armies, fighting in Iraq or Afghanistan, have problems with the weather 
conditions, including heat and storms.  
 
Food and water  
 
As already mentioned, food and water had a lot to do with the impact of the heat 
on the troops. There are no exact numbers of how much food the army carried 
with itself. When in late August the supply fleet sunk near Derbent, the Staff 
reported to the Emperor that the army had food supplies for only one month. 
Taking into consideration that so far half of the campaign was spent in camps 
and in settlements, a conclusion can be drawn that the army did not have 
sufficient provisions which could last until Baku without the support of the 
navy. Before putting the “failure” label to the expedition’s supply system, 
several important things must be considered. First and foremost, in the summer 
heat goods tend to spoil quite fast, especially the meat. Therefore, it seems, Peter 
preferred to carry a small baggage of supplies with the army and count on the 
regular resupply from the fleet, bringing fresh provisions from Astrakhan or 
Terki. In addition, Peter also hoped to acquire a certain amount of goods from 
his allies in the region and to conquer easily the settlements along his way, 
which would have cost him a lot if he had been fighting in the fortress-abundant 
European lands. Secondly, as already noted in the section about infrastructure, 
Peter considered naval transport to be safer and faster. If the army had to carry 
too heavy baggage train, it would become quite vulnerable to the mobile forces 
of the local warlords. Apart from the vulnerability, low speed meant that the 
Ottomans would have more time to react and to send an army in Shirvan. 
In the course of the campaign, the Russians were able to acquire food 
from the locals on several occasions.84 The first time was during the crossing of 
the Sulak River, when the shamkhal delivered a large number of fruits and oxen 
for the army, apart from the pack animals, which were assigned to the baggage 
train. Following the arrival at Tarki, the Russians resupplied their provisions by 
                                                 
83 Ibid., 345. 
84 For a summary regarding the supply acquisitions and problems during the 1722 campaign, see Table 8 in the 




using the local markets. The population of Derbent was initially unwilling to 
share their supplies with the Russians, but eventually, with the establishment of 
a garrison in the city, the army was able to purchase some food and fruits from 
the locals. Nevertheless, Peter never put too much trust in local supplies and 
counted on the naval support from his fleet under van Verden.85 However, the 
weather played its part and the destruction of 12 supply ships, along with part of 
the flour and some other goods predetermined the early end of the campaign. 
Regarding the water supplies, Peter counted on the several small rivers in 
the area as a source of fresh water. Furthermore, while still in Tarki, Peter 
instructed shamkhal Adil Girei to arrange the digging of wells along the future 
route of the Russian army. As it turned out, the shamkhal did not put too much 
effort into the task. The first days following the crossing of the Sulak turned out 
to be critical for the Russians, who exhausted by the heat, had access only to the 
badly-dug, muddy wells, left by Girei’s men.86 The slipshod work of the men 
from Tarki taught the Russians a lesson and until the end of the campaign, they 
used only well-built old wells or upstream rivers in order to supply with fresh 
water. The quality of the water itself was also problematic, due to the large 
quantity of limestone in the soil. It made the water salty and thus instead of 
quenching the thirst of the troops, it made the situation somewhat worse. The 
only possible solution was to boil the water, but the Russians did not know they 
should or did not have the time to do it.87 It can be only speculated whether the 
water had any impact on the number of sick soldiers during the expedition. 
However, it certainly increased the burden of the march. 
While Europe was blessed with an abundance of drinkable water from 
many rivers, springs and streams, the situation in Western Asia was different. 
The rocky soil, filled with different minerals, easily penetrating the streams, 
made the water salty and often unsuitable for drinking. Only local people knew 
from which wells and springs to drink, and which streams had a clear water 
debit. Therefore, a foreign army, unaccustomed to the local lore would suffer 
greatly from the lack of fresh water. Given the doubtful allegiance of the local 
population, the Russians were lucky enough to survive the campaign without 
any critical lack of water supplies. 
The same refers to food. The army ate a lot of fruits, which were 
uncommon in Russia and this had its effect on the troop’s health. But the greater 
impact was on the horses. As Peter Bruce notes in his Memoirs, hundreds and 
even thousands of animals died from poisonous grass. Since the animals of the 
cavalry were brought mainly by the Kalmyks and the Cossacs in Ukraine, they 
were unaccustomed to the types of grass and herbs, which grew in Dagestan.88 
                                                 
85 Van Verden was a Dutch sailor, who served in the Russian army. Together with Soymonov, he was sent to 
chart the Caspian Sea and later to command the supply fleet, which escorted Peter’s southern march.  
86 Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722, 8. 
87 Neither the Zhurnal nor Bruce’s Memoirs give any note on processing the water in some manner. 




Unlike the camels and the oxen, which were bought or received from the local 
tribes, the horses came with the army and were unaware of the local pasture.89 
In general, given the circumstances and the general lack of information on 
the quality of local food and water supplies, the Russian army performed well. It 
is a well-known fact that Western European contingents in Asia, the West Indies 
and Africa often suffered from the same problems, until eventually they became 
accustomed to the local environment. Peter’s reliance on the naval support was 
justified by the logic of the campaign specifics and failed only because of the 





One of the central issues of modern military history is to trace the origins of the 
horses for the cavalry and the animals, pulling the baggage train. While 
cavalries, as structure, armament and performance have been adequately studied, 
the mounts and the pack animals somewhat remain a mystery. Regarding the 
Persian Campaign, there are only a few secondary notes, which give information 
about the acquisition of horses. On the last pages of the Pokhodnyy zhurnal for 
1722, a brief note mentions that due to the high mortality rate of the animals 
during the summer campaign, Peter ordered colonel Tarakanov to purchase 
additional horses from the Kalmyks, the Cossacks, and the “Lower Cities”.90 
Tarakanov was to receive full support from local authorities, and his mission 
was considered of crucial importance for the campaign, which was planned for 
the next year.91 Using this scarce material, as well as several other sources, the 
dissertation maps the main horse breeding areas in the region, as well as the 
primary horse markets, available to the Russians.92  
The main regions, which bred horses, were located in Southwestern Asia 
in the territories of the Safavid and the Ottoman empires. Regarding Russia, its 
main “horse supply” areas were concentrated in Ukraine and around the Lower 
Volga. Other horse-breeding areas were the pastures of Central Asia. From these 
areas, the Russians had direct access to only three – Ukraine, the Lower Volga, 
and the lands of the Kalmyks. The Ottomans and their Tatar allies would 
certainly not provide the Russians with mounts and neither would the Persians 
or the khanates of Central Asia, with whom Peter already entered into a conflict. 
Therefore, the only possible solutions were the areas, already mentioned and this 
is where Peter concentrated the activities of his agents. Additional animals could 
have been acquired from Poland—Lithuania, but their transfer to the Caspian 
                                                 
89 As Bruce notes the camels and the oxen never ate from the herbs, since they were “familiar” with them; see 
Bruce, Memoirs, 320. 
90 The cities on the Lower Volga – Saratov, Tsaritsyn and Astrakhan. 
91 Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722, 193. 




theater of war would require too much time and funds.93 The Western Eurasian 
Steppe remained Russia’s horse-breeding territory at the time. The other 
possible source could have been the peoples of the Caucasus, given that they 
agreed to assist the Russian advance. After the sacking of Enderi by the cavalry 
under Veterani, the Dagestani leaders united against Peter and denied him any 
chance to acquire a lot of horses or pack animals from their herds.94 
Regarding the pack animals, Peter had to arrange their acquisition from 
the local warlords, since their transportation from Russia would require too 
much time and would also deprive the peasants of their primary labor force, 
which, given the nature of the Russian economy, would be fatal for the 
Treasury’s income.95 Thus, Peter arranged with the shamkhal the acquisition of 
7,000 oxen and 600 carts for the baggage train.96 In addition, the army 
purchased a number of camels, which were also used to carry the equipment and 
the provisions of the troops and were quite useful in the hot summer days of late 
July and August. Even if these numbers seem to some extent high, as it turned 
out, the army was still in shortage of pack animals and on its way back tried to 
acquire more oxen from the population of Buynaksk.97 Finally, after the 
expedition was over, Peter issued a decree on the further acquisition of pack 
animals and carts for the next campaign season.98 
These problems, however, did not slow the Russian advance and the army 
continued with superb speed. Again, given the conditions, the Russians 
performed well. They had to depend on local support for their baggage train. 
Horse supply for the cavalry was also problematic. Nevertheless, at the cost of 
additional human labor, the day–to–day problems of the campaign were 
overcome, and the army managed to reach Derbent in good order. The return 
march to Agrakhan also went without serious problems, except, of course, for 
the death of several hundred horses, caused by the above-mentioned poisonous 
herbs. In general, the Russians were able to provide enough animal power to 
support their effort and to achieve part of the campaign objectives. The inability 
                                                 
93 Augustus II the Strong (1697-1706; 1709-1733) was an ally of Peter and probably would have agreed to sell 
horses to the Russians. 
94 Kurukin and Lockhart argue that the destruction of the Endirey capital united local rulers against Russia. This 
issue will be analyzed later on. 
95 Like the horses, which had to be marched on land in order to reach Agrakhan, the pack animals also needed 
land route. However, moving a large herd of oxen through northern Circassia would only tempt the local tribes 
to attack the convoy and steal as much animals as possible. Such an outcome would have jeopardized the entire 
campaign and Peter was probably well aware of this fact. The animals could not have been transported via ships, 
since the Russians did not posses vessels, big enough for the purpose, or at least not in the Caspian Sea. 
96 See Table 8 in the Appendix for the current chapter. 
97 During the march toward Derbent, Peter tried to negotiate additional cattle for his army, but locals responded 
that they only had cattle enough to meet their own needs. As soon as the locals realized that the Russians were 
marching back, they refused to sell them oxen and even allied with Mahmud of Utamysh. 
98 Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722, 192; The order was for the governor of Astrakhan – Volynskiy and contained the 
following arrangements: [To be purchased] 2,000 cattle, 500 bulls and 500 charts from Greben and Terki. The 
money was to be extracted from the annual income of the Astrakhan guberniya; In addition, the Senate was to 




to continue the march after Derbent had nothing to do with the lack of pack 
animals or horses. 
 
Guns and munitions 
 
The transformation of Russia into a self-sufficient military power was one of 
Peter’s main goals. This task was accomplished only to a certain level, and there 
were still things to be done. Regarding the production of gunpowder, guns, and 
munitions, it was already outlined that Russia was able to satisfy most of its 
needs, but still a sizable amount of weapons had to be imported. Furthermore, no 
standardization of the weaponry was achieved, and the army continued to use 
dozens of different calibers. 
It would be rather hard to estimate the exact number of guns, employed by 
the Russians in the course of the Persian Campaign. Only I. Kurukin has given 
an accurate figure of the artillery train. He estimates a total of 196 guns, 
operated by 369 artillerymen under the command of Major Ivan Gerber.99 
According to the campaign journal some 96 guns were left in the garrisons, 
including Resht and Baku. Peter Bruce claims that the Derbent garrison was left 
with 150 guns. Though this number seems exaggerated, it suggests that the 
Russians captured a number of local guns when they occupied the city, and then 
deployed them as part of the new defenses, constructed at Peter’s command.100 
Regardless of the exact figures, it is quite certain that the Russians had a great 
advantage over their local enemies, who hardly had anything resembling an 
artillery train. Neither Bruce nor the campaign journal gives any note on the 
usage of guns by the Dagestani forces. 
Regarding the munitions and gunpowder supply for the campaign, of the 
available information is very little. The only concise summary up to this day is 
provided again by I. Kurukin. He estimates that only for the artillery there were 
102,246 pieces of different munitions along with some 206 tons of 
gunpowder.101 The campaign journal and P. Bruce do not mention weapon 
supplies and there is no complaint from the army for lack of munitions or 
powder. Therefore, it could be concluded that as far as the provisioning of 
ammunition and gunpowder was concerned, the Russians did their job very well 
and managed to supply enough ammunition for the entire march south. In 
addition, it was a common practice for Peter to issue gun salutes on any holiday, 
which the Russians celebrated during the campaign, as well as when the army 
entered Tarki and Derbent. Taking also into consideration that there were no 
                                                 
99 Kurukin, Persidskiy Pokhod, 55-6; The artillery was as follows: 2 1 pud howitzers, 1 5 pud howitzer, 4 2 pud 
mortars, 12 six pounder mortars and 177 other guns from different calibers. (1 pud = 16.38 kilograms). 
100 Usually Russian garrisons were supported by 20-30 cannons; see Table 6 in the Appendix for the current 
chapter. It was also supported by Abraham of Yerevan’s narrative, that gunpowder weapons were not as scarce 
in Persia, as previously supposed. 
101 Ibid., 56; The munitions were as follows: 59,472 cannon balls, 2,874 bombs, 29,820 grenades, 10,080 grape 




sieges and only one major engagement, the Russians did not need a lot of war 
materials during their march. Nevertheless, the effort to transport the guns and 
munitions through the Caspian Sea and then on land through Dagestan must not 
be underestimated. 
 
Ships and naval transportation 
 
So far on several occasions it became evident that Peter had a preference for 
shipping both supplies and troops in the course of the Persian Campaign. As 
already concluded, maritime transport was cheaper, faster and safer than its land 
equivalent. Ships could also deliver the required goods in a precise location, 
following the maps, which several expeditions in the Caspian provided. 
The vessels, used by the Russians were constructed in the dockyards 
along the Volga River. Since there was too little time for preparation, most of 
the vessels were built by soldiers, rather than by professional carpenters and 
later on, after a series of problems, this became evident. The vessels were 
relatively small, and most of them were just large boats, rather than real ships or 
galleys. As it is evident from Table 1 for the current chapter, there is no 
unanimous estimate on the exact size of the Russian Caspian fleet.102 While 
Bruce refers to all vessels as galleys, scholars try to distinguish between sailing 
and oar-powered ships. The only certain thing is that only a small portion of the 
vessels was with sails while most of the fleet was powered by oar-power.103  
Following the arrival at Agrakhan bay, the fleet was left on anchor and, 
later on, was used to transport supplies as well as news and dispatches to and 
from Astrakhan. However, at the beginning of August, the first problems with 
the ships appeared. Verden reported as early as 4th August that the ships were 
leaking and sustained substantial damage. The next stroke came with the storm 
near Derbent, which sunk 12 vessels and destroyed part of the army’s 
provisions. During the return sail from Agrakhan to Astrakhan, P. Bruce notes 
that they had a very serious breach in the hull of the galley on which he was 
sailing.104 Finally, a storm on 3rd of October sunk several ships, before the fleet 
managed to enter the mouth of the Volga River. Due to the sustained losses in 
both vessels and provisions, Peter issued an order on 4th November 1722, 
according to which additional ships had to be built and concentrated in 
Astrakhan for the next campaign season.105 It was the delay of their building that 
                                                 
102 See Table 1 in the Appendix for the current chapter. 
103 Kurukin estimates a total of 47 sailing and 400 oar-powered vessels; see Kurukin, Persidskiy pokhod, 56. 
Lystsov gives the following: 3 snaw ships (Nederl. Snauw), 2 hegbots (Nederl. Hekboot ), 1 guker (a type of 
sailing ship), 9 schuits, 17 tyalok (transport ships), 1 yaht, 7 evers, 12 galiots, 1 strugi, 34 transportation ships 
and many boats; see Lystsov, Persidskiy Pokhod Petra I, 116) L. Lockhart estimates a total of 274 vessels, 
without specifying their types, or the place, from which he took the figure; see Lockhart,The Fall of the Ṣafavī, 
179. 
104 Bruce, Memoirs, 352-3. 
105 In Kazan, Astrakhan and Nizhny Novgorod 30 hekbots, 6 big boats (botov) and 30 smaller had to be built. In 




prolonged the time, needed by Matyushkin to organize his expedition against 
Baku in 1723.  
Apart from the troubles with the ships, Peter also had to take care of the 
establishment of safe harbors if he was to use the maritime transportation as his 
main tool for supply. Following the return of Artemiy Volynskiy from Persia in 
1719, Peter sent an expedition under Captains Soymonov and Verden to explore 
the western and southern shores of the Caspian and to look for appropriate 
places for the building of harbors.106 In addition, two additional expeditions 
were carried out. The first, again under Soymonov, had to map the mouth of the 
Kura River in late November 1722.107 The second, under Peter Henry Bruce, had 
to circumvent the Caspian shores in eastern and then – in southern direction.108 
The results of these expeditions, combined with the land observations, made by 
Peter during his march south, led to the establishment of several desired 
positions, in which ports were to be built in order to a massive naval line of 
communications to be created - spanning from Astrakhan, all the way to 
Resht.109 According to Peter’s project for future ports, it could clearly be seen 
that he was not only planning to establish a good logistics system to support his 
garrisons, but he also wanted to lay the foundations of a maritime trading 
network, crossing the Caspian Sea on its way south. The 1723 campaign’s last 
expedition – the conquest of the Kura River mouth and the submission of the 
governor of Salyan secured Russia’s dominance in the coastal regions. The next 
step was undertaken by the piece-time administration in order to establish the 
required ports for strengthening Russia’s commercial and military position in the 
region. 
The hasty preparations, as well as the considerable distance for satisfying 
the transportation needs, made the Russian naval effort a labor-consuming task. 
Nevertheless, Russia was blessed to be the only naval power in the Caspian Sea. 
Even though ships were slow to be built and provisions were hard to allocate, 
there was no maritime competition, and the only obstacle before the Russian 
naval projects was the climate.110 Unfortunately for Peter, the summer storms of 
1722 sank а substantial part of his supply ships and prevent him from reaching 
the final destination of the campaign – the conquest of Baku. Nevertheless, 
during the following year, Russia was able to launch a successful expedition 
against Baku with which the Empire sealed its dominance in the Caspian Sea. 
By the time the treaty with the Ottomans was signed in 1724, the position of 
Russia in the region was cemented and secured. We must not be too judgmental 
toward the Russians as in 1724 the Russian Navy had existed for just 26 years. 
In comparison, Western European states had centuries of trans-oceanic 
                                                 
106 Kurukin, Persidskiy pokhod, 40. 
107 The other purpose of the expedition was the landing of Colonel Shipov’s troops near Resht. 
108 The entire expedition is well-documented in chapter IX of Bruce’s Memoirs. 
109 See Map 7 in the Appendix for the current chapter. 
110 As late as July 1723, the authorities in St.Cross fort had not yet completed the fortifications, due to lack of 




navigation experience. Therefore, although setbacks were evident, the young 
Russian Navy was finally able to achieve its purpose, even though it never met 
any actual resistance from its enemies. 
 
The human factor 
 
While logistics and armament are essential for the success of an army, it is the 
troops in it which are the heart of the entire system. Similar to all other nations 
in Europe, the Russians developed a generation of veteran soldiers, forged in the 
fires of the Great Northern War. It was exactly these experienced, battle-
hardened veterans that marched southward with their Emperor into the ill-known 
lands of Dagestan. General accounts about the quality of the Russian soldiers 
differ. Some are quite critical of their lack of discipline and narrow-mindedness 
while others claim that the Russians were the best soldier stock in Europe. 
Probably the truth lies somewhere in the middle, and the comparative analysis 
between the qualities of the Russian soldier in comparasion to his Western 
European counterparts is not a subject of the current dissertation. It is very 
important to note, is that the army, which followed Peter in Asia, was an 
experienced force, accustomed to marches, pitched battles, and swift 
manoeuvres. It had been formed under the fire of the Swedish artillery and in the 
face to face fight with one of the most formidable forces in seventeenth century 
Europe. The Russians won. When it comes to the quality of the personnel, 
Russia had a great advantage over the local gazi forces of the Dagestan 
warlords. It is precisely this professionalism that made it possible for Colonel 
Shipov to disperse a 15,000 strong mob in Resht with only a thousand troops.111 
It was this quality that allowed the garrison of 300 men in Milyukent to repel the 
attacks of a 12,000 strong force of local warriors and later - to retreat intact to 
Derbent.112 One thing is certain - there is nothing miraculous about these 
successes. In fact, the Russian combat experience was no different than similar 
developments, which took place prior or after the Persian Campaign in other 
parts of Asia.113 Dutch, English, Portuguese, Spanish and French soldiers had 
already proven that it was not so much gunpowder, but determination, discipline 
and combat experience, which brought Europe’s final success over its Asian 
rivals. Here is is useless to describe the physical shape of the Russian troops as 
Dagestani and Persian men were probably as well-built as any European.114 It 
                                                 
111 Kurukin, Persidskiy pokhod, 87. 
112 Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722, 16-7. 
113 Well-known examples are: the building of the Estado da Índia, the Dutch experience in the Far East, as well 
as Britain’s latter success in India. 
114 Throughout his description of Dagestan, P. Bruce constantly repeats the fine appearance of both men and 
women in the region. Peter also held a high esteem of the individual qualities of local fighters as it was 
previously noted. Thus, it would be erroneous to suspect any traces of “racial superiority” idea amongst the 
Russians. It is true that they referred to the Persians as barbarians, butso did they toward Europeans, especially 
before the Westernization trend unraveled in the course of the eighteenth century. Therefore, it would be 




was certainly not a matter of “racial superiority”, which spelled the 
preponderance of the Russian forces over their opponents. 
The main body of the Russian army could be divided into two general 
categories – regular and irregular soldiers. Unlike most European armies, Russia 
continued to maintain a large contingent of irregular troops in order to combat 
its Asian enemies and pacify the vast eastern reaches of the Empire. The 
irregular cavalry comprised of either Cossacks, who inhabited the territories 
between the Dnieper and Volga rivers, or of Kalmyks, who had settled in the 
Lower Volga and around what would later become the province of Orenburg. 
Both societies belonged to the larger Frontier ethos, which was the dominant 
element in the struggle between the empires and states in Western Asia and 
Eastern Europe since Antiquity. Both Cossacks and Kalmyks were well-
experienced soldiers, who participated in different expeditions and assignments 
on behalf of the Russian Empire. Fighting against Tatars and other eastern 
enemies made the irregular cavalry an indispensable part of any Russian project, 
focused on Asia. Peter was well-aware that his irregulars were the best tool for 
fighting against the gazi soldiers of Dagestan, and that is the main reason why 
these troops comprised one-half of his entire force. Except for their combat 
experience, Peter valued them for their ability to swiftly adapt to the frontier 
environment and for being able to use its elements for the benefit of their 
mission. This is why, for example, Peter used Cossacks and Kalmyks as 
vanguard and reconnoiter force, since they could find the best places for 
camping, and could also swiftly erect field fortifications to protect the camp and 
the baggage train from enemy depredations.115 In addition, the irregulars served 
as a perfect punitive force, when local warlords had to be subordinated by force. 
Peter was quite careful not to pillage enemy settlements by regular soldiers. The 
dirty work would always be carried out by the irregulars, thus removing any 
possible “dishonor” from the main army. In addition, pillaging was the only way 
the emperor could compensate the Cossacks and the Kalmyks since otherwise 
the upkeep of their numbers would be quite costly for the Treasury.116 
The regular body of the army was comprised of three major components – 
the infantry, the dragoon cavalry and the artillery. Since no protracted sieges 
were expected, Peter did not include an engineer corps in his forces. The 
infantry consisted of standard infantry regiments and several grenadier 
regiments. In general, it was conscripted among the peasantry for a 25 years 
term. In the current campaign, however, most of the troops were drafted from 
different regiments, situated throughout the entire empire, rather than taken as 
                                                 
115 In addition, the Cossacks along with the dragoons were used as engineer forces, when the land in front of the 
army had to be leveled or when bridges had to be built; see Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722, 63. 
116 The 7,000 heads of cattle and the war prisoners, captured by the Cossacks and the Kalmyks in September 





fresh recruits. 117 The dragoons were also experienced soldiers and due to their 
close cooperation with the Cossacks and the Kalmyks, were somewhat different 
than their western counterparts and fit better in a comparison to the Polish or 
Hungarian hussars. During the Caspian expedition, the dragoons were expected 
to be the main striking force of the army. They were as fast as the local gazi 
horsemen and were well armed with both muskets and sabers.118 After the Battle 
near Buynaksk, the dragoons along with the Cossacks and the Kalmyks followed 
the enemy retreat and played part in the conquest of the Utamysh settlement. 
Nevertheless, Peter did not hesitate to use his regular soldiers when it came to 
building forts. Dragoons were employed in the construction of all garrison posts, 
which the army erected during the campaign. A substantial number of them 
were left in St. Cross fort to assist the Cossacks in the construction works. 
In the course of the Persian Campaign, the Russian army proved to be an 
effective force, capable of routing local resistance with ease. The main problems 
of the army were not related to the enemy, but rather derived from logistics and 
weather conditions. The heat, followed by rapid cold and the frequency of the 
storms certainly had their impact on the army. In addition diseases, uncommon 
in Russia struck a severe blow at the state of the army. In general, the men 
performed well, and there were no reports of mutinies according to the available 
sources. Kurukin notes a certain number of deserters, but it would be hard to 
estimate any exact figures.119 The realities of the campaign were also part of the 
reasons for the considerably lower level of desertion. First and foremost, any 
Russian deserters in Dagestan would have found it impossible to return to 
Russia on their own, since the only two options were the Navy at Agrakhan or 
the land route to Tarki, both of which were under strict state control. In addition, 
the locals had no sympathy for the Russians, and any captured deserter would 
probably end in slavery or worse.120 Therefore, only extreme desperation would 
urge a man to abandon the relatively safety of the column in exchange for the 
dangers of the local lands.  
Since the campaign itself lasted for a relatively short time, it would be 
hard to reconstruct the daily routine of the soldiers. Based on the scarce 
materials it could be presumed that the army often began its march early in the 
morning, somewhere between 5 and 6 a.m. During the day several rests were 
allowed, the longest at noon, lasting for one or two hours. In the afternoon, the 
                                                 
117 The Campaign Journal notes that on 10th July, 1722certain number of regiments was brought to Astrakhan by 
Brigadier Matyushkin. The total number of soldiers, listed in the source is as follows: “…[From all regimental 
ranks], 20 soldiers form the Preobrazhenskiy, Semyonovskiy - 10, Astrakhanskiy – 328, Moskovskiy – 440, 
Koporskiy – 568, Galitskiy – 489, Nizhegorodskiy – 62, Vyborskiy – 86, Troitskiy – 15, Sibirskiy - 512, Pskovskiy 
– 64, Voronezhskiy – 517, Velikolutskiy – 572, Arkhangelogorodskiy – 561, all 4,304 [The actual sum is 4,244] 
including 140 sick…”; see Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722, 48; Recruitments were, however, carried out, and I. 
Kurukin estimates that a total of 22,500 men were drafted on the basis of two recruits in 1722; see Kurukin, 
Persidskiy Pokhod, 84. 
118 Muskets and sabers were only used when the troops were dismounted. 
119 See Table 10 in the Appendix for the current chapter. Kurukin, however, estimates a much higher rate of 
desertions than Lystsov.  




march continued until 5 or 6 p.m., but if the column did not reach a suitable 
location, the movement could last until such was found. Soldiers were sleeping 
in tents, although, Kurukin mentions that the number of tents was insufficient 
for the entire army.121 As already mentioned, bread, sukhari and meat were the 
main parts of the soldier’s diet. Water was the main drink allowed, since alcohol 
was prohibited, due to the heat. It is for certain that the best days for the soldiers 
were when the army was encamped in the vicinity of Derbent and Tarki. Drinks 
and additional food could be purchased in local markets. Regarding the non-
combat camp followers, it is hard to determine their numbers and their 
designation. It is certain that Peter did not take any civilians on his ships, but 
local camp-followers probably formed as early as the end of July, when P. Bruce 
notes that local merchants came to sell oxen, camels, and horses to the army. He 
again mentions that after the departure from Tarki (16th August) he was able to 
purchase two camels to carry his baggage.122 Neither the Journal nor Bruce gives 
any additional detail on the camp-followers. But it could be assumed that there 
were also women and probably boys, offering their services as servants.123 A 
further investigation of the daily life of the Russian garrisons in the newly 
occupied lands is well developed in I. Kurukin’s work, but is not a concern of 




Marching was an essential part of soldiers’ lives during the Persian Campaign. 
Nevertheless, the time, which the army spent moving, must not be 
overestimated. From a total of 43 days spent in Dagestan, only 23 were spent in 
moving. Taking this into consideration, the distance, covered by the army in 
each march between two camping points, as well as the total length of the 
army’s route is estimated in the current dissertation. 124 In total, the Russians 
covered a distance of 490 kilometers with an average of 21 kilometers per day. 
The medium marching speed of a late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth century 
army was approximately 22 kilometers. This shows that the Russians did a fine 
job in advancing through a land with a broken terrain, where no roads existed, 
and the landscape had to be leveled now and then so that the army could 
enhanced its speed if the situation required it. For example, Peter sent his 
dragoons and irregulars to chase the retreating Dagestani. The pursuit lasted for 
several hours, in which time the cavalry covered a distance of 21 kilometers and 
managed to besiege and take the capital of Utamysh and to return to the camp on 
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122 Bruce, Memoirs, 316 and 327. 
123 It could be argued that the locals, being Muslims did not allow their women to accompany the Russians. 
However, early modern Christians were as conservative as Muslims in that matter and still, Europe was full of 
female camp-followers. Therefore, probably similar groups existed in Western Asia as well. 




the following day.125 Taking into consideration that the Russians did not have a 
good preliminary knowledge of the terrain and that the weather conditions, 
along with the problems of supply with food and water, were all acting against 
them, Peter’s men did very well. The army’s march was rapid on its own, 
although a lot of time was spent in camps near Derbent, Tarki, and Buynaksk. It 
is debatable whether the army could have marched the remaining distance 
between Derbent and Baku by the end of the campaign season. The distance 
between these two settlements is 231 kilometers.126 If the Russians had kept 
their medium marching speed for the southern march (21.2 kilometers), it would 
have taken them approximately 11 days of marching to reach Baku. If we add 
additional 11 days in which the army would not march, Peter could have reached 
Baku sometime in the end of September 1722. We know, from the Staff 
meeting, which took place on 29th August, that the Russians had provisions for 
one more month. This means that, in theory, Peter could have marched his 
troops to Baku and captured it by the end of September. However, if he had 
done that, he would have risked the starvation of his army, since the supply 
ships were badly damaged and the ships in Agrakhan Bay already displayed 
problems. Thus, carelessness of the Russian leader toward human life must not 
be overestimated.  
To conclude, the Russians were able to maintain a steady speed of 21 
kilometers per day during the entire campaign and covered a total of 490 
kilometers within only 23 days of actual marching. In comparison, 
Marlborough’s famous rapid march to the Danube took him five weeks, in 
which the army covered 400 kilometers.127 To put it in other words, 
Marlborough’s “exceptional” movement took 35 days to march to distance, 100 
kilometers shorter than the Russian movement, and only a week faster.128 Thus, 
the marching speed of the Russians is quite impressive and shows Peter’s ability 
to mobilize the potential of his troops in the pursuit of the campaign objectives. 
 
Keeping the conquest 
 
Marching an army and defeating enemies was not sufficient to seal a true 
victory. The only way for Peter to prove the success of his plan was to manage 
to maintain his conquest after his main army left Dagestan in September 1722. 
                                                 
125 Sometime between 4 p.m. and 9 p.m. The army returned in 5 p.m. on the following day; see Pokhodnyy 
Zhurnal 1722, 117-9. 
126 For the distance between Derbent and Baku in kilometers; see hhttp://www.distancefromto.net/distance-from-
baku-az-to-derbent-ru. 
127 See D.G. Chandler, “The art of war on land” in J.S. Bromley (ed.), The New Cambridge Modern History: The 
rise of Great Britain and Russia, 1688-1715/25, vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 741-
762. 
128 If we compare a medium marching speed, taking all days of both movements, we get an average of 11.42 
kilometers per day for Marlborough’s army and 11.39 kilometers per day for Peter’s forces. Unlike 
Marlborough, Peter was not marching in well-developed rural area with roads and available points of 




He was well aware of this fact and made all possible arrangements to erect a 
chain of fortified positions to protect his lines of communications and to secure 
the conquests, achieved so far. As soon as the army reached Agrakhan on 28th 
July, Peter ordered a fortified camp to be erected to protect the landing and the 
fleet. After the army embarked, the garrison of the fort comprised of a total of 
1600 soldiers, including the ones who were sick. Peter’s next step was to reach 
Tarki. It is interesting that he did not place a Russian garrison there, but only left 
a regiment of troops to protect the shamkhal.129 The next garrison to be 
established was on the Milyukent River to protect the future harbor there. After 
it became apparent that the army had to march back, Peter also strengthened the 
garrison of Derbent. North of Derbent Peter established a small fortified post on 
the Inchi River to protect the road between Tarki and Derbent from the Sultan of 
Utamysh. Finally, the largest newly–built fort was placed on the influx of the 
Agrakhan and Sulak rivers, namely the St. Cross fort. It was designed by Peter 
Bruce.The plan consisted of five bastions, and two demi-bastions next to the 
river on the south side, with ravelins and a covered way with a palisade; on the 
north-side were six bastions, also with ravelins and a covered way; the two sides 
were to communicate by a bridge in the middle, over the river. It is evident that 
the emperor decided to use a western-style fortification, even though it was 
mainly constructed of wood, brought from Astrakhan or the woods, upstream 
the Sulak River.130  
 As soon as the army left Dagestan, the instability of the Russian position 
was revealed. Peter was still marching between Buynaksk and the Sulak, when 
Mahmud of Utamysh managed to destroy the Inchi garrison and to force the 
Milyukent garrison into abandoning their position. Peter responded to the new 
threat by strengthening the St. Cross fort and dispatching a flying corps of 5,000 
Cossacks and Kalmyks, who once again destroyed the capital of Utamysh and 
plundered a big portion of its riches. In early 1723 Peter sent additional 12,000 
Cossacks to strengthen Russia’s hold of Dagestan and to counter the alliance of 
the mountain warlords against Russia. 
With regard to the two southern positions - Baku and Resht, Peter acted in 
a similar manner. Resht was initially held with a small force, which was later 
strengthened while Baku was conquered with a substantial number of soldiers 
and garrisoned by the chief of the Caspian Theater – lieutenant-general 
Matyushkin. Artillery pieces were also provided and by the autumn of 1723, 
                                                 
129 The shamkhal Adil Girei was a vassal of Peter. Placing a garrison probably means that the Emperor did not 
trust his vassal, which undermines the position of the shamkhal. Peter could not afford to have a disturbed 
situation in his back, while marching toward Derbent. It could be presumed that he preferred to leave Tarki to the 
shamkhal. 
130 The fashion of the fort resembles the trace italienne. However, the need to place such a fortress is somewhat 
uncertain in a region, where no substantial artillery existed. Nevertheless, Peter always demonstrated a strong 
desire to apply western ways in his own dealings and the approval of Bruce’s sophisticated entrenchments may 
serve as an example. On the other hand, the importance of the enterprise for Peter’s plans must not be 
underestimated. In addition, if there was an Ottoman intervention, the Russians would indeed need better forts to 




Russia possessed a system of well-fortified positions, which were to guarantee 
its strong presence in the region and to convince the Ottomans to abandon any 
hope of repelling the Russians north of the Terek River. 
 
Paying the Price 
 
Like any other military effort, the Persian Campaign had its price. While it was 
not as costly and life-consuming as the Northern War, the Persian Campaign 
was indeed a laborious effort for Russia, mainly because of the speed with 
which Peter urged the preparations. Like any military “cost”, the toll of the 
Caspian expeditions could be measured in two different aspects – the price in 
money and materials and the human casualties. 
It would be impossible to calculate exactly how much resources were used 
to build the Caspian fleet, to erect the Dagestan garrisons or to feed and supply 
the army. The cost of human labor is also impossible to calculate since most of 
the work was done by both regular and irregular soldiers, rather than 
professional engineers and specialists. Also, there is no certainty on the exact 
proportions of the food, timber, and other materials, extracted from Russia to 
support the southern effort. What we know are some basic numbers, collected by 
I. Kurukin, during his work in the Russian archives. These numbers are 
summarized in Table 11 in the Appendix for the current chapter. What is evident 
from these numbers is that more than half of the 1722 state expenditure for 
military purposes was spent on the provisioning of ships and munitions for the 
army. The 320,000 rubles listed as supplies, might also include part of the 
ammunition for the army, but it could be assumed that the larger portion was 
spent on food supplies, uniforms and other goods, concerning the life of the 
soldiers. What is also surprising is that the money, spent to bribe foreign officers 
and warlords were almost four times as much as the money spent on 
medicines.131 In total, the 1722 expeditions cost the state around 1,000,000 
rubles, which was a substantial part of the state’s revenue at that time.132 
The human cost is also hard to estimate. Lystsov calculates a total loss of 
11,545 men due to desertion, death and dismissal from service.133 In his recent 
work, I. Kurukin estimates a higher loss due to diseases and desertion.134 He 
does not manage to provide a summary in the manner of Lystsov, but rather 
notes certain cases, available in the documents of the Russian archives. Until 
16th October 1722, Kurukin estimates some 2,700 dead, 3,936 sick and more 
than 200 deserters or a total of 6,836 casualties, almost all of them non-
                                                 
131 It seems that the state put additional effort in the following two years, since in 1724 a total of 7,000 beds for 
sick and injured were established in the five main points of Russian power in the Caspian; see Table 9 in the 
Appendix for the current chapter. 
132 Russia’s state revenue in 1723 was 6,042,000 rubles. An educated guess for 1722 would be to estimate the 
state revenue to 6,000,000, which means that the total expense of the campaign would amount to 1/6 of the state 
revenue or 16.6 per cent; see Table 5 in the Appendix for Chapter II. 
133 See Table 10 in the Appendix for the current chapter. 




combat.135 Out of an infantry of 18,602, these losses count for more than 33 per 
cent of the total force. Regarding the combat casualties, according to the 
campaign journal, between 212 and 241 soldiers were killed, 20 or 121 were 
wounded and two were captured by the enemy. The combat casualties were only 
around 275 out of more than 6,800 in total, which is a quite insignificant 
number.136 In comparison, the enemy lost either 1,926 or 2,126 killed and 
between 357 and 367 captured.137 The situation was even more problematic in 
the cavalry. On 16th October, a total of 6,925 dragoons returned to Astrakhan, 
accompanied by only 956 horses. Another 588 dragoons were left in Dagestan 
as garrisons.138 According to Kurukin, the dragoons in the beginning of the 
campaign numbered 8,786, which mean that 1,273 dragoons died during the 
expedition, along with at least 7,800 horses.139 The total casualties for the entire 
campaign, according to Kurukin’s estimates, would be 8,109 or approximately 
33 per cent of the total regular forces in the army.140 The problem with the high 
level of sickness continued in the following year, when Colonel Shipov reported 
from Resht that of 1110 soldiers, 315 were sick.141 The actual numbers are hard 
to determine. What is certain from the numbers, given above, is that the Russian 
regular forces suffered 33 per cent casualties, of which almost all were non-
combat. It is clear that the climate and the new variety of diseases took a heavier 
toll than any enemy force was able to inflict. However, these were soldiers, quite 
unaccustomed to the climate and to the general conditions of the Caspian region. 
In a similar situation, other European expeditions in the New World and in Asia 
suffered a very high degree of mortality, due to sickness, food poisoning and the 




The final element regarding the performance of the Russian troopsis not directly 
related to the army itself. Nevertheless it was essential for the development of 
the Persian Campaign. The local population has always been an important part 
of any military operation, especially in modern times. As the combat experience 
of the USSR and the USA has shown in the past forty years, no matter how 
powerful a country is, if it does not win the allegiance of the natives, its 
campaigns would remain victorious only in the field.  
                                                 
135 Kurukin, Persidskiy pokhod, 78. 
136 Taking the highest possible figures; see Table 5 in the Appendix for the current chapter. 
137 See ibid. 
138 Kurukin, Persidskiy pokhod, 79. 
139 If it is presumed that for each dragoon there was at least one horse this would mean that out of 8,786 horses, 
only 956 survived while 7,830 perished. 
140 Unfortunately there is no information about how many Kalmyks and Cossacks were killed or got sick in the 
course of the campaign. 
141 This would mean some 35 per cent of the total force. The report came only a month after the capture of Resht; 




The pursuit of Peter’s ambition placed the Russian Empire in the same 
situation. While Peter was confident in his power on the southern march, none 
of the local leaders confronted him openly and even, the sultan of Utamysh did 
not actually risk a pitched battle, but retreated as soon as the Russians advanced 
on his position. On the other hand, when it became apparent that Peter was 
returning north, an army of 20,000 Dagestani horsemen was swiftly assembled 
by Mahmud of Utamysh, the Usmi of the Quitaq, Mohammad of Aksay and 
Daud Beg of the Lesgins. Althoughe this force was too weak to overcome the 
power of Peter’s veteran army, it was sufficient to harass the Russian movement 
and to destroy two of the main outposts, established by the Emperor. Later on, 
Adil Girai of Tarki secretly joined the anti-Russian coalition and tried to avoid 
the entering of the Russian army on its return march.142 However, Tarki was far 
too vulnerable to oppose Russia and Girei had to reconsider his position and 
maintain his allegiance to Peter. The Dagestani were not ready to accept the 
Ottoman suzerainty either. As soon as Daud Beg was proclaimed governor of 
Shirvan, the Utamysh, Aksay and the Qaitaq withdrew from his alliance and 
opposed his pretense to be their overlord. In general, the Caucasian warlords 
were not very happy with the possibility to be incorporated by either Russia or 
the Ottomans. The long established tradition of local autonomy was the status 
quo for which these chieftains strived. In this sense, the disintegration of the 
Safavid Empire was on the one hand favorable, since they achieved their 
independence, but on the other - the interference of the Russians and the 
Ottomans made the situation complicated and uncertain. Therefore, the warlords 
tried to balance between the powers in order to secure their own position. As it 
turned out, neither Russia nor the Ottoman Empire were able to impose their 
direct control on the mountainous tribes. The control of the garrisons and the 
major settlements reduced the tribes’ possibilities for plunder, but could not 
deny them the advantage of mobility. The guerilla-style war, waged by the 
Dagestani was impossible for the Russians to cope with and only partial control 
could be achieved. It would take more than a century before Russia was finally 
able to subdue most of the Caucasus and rein in the various tribes, which 




To give a concise evaluation of the Russian military efforts during the Persian 
Campaign would be rather hard. It is certain that Peter possessed an army, which 
surpassed all local bands of gazi soldiers, or anything that the Persians or the 
Afghans could place on the field. Peter’s main opponents were the Ottomans, 
but they were as reluctant as he was to risk any major conflict given the 
                                                 
142 Three Russian envoys were killed a day before the army reached Tarki. Adil Girei was able to accuse his 
cousins and handed them to Peter as hostages. Thus, Girei managed not only to escape the revenge of the 




uncertain gains in a region, which had been so troublesome to control. Thus, 
there was no real military threat to the advance of the Russian forces. The army 
was well-trained and achieved an amazing speed of marching in a territory, 
deprived of infrastructure and favorable conditions. Combat was scarce and 
could be categorized as skirmishes, rather than actual battles. In this sense, 
Russia had a total military superiority over her enemies in the Caspian region.  
Yet, the question about what were the problems remains. The first and 
foremost obstacle before the Russian advance was the climate of the region. 
Powerful summer storms, combined with the sharp temperature variations had a 
lot to do with the high level of sickness, which took its toll of the Russian army 
and garrisons. The second problem was the supplying of the army with fresh 
food and water. While food had to be imported or collected from the reluctant 
natives, water had to be taken from the wells and rivers of Dagestan. Water was 
rather salty and instead of slaking the thirst of the soldiers, it became a 
supplement to the heat in harassing the marching troops. Finally, Peter urged his 
state and army too much. Preparations for the campaign were carried out hastily, 
and many things remained unfinished or unsupplied. Uniforms, tents, water-
carriers, carts, oxen and other goods were not sufficient, and their lack had to be 
compensate by acquisitions or additional purchases. There was no real 
reconnaissance of the terrain, and no measures were taken to protect the horses 
from the poisonous plants, which took as many animal lives as the heat and the 
lack of provisions.  
Although as a military achievement the campaign was fully successful in 
terms of securing the Caspian Sea for Russia, the logistics failed to demonstrate 
the ability of the northern Empire to march adequately its armies outside 
Europe. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the same issues were 
experienced by other European armies on the Continent. Over 20,000 Austrians 
and Prussians perished from hunger and disease during the War of the Bavarian 
Succession (1778-1779), and many more died during the Seven Years War. 
What the Russian experience confirmed, however, was that small, well-equipped 
contingents achieved far greater success in Caucasian conditions than large 
armies. The major acquisitions of the Persian Campaign – Baku and Resht were 
conquered by a combined force of some 5-6,000 troops and 40-50 cannons. 
Similar patterns were present during the British expansion in India and the 
earlier operations of the Portuguese and the Dutch. Even today, the armies, used 
by the USA to conquer territories in Asia are relatively small, given the scale of 
the enemy resistance and the size of the states. Nevertheless, a pattern that was 
evident in Russia in 1722 is still visible in the actions of US army some 290 
years later – the battles themselves take fewer lives in comparison to the non-






THE RUSSO-OTTOMAN WAR OF 1736-1739 
 
Following the death of Peter I, Russia went through a rough decade, filled with 
internal political strife and cautious foreign policy, dominated by the frequent 
shift of monarchs and their surrounding clique. With the advent of Anna 
Romanova in 1730, Russia’s internal political climate stabilized and the new 
monarch was able to indulge into more active foreign policy. It was closely 
related to the fate of Poland-Lithuania, whose ruler Augustus II was eager to 
secure the throne for his son Friedrich Augustus (the future Augustus III). 
Russia could count on the support from its ally Austria, as well as from Prussia 
while the main political opposition, headed by Stanisław Leszczyński and some 
of the Polish and Lithuanian magnates was supported by France. The struggle 
for Augustus II’s succession remains in history as the War of the Polish 
Succession (1733-1738) and resulted in a win-win situation for both France and 
Russia while Austria and Poland-Lithuania were most affected. In short, France 
was able to break the Habsburg grip on Italy, while Russia, following a swift 
and successful invasion of Poland, was fast to acquire the Duchy of Courland 
and to impose its claimant – Augustus III (r. 1734-1763) on the throne in 
Warsaw. The unprecedented speed with which the military struggle was 
resolved gave the Russians an opportunity to intensify their eastern policy.1  
During the war in Poland-Lithuania, the Ottoman Empire had 
demonstrated great reluctance to interfere in the conflict. The Porte was 
preoccupied with the struggle against the rising Nadir Shah in Persia, and most 
of its military resources were dedicated to the defense of Iraq and the Caucasus. 
This, combined with the information, received by the Russian agents, about the 
crumbling economic situation of the Ottoman Empire in its European provinces, 
made Empress Anna believe that the realm of the sultans was ready to be taken. 
Already Russia had significantly reduced its presence in the Caspian, following 
the Treaty of Resht (1732), and the new pact with Nadir Shah, signed in March 
1735, which sealed the anti-Ottoman alliance between Anna and Nadir Shah.2 
In 1735, Anna felt that the time was right, although some of her chief advisers, 
notably Count Osterman, were adamant in their position that at this point a war 
                                                 
1 The active campaigns ended in 1734 in the east and 1735 in the west. The war formally continued until the 
Treaty of Vienna was signed in 1738, but neither France nor Russia considered fighting each other. An excellent 
narrative of the conflict is given by J L. Sutton, The King's honor and the King's Cardinal: The War of the Polish 
Succession (University Press of Kentucky, 2014). 
2 According to the Treaty of Resht, Russia returned Resht, Mazandaran and Astrabad to Persia, and the second 
treaty, signed in Ganja brought Derbent and Baku back to Nadir Shah’s realm, while the shah agreed to proclaim 
the exiled Vakhtang VI as the rightful king of Kartli. The two treaties ended the ten year-long Russian presence 
in the Southern Caspian, which cost the Northern Empire great number of troops and a substantial portion of its 
annual revenue. For an exhaustive and up-to-date evaluation of the Russian occupation of the Caspian shores; 





with the Ottoman Empire could bring no fortunes for the Russians. 
Nevertheless, the Empress decided to recall her agent from Istanbul – Neplyuev. 
His report only strengthened her resolve to strike at the Turks and to reclaim 




The War of 1736-1739 has been studied through two major viewpoints – the 
Austrian failure against the Ottomans (1737-1739) and Russia’s series of 
campaigns against the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman holdings on the 
Dnieper and Don. The first perspective has been the primary concern of Western 
literature, and only recently did the focus move eastward with Brian Davies’ 
work on the Russo-Ottoman Wars in the eighteenth century.3 His narrative is 
largely a summary and retelling of the exhaustive work of staff Colonel A. 
Bayov, who in 1906 published a two-volume “A History of the Russian army 
during the reign of Empress Anna Ioanovna – Russia’s War with Turkey in 
1736-1739”.4 This work remains the leading Russian-language study of the 
conflict for over a century and due to its tremendous source base and the 
detailed research of the topic, it is likely to maintain its status. Another valuable 
source of information is General Bobrovskiy’s History of the Leibguard 
Yerevan Regiment, regarding its participation in the Russo-Ottoman War of 
1736-1739.5 It contains additional valuable data and provides further details on 
particular engagements in the course of the war. A recent article by Yuriy and 
Anna Manoylenko studies the performance of Minikh’s artillery during the last 
significant engagement of the war – the Battle of Stavuchani (1739).6 Without a 
doubt, the most valuable primary source of the war is the Memoirs of Christof 
von Manstein, a Prussian nobleman, born in St. Petersburg, who served in the 
Russian army during the War of 1736-1739.7 Manstein participated actively in 
the entire war and provides first-hand information on Peter von Lacy’s 
campaigns in Crimea. Another invaluable set of primary sources can be found in 
Maslovskiy’s corps original documents, published in 1889.8 It includes 
dispatches and reports from leading Russian officers and also the most important 
notes of B. von Minikh’s personal journal. 
 
 
                                                 
3 B.L. Davies, Empire and Military Revolution in Eastern Europe: Russia's Turkish Wars in the Eighteenth 
Century (New York & London: Continuum, 2011). 
4 A. Bayov, Russkaya armiya v tsarstvovanie imperatritsy Anna Ioannovny – Voina Rossii s Turtsiey v 1736-39, 
vol. 1-2 (St. Petersburg, 1906). 
5 P.O. Bobrovskiy, Istoriya 13 Leyb-grenaderskagoYerevanskogo Ego Velichestva polka za 250 let, vol. 2 (St. 
Petersburg, 1892-8). 
6 Yu.Ye. Manoylenko, A.S. Manoylenko, “A bomb after a bomb were lodged into the midst of the hostile 
army…’ The artillery of B.Kh. Minikh in the Stavuchan battle”, Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal 8 (2014), 61-3. 
7 C.H. von Manstein, Contemporary Memoirs of Russia from the year 1727 to 1744 (London, 1856). 




5.2. Preparations for the Initial Stages of the War 
 
Unlike Peter’s march against the Ottomans in 1711 and the campaign in Persia 
in 1722, Anna’s war was fought only after a meticulous preparation, which used 
the basis, set by Peter in 1722. The emperor had envisioned a possible war with 
the Porte during his campaign in the Caucasus and thus decided to resupply his 
supply depots along Ukraine and also to prepare substantial amounts of 
materials for the construction of a new fleet in Voronezh which had to attack 
and take Azov in coordination with a land force, as was done in 1696. These 
preparations were not realized during Peter’s lifetime but were used by Anna 
and her general during the early stages of the war.9 As early as 1732, Anna had 
ordered the military administration of Ukraine to revisit the depots and to 
resupply and repair them, in order they are up-to-date, in case the Ottomans 
decided to support France’s policy toward Poland-Lithuania.10 These measures 
were followed by a new Decree of Inventorisation, issued in September 1733, 
following a report, made by Minikh, regarding the condition of the supply bases, 
garrisons and fortresses along the southern borders.11 All preparations had to be 
carried out and completed by 1734.  
The firm Osterman, however, keen on pursuing an active policy in 
Poland-Lithuania and doubtful of the benefits of any southern aggression, re-
directed the Ukrainian supplies in support for the armies in Poland, which were 
successful in taking Danzig and affirmed Russia’s dominance in the 
Commonwealth. Thus, when in 1735 Minikh was placed in charge of the 
southern theater with the plan of conducting a surprise raid over the Crimeans 
and the Ottomans, the field-marshal was deprived of most of the supplies, he 
had relied to use. Nevertheless, due to Anna’s personal resolve, a substantial 
part of Russia’s western forces was allocated to Lvov, from where, it had to 
march east and besiege Azov, according to the plan, drawn by Osterman in the 
spring of 1735. The command of a 40,000 strong army was invested upon 
Ukraine’s military governor Weissbach. His death, however, significantly 
changed the situation and Anna summoned Minikh from Poland and gave him 
the overall command of the Ukrainian forces with the chance to choose whether 
he would strike Azov in the autumn of 1735 or he would wait for the spring of 
1736, gathering additional troops and supplies. Minikh was well aware that his 
logistics and the lack of heavy artillery would prevent him from taking Azov in 
1735.12 By the time the Russians were able to muster their forces, it was already 
August and instead of risking a troublesome march from Ukraine to the Don, 
Minikh decided to launch a surprise attack on the Crimean Tatars, by sending 
                                                 
9 Manstein, Contemporary Memoirs, 90; Bayov, Russkaya armiya, 181; see also the previous chapter on the 
Persian campaign for the possibility of a Russo-Ottoman war in 1722-1724. 
10 During the War of the Polish Succession, on several occasions the French diplomacy would,try to persuade the 
Porte to engage itself in a war against Austria and Russia, but to no avail.  
11 Bayov, Russkaya armiya, 181-2. 




Lieutenant general Leontyev against Perekop – the narrow isthmus which links 
Crimea to Europe’s mainland. Minikh was convinced that while Qalpan II Girei 
(r. 1769-1770) was away with the bulk of his forces, the Russians would be able 
to capture Perekop and invade Tatar heartlands.13 However, the preparations for 
this invasion took a month and a half, and it was not until 1st October that 
Leontyev could march his men south.14 The army numbered some 28,000 of 
whom 8,000 were Cossacks irregulars.15 
 
5.3. Leontyev’s Campaign of 1735 
 
The march of Leontyev’s troops began on the first day of October and it took 
five days for the army to reach the steppe south of the Orel River. According to 
Manstein, Leontyev was ordered to ravage the Crimean lands, put them to the 
sword and release any Russian captives he could find, as well as to “exterminate 
the Nogai-Tatars, who inhabit the deserts and steps, between Ukraine and 
Crimea”.16 
On 6th October, the Russians began crossing the dry, waterless grasslands, 
which were burnt by the Tatars during the summer. Lack of water and fodder for 
the horses began to take its toll on the army. Although Leontyev’s men were 
able to capture several Nogai ulusy in the vicinity of Crimea, the progress south 
was impossible due to the pouring October rains, which began on 13th and 
brought the rasputitsa to the Pontic region. Three days later, Leontyev called a 
meeting of the staff on which was decided to cancel the campaign and return to 
the Ukrainian line, although the army had almost reached Perekop.17    
The results of the campaign were far from satisfying – the Russians had 
lost over 9,000 men due to starvation, thirst, and diseases, as well as 4,000 
horses - for the same reasons. In return, over 3,900 Nogai-Tatars have been 
massacred and their cattle – taken by Leontyev’s army.18 When the Russians 
                                                 
13 Most of the Tatar hosts had been stuck in the Caucasus, foraging in Circassia and Kabarda after an 
unsuccessful attempt to reach Armenia and to join the Ottomans in their fight against Persia. Local Russian 
garrisons were instructed to hamper Tatar progress in any possible situation, and prevent the khan from joining 
the Turks in Iraq. 
14 This was due to the fact, that Leontyev was he third consecutive commander, bestowed with the position. It 
took six weeks until the government was able to finally issue Leontyev’s credentials following the death of 
Weissbach and the grave illness, which denied General Douglass the ability to take command of the field army; 
see Manstein, Contemporary Memoirs, 91. 
15 B. Davies states that the Russian army numbered 39,795 men and 46 guns; see Davies, Empire and Military 
Revolution, 190. However, he does not cite the source of these figures. According to Manstein, Leontyev’s army 
numbered 28,000 of which 8,000 were Cossacks, but he does not mention of any artillery; see Manstein, 
Contemporary Memoirs, 92. Manstein’s figures are taken into account in the current dissertation, given the fact 
that he is the main primary source on the topic. 
16 Manstein, Contemporary Memoirs, 92. 
17 According to Davies, the Russians were ten days away from the isthmus; see Davies, Empire and Military 
Revolution, 191. Manstein notes that the Russians were ten marches away from Perekop; see Manstein, 
Contemporary Memoirs, 92. 
18 Davies (Ibid., 191) quotes Manstein’s numbers, but estimates Nogai casualties at 1,000, instead of almost 




finally returned to their winter quarters in November, the army was severely 
mauled by diseases and by the demoralization after the unsuccessful march. 
Leontyev was court-martialed for the failure but was able to justify himself 
entirely and to receive a pardon. The blame was thrown on the dead Weissbach 
for not planning the campaign better.  
 




Following Leontyev’s disastrous campaign in the fall of 1735 Minikh set forth 
to prepare meticulously for the next year’s season. He was going to receive 
support from the forces of Hessen-Homburg, situated in Poland, as well as from 
the regiments, which were pulled out of Dagestan in the wake of the Treaty of 
Ganja.19 Although the regiments from Poland moved quite slowly and reached 
their quarters in Ukraine in the first days of March, Minikh used their slow 
march to cover the southern border against any Tatar retribution raids in the first 
months of 1736. As Bayov notes, the purchase of horses was among Minikh’s 
primary concerns.20 In November and December 1735 over 16,000 mounts were 
needed the Field-marshal complained that the process of their purchase was too 
slow. Furthermore, the prices of the animals, both regimental and pack had risen 
and a single war horse cost approximately 18 rubles, while pack animals worth 
eight rubles. This task was specifically assigned to the officers. In the dragoon 
regiments each officer had to purchase 80 war horses and 60 draft animals.21 
The staggering numbers could not be met by local merchants. Thus, the sale of 
horses outside the borders of the empire, including the animals, bred by the 
Cossacks and the Kalmyks, was put under ban. 
Regarding weaponry, Minikh issued a new model of cavalry swords, 
which had new design and replaced the old rapiers. According to the Field-
marshal the new swords were going to be more useful against the enemies the 
Russians were about to face. The army was also armed with 15,000 new 
muskets, some of which were produced in Tula while others were bought from 
Saxony. This resulted in weapons with different calibers, even among members 
                                                                                                                                                        
4,000 horses, which died by 17th October, while Manstein only mentions that 1,000 died from the snow and frost 
on the morning of 17th. 
19 The regiments were as follows: From Poland-Lithuania – Dragoon regiments – Olonetskiy, Novotroitsky, 
Kievskiy, Lutskiy, Troitskiy, Ingermanlandskiy, Permskiy, Narvskiy; Infantry regiments – Pervyy Moskovskiy, 
Yaroslavskiy, Vladimirskiy, Schlisselyburgskiy, Vologodskiy, Keksgolymskiy, Sibirskiy, Nevskiy, Permskiy, 
Sankty-Peterburgskiy, Vyatskiy. Additional regiments from Poland – Dragoon - Kargopolyskiy, Tverskoy, 
Vladimirskiy, Sankty-Peterburgskiy, Tobolskiy; Infantry – Tobolskiy, Narvskiy, Byalozerskiy, Velikolutskiy, 
Smolenskiy, Butyrskiy, Uglitskiy, Astrakhanskiy, Ladozhkiy; Regiments from Persia – Dragoon – 
Nizhegorodskiy, Kazanskiy, Pskovskiy; Infantry – Dagestanskiy, Kabardinskiy, Tenginskiy, Derbentskiy, 
Apsheronskiy, Nasheburgskiy; In total 16 Dragoon regiments and 26 Infantry regiments; see Bayov, Russkaya 
armiya, Note 4 for part I of Chapter III, 77 of the Appendix. 





of one and the same regiment.22 All older weapons – both guns and swords, 
were donated to the Land Militia of Ukraine. To avoid the troubles of the Pruth 
Campaign, related to the numerical superiority of enemy cavalry, Minikh issued 
an order, according to which each regiment had to carry 288 pikes, and over 
1,000 other spears and wooden stakes, which were going to be used by the 
infantry in case of cavalry attacks.23 The Russians were also going to use the old 
tactic of gulyay gorod-s, often applied by Peter in the course of the Great 
Northern War. Further, specific orders were issued concerning the baggage 
train, which was to be supplemented by special carriages, transporting water 
supplies, as well as additional carts for the pikes and steaks of the infantry. 
Officers were to limit the volume of belongings and supplies they could carry.  
By the time the army was set in motion, the army was not yet fully 
equipted and the Russians lacked 5,808 guns, 2,130 pistols, 1,578 swords and 
sabers, 1,206 saddles and 351 tents.24 New uniforms and clothing were also not 
sufficient since some of the regiments had to be supplied with uniforms, coming 
from Moscow, St. Petersburg, Riga and Smolensk.   
Before the launching of the actual campaign, Minikh had made some 
sophisticated calculations and sent a report to the capital, listing the amount of 
troops that, according to him, would be sufficient for the campaign in 1736. For 
the Crimea’s march, Minikh envisioned a Dnieper army, comprising of 19 
dragoon regiments, each consisting of 1,035 men and officers (19,665 men), 18 
infantry regiments, each comprising of 1,354 soldiers and officers (24,372 men), 
8 Land Militia horse regiments and 2 Land Militia foot regiments (10,000 troops 
in total), a hussar regiment of 500 soldiers, as well as free companies of the 
regular regiments, also numbering 500. Apart from these 55,037 regular troops, 
Minikh also included a strong irregular corps, namely 4,000 Don Cossacks, 
16,000 Malorossiyskiy Cossacks, 8,700 Slobodskie Cossacks, 150 Chyornyy 
Dol Kalmyks, 180 men of the Pavlovsk Companion regiment and 6,000 
Zaporozhians, all in all, 35,030 men. Thus, the combined number of regular and 
irregular troops was 90,067 of which almost 50,000 were cavalry. Also, the 
army was supposed to have an artillery train of 48 regimental and 18 field guns 
(66 in total), serviced by 200 men.  
The second army, which had to descend on Azov and take it, had to have 
the following composition: 5 dragoon regiments of 1,035 soldiers each (5,175 
men in total), 18 infantry regiments of 1,354 men each (24,372 men), one 
garrison dragoon regiment (1,035 men) and 5 garrison infantry regiments of 
1,354 troops each (6,770 men). These 37,352 regulars were to be supported by 
8,000 Don Cossacks and 284 guns, of which only 36 belonged to the regiments 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 189. 
23 Ibid. Manstein only mentions that each regiment was supposed to carry 350 pikes as well as 20 chevaux de 
frises, which were also used to protect the camp, during rests. What Manstein has in mind is probably the 
gulyay-gorod, which was already discussed in Chapter I. Davies quotes Manstein’s figures; see Davies, Empire 
and Military Revolution, 192. 




while the rest were siege artillery. The total amount of men, who were to be sent 
against Azov, was supposedly 45,352 strong.25 
As it is clearly seen, the core strength on the Crimean Theater had to be 
the massive horse contingent, while on the Azov front the Russians were going 
to count on the siege guns and the strong garrison corps, which had to protect 
the besieging army from enemy raids, which were constant during Peter’s 
campaigns in 1695-1697. Although Minikh is often criticized by Soviet 
historiography, for trying to impose foreign military manners on the native 
development of combat practices, according to these figures it is evident that the 
Field-marshal went through a lot of trouble to correct the errors, made by his 
predecessors during the previous campaigns in the south. 
 
The campaign  
 
Minikh departed from his winter quarters in Izyum at the beginning of March 
1736 and arrived at St. Anna’s fort. There he was surprised to find that out of the 
expected 10,000 troops (seven regiments) there were only 3,000 fit for combat. 
The others were either sick or sent to retrieve supplies from the local areas, since 
the garrison had been feeding on sukhari for the past two months.26 Minikh did 
not waste time and decided to gather whatever force he could muster and 
marched against Azov immediately while the main force under Peter von Lacy 
was to arrive later on. The Field-marshal had received intelligence that the 
Ottoman garrison of Azov was just 3,000 men strong, 1,000 of which were 
irregulars and Tatars.27 Furthermore, the bad weather in the Black Sea would 
prevent the arrival sea of reinforcements via sea. On the other hand, with the 
advent of spring, the grass had begun to grow in the Don Steppe, and Minikh 
calculated that it would suffice for the fodder of the cavalry. Furthermore, the 
ground was already softening after the winter frosts and was suitable for the 
digging of earthworks and trenches. With these factors in mind, Minikh 
assembled six regiments of infantry and a cavalry contingent of some 2,200 
Cossacks and set forth toward Azov.28 A detachment of 1,000 Cossacks was sent 
on the left bank of the Don to counter any attempts from the Kuban Tatars to 
relieve the siege. By the beginning of May, these men were to be further 
supplemented by 3,000 Cossacks and 20,000 Kalmyks. At the same time, 
Minikh sent a vanguard of 600 infantry and 1,200 Cossacks under G.M. von 
Spereiter to observe Azov and to cease any enemy attempt for scouting.29 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 203-5. 
26 Bayov, Russkaya armiya, 207-8. 
27 This proved to be false. The Ottoman forces numbered well over 5,000, with a substantial share of yeniçeri.  
28 Minikh was able to gather 9,250 men, of whom 5,800 were regular infantry and 2,200 were Cossacks; He 
expected that these forces would be supplemented by another 9,250 men  - 4,925 infantry and dragoons and 
5,000 Don Cossacks. These were expected to arrive at Azov by the end of March, raising the total force to 
18 500 men; see Bayov, Russkaya armiya, 210.  
29 Manstein, Contemporary Memoirs, 99. Exact numbers are given in Khronologicheskiy ukazately voennykh 




Spereiter’s troops advanced to the town and after meeting no enemy resistance, 
stormed and on 19th March took two enemy watchtowers (kalancha), followed 
by the capture of Fort Tulip (Lyutik) on the 23rd, after a successful night attack. 
The fall of the Lyutik fort gave Minikh the opportunity to begin the full 
circumvallation of Azov and also added 20 more guns to the Russian siege 
train.30 Spereiter proved quite successful – he was able to capture the 
watchtowers without the loss of a single man, and Fort Lyutik was subdued with 
only a lieutenant and three troops killed.31 The Ottomans lost between 50 and 
100 killed and over 50 captured, along with substantial amounts of provisions 
and munitions.32 
Minikh left Azov and returned to Ukraine at the end of March, being 
replaced by General Vasiliy Levashov, who was to command the blockade until 
the arrival of Lacy with the main bulk of the siege artillery. Before he set forth, 
Minikh made meticulous preparations, regarding the erection of defensive 
positions for his camp and buttressing the protection of his lines of 
communication with the St. Anna fort. The Field-marshal also strengthened the 
Azov corps with 60 guns, brought from St. Anna and sent a detachment of 1,000 
well-armed Cossacks on a flotilla of riverboats to blockade the mouth of Don 
and of Myortvyy Donets, preventing the shipment of any supplies from the 
Azov Sea. Furthermore, Minikh issued a complete set of instructions regarding: 
army disposition, digging of trenches and lines of circumvallation, distribution 
of the batteries, as well as allocation of garrisons and amount of cannons, 
necessary for strengthening the watchtowers and the Lyutik fort. These 
instructions were to serve Levashov until the arrival of Lacy, who was to take 
full command of the siege. Minikh was determined not to leave anything to 
chance. He was prepared in advance for all possible issues that could occur, 
including response to enemy sorties and the establishment of a regular postal 
service.33 
The month of April was spent in finishing the trenches and lines, 
projected by Minikh and in deflecting enemy sorties, which took place on 3rd, 
5th, and 25th. The first sortie was carried out by 600 Turks – half of whom were 
infantry and the rest – cavalry. They attacked a Russian supply train, protected 
by a company of footmen. The Russians were able to create a wagenburg out of 
the supply wagons and to repel enemy attacks, which continued for two hours 
and ended with the arrival of a Cossack detachment. The next sortie from 5th 
                                                                                                                                                        
Manstein states that Minikh has crossed Don on 27th March and that Lyutik was captured on 3rd April. According 
to the Khronologicheskiy ukazatel and A. Bayov, Lyutik was captured on 23rd, while the watchtowers fell on the 
night of 19th and 20th of March. It is possible, that the English translation of Manstein’s memoirs was corrected 
accordin to the Georgian Calendar.  
30 Bayov, Russkaya armiya, 213. 
31 Manstein, Contemporary Memoirs, 100. 
32 Russia’s official declaration of war was issued in the middle of March, 1736 and so the paşa of Azov did not 
have any idea of what the Russians were planning. Military drills of the border regiments were annual near the 
Russo-Ottoman border and the Turks were not very suspicious of Minikh’s maneuvers. (Ibid., 99). 




April was carried out by a force of 1,000 yeniçeri and 600 horsemen, who 
attacked the Russian trenches, which the troops were still digging on the right 
flank of the army. The garrison units were quick to respond and despite the 
fearsome charges of the kapukulu ocakları, the Turks were beaten back, after 
sustaining over 100 casualties, with the Russians losing only 17 men.34 The final 
sortie was carried out by several hundred Tatars, who were ambushed and 
soundly defeated by a corps of 400 Cossacks, sent by Levashov.  
When General P. von Lacy reached Azov on 4th May, following a 
troubled ride across Ukraine, he set forth to inspect the siege and review the 
state of the army.35 What Lacy concluded after the revision was that the army 
was lacking personnel. Of the expected 18,500 men, only 11,874 were present. 
Of them, 8,493 were regulars and 3,381 - Kalmyks and Cossacks, of whom only 
1,044 were horsemen. Out of the overall regular troops, 700 were sick after 
month and a half of military action, which demonstrates the low level of medical 
support and sanitation among the rank and file, allocated in the trenches and 
camps around Azov.36 
The sieges continued throughout May with no substantial success, the 
trench work proceeding slowly. The army had to struggle with the constant lack 
of bread, uniforms and the significant delay in payment.37 Lacy was forced to 
mobilize any available source of provisions and to redistribute the weapons 
among the troops, due to lack of muskets and rapiers. When guns were not 
available, soldiers were armed with pikes. On the other hand, as Lacy was to 
discover, from 5th May the Ottoman garrison was in a good position, with 
enough supplies and stationed in fortifications, which were in a superb state. 38 It 
turned out that Minikh, although right in his decision to exploit the 
unpreparedness of the Ottomans, failed in his calculation of the available 
provisions and of the capacity of Russian logistics to resupply the troops once 
Azov was blockaded. 
On 8th May the Turks renewed their struggle with a new sortie, in which 
500 footmen and 300 horsemen attacked a detachment of 150 grenadiers on the 
Russian left flank. The grenadiers were able to repel the enemy, inflicting heavy 
losses, while losing only 5 killed and 64 wounded. Following this sortie, Lacy 
issued an order according to which even workers in the trenches must wear arms 
and in case of a new sortie the entire army must be ready to respond. On the next 
day, the river fleet from Voronezh arrived, comprised of six galleys and nine 
gun-rafts, along with smaller vessels, all under the command of Rear admiral 
Bredal. Lacy sent Bredal to blockade the Don with his fleet, armed with 
additional guns. These vessels were allocated at the mouth of the Don to prevent 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 218. 
35 Lacy was ambushed in the steppe, south of the Ukrain Line and was almost captured by the Tatars, loosing 20 
of his 40 men escort, 10,000 rubles and most of his personal belongings. Ibid.  
36 Ibid., 219. 
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any relief coming from the Azov Sea. The decision turned out to be most 
fortunate for the Russians, since the main Ottoman fleet, under the Kapudan 
Paşa Canım Hoca Mehmed Paşa arrived a day later. His ships, however, could 
not enter the shallow waters of Don's mouth, and the heavy fire from the 
Russian fleet prevented a landfall from the Ottoman marines. Canım Hoca, 
unable to take further action had to sail back to Istanbul, leaving Azov to its 
fate.39  
On the 16th, the Ottomans carried out another major sortie, which included 
2,000 footmen and cavalry, which attacked the Russian left flank. Following a 
hard-fought combat, the Russians prevailed after Lacy personally led 500 
grenadiers in a flanking manoeuvre. The Ottomans were beaten back with heavy 
losses while the Russians lost 212 men, of who 21 were killed and the rest – 
wounded.40 This was followed by a new surprise attack on behalf of the Turks, 
which took place on 3rd June. In the course of the assault the Turks inflicted a 
severe blow on the Russians by killing 33 men and wounding 823. The incursion 
was finally driven back, with some 100 Ottoman troops killed.41 
The siege continued until the last weeks of June. The Russians were able 
to progress further with their earthworks and batteries, and on 8th June, a shell 
from a siege gun detonated Azov’s gunpowder supply depots. The Turks held 
for ten more days. Then during one night attack, after a breach in the outer 
defenses, the Russians were able to capture a position on one of Azov’s 
bastions. Two days later the commanding officer of the Ottoman garrison 
surrendered the town’s keys.After that his troops were allowed to leave the 
fortress and the Russians finally occupied Azov on 21st June 1736. During the 
siege, between 8th May and 20th June, the Russians lost 301 killed, died of their 
wounds or missing and 1,238 wounded. The strength of the army had increased 
from an initial force of 11,874 at the beginning of May to 28,000 at the end of 
June, with a total of 135 guns taking part in the sieges.42 Compared to the 
preliminary numbers, calculated by Minikh, the actual strength of the Don Army 
never reached even 50 per cent of the estimated figures. Nevertheless, the 
Russians achieved their goal even with such a minimal force, against a garrison, 
which was bigger than the one encountered by Peter four decades ago.43 
After the quartering of the garrison troops (four regiments), Lacy, 
mustering the bulk of the Don Army, set forth to join Minikh’s main army on 
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the Dnieper to strengthen the Field-marshal’s force in its invasion of Crimea. As 
it turned out, this was not destined to happen and in August, P. von Lacy 
retreated with his limited forces, heading back to Izyum for winter quarters. 
While Levashov and later Lacy were busy taking Azov, Minikh returned 
to Ukraine to direct and lead the main army personally against the Crimean 
Khanate. He reached Tsarichanka on the Dnieper River on 7th April and was 
unpleasantly surprised to find out that from the anticipated army, which had to 
descend on Crimea in full strength, only nine infantry, and nine dragoon 
regiments were present.44 They were ill-equipped and their baggage trains was 
still being suppliedaccording to Minikh’s orders. The soldiers also lacked 
uniforms and Prince Trubetskoy was still struggling to provide all the necessary 
supplies.45 Given the circumstances, Minikh decided to rush whatever forces he 
could muster and replace strength with surprise as his main advantage. By the 
time the army set forth, in was comprised of 10 dragoon and 15 infantry 
regiments available, 28,238 men in total, along with 10,000 troops from the 
Land Militia, 300 hussars and Wallachians, 3,200 Zaporozhian Cossacks, 12,730 
Malorossiyskiy (Ukrainian) Cossacks, 2,360 Slobodskiy Cossacks, 250 
Chuguevskiy Cossacks and 1,000 artillerymen and pontoon company, altogether 
58,078 soldiers and officers.46 As Bayov notes, only half of this force was 
consisted of regular troops, since the quality of the Land Militia was far from 
that of the regular field regiments, although Manstein held the militia in high 
esteem. At least 55 per cent of the army was comprised of irregular and regular 
cavalry which number was more or less according to Minikh’s preliminary 
calculations. The force, gathered for the capture of Crimea, was over one-third 
smaller, than the one, anticipated by the field-marshal in his initial plans.  
Minikh again issued extensive instructions for his subordinates, regarding 
the size of the officers’ baggage, the way the supply train had to be prepared, the 
usage of water-barrels, which were to be used as pontoons, once they were 
emptied. At the beginning of May, the weather was as fine as a general could 
desire, and the army was well supplied and in an excellent mood for a campaign 
as Minikh concluded.47 Manstein was more realistic in his assessment. 
According to the Prussian officer, the army still lacked supplies in the long term, 
and Minikh counted on Prince Trubetskoy to send regular caravans with 
munitions and food as soon as these commodities were assembled on the 
                                                 
44 18th according to the Gregorian version, used in the 1856’s edition of Manstein’s memoirs. I will use the 
Russian version of the dates, as was in the previous chapter. Manstein’s dates differ exactly 11 days. 
45 Bayov, Russkaya armiya, 231. 
46 Bayov, Russkaya armiya, 239; According to Manstein, there were 12 dragoon regiments, 15 infantry 
regiments, 10 Land Militia regiments, 10 squadrons of hussars, 12,000 Cossacks (5,000 from Don, 3,000 
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The Khronologicheskiy ukazatel (p.52) gives the same numbers as Bayov. Davies (Empire and Military 
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Ukraine line. Since transportation was rather limited, due to Minikh’s desire to 
bring as few carts as possible, and also due to the constant lack of vehicles, 
Trubetskoy had to organize transportation for the move, which he failed to do. 
As Manstein notes, the arrangement of the supply train was not yet completed, 
when the army returned from Crimea.48 In addition, Minikh, who had never 
fought on the Pontic Steppe, was convinced that there would be enough fodder 
for the animals in the early months of summer and that the abundant harvest, 
gathered in 1735 by the Crimeans would suffice for the upkeep of the Russian 
army.49 
The army departed Tsarichanka between 11th and 19th April and reached 
the edges of the steppe on 5th May. Three days later, the vanguard force, 
comprised mostly of Cossacks met large Tatar force (15-20,000 men), which 
was defeated by the arrival of cavalry reinforcements from the main army. The 
Tatars drew back and retreated in Perekop. The Tatar attack was launched from 
Qaplan II Girei’s main force came after the vanguard squadrons had discovered 
the location of the Crimeans at Chyornyy Dol (Black Valley). The Khan decided 
to avoid confrontation with the advancing Russian forces and withdrew his 
army. Fearing another attack from the Tatar cavalry, Minikh formed his army in 
close order into a giant, hollow square, with the supply train in the middle and 
with the dragoons at the corners.50 The Field-marshal would often use this 
formation during the campaign. Its composition, although limiting the dangers 
of enemy raids significantly hampered the movement of the troops. 
The Russians finally reached Perekop on 17th May and stormed the 
fortification line two days later, using 30,000 men, divided into six columns.51 
The rapid success strengthened Minikh’s resolve to march forward and to try to 
occupy all of Crimea before the Ottomans could redirect their military support 
from Azov toward Kaffa. He left a small garrison to occupy Perekop and 
dispatched General Leontyev with 10,000 troops and 3,000 Cossacks to hold 
Kinburn and prevent the Budjak Tatars from coming to their khan’s aid. 
Leontyev took the fortress without a single shot, allowing its small garrison to 
retreat to Ochakov on the opposite bank of the Dnieper. Leontyev took 
possession of 49 guns, 3,000 horses, 500 cattle and 30,000 sheep.52 
On 22nd May, Minikh summoned a war council, which had to decide the 
army’s next moves. The generals, headed by the prince of Hessen-Homburg, 
demanded that the Russians should maintain their position on the Perekop line 
until more supplies were sent from Ukraine by Trubetskoy, given the fact that 
the army had provisions for less than two weeks.53 The generals proposed some 
raiding parties to be sent to gather supplies and ravage Tatar territory. 
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Minikh, on the other hand, stated that the Russians had built a good 
momentum with their swift taking of Perekop and that no time should be wasted 
in order for the campaign to be brought to a successful end. Minikh believed that 
the army should capture the coastal settlements and occupy the capital 
Bakhchisaray before the Ottomans could reinforce the Tatars with a substantial 
number of yeniçeri and other infantry units, which would supplement the 
predominantly cavalry-based Crimean army. The Field-marshal was still 
convinced that the troops could be fed from the food storages of the local 
population and that the grass, still growing in mid spring, could support the 
horses without the constant flow of food and fodder from Ukraine. Minikh 
overrode his generals and marched his men forward, after leaving garrisons in 
Perekop, Kinburn, and Kazikerman. The Field-marshal was sure that Lacy had 
already taken Azov and that he would arrive soon with a substantial part of the 
Don Army. 
The army continued its campaign and on 7th June, after repelling several 
harassing raids by small Tatar units, the Russians took the position in the coastal 
town of Evpatoriya.54 They arrived in a “ghost town” as most of the town’s 
residents and the entire garrison had fled days in advance. Here, Minikh 
captured grain and rice stores, which would suffice his army for additional 
twenty-four days and thus he felt vindicated by his earlier perception. Still, 
Hessen-Homburg and some of the generals felt substantial doubt about the 
future success of the expedition, noting that dysentery had begun to take its toll 
on the soldiers.55 Water was also hard to find as there were just three small 
streams with drinkable waterand most of the wells along the route had been 
poisoned by the Tatars. 
The last significant success on Russians’ behalf came on 16th June when 
their main force held off a Tatar advance near Bakhchisaray while a small 
detachment of infantry and dragoons captured the city. Following the Tatar 
retreat, Bakhchisaray was partialy burnt, with the khan’s palace being destroyed, 
along with most of the supplies, gathered in the city. Following the capture of 
the enemy capital, Minikh decided to continue his movement toward Kaffa, and 
on 21st June dispatched a 10,000-strong force of Cossacks and infantry under 
generals Gustav von Biron and Ismailov to capture Aqmescit (Simferopol). The 
town was also emptied of its population, and the Russians burned it to the 
ground, after which they returned to the main army.  
At that point, Minikh had to acknowledge the impossibility of further 
advance. One-third of the army was already sick, with dysentery spreading 
rapidly amongst the troops.56 Since no supplies were found in Bakhchisaray or 
Aqmescit, the Russians were dangerously short of food, and the provision of 
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fresh water turned into a problem of monstrous proportions. Both animals and 
men were dying from thirst and heat, and the morale of the entire army was 
dwindling day by day. Given the circumstances and the fact that no decisive 
victory could be won against the Tatars, Minikh decided to abort the campaign 
and evacuate his troops before a strong Ottoman army could be formed in Kaffa. 
On 26th June, the Russians began their march back to Ukraine, while Lacy was 
just marching his regiments out of Azov to join the campaign against the Tatars. 
The army reached Perekop on 6th July, constantly harassed by Tatar raiding 
parties. Minikh’s retreat was perceived as a failure in St. Petersburg, and the 
Field-marshal was urged to start a new offensive in August or September, but he 
was well aware that his troops were worn out, and no adequate actions could be 
carried out before 1737. During the months of July and August, Minikh decided 
that his forces were insufficient for the upholding of Kinburn and Perekop, and 
he ordered the two fortifications to be destroyed, after which the main army 
retreated further north into Ukraine where it took winter quarters. After 
reviewing his shattered units, Minikh found out that he had lost 30,000 men, 
most of them due to dysentery, hunger, and thirst.57 Without receiving a single 
blow on the battlefield, the Russians had sustained over 50 per cent casualties of 
their entire force, which easily could count as a military disaster. In return, 
Minikh was unable to extend Russian holdings, nor defeat the Tatars or their 
Ottoman allies. In the end, the Russians had to rebuild their forces completely if 
they wanted to take on the initiative in the following campaign, as the Tatars 
would just follow their habit of returning and rebuilding their settlements. The 
fall of Azov was also not as grave on Ottoman positions in the Black Sea as 
before since no major program for the construction of the Black Sea Fleet was 
issued by St. Petersburg. Thus, the situation at the end of 1736 differed little 
from the one in the spring of 1735. 
 




The establishment of the army for the next year’s campaign began while 
Minikh’s troops were still on the field. Osterman, the energetic Russian 
Chancellor, set forth to bring Austria into the war with the Turks, stressing on 
the fact that according to the Treaty of 1726 between the two states the 
Habsburgs had to send an auxilliary contingent to Russia’s war efforts in case of 
a conflict with the Ottomans. In 1736 the Austrians had managed to avoid 
participation, using the war exhaustion from the conflict with France as a 
pretext. Russian historiography has developed a rather critical perspective 
toward Austrian actions. A. Bayov accuses the Habsburgs of being sagacious 
                                                 




and having second thoughts against a possible Russian expansion in the Black 
Sea region. He even states that the Austrians also sought to claim an access on 
the Black Sea, a thesis that hardly has any real dimensions. The Austrians were, 
however, keen on acquiring the right to serve as the protector of all Christians in 
the Ottoman Empire – a position desired also by Russia. Therefore, Vienna 
would try to use its military card only as a possible threat and would prefer to 
win the war on the diplomatic front. The rapid change in the situation in Persia 
would bring immediate shifts in the policy of Southesastern Europe. Following a 
series of victories over the Ottomans and his own internal opponents, Nadir 
Shah decided to overthrow the last legitimate Safavid ruler – the infant Abbas 
III (r. 1732-1736) and to affirm himself as the new overlord of Persia. This led 
to a series of revolts in Persia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Afghanistan, with which 
the new shah had to deal. This, in turn, initiated peace talks between Nadir Shah 
and the Sublime Porte, which would eventually lead to the Treaty of 
Constantinople, which restored the borders of 1722 and allowed the Ottomans to 
concentrate all of their resources toward the western fronts. Given the 
circumstances, Osterman was able to convince the Austrians that the time for 
talks was over, and more direct actions were required. The Chancellor reminded 
Vienna that until this moment Russia had fulfilled all of the arrangements of the 
1726 Treaty. Finally, the Habsburgs had to give in and agreed to join the war in 
1737. A military convention was signed on 29th December 1736, stating that the 
two sides would mutually support one another and that neither would be left to 
face the enemy by itself. In addition, it stated that neither Austria, nor Russia 
would sign a separate peace.58 
After diplomatic arrangements had been carried out, the military 
personnel began to prepare for its field tasks. In order to fill in the depleted 
regiments, an order was issued according to which 14,800 garrison troops from 
Moscow, Smolensk, Voronezh, and Archangelsk were going to be mobilized. 
There was a particular note that these men had to be the finest, most battle-ready 
and well-suited for marching among these garrisons.59 Since this figures were 
insufficient to fill in the losses, sustained in Crimea, and also to bring men from 
the garrisons in Ukraine, in the autumn of 1736 a draft was held, and it resulted 
in 45,167 fresh recruits.60 The cavalry also had to be equipped with horses, 
which were gathered from the population of the Sibir governorate, the “Lower 
cities” (along the Volga), as well as from the people of southern Russia which 
were attached to the upkeep of the Land Militia. According to A. Bayov, every 
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235 people had to provide one horse for the army. Belgorod was chosen as the 
central gathering point, from where animals were to be assigned to the separate 
regiments. Since the collection of horses went slowly and not quite adequately, 
in 1737, it was ordered that the governors and voevodi, as well as the regimental 
commanders should purchase additional horses, mainly from the Kalmyk 
settlements in the Eastern Pontic Steppe.61 An interesting issue came from the 
fact that pomeshtik-s in Ukraine preferred to pay the value of a horse in rubles 
instead of providing actual mounts. Minikh had to instruct repeatedly his men 
not to take the money but to recruit real animals. Moreover, he allowed the 
usage of military escort for the officers, sent to provide the mounts. By the 
beginning of May, there were 16,000 horses provided, but still both dragoon and 
infantry regiments lacked mounts and pack animals.62 It was in June when the 
infantry was finally supplied with the requisite number of horses, but the Land 
Militia regiments were still in need. In order to provide the necessary mounts, 
special measures were applied, mobilizing horses from the clergy, as well as 
placing a ban on horse trade until the army numbers were amassed. Officers 
were also expected to send some of their own animals. Oxen for the supply train 
were also in dire need. In April, it was calculated that the army required 29,466 
pairs, while in the first week of June, there were only 26,817 available.63  
In 1737, weapons were redistributed again. New muskets were brought, 
chiefly from Tula, but also, from the armories in Moscow, and a certain amount 
were purchased from Saxony. Minikh decided to take the rapiers away from the 
infantry and hand them to the dragoons, most of who were still armed with old 
swords and sabers. The Field-marshal claimed that the infantry would seldom 
use rapiers since they were accustomed to using bayonets in hand-to-hand 
combat and that the swords only served as additional burden during marching. 
All old handguns which could be spared were given to the Land Militia units, 
who were, again, in need of more arms. Minikh strengthened his determination 
to equip the infantry with pikes with which to protect the troops from the 
predominantly cavalry armies of the Tatars. He doubled the issued pikes per 
regiment, from 144 in 1736 to 288 in 1737. Given the bad experience with 
dysentery, Minikh placed great emphasis on the medical support of the army and 
the field physicians began to supply their stores as early as September 1736. 
Apart from the standard medicines, each regiment had a separate supply of wine, 
vinegar, and pepper used to fix problems with the stomach and to treat 
dehydrationand high temperature during the summer.64  
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In the second half of May, the armies of Russia were more or less ready to 
depart. Following a successful Kalmyk raid on the Kuban Steppe in the spring of 
1736, the local Tatars pledged their allegiance to the Russians and thus the Azov 
front was significantly relieved from pressure. Then it was then decided that the 
Russians would attack in two directions – the main army under Minikh would 
strike the Ottoman fortress of Ochakov, while a smaller force under Lacy would 
depart from the Don region and, supported by a fleet of 500 small vessels, would 
invade Crimea through the demolished fortification of Perekop. It was expected 
that the enemy resistence would not be very significant, and Minikh believed 
that the Ottomans, preoccupied with the war against Russia and Austria, would 
not support the Tatars with any units. In the winter of 1736/7 the military 
intelligence stated that the Turks possessed a force of 20,000 men in Babadag in 
the Danube Delta and some 14-20,000 troops in garrisons in Jedisan, which 
were to be supplemented by 35,000 soldiers from Egypt in the summer of 1737, 
as well as 6,000 Bosnians and a large number of Balkan and Anatolian troops, 
which could bring the overall strength of the Ottoman army in Bessarabiato 
80,000-90,000 men .65 At the same time, the Crimean Tatars were expected to 
mobilize around 85,000 men, which had to support the Ottoman struggle with 
Russia, to protect Crimea and also to attack the Kuban Steppe, reclaiming it 
from the Kalmyks. 
When on 21st May the army finally departed, Minikh was supposed to 
command a force of 30 infantry regiments, comprised of 1,686 men each 
(50,580 troops), along with 3 guard battalions (2,757 soldiers) for the infantry. 
In addition he was going to have also 21 dragoon regiments of 1,231 each 
(25,851 men), 401 guard cavalrymen and 9 regiments of mounted Land Militia 
with 1,077 men per regiment (9,693 men in total) or a total of  35,945 for the 
cavalry. Apart from these regular units, there were also over 13,000 Cossacks, as 
well as hussars and Wallachians, Kalmyks.The artillery corps comprised of 
2,842 men, who serviced 389 field and siege guns as well as grenade mortars. 
Thus, the total amount of troops under the Field-marshal was supposed to be 
92,124 regulars and over 13,000 irregulars, not counting the Kalmyks.66 In fact, 
it did not exceed 70,000, since some of the regiments were still not in full 
strength, many of the Cossacks had not arrived and a substantial part of the army 
was sick, so the ill troops had to be left behind.67 Once again Minikh was going 
to fight with an incomplete army.  
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At the same time, Lacy’s smaller army was supposed to have the 
following numbers – 20 infantry regiments of 1,686 men each (33,720 men), 13 
regiments of dragoons and mounted Land Militia, 1,231 men each (16,003 
troops), as well as 15-16,000 Cossacks, not counting the Kalmyks and the 
footmen Cossacks in the fleet. Of the total 49,723 regulars, 9,000 were to be left 
at Azov as a garrison, and Lacy would only use the other 40,723 as a field force. 
The artillery train of Lacy’s army consisted of over 32 guns and mortars with a 
different caliber.68 As in the case of Minikh, Lacy was also going to rely on 
quite fewer men. Out of the planed 55,000, he set off with just 25,000 regulars 
and irregulars, and another 10,630 were boarded on the ships, which were to sail 
through the Azov Sea. In total, 449 vessels were provided, 320 of which would 




Minikh’s forces departed on the 22nd of May, following the merger of all 
columns, which set off from Ukraine earlier the same month. The forces had to 
march to the Bug River and cross it in order to descend on the Ochakov fortress. 
Following twenty-three days of marching, the Russians finally arrived at the 
Bug River, which they began crossing on 14th June. Due to the large baggage 
train and the abundance of guns, the army lost a week in transferring on the 
other side of the Bug. Since the guns could hardly cross the river, Minikh 
decided to ship them down the Bug in a prepared flotilla of boats and rafts. 
Unlike Peter in 1711, the Field-marshal decided to put an extra effort and 
constructedc a river fleet, which was to supplement the movement of the army.70 
Even at this rate of river and wagon supply, Minikh’s army was proceeding 
slowly, and he decided to leave the heavy guns and part of the baggage train 
behind, guarded by a quarter of his army under Leontyev. The rest of the army 
was able to proceed at a greater speed and reached the outskirts of Ochakov on 
29th June.  
Minikh, having neither actual intelligence about the size of the Ottoman 
garrison nor knowledge about the actual disposition of its fortifications, decided 
to opt for immediate assault and not to wait until the heavy siege artillery is 
shipped to the site. His decision was influenced by the fact that the Ottomans 
had burned the vicinities of their fortress and the Russians were denied forage 
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and wood for the construction of field works. With a substantial part of his 
supply train still on the road, the Field-marshal considered that a protracted 
siege would have a devastating effect on his army. What he could not perceive, 
was that the Ochakov garrison had been reinforced by 20,000 troops and 
supplied with provisions for months ahead.71 On the next day, 30th June, the 
Ottoman garrison committed a sortie, consisted of 15,000 troops, split into two 
columns, which attacked both Russian’s flanks. After two hours of hard fighting, 
both sides lost around 200 men, and the Turks retreated back to the fortress.72 
On the next day, the Russians found two deserted Ottoman redoubts near the 
front of Ochakov and used them to install field batteries and began bombarding 
the town. On the following morning, a fire broke out in the center of Ochakov 
and Minikh decided that this was his chance to strike at the enemy, while they 
were struggling to put out the flames. Minikh sent a vanguard of infantry under 
James Keith to draw enemy fire from the ramparts and to prevent the garrison 
from fighting the fires in the settlement. Keith’s troops advanced, following the 
field-marshal's command. They climbed the glacis but encountered a ditch, 
which was a surprise for both Keith and Minikh. The blame goes entirely to the 
commander-in-chief, who never actually ordered a reconnaissance of the enemy 
positions. Keith’s forces stood exposed to enemy fire but were nevertheless able 
to inflict severe damage to the Ottoman troops, stationed on the ramparts. After 
two hours of fighting the Russians began losing heart and some of the troops ran 
back to the redoubts. At that point the Ottomans started organizing a sortie to 
finish off Keith’s retreating men, but by a stroke of luck, the fires detonated the 
fortress’ powder supply depot, which resulted in up to 6,000 killed and wounded 
among the Ottomans.73 The commander of the Turks, serasker Muhsinzade 
Abdullah Paşa waved the white flag and requested for negotiations for the 
surrender of Ochakov to be opened. 
The Russian troops demonstrated great resilience and courage, as well as 
strict subordination to the orders they had received. Although Minikh’s decision 
to storm the fortress at the wake of the fire was correct, his conduct was 
nevertheless far from flawless, since the lack of proper reconnaissance of the 
enemy defenses cost the Russian the lives of many able and valuable troops. 
Furthermore, if the fire had not destroyed a substantial part of the Ottoman 
manpower, the sortie, already in the making, could have had devastating results 
on the Russian army. Minikh, himself, threw his sword to the ground, crying 
out: “All is lost”.74 The Ottomans lost between 10,000 and 17,000 people due to 
the fires, the fighting and the explosion of the powder magazines. The Russian 
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casualties were nearly 3,900 men killed and wounded, of whom 200 were 
officers of medium and high rank as well as generals. 75  
After the gamble of Minikh paid off to some extent and Ochakov was 
captured, the Field-marshal decided to continue against Bender, but upon 
receiving the statistics, the government sent urgent orders that no further march 
should be undertaken. Then Minikh decided to pulll back to Ukraine, living a 
garrison unit of some 8,000 men in Ochakov under General Stoffeln. He was to 
receive further reinforcements in August along with materials and workers for 
the rebuilding of the devastated town. The living conditions for these 
unfortunate souls were wretched and at the end of August, Stoffeln commanded 
less than 5,000 men, of who one-fifth were sick.76 When Minikh returned to 
Poltava in September, a revision of the army was carried out, the losses were 
again staggering – 11,000 regulars and 5,000 Cossacks had died, along with at 
least 10,000 serfs, taken as caravan workers and laborers. Over 60 per cent of 
the casualties were again due to diseases.77 
However, the struggle for Ochakov was not yet done. In October, the 
Ottomans began their own counteroffensive to retake the stronghold. The 
Ottomans had brought an army of 20,000 troops, along with 30,000 Tatars to 
assist them. The expedition was headed by Genç Ali Paşa while the Crimean 
contingent was commanded by Begli Girei. The first main assault of the fortress 
was between 16th and 20th October when the Ottomans organized a series of 
attacks, which were deflected by the garrison. Stoffeln did not stand idle and 
sent several successful sorties, which caused substantial damage to the besieging 
army. A second grand assault was carried out on 25th October but was again 
beaten back by the Russians, who were even able to launch a small 
counterattack with a unit of 1,000 men under Brigadier Brake.78 Although Brake 
lost 150 men, he was able to inflict 2-3,000 casualties on the enemy before 
falling back to his position. During the next several days the Turks tried to 
breach the defenses with concentrated bombardment, but to no avail. Thus, on 
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the 30th, in the wake of an advancing winter, Genç Ali Paşa decided to abort the 
siege and to disengage his army. His army had suffered substantial losses, and 
the Ottomans also needed troops in the Balkans in order to face the advancing 
Austrians.79 
While the Dniester Army was struggling to sustain its positions in Jedisan, 
Marshal P. von Lacy’s forces were making good progress against Crimea. Given 
the fact that his army was smaller, hampered by fewer guns and supply carts, 
Lacy was able to march his army with good speed and reach the coastline north 
of Crimea on 23rd May, while Minikh was still departing to the steppe. The 
Tatars, under their Khan Fatih Girei were awaiting Lacy just after Perekop, with 
60,000 men, ready to engage in an open battle with the Russians. Lacy surprised 
everyone by choosing an out-of-the-box approach toward the peninsula. Instead 
of using the usual Perekop road, Lacy marched his army across the narrow Strait 
of Genichesk, which separates the Azov Sea from the so-called Rotten Sea. 
After just a dozen meters of water, the Strait ends at the so-called Arabat Spit – 
a “tongue” of sand and shells that stretches for tens of kilometers out of the 
Crimean peninsula, separating the Azov Sea from the series of lagoons and salty 
lakes to the east. Lacy was probably the first one to use this land bridge into 
Crimea and his gambit paid off entirely. In the words of Davies, Lacy shamed 
his generals, who had urged him to fall back on Azov, offering each of them 
passports and a dragoon escort.80  
His further march made a shift to the right, crossing the Rotten Sea to 
deliver a new surprise on the Tatars, who, caught unprepared decided to retreat 
further south. Lacy’s forces continued their advance in Crimea until 13th July 
when they arrived at the town of Qarasuvbazar. Here the Russians again found a 
deserted settlement as had happened with Minikh's troops the previous year. On 
14th, after observing the area, the Russians discovered a military camp, with up 
to 15,000 Ottoman troops stationed there. Lacy sent Douglas with 6,000 men 
and two dragoon regiments to attack them, drive them off and take the town. 
After an hour of hard-fought offensive, the Russians were able to defeat the 
Ottomans, expel them and capture Qarasuvbazar. Then Lacy after looting “one 
of best towns of Crimea” put it on fire.81 
The following day, Lacy began to move his forces out of Qarasuvbazar, 
when suddenly a great Tatar force appeared on the opposite bank of the Karas 
River. Lacy quickly evaluated the situation and decided to strike at the enemy 
before the Tatars could cross the river and use the plains around Qarasuvbazar 
as their force was predominantly cavalry. A vanguard of Cossacks and dragoons 
was sent under Douglas, who attacked the Crimeans, trying to capture their 
artillery. Although the Cossack attack was repelled, they occupied the enemy 
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long enough for Lacy to advance with the main force and drive the Tatars away 
by sending the Kalmyks into a flanking manoeuvre. The Crimeans broke their 
lines and began to retreat, closely pursued by the Kalmyks, who followed them 
for two days right to the outskirts of Bakhchisaray. Finally, the Kalmyks 
returned to the main army, bringing over 1,000 captives with them.82 
While the Kalmyks were chasing the retreating Tatars, on 16th Lacy held a 
military council. He and his generals were unanimous that the army had to be 
pulled out of Crimea before the peak of the summer heat in August. Diseases 
were already spreading among the troops, and water supplies were running low. 
It was decided that the army should follow the same route it used for advancing 
into Crimea. As for the main objectives of the campaign – the capture of Kaffa 
and Yenikale, both fortresses were outside the current reach of the army, and 
Lacy decided not to risk his. 
With the return of the Kalmyks on 17th, Lacy began his march back. To 
supply his forces, he sent raiding parties, comprised of light units and irregulars, 
who scorched the area for dozens of kilometers around the main force. In the 
end, they were able to gather 630,000 oxen and over 100,000 sheep, which 
provided enough meat for the army until the end of the campaign.83 The only 
significant enemy reaction to the movement of the Russian army came on 23rd. 
While Lacy’s men were crossing the Salgur River, the vanguard, comprised of 
light troops and irregulars, came under attack from a massive Tatar force, 
supplemented by a strong Ottoman contingent, sent from Kaffa. The irregulars 
were able to hold their ground until the artillery was placed along the river 
shores and began bombarding the enemy, inflicting considerable damage, which 
made the Turks and the Tatars fall back. The Russians went back across the 
Genichesk Strait and established a camp on the Molochnaya River, where Lacy 
maintained favorable position, keeping under observation all roads, leading in 
and out of Crimea. In the beginning of September, one of his scout units was 
able to capture several Tatars, who claimed that Fatih Girei was unable to march 
his forces in support of Ochakov due to the presence of Lacy’s army. Thus, the 
Tatars spent August and most of September awaiting for possible new Russian 
incursion south. Lacy’s strategic goals were, therefore, accomplished, for he had 
provided the main operations along the Dnieper with a secured flank. Lacy 
finally left his position at the end of September, marching toward Ukraine. In 
the meantime, he had dispatched half of his Don Cossacks back to the River 
Don valley, due to a series of Kuban Tatar raids, whose allegiance to Russia 
turned out to be short-lived. To punish them, a combined Cossack-Kalmyk 
force, under hetman Frolov and Donduk-Ombo, the leader of the Kalmyks, once 
again defeated the Kuban Tatars and ravaged their lands. 
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Following the return of the two armies from their military endeavours, Minikh 
rearranged his regiments along the Ukrainian line to strenghten the defenses of 
the southern frontier and to prevent Crimean winter raids, which had devastated 
part of Ukraine in the previous two years. Generals were given greater 
autonomy of decision, and the Ukrainian Line was divided into several sections 
to increase the speed of response during enemy attacks. In addition, light cavalry 
patrols were sent deeper into the steppe to bring early warnings for the approach 
of enemy forces. The system turned out to work fine and in February the 
Russians were able to repulse a significant Tatar force, some 40,000 men. Land 
Militia units were used to defend the fortifications, while after field units served 
as a strike force.84 This was the first winter of the war, in which the Tatars could 
not replenish their losses of cattle and provisions by ravaging the Russian lands. 
Given the winter operations and the movement of Austrian troops, a new plan 
was designed for 1738. Again it included actions on two fronts –Lacy was to 
march in Crimea, while Minikh would lead the main army into Jedisan. The aim 
of the Field-marshal was to opena corridor for a further march against Moldavia 
in case of anAustrian spring offensive.  
The Russians used the winter to resupply their fleets on the Dnieper and 
on the Don which had to blockade possible Ottoman incursions, and also to 
support the lines of communication for the advancing armies during the new 
campaigning season. Vice-admiral Peter Bredal’s fleet was refurnished to 
support Lacy’s new endeavour in Crimea while a Dnieper fleet was arranged by 
Minikh to protect Ochakov and Kazikerman from a possible Ottoman incursion.  
Similar to the previous year, the massive losses during the campaigns, as 
well as the calculations of the necessary army strength required a new draft to be 
carried out. In total, for 1738, 51,960 men were taken into service, which was 
the largest number of recruits taken in a single year ever since Peter began his 
reforms.85 According to Davies, a recruit was taken for every 98 households 
(while this ratio had been 1 per 125 in the previous year).86 The practice of 
taking too many people in consecutive years took its toll on the quality of the 
gathered men, as well as on the speed, with which the draft was carried out. A 
month after the proclamation of recruitment, Minikh still complained about the 
lack of eligible troops. Many of the men, taken from the draft were shorter than 
required and were only fit for garrison duty. In addition, a significant part of all 
new troops were underage, mostly seventeen-year-old.87 These recruits had to be 
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mustered and reassigned to their new regiments or garrison units which in most 
cases took months. Even when Minikh’s army was preparing to march into 
Jedisan in mid-May, recruits were still arriving on the spot. As in the previous 
campaign, horses and oxen were hard to find and by May, the army had a 
shortage of 4,000 horses.88 For this expedition, weapons were handed in time, 
with a distribution of 20,000 new muskets. They were given to the regular units, 
but the Land Militia scarcely received any and, in the end, many of the 
regiments lacked equipment.  
To increase army speed, Minikh would try once more to limit his baggage 
train and established two medical stations for the sick. People, who were ill 
before the campaign, were left at Perevolochnya where the sick from the first 
part of the march were also to be sent. Those, who got ill during the second half 
of the expedition, were to be shipped via the Bug River to Ochakov. In addition, 
medical stores were abundantly stocked, and more physicians were mustered. 
Regarding food, the army had to carry its rations of flour, cereals, and salt which 
had to suffice for four months and a half. Additional stores had to be set in 
prepared supply depots which had to provide food for eight months and a half. 
The army was to be accompanied by nine markets and over 2,000 traders, who 
would provide meat and drinks. Minikh also hoped that, if needed, meat and 
other supplies could be provided from the Zaporozhian Cossacks or brought 
from Poland. In the meantime, the Don army was provided with food supplies 
for five months in advance, as well as with 17,440 carts and the same number of 
oxen pairs for the supply train, which was to be navigated by 8,720 wagoners. 89  
Minikh’s Dnieper Army was supposed to have the following composition 
– 3 guard battalions (3,158 men), a cuirassier squadron (600 men), 21 dragoon 
regiments (25,850 troops), 9 regiments of Land Militia (9,693 men), 2 hussar 
regiments (900 men), 30 infantry regiments (50,580 soldiers), 3,000 artillerymen 
and engineers, 1,000 Regular Cossack horsemen – 94,781 regulars in total. Also, 
there had to be 13,500 Cossacks, including a Wallachian and Moldavian 
contingent under Constantine Cantemir, the son of the exiled Moldavian prince. 
The artillery train was to consist of 262 guns of different caliber, 11 mortars, 16 
howitzers, as well as 444 smaller mortars. The total paper strength of this army – 
108,281 men meant that this was the largest army Minikh was to command in 
the war.90 In reality, the regiments were mostly undermanned, and the army’s 
actual strength was less than 80,000, though it was still larger than the armies, 
used in the previous two years.91 
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The situation with Lacy’s forces was not better. According to the 
preliminary plan, the Don Army had to comprise of – 6 dragoon regiments 
(7,386 men), 1 garrison dragoon regiment (1,183 soldiers), 6 Land Militia 
regiments (6,462 troops), 15 regiments of foot (25,290 men), as well as 15,000 
Cossacks and 10,000 Kalmyks. In total, P. von Lacy’s army should have 
numbered 65,321 soldiers and officers, supported by 86 regimental guns, 16 
siege guns, four mortars, four howitzers and 60 smaller mortars.92 In reality, 
when he adavanced into the Crimea, Lacy commanded an army of 6 field 
dragoon regiments, one garrison dragoon regiment, and 7 foot regiments. His 
field artillery consisted of six 18-funt guns, six 12-funt ones, three 8-funt 
cannons, and three 3-funt pieces, as well as four 5-pud mortars, two 1-pud 
howitzers and two of half a pud. Instead of the 10,000 Kalmyks he had hoped 
for, only 1,385 were able to arrive, since Donduk-Ombo needed the rest to fight 
the Kuban Tatars. Nevertheless, following several days of marching, the army 
was joined by another 8 dragoon regiments and the 6 regiments of Land Militia. 
The army was further joined by approximately 12,000 Cossacks, which came 
into several columns during Lacy’s march forward.93 So instead of marching 
with a bit over 65,000 (as calculated on paper), Lacy invaded Crimea with 
around 53,000 troops over 2/3 of which were regulars. According to Manstein, 
Lacy actually commanded between 30 and 35,000 troops, including the 
Cossacks.94 Taking Christof von Manstein’s estimates into consideration, it turns 
out that most of Lacy’s regiments also had insufficient manpower as they were 
unable to receive additional men from the recruits that were so sluggishly 
transferred. Whether his estimates are too low remains uncertain, but the truth 





The Don army began its progress on 19th May 1738 by following the same route 
it had traversed the previous year up to the vicinities of Crimea. Upon reaching 
the Berdiya River, P. von Lacy sent a scouting party of 2,000 Cossacks under 
Colonel Mashlykin, who were to go forth and observe the positions of the Tatars 
and also to search for a suitable place, through which the army could invade 
Crimea. Lacy, satisfied with his decision last year, decided to repeat his 
unorthodox approach towards the peninsula. He was, however, unable to use last 
year’s route, since a strong Ottoman fleet penetrated the Azov Sea and attacked 
Vice-admiral Bredal’s fleet, which prevented him from using his vessels in 
support of Lacy’s march. Bredal was able to dismount some of the naval guns 
and set batteries along the shore and beat back several Ottoman attacks, 
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preventing the Turks from landing their force in support of the Tatars. In the 
meantime, Mashlykin’s force intercepted a strong Tatar unit and defeated it 
soundly on 25th May, after which he returned to Lacy with reports. The Field-
marshal, upon learning about the presence of the Ottoman fleet, decided to cross 
the Rotten Sea, by using a shallow part of the Sivash, near Odipy tract.95  
Using a low tide and wind, blowing with such strength that the flows were 
further diverted, Lacy marched his men into a thin column and crossed the small 
portion of sea bottom before setting foot in Crimea. The Russians lost a handful 
of carts due to the return of the tide, but the army itself remained intact.96 At the 
same time, the main Tatar Force under the new Khan – Mengli II Girei (r. 1724-
1730; 1737-1740), was stationed near the Perekop Line, waiting for the Russians 
to appear from this direction. The Tatars had rebuilt the line and planned on 
using it to hold off the Russian incursion. Lacy again surprised his enemies. On 
the 26th June, the same day they crossed the Rotten Sea, the Russians were able 
to capture Chivaskul – a small fortification at the end of the Perekop line. Two 
days later, following a severe bombardment and a coordinated attack from both 
sides of the Perekop Line, the strong fortress of Or-kapı surrendered to the 
Russians, who left ten companies of grenadiers to protect it and continued their 
march southward. Soon after that Lacy discovered the condition of the Crimean 
countryside. It was devastated by the last two campaigns and no fodder, food or 
animals could be taken to supplement the resources of the invading army. 
Troubled by the possibility of logistical disaster, Lacy called up a council of war 
on 6th July, on which was decided that the army had to retreat to Perekop and 
from there – to march towards Azov. As in the previous years, the main Tatar 
force was still nowhere to be seen. But after only three days on the march, a 
20,000 strong Tatar force attacked the rear of the Russian army. The Cossacks 
and the Azov dragoons were almost driven into retreat and scattered, but a 
counterattack conducted by General Shpigely, who commanded four dragoon 
regiments, managed to repel the Tatar attacks and to repel them. According to 
Manstein, Russian losses were between 600 and 700, while the Tatars lost 2,000 
men.97 According to Bayov, the Russians lost 1,045 killed and wounded, while 
the Tatars left over 1,000 dead on the battlefield.98 With no further 
confrontations, Lacy returned to the Perekop line and held it throughout August. 
In September he marched back to Azov, blowing up the fortifications on the 
Perekop. 
Lacy’s forces were performing remarkably well, not taking any great risks 
and obtaining most of their strategic goals. In the meantime, Minikh’s army 
once again marched to the southwest with the intention of entering Wallachia, 
and defeating all Ottoman forces on its way. The Field-marshal marched with an 
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army which was at least a quarter smaller than planned, and also, once again, not 
sufficiently supplied with ammunitions, weapons, food and carts for the baggage 
train. Horses were also insufficient, as were oxen, but this did not prevent 
Russian progress in previous years, so Minikh once again hoped to compensate 
logistics issues with speed, decisiveness, and resilience.  
The Dnieper army began its movement on 18th May after the Land Militia 
regiments and the guard units finally managed to arrive at the rendezvous point 
on the Omelynik River. Omelynik was reached on 23rd, and Minikh constantly 
halted different sections of his army to wait for fresh recruits, still coming from 
Ukraine to catch up with the army. Minikh used the time in waiting to perform 
military drills in order to raise the overall level of military training among his 
men. The cost for this training manoeuvre was the low speed with which the 
Dnieper Army proceeded.99 The Bug River was finally crossed on 25th June after 
the army had progressed with an average speed of 17-20 kilometers per day, and 
after every second day was ordered as a rest in order to built bridgesor to carry 
out exercises. 
The first notices of enemy concentration came at the beginning of June 
when Minikh received intelligence that the Budjak Tatars had gathered a force 
of 20,000 men, concentrated on the Dniester. This force was led by the Belgorod 
sultan, and was later supplemented by 30,000 Ottomans troops, stationed at 
Bender.100 A scouting force of 1,500 Tatars was sent forward to monitor 
Minikh’s movement. The Russian army was set into three divisions. They were 
to march in a column of consecutive squares, in the middle of which stood the 
supply train of each division. The divisions were headed by generals 
Rumyantsev, Magnus von Biron and Loewendahl and the guard battalions were 
set under the command of Gustav von Biron. This manner of movement, 
although offering substantial protection against enemy incursions, brought the 
army speed even lower of the level sustained before the crossing of the Bug 
River and raisedthe level of attrition among the soldiers.101 Following the 
transition of the Bug, Minikh decided to set his army on a route, which 
surpassed as many sources of water and fodder as possible. The army was 
supposed to travel 190 kilometers between the Bug and the Dniester, having 
only two major streams to cross – rivers Molokish and Savranka.102 
The first actual encounter with the enemy happened on 29th June, during 
the army’s crossing of the small river Kodyma. The Tatars tried to launch a 
surprise attack on the Russian rear, while the artillery and the baggage were still 
moving through the river. The Cossacks under Frolov, supported by dragoon 
                                                 
99 Bobrovskiy, Istoriya, vol. 2, 138. 
100 Ibid.; Bayov, Russkaya armiya, 501-2. The garrison of Bender had been 15,000 strong (8,000 yeniçeri and 
7,000 sipahi and arnaut-s (Albanians) in the end of May but in mid June was supplemented by another 15,000 
men, led by the serasker of Bender. The entire Tatar force under the Belgorod sultan was 30,000, and it crossed 
the Dniester at the same time Minikh traversed the Bug River. 
101 Bobrovskiy, Istoriya, vol. 2, 139. 




regiments under Rumyantsev, were fast to respond, and the enemy chose to 
retreat. On the morning of 30th June, the Tatars reappeared, 10,000-strong and 
launched three consecutive assaults on the Russian forces, which were still 
stationed in their encampments. The first two charges of the Tatars were 
repulsed with ease by the Ukrainian Cossacks and the vanguard division under 
Rumyantsev, supported by dragoons from Gustav von Biron’s division. The 
third charge came upon a small vanguard under Colonel Shipov, who decided to 
attack the Tatars following their second failed attempt. Shipov’s men were 
surrounded but were able to hold their ground until reinforcements arrived, 
repulsing the enemy. Minikh, who received intelligence that the Tatars were 
receiving reinforcements, including Ottoman units, decided to develop his 
momentum and ordered the entire army to break camp and form for battle. The 
Tatar-Ottoman force, however, fled the battlefield as soon as the Russian army 
began to advance, supported by heavy artillery fire. By 2:30 p.m., the Russians 
reached the previous enemy positions and stood firm until the last Tatars were 
out of sight.103  
The same situation repeated a week later, when on 8th July, while camping 
on the Savranka River, the Russian encampments came under attack from a 
combined Ottoman-Tatar force. Consecutive enemy charges were repelled and 
by 5 p.m. the Russians had beaten back Tatar and Ottoman advances, killing 
over 1,000 enemies in the process.104 Few days later, Minikh received an 
intelligence report from Russia’s agent in Istanbul – Neplyuev. It stated that the 
Ottomans had concentrated 138,000 men at the Dnieper, of which 60,000 were 
Ottoman units, 48,000 were Belgorod and Budjak Tatars and 30,000 were 
Nogais. The army was commanded by Sherif Efendi and several high-ranking 
officers (nine three-tail paşas, twelve two-tail paşas, five Tatar sultans). The 
army’s task was to intercept the Russians and enter into a decisive engagement 
with them, regardless of the location. A military council held by the paşas 
decided to monitor enemy movement and try to inflict defeat on Minikh’s troops 
while crossing the Savranka. This left Minikh with the impression that he had 
managed to defeat the entire enemy force, driving them into a retreat. He 
believed that if another victory against the Ottoman-Tatar force could be 
achieved, he would fulfill the Empress’ desire to capture Wallachia.105 
Continuing their further advance, the Russians finally reached the 
Molokish River on 21st July and again came under enemy attack. Gustav von 
Biron’s division, which came under assault, was able to form and beat the 
advancing enemy forces, driving them into full retreat by the afternoon. 
Minikh’s further advance was delayed due to notices of enemy forces 
concentrating in front of the Russians. The Ottoman army of 60,000 men and 76 
guns took a position on the opposite bank of the Dniester while the Tatar and 
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Nogai forces locked Minikh’s left flank on the Biloch River.106 On 23rd, Minikh 
sent a vanguard under William Fermor, consisting of seven infantry regiments, 
the predominantly Bulgarian hussar regiment under Colonel Stoyanov and 2,000 
Cossacks. Minikh also joined the vanguard commanding a squadron of 
cuirassiers, and a Leib Guard mounted squadron. Near the Gura Bilotsk tract, 
the vanguard engaged an enemy force of 12,000 men. Minikh quickly sent 
dispatches, urging Gustav von Biron to move his division in support of Fermor’s 
vanguard and also to dispatch as quickly as possible the Prince of Brunswick 
with a force of three regiments. Soon after Brunswick arrived the enemy 
launched their attack concentrating on the Russian’s right flank, while 
simultaneously carrying out a diversion, by sending several units to engage with 
the rest of Minikh’s troops. The Tatar-Ottoman advance was halted and repeled 
by the Russian artillery, followed by an advance of Fermor’s troops, who chased 
the retreating enemy until nightfall.  
On 25th Minikh held a military council. Due to the forthcoming summer 
heats as well as to the problems with fresh water supplies, it was decided that on 
26th a decisive advance would take place, its purpose being the destruction of the 
enemy fortified position and the winning of a bridgehead for the crossing of the 
Dniester. On 26th, the army formed in three columns of infantry and dragoons, 
each with a body of cavalry in its vanguard, comprising of the cuirassier 
squadron on the left flank, the Bulgarian hussars under Stoyanov in the center 
and the second hussar regiment under Kumingov covering the right flank.  
The battle began with an attack of the Budjak sultan and the Ottoman 
units on the Russian left, at that moment occupied by the Cossacks. The initial 
Tatar advance pushed back the Cossacks, who were able to reform and to use 
their pikes to charge and break the enemy momentum, even though they were 
lesser number than the Tatar-Ottoman force.107 Following their failure, the 
enemy redirected their momentum at part of the baggage train, protected by the 
troops of General Mikhail Filosofov, who was advancing slower than the rest of 
the army. Filosofov’s men were able to hold their ground until reinforcements 
arrived under Rumyantsev. The enemy charges continued until 4 p.m. when the 
last of their units left the battlefield. Minikh lost 200 men while Tatar casualties 
were quite higher.108 The Russians camped at a cannon-shot distance from the 
Dniester. After a month of marching from the Bug to the Dniester, the army of 
Minikh moved at the staggering speed of 5.8 kilometers per day, more or less 
repeating Sheremetev’s slow progress before the conquest of Iași in 1711.  
During the following two days, Minikh made several unsuccessful 
attempts to establish a bridgehead over the Dniester. His efforts were prevented 
by concentrated fire from the Ottoman batteries on the opposite bank. On 29th 
the Russians, unable to continue further, were ordered to begin a return march 
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north. Minikh was worried about the possibility of a new encirclement, similar 
to that suffered by Peter, the deteriorating situation with the water and food 
supplies, and the advent of blistering summer temperatures in August. The first 
major engagement during the retreat north came on the 30th of July when the 
Russian rearguard came under attack by enemy units of yeniçeri and Tatar 
horsemen. The infantry regiment guarding the last elements of the baggage train 
was able to repel initial Ottoman attacks. A counterattack of the Bulgarian 
hussars, the Chuguevskiy Cossacks and several dragoon companies, were able to 
scatter the enemy forces and drive them into full retreat. This day the Russians 
lost 300 men while the Ottoman-Tatars units had 1,000 of them killed.109 The 
next big enemy raid came two days later, when a Russian foraging party rode 9 
kilometers away from left the main force. They were ambushed by the Tatars 
and the Ottomans and over 700 men were lost, along with 2,000 heads of 
cattle.110 The next 11 days passed without any general engagements. When on 
20th August the Russians were crossing the Bug River, their rearguard was once 
again attacked by a force of 17,000 Tatars, whose assault was repelled by the 
Astrakhan infantry regiment and the lead guard squadrons.111  
Simultaneously to Minikh's retreat into Ukraine, General Stoffeln decided 
to abandon the fortress of Ochakov, raze its defenses and fall back, with 
whatever troops he still commanded toward the Ukrainian line. The spread of 
dysentery, scurvy, as well as plague (which also appeared in Poland, Moldavia, 
and Wallachia at the time), strengthened Stoffeln’s resolve. He had not received 
adequate supplies since 1737, most of his men were sick and the garrison was 
undermanned. At the same time, news came that an army 40,000 Ottomans and 
siege guns was assembling in Moldavia and planned to take Ochakov and the 
smaller fortress of Kinburn in October.112 Given the circumstances, Minikh 
approved Stoffeln’s decision and allowed him to move back north and to destroy 
all fortifications left behind. By mid-September, the Russians had evacuated 
Jedisan, losing whatever gains they had made in the previous months. In the 
words of Manstein, for the Russians the campaign was as costly as the previous 
one. Although they did not lose so many men on the field, a great number of 
them were sick upon returning to Ukraine and most of them died. This was also 
the costliest expedition so far, in relation to oxen and horses lost. Minikh had to 
abandon a substantial part of his carts and artillery in Poland because there were 
no pack animals available.113 Tactically speaking, the Russians were, in general, 
able to outperform their enemies on the battlefield. Strategically speaking, the 
Ottomans were able to outperform the Russians and to bring back the front lines 
where they stood in December 1736, rendering in vain year and a half of 
preparations, marches and thousands of human lives lost.  
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5.7. The Campaign of 1739 
 
In 1739, the Russo-Austro-Ottoman War came into its final stage. There were 
many factors, which predetermined the abrupt end of the conflict, but the most 
important one was Austria’s ultimate failure on the Balkan Front. The Austrians 
entered the war in 1737 and sustained a series of humiliating defeats, resulting in 
the loss of Serbia (except Belgrade) as well as Western Wallachia (Oltenia), 
occupied by the Austrians since the treaty of Passarowitz (1718). Several 
Austrian armies had been beaten back in Bosnia. Habsburg logistics and 
manpower mobilization also failed. The ongoing economic crisis, combined 
with the damage sustained by the military establishment during the War of the 
Polish Succession hampered the Austrians from displaying their full potential. 
The military leadership was rather mediocre as most of the generals were too 
inexperienced or  incompetent. Court-martial among the high ranking officers of 
Vienna’s forces was an often repeated event during the war. 
Nevertheless, by the early months of 1739, Emperor Karl VI has still 
resolved in his commitment to his Russian allies and Empress Anna was willing 
to satisfy all Austrian strategic demands to keep the Habsburgs in the war. In the 
pursue of this goal, the Cabinet in St. Petersburg approved a strategic plan for 
the upcoming campaign season, which focused on sending the main force from 
Dnieper toward Transylvania, while a smaller force had to attack Crimea once 
again, aiming to prevent the Tatars from joining the Turks. Additional 
intelligence suggested that a dispute between the Belgorod and Budjak Hordes 
would eliminate them as possible allies of the Sublime Porte during 1739. In 
general, the situation was in no way dire, and if the allies were finally to achieve 
a decisive advance against the Ottoman Empire or its Wallachian and Moldavian 





Following the plan, approved by the Cabinet and the Empress, the main force 
had to be under the command of Minikh. According to initial estimates, the 
army should number 76,311 regular troops and 14,800 irregulars, bringing the 
total strength to 91,111 men, supported by 606 pieces of artillery.114 The 
baggage and artillery trains required over 15,000 carts as well as 22,000 pairs of 
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oxen and horses to pull them. Food provisions would suffice for three months 
ahead while supply depots would have to provide the additional supplies. 
Lacy would again lead the second army, the task of which was seen as 
supportive and its numbers were lesser in comparison to the Dnieper army. Lacy 
was supposed to command 39,147 regular troops, accompanied by 15,000 
irregulars and 146 artillery pieces for regimental, field and siege purposes.115 
Not counting regimental horses, the Don army would require 18,000 pairs of 
horses and oxen. The food supplies issued for Lacy’s Crimean march were 
calculated to suffice for five months. Lacy would also receive support from the 
Azov fleet, which would transport additional 5,000 Cossack footmen. To divert 
the enemy attention of the main strike against Crimea, part of the Ukrainian 
garrison troops, along with the river fleet on the Dnieper would strike at 
Ochakov and Kinburn while Donduk-Ombo would lead 10,000 Kalmyks against 
the Kuban Horde.116 
In reality, numbers again differed. Not counting the irregulars, Minikh’s 
army actually numbered 58,000 men, instead of the 76,311 planned. This was 
due to granting leaves, as well as to the inadequate allocation of new recruits, 
taken from the levy for the 1739 campaign. Thus, the situation of the previous 
years repeated itself. Regarding the Cossacks, there were only 5,300 Ukrainian 
available, as well as another 500 Zaporozhians. The total troops under Minikh 
were up to 65,000 men instead of the 91,111 anticipated in the preliminary 
calculations, which meant that 28.5 per cent of the planned army personnel were 
unavailable for the campaign.117 The situation in Lacy’s force was no better and 
in mid-May he only had six dragoon regiments, eight infantry regiments, three 
Land Militia regiments and four Slobodskiy regiments, all of which were 
incomplete regarding personnel. Also there was a tremendous shortage of pack 
animals, and the provisions, which Lacy could take with him, could only suffice 
for two months instead of the previously planned five. In addition, the 
supporting troops from Azov and Ukraine never made it to the field.118 Stoffeln 
would even fail to step in the vicinity of Ochakov, marching only 1,200 instead 
of the planned 7,800 troops along the Dnieper, while an epidemic on the Lower 
Don would prevent Levashov from sending five infantry regiments in Lacy’s 
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aid. Due to a shortage of vessels and the above-mentioned disease, Bredal’s 
naval contingent also stayed put.119 
Lacy’s army moved first, departing on 10th May 1739 from Izyum. The 
Field-marshal was well aware that if he waited for the Dnieper flotilla to act or 
hope that the Don forces would rid themselves of the plague, his force would 
miss the strategic initiative and allow the Crimeans to move out of their base and 
intercept Minikh’s forces. Therefore, Lacy decided to march whatever troops he 
had available and try to deter any Tatar movement. After receiving intelligence 
that the Ottomans had buttressed Crimea’s defenses, by sending garrisons to 
Perekop, Kaffa, and Evpatoria and dispatched a strong fleet in the Azov Sea to 
block the Genichesk Straight and the Rotten Sea, the Field-marshal correctly 
decided to avoid risking an incursion into the peninsula. Instead, he placed his 
regiments along the Crimean border to blockade and intercept enemy movement 
out of Perekop toward the Dnieper and the Dniester. On 15th August, P. von 
Lacy approached Perekop with a small force of 12,000 regulars and 5,850 
Cossacks, but learning that there was no fodder for his horses, and already 
losing animals, due to heat and starvation, he decided to fall back on the St. 
Andrey fort of the Ukrainian line, ending his last campaign into Crimea.120 
Although the Russians were unable to penetrate the peninsula, Lacy achieved his 
strategic goal of holding Tatar forces at bay and also distracting the attention of 




The main army under Minikh began marching on 23rd April, but it took over a 
month before the Russians were able to move from Kiev, through Dnieper and 
reach the Russo-Polish border at the Stubla River, near Vasilykov. It was not 
until 22nd May during a military council that Minikh finally revealed the 
campaign plan to his subordinate generals. During his initial movement, Minikh 
had experimented with several formations and finally in mid-May the Field-
marshal established the permanent setting of his troops during the marches – 
four divisions under Rumyantsev, Biron, Loewendahl and Fermor, each 
comprised of different portions of infantry, cavalry and Militia units. When the 
Russians enter Polish territory on 28th May, Minikh would disperse the divisions 
into separate columns, with substantial space for foraging. The idea was to move 
through Poland-Lithuania as fast as possible and to avoid any confrontation with 
the forces of hetman Potocki, who had vigorously opposed any transgression of 
the southern Polish border.  
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The Russians continued their march, covering stages of up to 25 
kilometers each and resting for a day after each phase. Keeping that movement 
speed intact, the army was able to reach the Bug River a month later and cross it 
on 22-24th June.121 After the Bug had been traversed, Minikh continued toward 
Moldavia, always vigilant of possible Tatar incursions. Upon reaching the 
Dniester, he split his troops in two major divisions. The first under Rumyantsev 
was sent ahead to Khotyn, while Minikh with 20,000 handpicked soldiers and 
most of the heavy artillery, went to Nichlava, crossing the Dniester upstream 
from Khotyn and using his engineers to hasten the transition of the guns. The 
Russian position at Senkovitsy was entrenched and fortified with redoubts and 
batteries. On 20th July, Minikh had finally reached his first objective, standing 
less than 60 kilometers from the Moldavian border fortress. Minikh’s gamble 
proved successful. Carrying only rations, sufficient for six days and a small 
volume of baggage, his troops had outmaneuvered the Ottomans and their 
vassals, denying the enemy the chance to block Minikh’s crossing, as had 
happened the previous year. In the meantime, Rumyantsev’s army was delayed 
due to heavy rains and Minikh had to wait for his arrival before hoping to lure 
the Turks into a decisive battle or begin a siege of Khotyn. 
On 22nd July, while a dragoon regiment under Colonel Rode was foraging 
in the vicinity of the Senkovitsy camp, it came under attack from a combined 
Ottoman-Tatar force, numbering 18 to 21,000 troops under Islam Girei and Iliaş 
Colceag Paşa.122 Rode was able to form a wagenburg and to hold off enemy 
attacks until reinforcements came.123 Minikh, still remembering the loss of over 
700 troops in a similar ambush last year, sent forth the hussar regiments, 
followed by dragoons and mounted grenadiers. One by one, the Russian units 
added their fire to the effort, and the enemy troops fell back leaving over 600 
killed while the Russians lost only 198 killed, wounded or missing.124 The 
following week passed with no further incident and by 26th July, all of 
Rumyantsev’s units finally reached Senkovitsy and the army under Minikh was 
once again in full strength. In the meantime, Minikh had sent raiding parties into 
Moldavia, which returned on 28th, bringing a great number of cattle for the 
army. 
The Russians resumed their march on 29th of July and on 1st August 
defeated another enemy raid, carried out by a predominantly Tatar force. 
Russian losses were insignificant, and Minikh continued his march forward. The 
army was now formed in a new battle order of four divisions. Rumyantsev 
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commanded the center, Biron – the right flank, Loewendahl – the left and 
Fermor – the rearguard. The army reached the fortified Ottoman position of 
Okop on 7th August. Instead of assaulting it, Minikh left a force of 20,000 men 
to guard the largest part of the baggage train at the camp near the Gukov River, 
while he led the rest of the army (some 48,000) into a flanking manoeuvre south, 
which could allow the Russians to descend directly on Khotyn. The Field-
marshal decided to take limited food supplies and an adequate number of heavy 
guns. The army suceeded in making a rapid progress and by 14th the Russians 
surpassed the entrenched Ottomans at Okop and continued their advance 
towards Khotyn. In the meantime, the Ottomans were assembling a large force, 
divided into several units. According to Davies, the total Ottoman-Tatar force, 
concentrating in Khotyn, was between 80 and 90,000, most of whom were 
horsemen.125 Minikh knew that he could easily be encircled in the same fashion 
as Peter had been at Stănileşi in 1711. The only possible solution was to strike 
first. Furthermore, the enemy forces were not gathered in a single location, and 
the Field-marshal had a good chance in defeating them one at a time. Having 
such a tactical arrangement in his mind, Minikh marched his men against Veli 
Paşa’s position at Stavuchany, which the Russians reached at dusk on 16th 
August.  
The Ottoman forces were only 20,000 strong, stretched on a series of hills 
in front of the Stavuchany settlement and supported only by 66 guns.126 On the 
morning of 17th August, Minikh decided to use the gaps in Veli Paşa’s position 
and sent General G.Biron with a division to strike at the enemy’s right, so the 
the Turks would weaken their center and left flank by sending reinforcements. 
Biron commanded a force of arround 9,000 troops (dragoons, infantry and 
guards’ squadrons), as well as 34 guns and mortars. The thirty 30-funt guns 
were placed in front of the big square, arranged by Biron, while the mortars 
were allocated in the formation’s core.127 Biron’s guns began a bombardment on 
enemy lines, forcing Veli Paşa to concentrate his troops in the center and on the 
right flank to respond to the artillery fire. Ottoman batteries were not so accurate 
and effective, and new guns allocated against Biron were soon silenced by the 
Russian cannonade. With the forces of Veli Paşa advancing, Biron began to 
retreat slowly, while the rest of the army under Minikh began to cross the 
Shulanets stream which separated the battlefield in two sections. Minikh’s main 
target was the weakened Ottoman left flank. A battery of 14 field guns and eight 
howitzers was covering the crossing and was able to repulse several attacks, 
carried out by Ottoman and Tatar horsemen.128 It was not until 5 p.m. that the 
Russians were finally able to traverse Shulanets and to form a huge square with 
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the siege artillery placed in the center. In such a formation, Minikh marched his 
men uphill against the main enemy positions. Veli Paşa tried one last desperate 
attack to break Minikh’s formation, but the superb Russian artillery once again 
forged victory. The Ottomans burned their encampments and fleed toward 
Bender while the Tatars returned to Budjak. Khotyn, guarded by several 
hundred men, was left on Minikh’s mercy. The Russians had lost less than 67 
dead and wounded.129 
Khotyn was reached on the next day (18th August), and capitulated on 
19th, without the firing of a single shot. Five days later, Minikh resumed his 
march. Instead of striking at Bender as previously planned, the Field-marshal 
decided to follow the Pruth and to capture Iași, while using raiding parties to 
wreak havoc and to intimidate the Ottomans to “sit on the conference table” at 
Nemirov. Constantine Cantemir was sent ahead with a flying corps of 3,000 
Wallachians, hussars and mounted grenadiers along with twelve light guns to 
pillage and reconnoiter.130 Cantemir was able to advance south and entered Iași 
with no opposition on 1st September, followed two days later by Minikh. On 12th 
September Minikh held a military parade to celebrate his conquest of Moldavia. 
A day later he received official dispatch that the Austrians had capitulated to 
Ottoman demands and had left the war, signing a peace treaty at Belgrade on 7th 
September, after a secret one was negotiated on 21st August. Russia was left 
alone with diminishing resources and had only one choice – to end the war as 
well. Iași and Khotyn were returned to Moldavia and Azov was kept, but the 
Russians were forbidden to build and maintain a fleet in the Azov Sea, and all 
fortifications in Azov had to be demolished. The war had ended in a strategic 
stalemate, which predominantly favored the Ottomans, who continued to hold 
the Black Sea in a tight grip. The Russians acquired nothing with regard to land 
or strategic points, but gained valuable experience, as they took very important 
notes on the disposition and vulnerabilities of Istanbul’s northern defenses. 
Although Minikh has usually been labeled a failure in the eyes of Russian 
historiography, it is a fact that Catherine the Great’s successful wars against the 
Turks were possible due to the immense volume of data and knowledge, 
accumulated by Minikh’s forces on their four-year venture. 
 
5.8. The performance of the Russian army 
 
Unlike previous sub-chapters, where each campaign was evaluated separately, 
the Russo-Ottoman War of 1736-1739 will be analized in its entirety. The 
patterns, demonstrated by the Russians regarding mobilization, logistics, choice 
of routes and targeted objectives demonstrate a trend which can be clearly 
followed throughout the five years of campaigning. Separate elements of 
                                                 





performance will be outlined in subsections, but the overall evaluation will be 




The backbone of each military effort was, is and probably would always be - the 
troops. Russia’s army of the 1736-1739 War comprised essentially of two 
general elements – the regular regiments of footmen and dragoons and the 
irregular cavalry units of Cossacks and Kalmyks. They were supplemented by a 
small number of other regular and irregular units, among which the Land Militia 
regiments, the guards’ squadrons, and the hussar regiments could be noted, who 
had continued their existence after the Petrine era. What can be clearly seen by 
studying the army numbers is the pursuit of balance among the main 
components of the army. Field-marshal Minikh, who was the mastermind of the 
War of 1736-1739, picked specific numbers for cavalry, infantry and artillery 
according to each army’s primary objective – a raid, a siege or a prolonged 
campaign with multiple tasks. Thus, armies, marching against the Ottoman 
fortress chain in Jedisan and Budjak, would have a greater proportion of infantry 
compared to cavalry, as well as a substantial amount of guns while an expedition 
in Crimea would require a force in which the cavalry comprised an essential part 
of the total strength.131 This was a fundamental step forward from the early 
Petrine campaigns, in which the tsar would muster as many men as possible, 
without specifically arranging the proportion of the army branches. Another 
important element of soldier disposition was the level of mobilization, achieved 
among the Cossacks. While in 1695 Gordon noted that only the tsar’s presence 
could assemble a substantial number of steppe hosts, during Minikh’s 
campaigns, Cossacks contributed up to 20,000 or sometimes even more men in a 
single season. The level of mobilization among the several hosts remained 
considerably high throughout the war. This meant that the state had achieved a 
greater degree of control over its frontiersmen and had developed the necessary 
administrative measures required to use Cossack manpower efficiently. 
Regarding men’s performance on the battlefield, the army could be 
divided into three main sections. The most efficient body of troops in the 
Minikhian army was the cavalry. The combination of effective regular mounted 
troops (the dragoons) and the irregular, experienced and adaptive Cossacks 
proved essential for the successful progress of the Russian armies in the steppe. 
Their effort was supplemented by the Kalmyk units, who proved to be 
formidable force and their raiders usually gained the upper hand against superior 
Tatar forces. The Kalmyks were also excellent scouts and pursued enemy units 
with vigor since captives provided a substantial part of their war booty. In the 
campaigns of 1738 and 1739, the two hussar regiments also proved their bravery 
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and value by intercepting enemy raids and by delivering decisive blows on the 
flanks of the Tatar units, acting in the Russian rear. The cavalry demonstrated an 
overall level that surpassed the performance of the Tatar cavalry, as well as the 
Ottoman semi-regular units of sipahi and the irregular cavalry units, assembled 
in the Balkans and Anatolia. 
The second most decisive element of the armies of Minikh was the 
artillery. While the cavalry deflected enemy raids and scouted the areas ahead of 
the army, the artillery was the branch which usually won the battles and was 
crucial for breaking both enemy fortifications and field formations. Taking 
Azov, Ochakov and Perekop, holding enemies at bay during the raids (such as 
that near the Savranka River), and destroying Ottoman units at Stavuchany were 
all artillery’s achievements. The artillery, both diverse and numerous, provided 
an adamant predominance of firepower which could not be outmatched by the 
enemies of St. Petersburg. Although lacking standardization in caliber and even 
in material, the sheer number and size of the cannons were sufficient to surpass 
the enemy artillers. 
Finally, the most enduring element of the Russian army was, by all means, 
the infantry. Marching for hundreds of kilometers, usually in shortage of 
supplies, munitions, and even uniforms, the rank and file was a stalwart military 
machine, capable of facing numerous challenges, coming from enemies, nature, 
or their commanders’ miscalculations. The Russians maintained an 
exceptionally high level of field performance when facing enemy forces. The 
Russian infantry units almost never retreated when they were under attack by 
Tatar or Ottoman cavalry. They were usually able to reposition and meet enemy 
charges, reversing their momentum and eventually breaking them. As they 
seldomly met enemy footmen, their hand to hand abilities against other infantry 
were not sufficiently tested. Nevertheless, on some occasions, the Minikh’s 
infantry met the Ottoman yeniçeri in open combat and gained the upper hand - 
unlike during the first sieges of Azov, when the soldaty and streltsy regiments 
were badly mauled by yeniçeri charges. Unlike the resistance to enemy attacks, 
the Russian footmen turned out to be quite more vulnerable to the shortages of 
food, water and rest, as well as to diseases and worsening weather conditions. In 
fact, probably over 60 per cent of the Russian casualties during a campaign were 
due to non-combat circumstances. This, however, had nothing to do with the 
soldiers themselves, but was rather a problem of the next major point of 
evaluation. 
To conclude, the quality, which the Russian rank and file of all military 
branches demonstrated, was superb and essential for all of Minikh’s 
achievements in the course of the 1736-1739 War. The Russians showed an 
upward trend of evolution with regard to training, discipline and battlefield 
resilience. The rather insignificant number of field casualties is an evidence for 




of the soldiers’ personal combat skills, as demonstrated during the storming of 




Unlike the superb performance of the men in the ranks, the achievements of 
those, standing in the rear were not so impressive.132 Year after year, campaign 
after campaign, the logistics proved to be the main issue of Russia’s military 
organization. Armies would fight well and march well, as long as there were 
enough food and munitions. These, however, proved to be scarce once the 
Russians left their lands and marched into the open steppe. The magazine 
system used by Minikh proved to be somewhat successful, but after a month or 
so in the field, the army started to show signs of shortages of food, water and 
also of diseases. This was due to the low hygiene level, lack of uniforms, tents 
and other factors, such as the marshy countryside and the different climate. 
Minikh would divert a substantial part of his preparations for the 
systematic organization of logistics, supply trains, and chains of magazines and 
stores. On paper, it all looked good with rations usually calculated to last for 
four to six months in advance and sometimes even longer. New weapons were 
issued yearly, and the purchase of horses, pack animals and medical supplies 
started in the autumn of the previous year. Uniforms were ordered in advance 
from several locations, in order to avoid overburdening of local cloth 
production. Carts, oxen and horses were bought from a vast territory, spreading 
from Poltava to the Ural and from Kazan to Astrakhan, sometimes even 
acquiring animals from outside these limits. Minikh also ordered a type of water 
barrels which could be used in the construction of pontoon bridges once the 
water was over in order to limit the cargo and spare wagons for other essential 
provisions such as food and munitions. 
So what went wrong? First and foremost, the logistics and the supply 
system were significantly hampered by the road infrastructure, which was barely 
existent outside the major settlement regions around Moscow. The situation had 
improved since Gordon made his way through the steppe in 1695, but still, only 
a handful of actual roads existed, and most of them were just a bunch of wagon 
tracks and dirt, left by passing caravans, traders or military units. Water 
transportation remained essential and Minikh used rivers as often as he could to 
supply and resupply his armies. This, however, was problematic once the 
Ukraine line was traversed. The steppe of Jedisan and Budjak had no river ports 
and often no settlements at all which could be used as havens for the fleet. The 
mouths of major rivers were dominated by Ottoman forts, which had to be 
captured before any naval contingents could be used to resupply and strengthen 
field armies. When the spring and autumn rasputitsa is added to the picture, it 
                                                 




turns into a logistical nightmare which would haunt Russian supply system up 
until World War II.  
The second problem was the coordination of different authorities, 
responsible for the furnishing of provisions and supplies, and sending them to 
the army. Apart from the military quartermasters, who were sent to collect 
animals, men, and resources for the military establishments, local governors and 
voevodi had their own, autonomous power, which either assisted or hampered 
the work of the logistics officers. Also, local pomeshchiki had to be tamed or 
persuaded to fulfill their obligations regarding laborers and animals, as well as 
food supplies. Organizing a system of interdependent administrative units, 
which would transfer supplies on distances, usually on the verge of 1,000 
kilometers, was not an easy task and it is a small miracle that it actually worked. 
It is no wonder that in 1737 Minikh doubled the number of logistics officers in 
his army, after noticing the slow pace with which the provisioning of his troops 
was carried out. 
Corruption and personal incompetence are also factors, which should be 
taken into consideration. The divertion of funds, which had to cover military 
expenses, was no novelty, as was the drastic icrease in the cost of supplies and 
animals whenever a war began. Often price spaculations wereused as a trick by 
local merchants, and several occasions in which Minikh had to provide 
additional funding for the purchase of horses and oxen were already mentioned 
in the current chapter. Regarding personal mismanagement, Russian 
bureaucracy was far from perfect, and this was demonstrated in the inability of 
Knyaz Turbetskoy (who oversaw the logistics preparation for each campaign) to 
handle the organization of army supply, as well as the inadequate distribution of 
new recruits for the field regiments. Surprisingly, he would maintain his 
position, even though it was evident that the Knyaz was far from achieving his 
objectives. His close connections with the Empress kept him intact. 
Another problem for the logistics was the population density in Ukraine 
and the Pontic Steppe. Unlike the rest of Europe, these lands were scarcely 
populated, and resources were very limited. Large amount of horses and oxen 
were mobilized and most of them died during the first two years of the war. This 
depleted the countryside of draft animals and made further levies of mounts 
impossible, or in any case - hard to achieve. By 1739 shortages of animal power 
were staggering as was the inability of military services to redistribute recruits 
among regiments, which had a lot to do with the condition of roads. 
The lack of long-term supplies, the unfavorable conditions in the steppe as 
well as the inability to resupply from enemy lands were all factors which 
contributed to the limited time throughout which the Russian armies could carry 
out their field endeavors. Logistical problems were both internal and external, 
and no other contemporary army could have performed better given the 
circumstances. On the other hand, the organization of supplies could have been 





Marching and speed 
 
The third major element of army performance is the speed with which the 
military units progressed into enemy territory. Speed is one of the essential 
factors of success in any war effort since Ancient times and is directly related to 
the ability of an army to deliver decisive blows or to outmanoeuvre enemy 
contingents.  
Statistically it is impossible to determine a medium marching speed for 
the Russian army with respect to the entire war or even to a single campaign. 
The main reason is that the movement of the army depended on the terrain and 
whether the troops traveled through their own territory or through enemy lands. 
Minikh’s campaigns reveal that while in Ukraine the Russians were able to 
maintain a good average speed of movement, but once the army entered the 
steppes, the Field-marshal prefered to protection instead of haste. Tatar raids 
were constant and a moment of inattention could result in the death of hundreds 
as well as in the destruction of the invaluable food and water supplies. Minikh 
marched his men in a different fashion, adapting to the hostile territory, and 
paying less attention to the terrain. While in the Russian lands, the army 
marched in columns, stretched into a long line. Once in Tatar lands, the Russians 
repositioned into giant squares, placing the baggage train in the center and 
supporting the flanks with cavalry. This formation, although critically reducing 
the speed of the army, proved successful in preventing enemy incursions.  A 
measure of average speed could be calculated. It seems that the Russians 
marched between 5 to 25 kilometers per day on the average but usually their 
speed did not exceed 20 kilometers per day. Another option for rapid movement 
were the marches performed in stages, used by Minikh in 1738 and 1739, when 
the army covered 15-20 versti per day (16-21.5 kilometers), and then took the 
next day as a rest. Although it kept soldier constitution considerably high, this 
decreased movement speed. In this case actual daily marching did not exceed 11 
kilometers per day, which, compared to the 21 kilometers, usually covered by 
Peter’s Army in Dagestan, looks unimpressive and even sluggish. The slow pace 
protected the army from enemy raids, but it also limited the time in which the 
army could campaign before the advent of summer heats, which was the real 
bane of Russian troops. The question remains whetherMinikh’s decision to save 
hundred lives on the march did not cost him thousands more in the later stages 
of the expeditions. 
Another element, which had a considerable impact on the movement, was 
the size of the baggage train. Even if the army did not proceed with over 40,000 
carts, as mentioned in Manstein, it most certainly advanced with around 20-




campaigns.133 Minikh has received a substantial amount of criticism from both 
modern and nineteenth-century historians regarding the enormous supply train, 
which he used during the expeditions. The Field-marshal’s desire to calculate 
and bring every possible necessity with him resulted in the overall 
overburdening of the army, which Manstein underlines on several occasions. In 
1739 Minikh finally decided to act more aggressively and to leave his main 
supplies behind. Thenthe army was able to reveal its actual potential for rapid 
progress. The marches prior to Stavuchany were executed superbly and 
demonstrated the maneuverability of the Russian army in comparison to its 
enemies, who were not expecting Minikh to change suddenly his manner of 
conduct. 
The situation with speed was rather different on the Crimean/Don front, 
where Lacy operated. He was a practical man, who made the best he could with 
whatever he had at hand. His armies were always smaller than Minikh’s, and his 
operations were perceived as supporting and secondary. This allowed Lacy to 
bring a limited number of men and supplies with him and thus to conduct faster 
marches and to be able to manoeuvre more freely. His ingenious incursions into 
Crimea in 1737 and 1738 demonstrate the advantages of smaller baggage trains 
and limited troop numbers. On the Dnieper and the Dniester front, Minikh left 
the initiative to the raiding Tatars while slowly proceeding toward his objective. 
In the meantime, in Crimea Lacy was able to outmanoeuvre the enemy and 
dictate the pace of conflict. 
 
Command and control 
 
The final significant aspect of military performance is the conduct of the 
commanding generals and the officers. In an age, when the ratio of NCO-s and 
higher ranking men was kept high in comparison to the overall regimental 
personnel, the role of officers was decisive for the discipline, effectiveness and 
morale of the troops. Like their western contemporaries, Russian officers were 
trying to live up to the standards of being a role model for their troops, 
demonstrating bravery and courage, as well as resilience and composure. 
NCO-s and middle-rank officers (from lieutenant to colonel), were an 
essential part of the military efforts. They personally led their units into combat 
and inspired the esprit de corps of the rank and file. It was a common feature of 
military life that sergeants, captains, and even colonels received wounds or even 
die in the front line during a battle. In general, the lower officer ranks of the 
Russian army performed well, fulfilling their tasks and demonstrating good 
commanding abilities. This was most evident during ambushes, when the 
conduct of a captain or a colonel could save his unit from the enemy. In fact, the 
occassions, when Tatar raids were able to break the defenses of surrounded 
                                                 




units, were scarce. Usually, under their commander’s directions, Russian troops 
were able to hold out for several hours, until the cavalry and infantry 
reinforcements arrived. The additional demonstration, of both native and foreign 
officer abilities, was revealed during assaults on enemy positions, such as the 
capture of Perekop, where Christof von Manstein personally led a detachment of 
60 men and captured several fortified towers, full of yeniçeri. Another example 
is the conduct of the Bulgarian hussar regiment, when Colonel Stoyanov and his 
son poruchik (first lieutenant) Stoyanov were commemorated for their bravery 
during the deflection of the massive Ottoman-Tatar raid during the battle which 
took place on 30th July 1738.134 
The bravery and leadership of generals also must not be underestimated. 
Minikh often led the vanguard with his cuirassiers, as did Lacy, while division 
generals usually rushed forward along with their men when enemy units had to 
be engaged. Biron, Rumyantsev and other commanders of field units were 
among the names that demonstrated their combat skills in the front ranks. 
During the siege of Ochakov, in which several high-ranking officers were killed 
or wounded, the generals stood firm in the ranks, leading their men against 
enemy fire. Later in the same year, during the Ottoman siege of Ochakov, 
Brigadier Brake demonstrated bravery by charging yeniçeri units in hand to 
hand combat and drove them off the field. 
While combat skills were essential for winning the hearts of the soldiers, 
tactical and strategic skills were essential for winning battles. During the age of 
Anna Romanova, Russia did not have great strategists who would appear later 
on. There were no commander like de Saxe, Eugene or Marlborough, but still, 
the generals demonstrated if not military genius, at least capability in terms of 
main tactical and strategic knowledge. Minikh was a meticulous planner, who, if 
possible, would have written instructions regarding any possible element of 
army life – from marching, through everyday life to conducting combat. If it 
was possible, he would have tried to plan the entire campaign day by day. On 
the one hand, this was good, as he seldomly left anything on the chance. On the 
other hand, his pedantic manner sometimes hampered his ability to respond 
accordingly to the emerging problems. Paradoxically, he was also a gambler 
type, who would risk a lot when convinced of his superiority over the enemy, no 
matter if it actually existed. The siege of Ochakov demonstrates his hazardous 
manner of rushing forward against all odds, even though preparations were not 
yet carried out and reconnaissance was not made. While this could prove 
troublesome in some cases, it turned out to be helpful in others. If he had not 
been willing to rush forward with half-prepared units, his army would have 
never made it out of Ukraine on any of the campaigns between 1736 and 1739. 
In general, the “planner” in Minikh's character disappeared when the “action 
man” appeared. The fact that Minikh was a foreigner must not be 
                                                 




underestimade. Each failure could provoke the reaction of Russian nobility, 
jealous and mistrustful towards the nemts. 
The second leading figure of the 1736-1739 War was Count Peter von 
Lacy. An experienced, stalwart soldier, who knew his way around military tasks 
and strategic decisions, Lacy was probably one of the best military leaders of 
Russia before Rumyantsev and Suvorov. Unlike Minikh, Lacy was more 
inclined to react to the changes of the campaign instead of planning the entire 
endeavour in advance. He was brave and provident, but he was no gambler and 
would rather halt an offensive rather than risk the lives of his men on the 
possibility of victory. Lacy was certainly an innovative soldier, contributing to 
the development of Russian strategic thought and serving as a tutor of a future 
generation of commanders, who would lead Russia throughout the Seven Years 
War (1756-1763) and during Catherine’s wars against the Ottomans.  
A common feature of both Minikh and Lacy was their determination to 
comprehend situations according to their perception, rather than relying on their 
subordinates’ advice. Furthermore, they were good field tacticians and were able 
to find the right formula to conduct the war against the irregular and 




The Russo-Ottoman War of 1736-1739 brought no actual political or strategic 
gains for Russia. It only strengthened further the Ottoman grip on Wallachia and 
Moldavia and enabled the Turks, after their victories over Austria, to regenerate 
part of their lost positions in the Balkans. What the Russians gained from the 
conflict was invaluable experience. The Pontic Steppe would no longer be terra 
incognita for the Russian generals. All major fortresses in this region had either 
been studied or taken, the routes were well documented and observed, and 
tactics were adequately adjusted to outmatch the Turks and Tatars during any 
following conflict. The Russian army demonstrated an upward trend in its 
development regarding discipline, battle preparedness, and maneuverability. The 
logistics remained the main issue of the eighteenth century, but due to the 
imperfect condition of roads and the slow development of transportation, this 
was to be the case up to the World War II, when rasputitsa dominated the 
planning of both Stavka and OKW, even though tanks, trucks, and planes were 
already available.  
In general, the Russians performed well, outmatching their enemies in 
every element of combat except for logistics. Russian troops were better in 
terms of firepower and precision, as well as in hand-to-hand combat. Colonels 
and captains were brave and motivated, as well as tactically efficient, winning 
small-scale confrontations and defending positions with substantial ease and 
skill. Generals, although no military prodigies were capable and after several of 




good team of subordinates with which he could achieve most of his objectives. 
In the meantime, Lacy’s ability to work with the Cossack atamans and the 
Kalmyk war chief Donduk-Ombo allowed him to use the soldiers of the steppe 
with high effectiveness and to coordinate easily his progress with their leaders. 







The history of Russia's military way to the West has been a tale, told and retold 
both by national scholars and by western historians. The Cold War’s obsession 
in understanding Russia and its military development throughout the ages was 
perceived as a crucial element in the ideology of “get to know one's enemy” but 
was also accepted as essential for the understanding of early modern Europe and 
its warfare. It is beyond doubt that the history of European conflicts since the 
eighteenth century inevitably includes Russia as a crucial factor in both the 
political and military struggle for mastery.  
 Changing notions and trends within western historiography and the 
reopening of Russia's intellectual elite toward the non-socialist world triggered a 
new wave of researchers, who are looking from a new perspective on the 
military history of Imperial Russia. The proliferation of ideas has reached an 
unprecedented level in the last decade as a great number of articles and books 
dealing with variety of topics emerged. Among the large number of themes are 
the analysis of the connections between state building and military development, 
as well as the incorporation of a wide variety of ethnic groups within the 
boundaries of the empire. A lesser number of studies have paid attention to 
“conflict” as a main theme of their narratives and even fewer have opted to 
evaluate the military effectiveness. In general, it is hard to assess both political 
and combat efficiency and to add the social value of state-inspired violence in a 
single work. 
 The present dissertation detaches itself from the general political and 
social paradigms of Russian warfare. Instead, this work mainly concentrates on 
the practical side of war in the period 1695-1739: combat effectiveness, 
application and upkeep of adequate logistics, conduct of military leaders and 
balance between gains and costs. The historians that have studied the period 
rarely paid significant attention to this side of the conflicts and many scholars 
choose to build their analysis on paper strength and on the general outcome of 
the war efforts. As demonstrated during the course of the Pruth Campaign, there 
was a striking discrepancy between the devastating political results and the 
actual military effectiveness of Peter's men. It is essential to draw a distinctive 
line between evaluating the military potential of an early modern state, and 
judging the overall political and diplomatic effectiveness of the country in 
question. To put it in other words, losing wars was not necessary a sign of 
inferiority in terms of the quality of deployed forces. This applies not only in the 
case of Russia, but is also evident in the outcome of the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1701-1714) and the Nine Years’ War (1688-1697), which France 
was unable to win, but nevertheless Louis' armies were as qualitative as those of 




 The Cold War military studies also evaluated the period 1695-1739 in 
close relation to the level of “westerness” the army could demonstrate. Combat 
proficiency was proportional to the level of resemblance between a certain army 
and the standards of the age – the forces fighting along the Rhine during the 
wars of Louis XIV. This notion has been swept aside by the critical approach of 
late twentieth century scholars, who have correctly noted that adoption of 
contemporary tactics rather than mimicking them was the true measure-stick 
according to which a military establishment could be evaluated. Instead of solely 
studying the rise of the West, it became apparent that understanding the rest of 
the world was far more effective in depicting and assessing the nature of early 
modern warfare. Once more Russia is a fundamental element in tracing the 
trends of evolution and adoption of certain Western European tactics into the 
relatively different environment of Eastern Europe and Asia. By focusing on the 
southern theater of Russia's expansion, the current dissertation demonstrates the 
elaborate interrelationship between military reforms, geographic factors and the 
army’s adaptability. Through reviewing the main restraints, which the different 
environment imposed on the conduct of war, the text argues that Russia faced a 
voluminous amount of problems, which were more or less unknown for 
contemporary armies in Western and Central Europe. Distance, climate, 
distribution of drinkable water, availability of pastures, wood and other natural 
resources was essential for the conduct of any campaign. The fact that Russia 
constantly struggled with nomadic societies, against which standard practice of 
conquest and decisive actions was more or less inadequate, meant that wars in 
the Pontic and Caucasus regions could neither be fought nor won in the same 
manner as those in Lorraine or Flanders.  
 Apart from the socio-geographic side of conflict, the understanding of 
local forces is also essential for the evaluation of Russian effectiveness during 
the Southern Campaigns. Only recently historiography has acknowledged the 
military potential of steppe societies to meet and counterweight imperial military 
power. Furthermore, until recent years the notion of military backwardness, 
applied toward the Ottoman Empire, has prevented the adequate evaluation of 
the Porte's ability to respond to Russian expansionism and counter it with great 
efficiency up until 1768. By adressing the subject of Ottoman, Safavid and 
steppe military potential, the current work argues that Russia's victories were not 
against some ill-efficient enemies, waiting idly to be vanquished by superior 
“western-style” forces, but to the contrary – these hostile forces were quite vital 
and able to hold their ground against Muscovite offensives. The proper depiction 
of St. Petersburg's foes is crucial for the adequate assessment of Russia's 
development, its army’s adaptability and the overall trends in military evolution. 
 Last but not least, in order to gasp the full proportions of the military 
development in Petrine and post-Petrine Russia, the thesis closely examines the 
battlefield performance of the army, its ability to advance or retreat and its 




The current dissertation provides considerable data and number of practical 
examples, which have been carefully studied and assessed in terms of 
preparations, movement, battlefield conduct and tactical and strategic ability of 
the commanding elite. While logistics would remain an essential issue of 
Russia's military machine as late as World War II, the trends in the performance 
of its field units demonstrate a constant upgrade. Following the rather indecisive 
conduct during the Azov sieges, in terms of field performance the tsarist armies 
became better and better after each campaign . It is important to note that these 
improvements were not merely a product of the developments on the Pontic and 
Caucasian battlegrounds, but instead were a symbiosis between experience 
gained in the steppes and during the bitter fighting against the Swedes in the 
Baltic region. Hence, Russian commanders were able to draw conclusions from 
two distinctive fronts, accumulating considerable amount of experience, which 
was later applied in both the Seven Years’ War (1754-1763) and the wars 
against the Ottoman Empire under Catherine the Great.  
 This continuity in Russian military tradition can easily be used to prove 
the fact that early modern developments in warfare should be seen not so much 
as a military revolution, as outlined by over half a century of historical works, 
but rather as an evolution, spanning over a considerable time period. The 
dissertation presents a case study of Muscovite military transformation and 
soundly establishes, that the “punctuated evolution” model, suggested by C. 
Rogers and extended by other scholars as well, is far more suitable to describe 
Russia’s military change. What this work adds to the debate, is the notion that 
geographical and social factors should be taken into consideration in the 
assessment of the evolutionary development of early modern Muscovite warfare. 
While falling under the same general influence that changed the face of war 
throughout Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the modus of war 
in Russia followed it’s own, internal logic and was subjected to different 
principles, influenced by the diverse geographical and social factors, most of 
which were nonexistent in Western Europe. 
 
Soldiers of the tsar  
 
The main theme of the present dissertation is the story of the Russian soldier and 
his ability to survive, adapt and win in the span of four and a half decades of 
almost constant warfare. Originally designed by Peter as “bessmertnyy” 
(immortal) recruits, the consecutive levies, drawn from the general population 
on a constantly shifting basis of households per soldier, consumed a substantial 
part of the male population. In general, over ¾ of a million men were drafted 
into military service between 1700 and 1740. Out of a population of 11-15 
million, this was a staggering percentage. Even more troublesome was the level 
of casualties, both combat and non-combat, sustained by the army for the same 




estimated that almost one-third of all drafted men died, mainly due to sickness, 
malnutrition, dehydration, and exposure to freezing cold or overwhelming heat. 
Combat casualties were rather low during the Southern Campaigns. 3-4,000 men 
were considered a tremendous loss of life in a single engagement and were rare 
in general. Therefore, it is important to make a distinction between the combat 
performance of the army against different enemies and the effect of ill-organized 
logistics during marching and quartering. Fatigue of all sorts rather than enemy 
bullets or swords turned out to be greater nemesis to the Russian rank and file. 
In this context, it is important to note that an evaluation of the military capability 
of the tsarist army cannot be measured solely in terms of casualty numbers, 
which are, generally, misleading for the actual quality of the troops.  
 Initially, the Russian troops were ill-prepared for engaging into open 
battles and conducting sieges in the Pontic region. This was demonstrated during 
the first Azov Campaign. In the subsequent years, due to the reform of the army 
following the disaster at Narva, a higher level of proficiency among the soldiers 
became apparent. While logistics and political actions ultimately failed during 
the Pruth Campaign, the battlefield performance of the Petrine army was the 
main factor standing between defeat and total disaster. The firm resistance at 
Stănileşi not only bought time for Peter to negotiate more favorable terms for 
extracting his surrounded army, but also proved that by that time the Muscovite 
soldier clearly matched and even outmatched the yeniçeri, a trend, not so visible 
during the two sieges of Azov fifteen years earlier. The parallel action on the 
Kuban proved that indecisiveness demonstrated by Shein in 1697 was replaced 
by aggressive offensive approach toward nomadic horsemen, which, in general, 
proved to be the right manner of fighting these opponents.  
 The Persian Campaign reveals the continuing upward trend in the 
development of Russian field armies and their ability to counter and overcome 
enemies. They adjusted their fighting techniques in order to match the unusual 
tactics, applied by enemy troops in the Caucasus region. Winning large-scale, 
pitched battles was simply not an option in Dagestan and the Petrine army was 
quick to adapt to the way local tribal forces operated. Even though offensives 
conducted deep into enemy territory were to some extentineffective, the 
combination of economic desolation of tribal settlements and the upkeep of 
well-constructed and well-equipped garrisons along vital routes was more or less 
successful. During his reign, Peter introduced the use of mobile, light cavalry in 
combating nomadic raiders as well as the large-scale establishment of auxiliary 
forces, drawn from local allies (Kalmyks, Circassians, Kabardians etc.). This 
combination proved to be the most successfuland effective way of dealing with 
both the protection of the frontier and the necessity of launching preemptive 
campaigns against Tatars, Nogais, renegade Cossacks and Caucasian warlords.  
 Using the experience, accumulated in the previous conflicts, Minikh and 
his generals tried to subdue the Crimean Khanate and to defeat the Ottoman 




war of 1736-1739 only confirmed the lessons learned during previous conflicts. 
Large-scale, slow-moving armies were doomed to fail when confrontedthe 
mobile, evasive forces of the Tatars and the well-supplied Ottoman units. The 
later enjoyed the luxury of operating in proximity to their well-established 
supply lines. While P. von Lacy was quick to understand the necessity of acting 
with rather limited and mobile forces, able to rapidly penetrate enemy territory 
and defeat opponents by denying them the chance to concentrate, Minikh would 
struggle in the old-fashioned way. It was not until 1739 during the final stages of 
the war that Minikh finally gasped the correct approach and was able to soundly 
defeat the Ottomans at Stavuchany and almost to conquer Moldavia. Even so, 
the actual battlefield capability of the Minikh’s army stood higher than anything 
the Ottomans could place on the field. Even though campaigns failed in Jedisan 
and Moldavia, battles and lesser engagements were always won by the Russians 
and even cavalry confrontations ended with Minikh and Lacy’s troops gaining 
the upper hand. By 1737, it was obvious that dragoons, hussars and Cossacks 
were more successful and, generally, better in almost every aspect, than their 
Ottoman and Tatar opponents.  
 In general, the size of the Russia’s forces differed little from that during 
the age of Aleksey. Troop numbers alone can be misleading when asserting the 
actual effects of the reforms. Instead, as already outlined, it was the practical 
side of war and combat that should be used as a measure stick for success. The 
overall result of the campaigns in the south was the establishment of well-
organized, disciplined units, who were able to adapt quickly to the changing 
climate and geographic context. Apart from nurturing several generations of 
veteran troops, essential for the building of a professional and highly effective 
force, the campaigns in the Pontic region and the Caucasus also represent a field 
school for Russian generals and officers. The valuable lessons, learned with 
blood, hardship and resilience would become essential for the upbringing of the 
next-generation military leaders, such as Rumyantsev, Suvorov and even the 
generals of the nineteenth century. Patterns of invasion and campaign 
organization, applied and defined in the first decades of the eighteenth century, 
were repeatedly used up until World War I. The series of Russo-Ottoman wars 
after 1768 were all developed on the basis of Minikh’s experience and the 
inheritance of the Petrine era. 
 The conduct of war in the south played a substantial role in the upbringing 
of Russia’s native officer corps, as well as in the rather smooth merging between 
native and foreign experience used for the transformation of the nature of the 
Muscovite military elite. The ability to attract foreign specialists and to transfer 
their experience into practice in the construction of the army was among the 
main strong points of Peter’s military reforms. The broad but systematic use of 
“outsiders” both as middle and high-level officers became an essential element 
of Petrine heritage, which remained a trend in Russia’s military history as late as 




crucial feature of the Tsardom’s political ethos throughout the eighteenth 
century and the nemtsy were frequently used by monarchs to counterweight 





For most of the seventeenth century the principle of bellum se ipsum alet 
remained the predominant notion in the organization of logistics and military 
financing. Brought to life in the sixteenth century from a concept, the seizure of 
resources from enemy’s or allied lands became a conditio sine qua non for the 
armies of Wallenstein, Gustavus and their followers. After 1648, and especially 
in the context of the Sun King's wars, early modern warfare experienced a 
constant evolution in terms of organization in both tactical and logistical aspect. 
As David Parrott notes in his recent study on mercenary warfare, the state would 
follow a constant trend of monopolizing the organization and levying of field 
units, the appointment of their commanding structure and the subordination of 
the separate corpses to the overall strategy of war.1 This process was closely 
related to the development of military enterprise as well as to the strengthening 
of royal authority accomplished through tightening the relations between the 
crown and the nobility. To put it in other words, the ruler struggled to enhance 
his ability to mobilize resources with the help of the central administration, but 
also by involving the aristocracy as coinvestors in the business of war in 
exchange for political power, patronage and leading positions in the army. As 
noted in the first chapter of the current dissertation, this process is clearly visible 
in Romanov Russia, where Mikhail and Aleksey relied heavily on the dvoryani's 
support during their continuous struggle with Poland-Lithuania and to lesser 
extend – with Sweden. The trend remained unchanged during Peter's reign. The 
buttressing of serfdom and the expansion of the administrative areas, in which it 
was applied were a constant feature of Russia's domestic policy during the 
seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. While early Romanovs needed support 
from the boyars in terms of political justification, following the election of 
Mikhail in 1611 and Aleksey's reforms, Peter and his successors were in state of 
debt to certain parties among the higher nobility with whose help the throne was 
secured for the Great Tsar and his successors. With the rise of Catherine II, the 
notion of satisfying the nobility in exchange for political credit grew even 
stronger because she was a foreigner and she was not related by blood to the 
ruling dynasty. Later on, Aleksandr I (r. 1801-1825) would balance his reform 
policy in order to please his father's murderers, who brought him to the throne in 
1801. In return for cementing its social and political privileges, the aristocracy 
was ready to support the crown with funds both loaned and invested for the 
                                                 
1 D.A. Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe 




upkeep and upgrade of Tsardom's forces. As in the course of the Second Azov 
Campaign, it was the companies of aristocratic houses, which provided the 
necessary funds for the construction of the Voronezh navy. In 1737 and 1738 it 
was the dvoryani from the southern Russian lands who contributed, though with 
reluctance, for the provision of the depleted army with horsepower for the 
repetitive invasions in Jedisan and Crimea. The native aristocracy also made up 
the bulk of the Russian military elite, with a number of prominent army figures 
rising in ranks from the close entourage of Peter. 
 Apart from the considerable role of the nobility in the development and 
the upbringing of the tsarist army, Peter’s era sought the application of the 
entrepreneur-based supply system. While the army organization became more 
and more a matter of state participation, the provision of food, clothes, 
munitions and guns remained an element of private arrangement between the 
state and particular merchants. Some of them were closely related to the higher 
and middle-rank nobility, benefiting from patronage in receiving state-funded 
deals. Although Peter tried to establish a form of military autarcky for his forces, 
gunpowder, guns, ship parts and even cloth for the uniforms, these materials still 
had to be imported from abroad, not to count the large number supplies, which 
were delivered by private entrepreneurs. Owners of gunpowder mills and gun-
casting facilities, uniform producing textile manufactures, food suppliers, 
carpenters and even shipbuilders were contracted to support the army with their 
professional skills and the goods they provided. This, however, does not indicate 
any form of state weakness in providing the necessary means of waging war. On 
the contrary, this demonstrates a form of flexibility, which allowed Russia to 
provide supplies and armament, which it otherwise would be impossible to 
secure if the Tsardom relied strictly on its bureaucratic capacities. In this sense, 
Russia was standing on the same ground as contemporary states throughout 
Europe. Furthermore, the ability to provide such substantial quantities of 
supplies and materials along lines of communication, spanning sometimes tens 
of hundreds of kilometers, was rather impressive.  
 On the other hand, it is evident that constant shortages of logistics support 
for the operating armies occurred in each campaign. Horses were a rarity, 
especially during the later stages the conflicts. Food and water supplies were 
also problematic. Usually the rations lasted for half the expected time as 
demonstrated by Minikh's incursions in Jedisan in 1736, 1737 and 1738, but also 
during the Pruth Campaign and the First Azov Campaign. Problems with 
adequate water and land transportation were evident and never fully overcome. 
There was a certain struggle between the need of providing a substantial 
baggage train for the operating armies and the necessity of maintaining a higher 
movement speed in order to cover the spacious distances between the 
operational bases and the campaign objectives. Minikh experimented with 
barrels, which could be reassembled as rafts and other practical means of 




water to keep the army going. To the shortcomings contributed: the cumbersome 
frontier administration, the lack of clear perception of available resources, the 
open or hidden arguments between the operating commanders and the civil and 
military administration, responsible for the logistical upkeep of the advancing 
forces. Rulers were also not immune to such problems, as Peter found out on 
several occasions, being forced to repeat orders and even threaten with 
reprimands in case of further insubordination. 
 In reality, the actual effectiveness of the Russian army was like a 
mathematics equation of the “a-b=c” type, in which “a” stands for the battlefield 
efficiency of the troops and “b” represents the logistics constrains, which the 
army faced. Other modifiers, such as the capability of commanders, 
effectiveness of the enemy forces, as well as the “unknown” factors – such as 
climate change, all contributed to the outcome of each conflict. As demonstrated 
during the course of the Persian Campaign, the shift in the weather was far more 
dangerous for the army than the incursions of Caucasian war-bands. The ability 
of the logistical services to rapidly respond to changes in weather, unexpected 
deaths of great number of animals and unpredicted shortages of food supplies 
did not occur in the Russian case. Similar problems were experienced as late as 
the winter of 1877 and even later. They were closely related to the limitations of 
transportation as well as the bad quality of the existing road infrastructure. 
Although there were evident discrepancies in the logistics system of Imperial 
Russia, it would be inaccurate to denounce it as inefficient, without taking into 
account the social, geographical and technical limitations, within which Russian 
authorities operated. While it is true that certain figures in the civic and military 
structures of the state demonstrated apparant lack of abilities, the big picture 
reveals a general desire for achieving the goals, laid down by the ruler and his 
advisers. The overall notion that Russia was lagging behind other major states in 
making the transition from a military-fiscal to a fiscal-military state does not rest 
on any solid historical data. Evaluating the experience of the Southern 
Campaigns proves that although Russia faced considerable financial, 
administrative and logistical problems, it was able to maintain its war efforts for 
substantial periods of time, while simultaneously fighting on other fronts. 
 
The southern frontier 
 
So far, the dissertation has outlined the general trends of Russian military 
development over the course of half a century between the first siege of Azov in 
1695 and the last shots of the 1736-1739 war. In the period in question these 
were not the only conflicts, in which the Empire was entangled. The Great 
Northern War (1700-1721) and the War of the Polish Succession (1733-1738) 
were as essential to the political and military development of the Tsars’ realm as 
were the confrontations with the Ottoman and Safavid states and their vassals. 




should be paid to the ongoing wars in these territories? First and foremost, 
because it represented a unique environment, in which the Russian army had the 
chance to test and readjust its tactics and overall strategy and to fix (or at least 
try to) existing problems in relation to the supplying of the field armies. A 
puzzle of grasslands, half-deserts, waterless steppes, marshes, small and large 
rivers, valleys, hills and mountains, spanning on an area twice as large as France 
or Spain, the southern frontier on the Pontic Steppe and the Caucasus was unlike 
anything seen or conquered by Western and Central European armies. Habsburg 
forces faced somewhat similar conditions during their operations in Hungary 
and Transylvania, but distances were insignificant in comparison to the 
territories stretching in front of the marching Russian forces. For an early 
modern army, the Black Sea region was not a place for conquest, but rather an 
arena on which the ability to adapt, evolve and survive was put to the test. It was 
not the only harsh environment in Europe. The Baltic and Finland placed 
considerable constraint in front of Russia's military endeavour. The difference 
came from the size of the operational area, the proximity of the main Russian 
supply bases and the fact that most Russian soldiers were native to the climate of 
the Baltic-Finland region. Thus, during the Great Northern War it was the 
Swedes rather than nature that were the main problem in front of the Russian 
army. In the Pontic-Caucasus region nature was the predominant enemy. While 
Tatars, Nogais and Dagestani did possess substantial military skills, which 
buttressed the existing imperial forces of the Ottoman Empire and the Safavids, 
the battlefield quality of the Russian army remained unmatched. This, however, 
was insufficient, in relation to greater odds, such as encirclement, depletion of 
supplies or the overwhelming military potential of the reinvigorated Persian 
forces under Nadir Shah. Therefore, it was important for the imperial military 
establishment to develop certain features of organization on logistical and 
tactical level in order to face and deal with problems, most of which were non-
existent during the war against Karl XII.  
 Apart from the military-geographic importance of the south for the 
evolution of Russia's military machine, the Pontic-Caucasus region has one 
other important feature. Following the Seven Years War, it was to become the 
main theater of operation of the imperial forces in the next two centuries. While 
the struggle with Napoleon presented a tremendous distraction, Russia's main 
political focus remained the destruction or at least the overpowering of the 
Ottoman Empire and the establishment of firm control over the Straights. The 
roots of Russia's involvement in the region, as well as the basic approaches both 
diplomatic and military were all formulated during the wars of 1695-1739. 
Understanding the routes and the conduct of later campaigns or the existence of 
certain trends in diplomatic preparations after 1768 is not possible without 
knowing and appreciating the military and diplomatic process of Russia's 
southern expansion during the Petrine and Post-Petrine era. It is during this 




Caucasus region, but also further south, laying the foundations of present-day 
policies, pursued by Moscow and its political leadership. The struggle to include 
Iran in a political sphere of influence, as well as the desire to enter the lucrative 
trade in the Indian Ocean, have remained essential to Russia's pursuit of mastery 
in Asia.  
 Dealing with local power-brokers became an integral part of Russia's 
diplomatic school, but also means of influence over a broader geo-political 
perimeter by pushing adjacent countries into following certain policies, which 
buttressed Russia's grand strategy in Europe and Asia. The diplomatic and 
military developments today demonstrate that problems inherited by imperial 
direct and indirect domination have, generally, remained intact through the last 
three centuries. Russia still faces a stiff opposition from the Bosporus in its 
sothern drive in the Caucasus and the Levant, while Iran is sometimes an ally 
and sometimes an enemy for the affirmation of Moscow's interest in the region. 
Lesser states, such as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan still try to balance their 
existence by allying with one local power against another or by seeking help 
outside their direct geo-political zone. Ukraine is again as troublesome for 
Russian policy-makers as it was in the age of Mazepa and the radical approach 
towards Kiev has produced inconclusive results, opening more questions than 
finding any solution to existing problems. From this point of view, Petrine 
Russia had demonstrated a more flexible policy of winning Ukraine in 
comparison to Putin's twenty-first century domain. 
 
The necessity of determining and assessing military effectiveness in early 
modern Europe is essential for the evolution of the historiography. While in 
theory most aspects of state-building, policy-making and general conduct of war 
have been dealt with, the evaluation of battlefield performance and the clear 
distinction between waging successful wars and organizing particular campaigns 
still needs to be addressed by modern scholars. While an army can perform 
exceptionally in the course of a certain conflict, a war might still turn out to be a 
disaster, given the fact that the outcome of warfare is dependent on a number of 
factors, with tactical success being just one among them. On the other hand, 
losing a war is not the same as possessing an inadequate military establishment. 
What this dissertation attempts to prove is that despite the overall negative 
outcome, a field army might perform in an impressive manner, overcoming 
substantial impediments such as: logistical restrains, administration and 
command incompetence, and superior enemy numbers. In order to build and 
present a full-blooded depiction of what warfare looked like during the 
eighteenth century, its specifics must be carefully assessed and the various 
limitations which influenced the performance of the army (natural, 
administrative and technological), must be taken under consideration. It is also 
important not to compare contemporary establishments only in terms of 




context in which the states in question and their forces thrived and developed. 
While certain historiographical models could be generally applied to specific 
periods of time, only a thorough study, which compares and outlines the 
particular cases, can assist the understanding of early modern warfare. The tale 
of Russia's Southern Campaigns, their development, evolution and unique 
features is an important segment of the sophisticated puzzle of eighteen-century 
military conduct. Along with other specific theaters of operation, for a long time 
the Pontic-Caucasian frontier has remained a rather understudied element of 
early modern war. Understanding its specifics and relation to events during the 
Petrine and post-Petrine era is essential for the perception of Russia’s present-







PART I, CHAPTER I 
 










Army growth in Russia 1631 – 1722 
 


























1631 ~ 35,000 
(2) 
29,000   90,000 (20) 34 558 
(17) 










1687      112,902 
(19) 







1695/6   ~ 90,000 (7) 150,000   
1700  40,000 34-45,000 
(8) 
34,000 (8) 280-300,000 
(20) 
 
1705  60,000     
1709   42,000 (9) 200,000 
(15) 
  
1711/1712 174,757 100,000 44,000 (10) 144,464 
(16) 
  
1713   13-16,000 
(11) 
   
1720 177,029      
1724  130,000 210-265,000 
(5) 




   289,000 
(23) 
 
1730     226,000   
1732     230,354  










(1) Fuller regards only field army and does not include garrison and supporting troops. 
(2) 17,400 strong new model regiments, which comprised half of the total active army. This 
figure applies only for the forces that participated in the Smolensk Campaign; see J. Keep, 
Soldiers of the Tsar, 81. 
(3.1) S.M. Seredonin 
(3.2) A.A. Zimin 
(4) I.A. Korotkov 
(5) Including the navy personnel. Otherwise ~ 289,000. 
(6) This was a field army under Golytsin for the Crimean Campaign. Fuller estimates the 
Russian forces at 100,000 for the Crimean Campaign of 1687. 
(7) This was a field army under Peter I for the Azov Campaign 
(8) Only the army at Narva 
(9) Only the army at Poltava 
(10) Only the army at Pruth 
(11) Only the army in Finland 
(12) War-time army; see C. Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, 6-7. 
(13) In the 1670s 
(14) Duffy quotes Pososhkov (1951, 262) 
(15) This figure is for 1707. Duffy gives 45,000 for the Battle of Poltava. 
(16) This is the number of regular forces, including 58,000 garrison troops. 
(17) The field army of M. Shein in the 1631 campaign. A.V. Chernov,Vooruzhennye sily 
Russkogo gosudarstva v XV-XVII v.v.  
(18) The total paper strength of Aleksey’s army, Ibid. 
(19) These are the field armies’ paper strength for the two Crimean Campaigns. Ibid. 
(20) Brian Davies, Empire and Military Revolution in Eastern Europe, 62-3. For 1625-1631, 
he gives a total of 90,000 for the entire Muscovite army; For 1681 he estimates a total of 
245,000, not including the Ukrainian Cossacks. The figure for 1700 is for the entire army 
prior to the Narva Campaign. 
(21) A.V. Volkov, Voyny i Voyska Moskovskogo Gosudarstva, 356 
(22) According to L.G. Beskrovnyy. 





















Number of Recruits for the Russian Army 1700 – 1740 
 







1700 33,234 - 32,130  
1701 - - No recruitments were 
carried out. Conscription of 
serfs and free men was 
used. 
1702 - - 
1703 - - 
1704 - - 
1705 44,539   
1706 19,579 12,572 (not 
including the 
fleet and the 
supply train) 
12,579 for the army, 6,000 
for the supply train, 1,000 
for the navy 
1707 12,450 13,135  
1708 11,289 12,739 Anisimov gives a higher 
number of recruits, 
including 550 from the War 
department. The 11,289 
soldiers, given by 
Beskrovnyy were enlisted 
by the Pomesnchiye 
department as noted in 
Anisimov. 
1709 15,072 15,000  
1710 17,172 9,600 Anisimov states, that state 
expectations were for 
14,200 recruits, but only 
9,600 were actually 
enlisted. Beskrovnyy 
presents a completely 
different picture. 
1711 51,912 50,000 There were three 
recruitments in this year. 
1712 - -  
1713 37,958 - There were two 
recruitments for the army 
(20,416 men and then 
16,342 in the second) and 
1,200 men for the fleet. 
1714 500 - All for the fleet. They were 
recruited from the sea 
areas.  





1716 250 - They were sent to the 
Prussians as grenadiers. 
1717 2,500 - They were all sent to the 
fleet. 
1718 15,389 - For the fleet and the army. 
1719 14,112 -  
1720 4,000 - They were recruited from 
the children of soldiers and 
NCOs 
1721 19,755 -  
1722 -   
1723 10,118 -  
1724 20,550 -  
1725 - -  
1726 22,795 -  
1727 34,425 - There were two 
recruitments – 16,640 and 
17,785 men. 
1728 15,016 -  
1729 23,698 -  
1730 16,000 -  
1731 - - There was recruitment for 
the fleet, but no actual 
numbers are given.  
1732 18,654 -  
1733 50,569   
1734 35,000  A new rule was introduced, 
regarding the minimum 
height of the recruits.  
1735 -   
1736 45,167 ~40,000 (A. 
Bayov) 
For the war against the 
Ottoman Empire. 
1737 51,960  4,000 of them were Bashkir 
cavalrymen 
1738 34,071   
1739 31,450  These were taken in a 
single recruitment. 
However, several other 
local recruitments were 
carried out, but no numbers 
are given for them. 
1740 41,131  They were enlisted in 2 
recruitments – 21,131 and 
20,000 men. 
TOTAL 762,710   
 
 







Russian and European Army Growth (1590-1715) 
 
Year Russia France England Sweden Netherlands Spain Austria 
1590s 110,000 
(1) 
80,000 30,000 15,000 20,000 200,000 - 
1630s 35,000 150,000 
(5) 
- 45,000 50,000 300,000 - 
1650s 138,755 
(2) 
100,000 70,000 70,000 - 100,000 - 











75,000 110,000 130,000 30,000 100,000 
(9) 
 
Source: G. Parker, “The Military Revolution 1550 – 1660 A Myth?”, in C.J. Rogers (ed.) The 
Military Revolution Debate (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 44; P. Kennedy, The Rise and 
Fall of Great Powers (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 99 (For the 1710s numbers only); 




(1) Taken from Table 1; Both Keep and Hellie accept this figure; see Table 1 above 
(2) According to C. Duffy; see Table 1 above. 
(3) Keep gives 174,757 for 1711-12; Duffy estimates the active army at 144,464 soldiers; see 
Table 1 above. 
(4) Beskrovnyy places the entire Russian army following the regulations of 1711 and 1720 at 
253,000. L.G. Beskrovnyy, Ruskaya armiya i flot, 39-50.  
(5) John Lynn gives 125,000 as the actual number of the French army for 1635 – 1642; see J. 
Lynn, Recalculating French Army Growth in TMRD, 133. 
(6) Lynn estimates 340,000 during the Nine Years War; Ibid., 132. 
(7) Lynn estimates 255,000 during the War of the Spanish Succession, Ibid., 132. 
(8) Tim Blanning estimates 100,000 for Audtria in 1700; see T. Blanning, The Pursuit of 
Glory: Europe 1648 – 1815 (London: Penguin UK, 2007), 603 















Table 4  
The Russian Military Expenditure Tables 
 
 1711 1720 1724 
Army type Size Cost Size Cost Size Cost 
General Staff 184 91,000 360 163,000 360 163,000 






5,817 156,000 5,817 245,000 
Infantry 57,956 1 427 000 58,754  
3,840,000 
(2) 
Garrison 64,769 452,000 69,896 961,000 69,313 
Artillery 3,526 195,000 3,526 195,000 4,526 300,000 
Other - - - - 124,150 
(1) 
2,144,000 
Total 174,757 2,385,000 177,029 4,291,000 304,000 6,692,000 
 
Source: J. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462–1874 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1985), 136-8; Prices are in rubles.  
 
Notes: 
(1) Includes “Lower Corps” (Nizovoy korpus – the army occupying Persian provinces in the 
south Caspian Sea); Ukrainian frontier force; irregular troops; naval forces. 
(2) This figure is the total expenditure for the cavalry, infantry and garrison troops. 
 
Table 5 







Military % of the 
Revenue 
1680 1,500,000*  750,000* 
 
50%  
1701 3,546,000****  1,839,000* 
 
52% 
1704 - 3,032,082 1,439,832*** 
 
40.9% (3)*** 
1710 3,133,879*** 3,077,110***** 3,000 ,000(1)****** 
 
95% 
1711 3,200,000** 4,268,000 (2) 4,000,000 (2) ** 
 
125%  
1712 - - 3,356,900 
 
 
1720 6,499,000**** 5,556,000**** 4,291,000** (5) 
 
66% 





1724 8,556,000****** 6,243,000**** 5,403,348 
 
63% 
1725 10,186,000****** 10,141,000 * 6,541,000 * 
 
66% (4)  
1729 - - 5,412,263***** 
 
- 
1734 - 9,424 000 * 6,731,000 * 
 
 




Sources: J. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar, 136-8; L. Hughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great 
(New Heaven and London: Yale University Press 1998), 136-8; C. Duffy, Russia’s Military 
Way to the West, 36; S.G. Strumilin , “K voprosu ob ekonomike Petrovsko epokhi” in L.G. 
Beskrovnyy (ed.), Poltava: K  250-letiyu Poltavskogo srazheniya; sbornik statey, (Moscow : 




* C. Duffy estimate  
** J. Keep estimate 
*** L. Hughes estimate 
**** S. Strumilin estimate 
***** B. Davies estimate 
****** Beskrovnyy’s estimate 
* Troitsky’s estimates 
 
(1) C. Duffy estimates the war expenditure for 1710 at 3,000,290 or around 93 per cent of the 
State Revenue. Lindsey Huges estimates a total military expenditure of 3,834,418 rubles. 
Davies claims that the war expenditure for 1710 was 2,544,000 or 83% of the total state 
expenditure for that year. In the dissertation are used Beskrovnyy’s estimates, which include 
naval personnel as well. 
(2) Includes 1,260,000 rubles cost for supplies and forage. Without these, the total war 
expenditure is 2,740,000. This is 90% of the total state expenditure for 1711, which is 
3,008,000 rubles. 
(3) This is the percentage from the total state expenditure for 1704 which was 3,032,082 
rubles. 
(4) According to Beskrovnyy, the total war expenditure was 5,970,000 rubles or 66 per cent 
of the total revenue. 








Growth of the Kapukulu Ocakları Forces (1514-1769) 
 
 
 Ágoston Murphey Inalcık 





1514 10,156 1,171 - -  
16-30,000 1526 7,886 2,162 7,886 18,689 
1567-68 12,798 2,671 - - 
1574 - - 13,599 29,175 
1597 - - 35,000 62,000 (1) 30-70,000 (2) 
1609 37,627 7,966 37,627 75,868 
1660-61 54,222 6,488 53,849 98,342  
50–60,000 
 
1665 49,556 - - - 
1669 51,437 8,014 - - 
1670 49,868 - 39,470 70,296 
1680 54,222 - - - - 
1687 - 9,122 - - - 
1698-99 - 15,307 - - - 
1702 - 4,201 - - 70,000 (3) 
1738-39 - 19,430 - -  
1769 - 5,222 - -  
 
Sources: G. Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan – Military power and Weapons Industry in the 
Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); R. Murphey, Ottoman 
Warfare 1500-1700 (London: University College London Press, 1999); Inalcık, H., “Military 
and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700”, Archivum Ottomanicum 6 




(1) This figure does not include the artillery corps 
(2) For the 1590-1630 period 











Sources: M. Axworthy, “The Army of Nader Shah”, Iranian Studies 40, 5 (2007), 639; ; 
Abraham of Yerevan, History of the Wars, 1721 – 1738, trans. by G.A. Bournoutian (Costa 
Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1999); Encyclopedia Iranica – Army – Safavid Period 
(http://www.iranica.com/articles/army-iii ); L. Lockhart , “The Persian Army in the Safavid 
Period”, Der Islam: Journal of the History and Culture of the Middle East 34, 1 (1959), 89-98 
 
Notes: 
For 1530 - Including non-combatants. Of these, 84,000 were part of the qizilbash tribesmen. 
For 1722-25 - These figures are given by Abraham of Yerevan for the army of Tahmasp II. In 
addition, he gives different numbers for the garrisons, loyal to Tahmasp and conquered by the 
Ottomans. However, some of these figures (for example the 85,000 garrison of Tabriz) are a 
clear exaggeration, and are therefore not included. 
For 1736 – Axworthy gives the number between 120,000 and 180,000. For the purposes of 
the chart, 150,000 are given as a middle ground. 
For 1743 - This number represents the total field forces of Nadir Shah for his campaign 
against the Ottoman Empire. This number does not include the garrison troops, left to protect 
Persia proper. Another suggested figure is 200,000 troops, not counting the detachments, send 






















1502 1513 1514 1516 1530 1576 1620
Persia's Royal Guard (Qurchis) Growth
 
 





For 1620 – Haneda notes that the qurchis under Abbas were between 10,000 and 15,000. For 


































Map 2 - Gunpowder Production in the Ottoman Empire 
 
 
The map shows the disposition of the main sources and the production centers for the 
Ottoman gunpowder industry. The cities indicate the places where there were one or 
more gunpowder mills (baruthane). The regions producing saltpeter are in light brown. 
The regions producing sulfur are in dark yellow. The wood deposits are in green. The 
boundaries refer to the Ottoman Empire and its vassals in 1680. 
 
Sources: G. Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan; G. Ágoston,”Gunpowder for the Sultan’s Army: 
New Sources on the Supply of Gunpowder to the Ottoman Army in the Hungarian campaigns 
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                 Scheme – The Two sieges of Azov (1695, 1696) 
 
Source: Bobrovskiy, P.O., Istoriya 13 Leyb-grenaderskagoYerevanskogo Ego Velichestva 











             Scheme – The encirclement at Stănileşi (1711)Source: Porfiryev, 
E.I., Petr I osnovopolozhnik voennogo iskusstva russkoy regulyarnoy Armii i flota (Moscow: 
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Map 6 – Horsemarkets and Horsebreeding areas 
 
Sources: Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722 (St. Petersburg, 1855); G. Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan; 
R. Murphey, Ottoman Warfare; R. Matthee, “Unwalled Cities and Restless Nomads: Firearms 
and Artillery in Safavid Iran” in C. Melville (ed.), Safavid Persia: The History and Politics of 








Sources: V.P. Lystsov, Persidskiy Pokhod Petra I: 1722 – 1723 (Moscow, 1951); I.V. 
Kurukin, Persidkiy pokhod Petra Velikogo. Nizovoy korpus na beregakh Kaspiya, 1722-1735 









The thick black line represents the main state borders, while the thiner lines 












S. Solovyev P. Bruce L. Lockhart V. Lystsov I. Kurukin 
Infantry 22,000 33,000 22,000 21,495 18,602 
Dragoons 9,000 7,000 9,000 8,757(2) 8,786 
Cossacks 20,000 20,000 20,000 16,300 16,300 
Kalmyks 30,000 40,000 55,000 (1) 4,000 4,000 
Sailors 5,000 - 5,000 - - 
Total 
personnel 
86,000 100,000 111,000 50,552 48,057(3) 
Vessels - 250  274 +87 447(4) 
Guns - - - - +196 
Notes: 
(1) – 20,000 Kalmyks and 35,000 Tatars 
(2) - Lystsov does not give an exact number but states that there were 7 dragoon regiments. 
Taking a regular regimental strenght of 1,251 troops, officers and servants, the “paper” 
strenght of the supposed 7 regiments is calculated.  
(3) - Including 369 artilerymen 
(4) – This figure includes all boats and ships used during the campaign. Many of the vessels 








Table 2 - Weather Conditions during the 1722 Campaign 
Notes: 
Bold Text – The text given in bold is drafted from Peter’s personal entries in the 1722 campaign 
journal 
(Text) – The text in normal brackets is drafted from the First Addition to the 1722 campaign 
journal 
{Text} – The text in curly brackets is drafted from the Second Addition to the 1722 campaign 
journal 
‘ – ‘ indicates that there is no information on the climate in any of the Journal entries  
Text [P.Bruce] – The text in italics, followed by [P.Bruce] is drafted from the Memoirs of Peter 
Henry Bruce 
Date Weather Notes 
18.07.1722 North – northwestern Wind; (Clear weather) Sailing Volga 
19.07.1722 Southern Wind; Later - Thunders; (The weather was 
calm. west-south wind. Sunshine with some light rain.) 
Sailing Volga 
20.07.1722 Weak south-southwestern wind; (Dead-wind, clear skies) Sailing Volga 
21.07.1722 Dead-wind until 7 p.m., then the wind turns into east-
north-east; Thunders, strong wind and heavy rainfall in 
the evening and during the night; (Strong wind until 2 
p.m.; Small rainfall in the evening. Had to stay on anchor 
during the night, because of the weather. The wind was 
southeastern) 
Entering the Caspian 
Sea 
22.07.1722 North-western wind in the mornig. After 6 a.m. the wind 
turns south-south-east; (The weather was clear; The wind 
was south-eastern) 
Sailing Caspian Sea 
23.07.1722 Eastern wind that turns east-north-east; During the day 
the wind made following the course of the ships very 
hard. Storm and hevay rain; (southeastern wind in the 
morning. Storm between 10 and 12 a.m.; at noon the wind 
turned northern and made sailing possible) 
Reached Terki and 
stayed in the gulf of 
Terki until 26.07; 
Part of the fleet got 
lost at sea, due to 
lack of experienced 
navigators and 
compasses (P.Bruce) 
24.07.1722 Northern wind; (Waited for the rest of the fleet to join 
before sailing south) 
In the bay of Terki 
26.07.1722 Weak east-north-east wind; (Tail-wind during the day. 
Storm in the evening) 
Sailing from Terki to 
Agrakhan bay 




28.07.1722 Eastern wind (…) Landed the troops 
29.07.1722 Eastern wind; (Eastern wind) Fortifying the 
landing until 04.08 
30.07.1722 1 p.m. – west-south-west wind (eastern wind) In Agrakhan bay 
31.07.1722 North-north-eastern wind; (north-western wind) In Agrakhan bay 
01.08.1722 Strong western wind after midnight. After 8 a.m. north-
western wind; after noon – north-north-western wind; 
After 1 p.m. – Temperate north-eastern wind; 8 p.m. – 
western wind; (…) 




02.08.1722 Strong western wind and light rainfall after 1 a.m.; (…)  
04.08.1722 - ; The heat was so intolerable that numbers of our men 
dropped down by the way[P.Bruce]  
Fortifications built 
05.08.1722 - The army marches 
from the fortified 
camp 
06.08.1722 … (Great heat during the day, the army had to stop for rest 
in the afternoon) 
Reached the Sulak 
River 
07.08.1722 Great storm from north-west that raised the level of the 
Sulak River. The storm continued until 11.08 (…) 
Preparing to pass the 
river 
08.08.1722 … (Strong eastern wind during the entire day. Made crosing 
the river very slow – it took the entire day and part of the 
night for most of the army to cross) 
The army stops 
09.08.1722 … (A great strorm with very strong wind that made crossing 
the river very burdensome) 
Trying to cross the 
river 
10.08.1722 - Still crossing the 
river 
11.08.1722 - ; (We marched thirty wrests, notwithstanding the infinite 




12.08.1722 - Reached Tarki 
13.08.1722 - Stayed in Tarki 
14.08.1722 - Stayed in Tarki 
15.08.1722 - Stayed in Tarki 
16.08.1722 - ; We marched … in a scorching heat [P.Bruce] Marched from Tarki 
to the Manas River 
17.08.1722 - ; I was reduced to walk on foot, which was extremely 
fatiguing in this hot climate [P. Bruce] 
Marched from the 
Manas to Old 
Buinaksk 
18.08.1722 - ; We lost, this day, a number of horses, by heat…[P.Bruce] Entered the domains 
of Utamysh. Reached 
the Inchi River. 
19.08.1722 Had to give the horses some rest at noon [persumably 
because of the heat].(…) 
Battle with the sultan 
of Utamysh (3 p.m.) 
20.08.1722 - The Cossack-
dragoon forces return 
to camp 
21.08.1722 - Reached the 
Bushbugam River 
22.08.1722 - Reached the Darbakh 
River 
23.08.1722 - Entered Derbent 
24.08.1722 Great north-eastern storm that sunked 12 vessels and 
destroyed part of the provisions for the army (…) 
In Derbent 
25.08.1722 … ; (…) ; {Storm from the North in the evening, that sunked 
some of the boats – this probably refers to the storm from 
the previous day. The storm probaly lasted throughout the 
entire 24/5 night} 
P. Bruce dates the 
storm on 25.08. 




27.08.1722 - In Derbent 
28.08.1722 2 a.m. – very strong and hot western wind - It was so hot 
that it seemed as we were in a bath; (…) ; {Strong and hot 
western wind, that soon abated} 
In Derbent 
29.08.1722 … ; (…); {Substantial rainfall} Held council for the 
future of the 
campaign 
30.08.1722 … ; (…) ; {The day was cloudy and gloomy; there was 
substantial rainfall during the night) 
The infantry passes 
the Milyukent River 
31.08.1722 … ; (…) ; {Gloomy and Rainy} The Usmiy refuses to 
provide supply for 
the army 
01.09.1722 … ; (…) ; {Cloudy in the morning, clear skies in the 
afternoon} 
 
03.09.1722 - A fort was errected 
on the Darbakh River 
04.09.1722 - Problems with some 
of the vessels 
06.09.1722 - The army begins its 
march back 
07.09.1722 - Leaving Derbent 
08.09.1722 9 p.m. – storm; (…); {Fine weather with weak wind during 
the day; Strong wind and a storm in the evening and during 
the night} ; The heavy dews now began to fall in the night-
time, which rendered it very cold [P.Bruce] 
Sending envoys to 
Astrakhan and the 
fortified camp at 
Agrakhan 
09.09.1722 The wind calmed in the evening but during the night 
there was again a very strong northern wind; (…); {The 
storm from the previous night continued during the 
morning; The storm stopped at noon, and it continued 
raining; At 3 p.m. a new storm began with a very strong and 
very cold northern wind. The storm continued during the 
evening and throughout the night.} 
Reached the 
Bushbugam River 
10.09.1722 - ; We rested on the 10th, in the night of which, the hills were 
very tick covered with snow, which made it exceedingly 
cold.. [P.Bruce] 
Reached the Inchi 
River 
11.09.1722 
… ; (…) ; {The skies were clear but it was cold during the 
entire day); The night…was bitter cold [P.Bruce] 
Reached the place, 
where they fought 
the Utamysh army on 
19.08 
12.09.1722 - ; The wind blew so hard this day, that we were almost 
blinded by the sand and dust.. [P.Bruce] 
A Cossack 
detachment defeated 
a Dagestan band. A 
10,000 Dagestani 
force which followed 
the march of the 








Buynaksk to acquire 
food for the horses 
since there were no 
natural pastures in 
the area. 
14.09.1722 - ; We were reduced so low by the continuous marching, the 
watching and the cold… [P.Bruce] 
Reached the Manas 
River. The 
population of 
Buynaksk refused to 
supply the Russians 
and allied with the 
Utamysh; The army 
was exhausted from 
the march, the cold 
and the constant state 
of alert because of 
the enemy forces that 
followed the Russian 
march. 
15.09.1722 - Reached Tarki and 
bought forage for the 
horses. 
16.09.1722 - Left Tarki 
18.09.1722 … (The morning was cloudy; In the afternoon the weather 
was warm) 
Reached the Sulak 
River 
19.09.1722 - Began building the 
St. Cross fort 
20.09.1722 - Finished building 
bridge over the Sulak 
24.09.1722 - Enemy raid 
destroyed a position 
near the Derbakh 
River 
25.09.1722 - The St.Cross fort was 
completed 
26.09.1722 - Began marching 
toward the seaside 
camp 
27.09.1722 - Boarding the fleet 
28.09.1722 - Sending envoys to 
Georgia 
29.09.1722 … ; (…); {The Wind was south-south-east} Peter sailed to Terki 
30.09.1722 … ; (…); {South-western wind until noon; Dead-wind from 
north-north-west in the afternoon. In the evening there was 
mist} 
Peter left Terki for 
Astrakhan 
01.10.1722 … ; (…); {Weak wind from south-south-east} Sailing the Caspian 
Sea; Bruce describes 
the weather as “fine”; 
02.10.1722 … ; (…) ; {The wind changed from northwestern to 
northeastern}  
Sailing the Caspian 




the weather as “fine” 
03.10.1722 Great Storm from north-west. The storm ended before 7 
p.m. At 7 p.m. “the sky in the South became light, as if a 
great fire was burning. The shining went to the West of 
the horizon and then to the north. The Night became 
bright, as if the coast arround the fleet was lightened by 
fires”. The phenomenon lasted for 2 hours. Peter 
contributes this occurance to a meteor, passing trough 
the sky; (…); {There was a East-North-East wind in the 
morning; The wind became Southern at noon and again 
East-South-Eastern in the afternoon; Sometime after 3 p.m. 
a storm began, that sunk some of the boats and lasted until 
the evening; After the storm, there was a great brightness in 
the sky for some time, and when it disappeared, the night 
became very dark} 
Reached the mouth 
of the Volga;  
The storm sunk at 
least 7 galleys from 
the main fleet and 
many of the men on 
board drowned 
(P.Bruce) 
04.10.1722 The day was windy. The wind shifted its direction from 
north to west; (…) ; {The weather was windy during the 
morning and the early afternoon, the wind shifting from 
north to east and then from north to west; At 1 p.m. a 
powerful wind came out from the north-west and the fleet 
had to anchor. The storm lasted until 5 p.m.; At 8 p.m. a 
new storm began, which continued until midnight} 
Peter entered 
Astrakhan; Most of 
the fleet remained at 
sea because of the 
storms; 
15.10.1722 - The entire army 
reached Astrakhan 
 


































87 27 23 30 13 5 8 8 
 
Total days with calm 
weather 
 
Total days of bad 
weather (rain, cold, 
storms) 
 


















1 storm per 
2.87 days 
 





The Journal and the Memoirs of P. Bruce do not give information on the weather during the 
days, in which the army was not marching (i.e. the days spent in Tarki and Derbent). 
Therefore the storm/day ratio is calculated taking only the days in which the army was 
moving.  






Sources: Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722 (St. Petersburg, 1855); P.H. Bruce, Memoirs of Peter 
Henry Bruce, Esq. - a military officer in the services of Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain, 
containing an account of his travels in Germany, Russia, Tartary, Turkey, and the West 




Table 4 – Distances and march speed (1722) 
 
Day From - To Distance Notes   
18-19.07.1722 Astrakhan – Troytskiy 
dyke 
25 verst (26.5 km) The army is sailing 
from Astrakhan to the 
Caspian Sea 
  
19.07.1722 Troitski dyke – 
Dvortsoviy dyke 
30 verst (31.8 km) Sailing the mouth of 
Volga 
  
26.07.1722 Terki-Agrakhan 50 verst (53 km) (not the 
entire distance but only 
for the day) 
Sailing the Caspian 
Sea 
  
27.07.1722 Terki-Agrakhan - Reached Agrakhan 
bay 
  
05-06.08.1722 Agrakhan-Sulak 31 verst (32.86 km) 
(entire distance) 
Marching from 
Agrakhan to the Sulak 
River (Bruce states 
that the army marched 
25 verst on 04.08 and 
additional 5 verst on 
05.08 
  
06.08.1722 Agrakhan-Sulak 15 verst (15.9 km) (only 
that day) 
Peter reached the 
Sulak River  
  
11.08.1722 Sulak-wells before 
Tarki 
26 verst (27.56 km) Marched the entire 
day from 5 a.m.; 
P.Bruce claims that 
the army marched 30 
verst this day. This is 
to great extent 
impossible, since the 
Journal claims that the 
wells were 8 verst 
from Tarki and not 
11. However, after 
estimating a march of 
26 verst the first day, 
the Journal claims a 
total of 37 verst for 
the entire route from 
the Sulak to Tarki. In 
this particular case it 





Journal since the 
distance is confirmed 
in two separate 
sections. 
12.08.1722 Night camp - Tarki 11 verst (11.66 km) (for 
four hours) 
Reached Tarki   
11-12.08.1722 Sulak River - Tarki 37 verst (39.22 km) Total Distance   
16.08.1722 Tarki – the Manas 
River 
25 verst (26.5 km) Marched the entire 
day from 5 a.m. 
Distance is also 
confirmed by P.Bruce 
  
17.08.1722 the Manas River – Old 
Buynaksk. 
14 verst (14.84 km) 
(only in the morning); 30 
verst (31.8 km) the entire 
distance (P.Bruce) 
Marched to Old 
Buynaksk until 9 
p.m.; Reached Old 
Buynaksk, where 
there was a well. Peter 
went further 5 verst to 
explore the mountain 
  
18.08.1722 Old Buynaksk – the 
Inchi River 
25 verst (26.5) km This distance is 
included only in P. 
Bruce. However, it 
fits the general daily 
pattern of the Russian 
march both in 
distance and in time. 
  
19.08.1722 The Ichi River- 
Utamysh 
+20 verst (+21.2 km) 
(This distance was 
covered by the dragoons 
and the Cossacks, 
following the retreating 
forces of the Sultan of 
Utemish. This was the 
distance between the 
battlefield near 
Buynaksk and the 
“capital” of Utamysh. 
Battle against the 
army of Utamysh. 
  
21.08.1722 The Inchi River – the 
Bushbugam River 
27 verst (28.62 km) Marched the entire 
day from before 6a.m. 
to 6 p.m. with a brief 
rest at noon. 
  
22.08.1722 The Bushbugam River 
– the Derbakh river 
15 verst (15.9 km) Marched with several 
rests. 
  
23.08.1722 The Derbakh River - 
Derbent 
15 verst (15.9 km) Only appears in 
P.Bruce’s Memoirs 
  
24.08.1722 Derbent camp – the 
Milyukent River 
13 verst (13.78 km) Peter send a 
detachment further 
south from Derbent to 
cross the Milyukent 
River and to look for 









30.08.1722 Derbent camp – the 
Milyukent River 
13 verst (13.78 km) Peter sent his infantry 
toward the position, 
previously established 
by the detachment. 
There, the army was 
better supported by 
the navy. The infantry 
covered the distance 
in 3 hours. 
  
06.09.1722 The Milyukent River - 
Derbent 
13 verst (13.78 km) The army returned to 
Derbent, beginning its 
march in the morning 
and reaching the city 
at noon. 
  
06.09-13.09.1722 Derbent – Old 
Buynaksk 
82 verst  
(15 verst/15.9 km on 
07.09;  
15 verst/15.9 km on 
09.09; 
24 verst/ km on 11.09) 
The army followed its 
old route; Rested on 
08.09 and on 10.09; 
Reached the Inchi 
River on 11.09 (P. 
Bruce) 
  
14.09.1722 Old Buynaksk – the 
Manas River 
30 verst (31.8 km) The army marched the 
entire day. The speed 
was the same as 
during the march 
south. 
 
15.09.1722 The Manas River – 
Tarki 
25 verst (26.5 km) Marched the entire 
day from “early 
morning”. Probably 
maintained the same 
speed as on the way 
south. 
  
16.09.1722 Tarki – Wells on the 
road to the Sulak River 
10 verst (10.6 km) Began march at 3 
p.m.; Distance 
confirmed by P.Bruce 
  
17-18.09.1722 Wells – the Sulak River 
(St.Cross Fort) 
52 verst ( km) – 27 verst 
on 17.09; 25 verst on 
18.09 
Had to extend their 
route to overcome a 
swamp, being misled 
by a local guide. 
Stopped several times 
because of lack of 
water and to give rest 
to the troops. 
  
01.10.1722 St. Cross - Agrakhan 
fortified camp 
30 verst (31.8 km) Noted only by P. 
Bruce 
  
South March distance 221 verst ( 234.26 km) 11 days of marching; 




Northern March 242 verst (256.52 km) 12 days of marching 
Medium Marching speed per day 20.1 verst (21.3 km) - 
The entire campaign (From the departure 
of the Agrakhan fortified camp until the 
return to Agrakhan fortified camp) 
Total distance 
covered: 
Days of Campaign  
463 verst (490.78 km) 43 
Overall MMS Days Marching  
20.1 verst (21. 3 km) 23 
Notes: 1 verst = 500 sazhens = 1.06 km; MMS – Medium Marching Speed per day 





Table 5 - Engagements during the 1722 campaign 
 
Date Place Casualties Notes 
23.07.1722 Endirey, Circassia 70, a dozen wounded/ 
89 killed, 115 
wounded 
Russian cavalry 
destroyed the main 
settlement of the 
Endirey, killing 300 
enemy fighters and 
burning 3,000 houses. 
(Bruce estimates the 
number of killed 
Endireys at 5 000); 
Kurukin estimates the 
Russian casualties at 
89 killed and 115 
wounded. 
19.08.1722 Near the Inchi River, 
Dagestan 
 The Russian army was 
attacked by the forces 
of Utamysh (6-
12,000). 500-700 
enemies were killed 
and 30-40 were 
captured (and later 26 
were executed). The 
Cossacks and 
dragoons managed to 
capture the capital of 
Utamysh and to 
plunder it.  
12.09.1722 Near Buynaksk, 
Dagestan 
2 captured Cossack vanguard was 
attacked by enemy 
skirmishers during the 
entire night. The 





14.09.1722 Fort on the Derbakh 
River, Dagestan 
130 (entire garrison) Attacked for four days 
by 10,000 troops of 
Usmi, Utamysh and 
Surkhai; The 
defenders managed to 
kill 400 from the 
Dagestani army. 
19.09.1722 Fort on the Milyukent 
River, south of 
Derbent, Shirvan 
5 killed, 8 wounded Managed to repulse a 
four-day siege of 
Dagestani forces. 
20.09.1722 Near Buynaksk, 
Dagestan 
??? A detachment of 1,000 
Cossacks and 4,000 
Kalmyks killed 500 
enemy troops and 
captured 350; Also 
captured 7,000 cows 
and 4,000 sheep. 
21-22.09.1722 Fort on the Milyukent 
River, near Derbent, 
Shirvan 
7 killed The Russians managed 
to repulse the enemy 
assaults and killed 80-
100 enemies, among 
which 3 “paşas”; Part 
of the fort was 
damaged due to the 
heavy rains and the 
enemy fire. The 
commander of the fort 
decided to abandon the 
position and retreat 
with all his men and 
supplies to Derbent. 
The retreat took place 
on the 27.09.1722 
Total Russian 
Combat Casualties 
212- 241 killed, 20-




1,926 – 2,126 killed, 
357-367 captured 
Sources: Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722 (St. Petersburg, 1855); P.H. Bruce, Memoirs of Peter Henry 
Bruce, Esq.; I.V. Kurukin, Persidkiy pokhod Petra Velikogo. Nizovoy korpus na beregakh 




Table 6 - Fortifications, built or strengthened during the 1722 campaign in 
Dagestan and 1723 campaign in Persia 
 
Fortress Garrison Notes 
Tarki 2,000 regular, 1,000 
Cossacks, 31 cannons 
Well fortified, with ramparts 
and bastions in the modern 
style (Bruce) 
Agrakhan landing base 200 /300 regular troops and 
1,500/1,600 Cossacks 
Left to protect the landing 
base and the fleet. 
the Derbakh River 110 regulars and 20 Cossacks The garrison was destroyed 
by the Dagestani forces on 
14.09.1722 
the Milyukent River 200 regulars and 300 
Cossacks (P.Bruce) 
Built between 25.08-05.09. 
Consisted of “four battalions, 
surrounded by a moat, into 
whitch water from the river 
[Milyukent] was 
led”(P.Bruce, who 
commanded the building of 
the fort ); 
Abandoned after enemy raid 
on 21-22.09.1722 
St. Cross 1,384 soldiers (729 regular, 
655 irregular), 21 cannons, 
sufficient gunpowder and 
ammunitions 
P.Bruce, who drew the plans 
for the fort describes it as 
follows: “the plan consisted 
of five bastions, and two 
demi-bastions next the river 
on the south-side, with 
ravelins and a palisaded 
covered way; on the north-
side were six bastions, also 
with ravelins and a palisaded 
covered way; the two sided to 
communicate by a bridge in 
the middle, over the river” 
Bruce states that Peter left 
brigadier veterani with 
18,000 (7,000 dragoons, 
5,000 regular infantry and 
6,000 Cossacks) troops to 
finish the fort and protect the 
works. 
Derbent 1,321 soldiers + 300 
Cossacks/ 3,000 troops, 150 
cannons; 
These forces were 
strengthened by 1,200 
Cossacks, two infantry 
battalions and 20 cannons in 
Additional 300 Cossacks 
were sent to two field 
fortifications near Derbent;  
P. Bruce estimates a total of 
3,000 garrison troops, 100 
iron and 50 brass cannons of 




the spring of 1723 an abundant supply of 
ammunitions and gunpowder. 
However, the numbers given 
by Bruce might be 
exaggerated. Otherwise, they 
might include a number of 
cannons that were already in 
Derbent (this is evident in the 
Journal). 
the Inchi River 100 regulars and 200 
Cossacks 
Noted only in P.Bruce 
Resht 3,110 troops, +24 guns By June 1723 
Baku 4 regiments (5,000 troops) By July 1723; According to 
Lockhart, the army that 
marched against Baku 
numbered 3,000. 
Total garrison troops 16,715 /18,094 soldiers, 
+96/+246 cannons 
(14,715/16,094 according to 
Lockhart’s account) 
In addition, there was a field 
force of some 22,000 
Cossacks and dragoons near 
St. Cross fort. 
Sources: Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722 (St. Petersburg, 1855); P.H. Bruce, Memoirs of Peter 




Table 7 – Russian Garrisons as of 01.10.1724 
 
Place Infantry and 
dragoons 
Place Infantry and 
dragoons 
Astrakhan 2,483 Rest 3,974 
Agrakhan fortified 
camp 
421 Catherinople Fort 182 
St. Cross fort 6,147 Kesker 1,396 
Derbent 2,686 New fort 440 
Baku 3,017 Peribazar 178 
Near Anzali 51   
Total number of troops 20 975 
Source: V.P. Lystsov, Persidskiy Pokhod Petra I: 1722 – 1723 (Moscow, 1951), 149. 
 
 
Table 8 - Supplies and provision problems during the Persian Campaign 
 
Date Type Notes 
21.07.1722 Brigadier Veterani reports that 
the horses are dying out in the 
steppe, because of the weather; 
The supplies of the cavalry 
were depleted;  




28.07-04.08.1722 Circassian and Dagestan 
Tatars came to sell oxen, 
camels, horses and wagons to 
the army 
The Journal does not mention 
this, but P. Bruce reports that 
the army purchased the goods 
on the prices, set by the 
“Tatars”. He, himself, bought 
a wagon and two horses. 
05.08.1722 “The Tartars brought such 
quantities of grapes, melons, 
oranges, pomegranates, apples, 
pears etc. and our people 
devoured them so voraciously, 
that many were seized with 
fevers and fluxes” (P.Bruce) 
Having marched for three 
days in the heat, the soldiers 
were surely starving for the 
refreshment which fruits 
offered. At this early stage of 
the campaign it is unlikely 
that the army lacked food 
supplies, thus it was not 
hunger but heat and 
exhaustion that made the 
troops so “verocious”. 
06.08.1722 Over 7,000 oxen (Additional 
note to the Journal III) and 600 
carriages brought by the 
shamkhal Adil Girei and sultan 
Mahmut of Aksay; Peter was 
given 6 horses as a personal 
gift;  
“The governor of Gorski and 
the governor of Axay rought his 
majesty nine Persian horses 
with rich furniture, six hundred 
wagons, drawn by two oxen 
each and 150 oxen to be killed 
for the army” (P.Bruce) 
These provisions were 
arranged before the departure 
from Astrakhan; 
The gift of oxen for the 
army’s feast is also confirmed 
by an Additional note to the 
campaign journal IV (100 
oxen are mentioned there, 
together with 7 horses for 
Peter). 
11.08.1722 The army remains without 
water the entire day, because 
the wells (in reality only 10), 
which the shamkhal had to 
arrange were badly dug and the 
water inside was muddy; 
Several horses died from eating 
poisonous herbs. The camels 
and oxen did not suffer from it. 
(P.Bruce) 
As with the oxen and the 
carriages, the shamkhal was 
supposed to provide water 
supplies for the Russian army 
on its way to Tarku. 
12-23.08.1722 The water supply was provided 
from old wells, which were 
well-dug 
Peter did not rely on Girei’s 
support any more during his 
march south. 
16.08.1722 The army replenishes with 
water from Manes rivers, but 
since there was no forage for 
the horses, they were sent 
upstream to the mountain for 
pasture. There, part of the 





animals was stolen by the Tatar 
forces, which were following 
the Russian movement since the 
departure from Sulak river. 
18.08.1722 The citizens of Derbent refused 
to sell their cattle to the 
Russians;  
Some of the horses died from 
fatigue, lack of forage and 
water. 
Locals said that they cattle 
only enoughto meet their own 
needs. It seems that the 
Russians needed additional 
cattle for food and to pull the 
supply train and the carriages; 
The death of the horses was 
again noted only in Bruce. 
24.08.1722 1,500 horses died from eating 
poisonous grass; The oxen and 
the camels were not affected, 
since they did not eat from it. 
This is noted only in 
P.Bruce’s Memoirs. 
26.07.1722 The flour, rescued from the 
destroyed ships was distributed 
to the soldiers and backed into 
sukhari. 
Noted in P.Bruce’s Memoirs. 
27.08.1722 The army was transferred to the 
Milyukent River in order to 
receive provisions from the 
fleet – bread and sukhari and 
also to gather fruits form the 
local orchards. 
A storm destroyed part of the 
supply fleet off Derbent. 
Peter noted that the army had 
provisions for only one 
month. The Russians tried to 
use local fruits to compensate 
the lack of other food. 
10.09.1722 Extreme cold and snow in the 
evening. The army lacked 
winter uniforms and suffered 
greatly. 
Noted only in P.Bruce’s 
Memoirs 
13.09.1722 Several hundred horses died by 
eating poisonous grass. 
Noted only in P. Bruce 
01-15.10.1722 Insufficient food supplies on 
the ships, returning from 
Agrakhan. 
Noted only in P.Bruce’s 
Memoirs. 
Sources: Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722 (St. Petersburg, 1855); P.H. Bruce, Memoirs of Peter 
Henry Bruce, Esq.; I.V. Kurukin, Persidkiy pokhod Petra Velikogo. 
 
 
Table 9 – Medicine support for the campaign (1724) 
 
Place Number of beds 
Astrakhan 3,000 









Table 10 – Casualties during the Persian Campaign (1722 – 1724) 
 




1722 2,779 17 193 382 93 3,464 
1723 3,752 5 33 6 75 3,871 
1724 3,652 24 41 441 52 4,210 
Total 10,183 46 267 829 220 11,545 
 
Source: V. Lystsov,Persidskiy Pokhod Petra I: 1722 – 1723 (Moscow, 1951), 241. 
 
 
Table 11 – Additional Military Expenditure for the Persian Campaign of 
1722 
 
For Money (in rubles) 
Provisions 320,048 
Admiralty 323,057(1) 
Total for ships, guns and munitions 681,574 
Gifts for the Kalmyk khan 6,000 
Gifts for the Kalmyk horsemen 25,000 
The embassy in Istanbul 17,500 
Resin for Astrakhan 1,413 
Medications 13,512 
Total military expenditure 1722 1,045,000 
Notes:  (1) Not all of this money was spent on the Persian Campaign 
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Table 1 -1 – Dnieper Army 




1736 1737 1738 1739 



















10,000 9,693 9 reg. 9,693   
Guard 
infantry 
  2,757  3,158   
Guard 
cavalry 
  401 2 sq.   3,124 
cuirassiers    1 sq. 600 600 965 
hussars 500 
 








13,000 13,500 3 reg. 
(5) 
14,800 5,800 




 6,430  
Artillery 66 
 
 389  733 (4)  606 262 
TOTAL 85,067 58,078 105,124 60-70, 
000 
108,281 50 – 80, 
000 
91,111 63,800 / 
60-65,000 
 
SS – Supposed strength 
AS – Actual strength 
 
Source: Bayov, A.K., Russkaya armiya v tsarstvovanie imperatritsy Anny Ioannovny – Voina 
Rossii s Turtsiey v 1736-39, vol. 1-2 (St. Petersburg, 1906) 
 
Notes: 
(1) including hussars and Wallachians 
(2) Artillery men 
(3) 3,000 artillery men and 1,000 regular Cossacks 
(4) 262 guns of different caliber, 11 mortars, 16 howitzers, as well as 444 smaller mortars 





Table 1 - 2 – Don Army 




1736 1737 1738 1739 
Unit SS AS SS AS SS AS SS AS 
Reg. 
infantry 
24,372 5,800 33,720 20 reg. 25,290 15 reg. 23,745 7 reg. 
Dragoons 5,175 1,250 16,003 13 reg. 8,569 7 reg. 8,593 6 reg. 












       
Artillery 284 135 32  170 (4) 25 146  












SS – Supposed strength 
AS – Actual strength 
 
Source: Bayov, A.K., Russkaya armiya v tsarstvovanie imperatritsy Anny Ioannovny – Voina 
Rossii s Turtsiey v 1736-39, vol. 1-2 (St. Petersburg, 1906) 
 
Notes: 
(1) Garrison foot and dragoon regiments 
(2) This number would eventually rise to 11,874 in May 1736 and to 28,000 by the end of 
June 
(3) 9 000 were to be left as a garrison of Azov 
(4) 86 regimental guns, 16 siege guns, 4 mortars, 4 howitzers and 60 smaller mortars 
(5) If the regular regiments were with the supposed strenght 
(6) In Manstein's account. This would presume undermanned regiments. Given the lack of 
troops in the Dnieper army, Manstein’s estimate seems more plausible. 
(7) Less than 25,000, probably no more than 20,000, due to the fact that regiments were 







Primary Sources in Russian: 
 
Maykov, T.S. (ed.), Gistoriya Sveyskoy Voyny (Podennaya zapiska Petra Velikogo), vol. 1-2 
(Moscow, 2004)  
von Minich, K.B., Zapiski feldymarshala grafa Miniha (Moscow: Fond Sergey Dubov, 1997) 
Ryzhenkov, M.R. (ed.), Patrik Gordon – Dnevnik 1690-1695 (Moscow: Nauka, 2014). 
Pisyma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo, vol. 1; 11 (St. Petersburg, 1887; Moscow, 1962)  
Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1695-1701 (St. Petersburg, 1853)  
Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1711 (St. Petersburg, 1854) 
Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1722 (St. Petersburg, 1855) 
Pokhodnyy Zhurnal 1723 (St. Petersburg, 1855) 
Ruban, V.G., Pokhod boyarina i bolyshago polku voevody Alekseya Semenovicha Sheina k 
Azovu, vzyatie sego i Lyutika goroda i torzhestvennoe ottudy s pobedonosnym voinstvom 
vozvrashchenie v Moskvu (St. Peterburg, 1773)  
Sbornik Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshtestva, vol. 11 (St. Petersburg, 1873) 
Solovyev, S.M., Istoriya Rossii s drevneyshikh vremen 17-18, IX (Moscow, 1963) 
Zapiski brigadira Moro-de-Braze (Kasayushchiesy do Turetskogo pohoda 1711 goda) – 
translated into Russian by A.S. Pushkin (http://rvb.ru/pushkin/01text/09petr/1183.htm ) 
Zapiski datskogo poslannika v Rossii pri Petre Velikom – printed in Russian in 1899 and 
reprinted in 2001 (http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus11/Jul/frametext10.htm) 
Zhelyabuzhskiy, I.A., “Dnevye zapiski” in Rozhdenie Imperii (Moscow: Fond Sergeya 
Dubova, 1997) 
Zhurnal ili podennaya zapiska blazhennyya i vechnodostoynyya pamyati gosudarya 
imperatora Petra Velikogo s 1698 goda dazhe do zaklyucheniya neyshtatskago mira (St. 
Petersburg: Akademia nauk, 1770) 
 
Primary Sources in English and French: 
 
Abraham of Yerevan, History of the Wars, 1721 – 1738, trans. by G.A. Bournoutian (Costa 
Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1999) 
Bruce, P.H., Memoirs of Peter Henry Bruce, Esq. - a military officer in the services of 
Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain, containing an account of his travels in Germany, Russia, 
Tartary, Turkey, and the West Indies, &c, as also several very interesting private anecdotes of 
the Czar, Peter 1 of Russia (Dublin, 1783)  
Lemercier-Quelquejay, C., “An Unpublished Document on the Campaign of Peter the Great 




Kurat, A.N. (ed.), The Dispatches of Sir Robert Sutton, Ambassador in Constantinople, 1710-
1714 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1951). 
von Manstein, C.H., Contemporary Memoirs of Russia from the year 1727 to 1744 (London, 
1856) 
Marsigli, L.F., L'Etat Militaire de l'Empire Ottoman (Amsterdam, 1732) 
 
Secondary Sources in Russian and Bulgarian: 
 
Artamonov, V.A., “O russko-krymskikh otnosheniyakh kontsa XVIIv. – nachale XVIII v.”, 
Obshtestveno-politicheskoe razvitie feodalnoy Rossiy (Moscow, 1985), 71-85 
Avtokratov, V.N., “Voennyy prikaz (u istorii komplektovaniya i formirovaniya voysk v 
Rossii v nachale XVIII v.)”, in L. G. Beskrovnyy (ed.), Poltava: K 250-letiyu Poltavskogo 
srazheniya; sbornik statey (Moscow: Akademia nauk, 1959), 228-45 
Azanchevskiy, M.P., Istoriya Leib-gvardii Preobrazhenskogo polka (St. Petersburg, 1859) 
Bayov, A. K., Kurs istorii russkogo voennogo iskusstva: Vypusk II, Epokha Petra Velikogo, 
(St. Petersburg: Tipografiya Gr. Skachkov, 1909) 
 -- , Russkaya armiya v tsarstvovanie imperatritsy Anny Ioannovny – Voina Rossii s Turtsiey v 
1736-39, vol. 1-2 (St. Petersburg, 1906)  
Beskrovnyy, L. G. (ed.), “Poltava: K 250-letiyu Poltavskogo srajeniya; sbornik statey 
(Moscow: Akademia nauk, 1959) 
 -- , Russkaya armiya i flot v XVIII veke (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1958) 
 -- , Khrestomatiya po Russkoy voennoy istorii (Moscow, 1947) 
Bobrovskiy, P.O., K dvuhsotlyatiyu uchrezhdeniya regulyarnykhy voysky v Rossiy (1699-1700 
po 1899-1900), (St. Petersburg: Tipografiya Glavnago Upravleniya Udyalov, 1899) 
 -- , Istoriya 13 Leyb-grenaderskagoYerevanskogo Ego Velichestva polka za 250 let, vol. 1-2 
(St. Petersburg, 1892)  
Bogoslovskiy, M.M., Petr I. Materialy dlya biografii, 1672-1697, vol 1 (Gospolitizdat, 1940) 
Brandenburg, N., “Kubanskiy pokhod 1711”, Voennyy sbornik 3 (1867), 29-42 
Chernov, A.V., Vooruzhennye sily Russkogo gosudarstva v XV-XVII v.v. (Moscow, 1954) 
(http://nozdr.ru/militera/research/chernov_av/index.html - accessed on 15th August, 2016) 
Dirin, P., Istoriya Leibgvardii Semenovskogo polka (St. Petersburg, 1883) 
Erdniev, U.E., Kalmyki - Istoriko-etnograficheskie ocherki (Moscow: Kalmyk Book 
Publishing, 1985) 
Georgieva, Ts., Enicharite v balgarskite zemi (Sofia, 1988) 
Kersnovskiy, A.A., Istoriya Russkoy Armii, Tom Perviy – ot Narvy do Parizha, 1700-1814 
(Moscow, 1992) 
Khronologicheskiy ukazately voennykh deystviy russkoy armii i flota (1695-1800) (St. 
Petersburg, 1908) 




Kulinich, A.A., “Deyatelnosty russkogo komandovaniya v Prutskom pokhode 1711 goda”, 
Istoricheskie, filosofskie, politicheskie i yuridicheskie nauki, kulyturologiya i 
iskusstvovedenie. Voprosy teorii i praktiki 5, 43 (Gramota, 2014), 109-13 
Kurukin, I.V., Persidkiy pokhod Petra Velikogo. Nizovoy korpus na beregakh Kaspiya, 1722-
1735 (Moscow: Kvadriga, 2010) 
Lukyyanov, P. M., “Proizvodstvo Porokha v Rossii v pervoy chetveri XVIIIv.”, in L. G. 
Beskrovnyy (ed.), Poltava: K 250-letiyu Poltavskogo srazheniya; sbornik statey (Moscow: 
Akademia nauk, 1959), 199-209 
Lystsov, V.P., Persidskiy Pokhod Petra I: 1722–1723 (Moscow, 1951) 
Manoylenko, Yu.Ye., A.S. Manoylenko, “A bomb after a bomb were lodged into the midst of 
the hostile army…”. The artillery of B.Kh. Minikh in the Stavuchan battle”, Voenno-
istoricheskiy zhurnal 8 (2014), 61-3 
Mantran, R. (ed.), Istorya na Osmanskata imperiya (Sofia, 1999) 
Maslovskiy, D.F., Materialy k istorii voennogo iskusstva v Rossii (Moscow, 1889) 
Mihneva, R., Zemya izvan vremeto – Rusiya i Osmanskata imperiya. Antologya na 
promyanata (kraya na XVI – nachaloto na XVIII vek) (Sofia, 2003) 
Moryakov, V.I., Istoriya na Rusiya IX-XVIII vek (Sofia: Paradigma, 2007) 
Pavlenko, N.I., “Produktsiya uralyskoy metallurgii v nachale XVIII v.”, in L. G. Beskrovnyy 
(ed.), Poltava: K  250-letiyu Poltavskogo srazheniasrazheniya; sbornik statey (Moscow: 
Akademia nauk, 1959), 190-98 
Penskoy V.V., “Voennaya revolyutsiya i razvitie voennogo dela v Osmanskoy imperii v XV-
XVII v.”, Vostok, vol. 6 (Moscow, 2007), 30-40  
Petrukhintsev, N.N., Tsarstvovanie Anny Ioannovny: formirovanie vnutripoliticheskogo kursa 
i sudyby armii i flota (Aleteyya, 2001) 
Porfiryev, E.I., Petr I osnovopolozhnik voennogo iskusstva russkoy regulyarnoy Armii i flota 
(Moscow: Voennoe izdatelstvo, 1952) 
Priymak,Yu.V., “Kuban campaign of P. M. Apraksin's troops in 1711 (From the History of 
the Ottoman-Russian wars 1710-1713)”, Nauchnye problemy gumanitarnykh issledovaniya 1 
(2012), 88-94; 
 -- , “Diplomatic, Military and Political Activity of Russia in the Sea of Azov and the 
Northwest Caucasus in the context of Kuban Campaign in 1711”, Nauchnye problemy 
gumanitarnykh issledovaniy 11 (2011), 43-8. 
Sakharov A.N. (ed.), Istoriya Vneshney Politiki Rossii konets XV v. – 1917, vol. 1-2 (Moscow, 
1998) 
Sanin, O.G., “Krymskoe Khanstvo v Russko-turetskoy voyne 1710-1711 goda”, “Istoriko-
publitsisticheskiy alymanakh “Moskva-Krym”, vol. 2 (Moscow, 2000), 76-87 
Shefov, N., Bitvy Rossii (Moscow: ACT Moskva, 2006) 
Shirokorad, A., Russko-Turetskie voyny, 1676-1918 (Moscow, 2000) 
Stoilova, T., Tretiyat Rim – Mirnite resheniya na Ruskata imperska politika v Yugoiztochna 
Evropa prez XVIII vek (Sofia, 2001) 




Strumilin, S.G., “K voprosu ob ekonomike Petrovsko epokhi”, in L. G. Beskrovnyy (ed.), 
Poltava: K  250-letiyu Poltavskogo srazheniya; sbornik statey (Moscow: Akademia nauk, 
1959), 179-89 
Tarle, E.V., Russkiy flot i vneshnyaya politika Petra I (Brask, 1994) 
Tatarnikov, K.V., Russkaya polevaya armiya 1700-1730. Obmundirovanie i snaryazhenie 
(Moscow: Lyubimaya Kniga, 2008) 
Troitskiy, S.M., “Istochniki dokhodov v byudzhete Rossii v seredine XVIII veke”, Istoriya 
SSSR, vol. 3 (1957), 176-98 
Tsagareli, A.A., Snosheniya Rossii s Kavkazom v XVI – XVIII v. (St. Petersburg, 1891) 
Urlanis, B.Ts., Voyny i narodonaselenie Evropy (Moscow, 1960) 
Ustryalov, N.G., Istoriya tsarstvovaniya Petra Velokogo. Poteshnye i Azovskie pokhody, vol. 
2 (St. Petersburg, 1858) 
Vodarskiy, Ya. E., “Legendy Prutskogo pokhoda Petra I“, Otechestvennaya Istorya 5 (2004), 
3-26 
Volkov, V.A., Voyny i Voyska Moskovskogo Gosudarstva (Moscow: Eksmo, 2004) 
Volkovskiy, N.L. and D.N.Volkovskiy (eds), Vse Voyny – Mirovoy istorii po Kharperskoy 
entsiklopedii voennoy istorii, 1500-1750, vol. 3 (Moscow and St. Petersburg, 2004)  
Yuht, А.I., “Russkaya promyshlenosty i snabzhenie armii obmundirovaniem i amunitsiey”, in 
L. G. Beskrovnyy (ed.), Poltava: K  250-letiyu Poltavskogo srazheniya; sbornik statey 
(Moscow, 1959), 210-27 
Zvegintsov, V.V., Russkaya Armiya 1700-1763, vol. 1 (Paris, 1967) 
 
Secondary Sources in English: 
 
Acemoğlu, D. and J. Robinson , Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and 
Poverty (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012)  
Acer, Z., “Place of Reforms in Western Structuring Process of Ottoman State and Their Effect 
on Modernization (1718-1789)”, Zeitschrift für die Welt der Türken 2, 1 (2010), 135-46 
(http://www.dieweltdertuerken.org/index.php/ZfWT/article/viewFile/105/zaacer)  
Ágoston, G., “Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia, 1500–1800”, 
Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 12 (2011), 281–320 
 -- , Guns for the Sultan – Military power and Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
 -- , “Gunpowder for the Sultan’s Army: New Sources on the Supply of Gunpowder to the 
Ottoman Army in the Hungarian campaigns of the 16th and 17th Centuries”, Turcica 25 
(1993), 75-96 
Aksan, V., Ottoman Wars, 1700-1830: An Empire Besieged (New York: Routledge, 2007) 
Allen, W.E.D. and P. Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields – A History of the Wars on the Turco-





Anderson, M.S., Peter the Great (London, 1978) 
Axworthy, M., “The Army of Nader Shah”, Iranian Studies 40, 5 (2007), 635-46 
Barrett, T.M., At the Edge of Empire: The Terek Cossacks and the North Caucasus Frontier, 
1700 – 1860 (Oxford and Colorado: Westview Press 1999) 
Benningsen, A., “Peter the Great, the Ottoman Empire and the Caucasus”, Canadian-
American Slavic Studies 8, 2 (1974), 311-8 
Black, J., “A Military Revolution? A 1660-1792 Perspective”, in C. J. Rogers (ed.), The 
Military Revolution Debate (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 95-117 
Boeck, B.J., Imperial Boundaries: Cossack Communities and Empire-Building in the Age of 
Peter the Great (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
Börekçi, G., “A Contribution to the Military Revolution Debate: The Janissaries Use of 
Volley Fire during the Long Ottoman-Habsburg War of 1593-1606 and the Problem of 
Origins”, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 59, 4 (2006), 407-38 
Bushkovich, P., “The Politics of Command in the Army of Peter the Great”, in David 
Schimmelpennick van der Oye and Bruce W. Menning (eds), Reforming the Tsar’s Army. 
Military Innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 253-73 
Childs, J., Warfare in the Seventeenth Century (London, 2001) 
Davies, B.L., Empire and Military Revolution in Eastern Europe: Russia’s Turkish Wars in 
the Eighteenth Century (New York & London: Continuum, 2011) 
 -- , Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500-1700 (New York: Routledge, 
2007) 
Dixon, S., The Modernization of Russia, 1676–1825 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999) 
Duffy, C., Russia’s Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power, 
1700–1800 (London: Routledge, 1981) 
Encyclopedia Iranica (1985-present) (http://www.iranica.com/) 
Faroqhi, S.N (ed.). The Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 3 – The Later Ottoman Empire, 
1603-1839 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
Farrokh, K., Iran at War: 1500–1988 (London: Osprey, 2011) 
Ferrier, R.W., “Trade from the Mid-fourteenth century to the end of the Safavid Period”, in 
Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 412 – 90 
Floor, W., The Afghan Occupation of Safavid Persia, 1721–1729 (Paris: Peeters Publishers, 
1998) 
Foran, J., “The Long Fall of the Safavid Dynasty: Moving beyond the Standard Views”, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 24, 2 (1992), 281-304 
Fuller, W.C., Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914 (New York: The Free Press, 1992) 
Haneda, M., “The Evolution of the Safavid Royal Guard”, Iranian Studies 22, 2-3 (1989), 57-
85 
Hartley, J., “Russia as a Fiscal-Military State, 1689-1825”, in C. Storrs (ed.), The Fiscal-




Hellie, R., “The Petrine Army: Continuity, Change and Impact”, Canadian-American Slavic 
Studies 8, 2 (1974), 237-53 
 -- , Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy (University of Chicago Press, 1971) 
Hughes, L., Russia in the Age of Peter the Great (New Heaven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1998) 
Inalcık, H., “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700”, 
Archivum Ottomanicum 6 (Mouton, 1980), 283-339 
Jackson, P. and L. Lockhart (eds), The Cambridge History of Iran, vol.6 – The Timurid and 
Safavid Periods (Cambridge, 1986) 
Kafadar, C., Between Two Worlds. The Construction of the Ottoman State (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1996). 
Keep, J.L., Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462–1874 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1985) 
Kennedy, P., The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage Books, 1989) 
Khodarkovsky, M., Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 
1600-1771 (Cornell University Press, 2006) 
 -- , Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2002) 
Konstam, A., Peter the Great’s Army, vol. 1-2 (London: Osprey Publishing, 1993) 
Lang, D.M, “Georgia and the Fall of the Ṣafavi Dynasty”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental 
and African Studies 14, 3 (1952), 523-39 
LeDonne, J.P., The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650–1831 (Oxford, 2004) 
Lockhart, L., “The Persian Army in the Ṣafavī Period”, Der Islam: Journal of the History and 
Culture of the Middle East 34, 1 (1959), 89-98  
 -- , The Fall of the Ṣafavī Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1958) 
Lorge, P.A., The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
Lynn, J.A., “Recalculating the French Army Growth during the Grand Siécle, 1610-1715”, in 
C. J. Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 117-49;  
 -- , “The trace italienne and the Growth of Armies: The French Case”, in C. J. Rogers (ed.), 
The Military Revolution Debate (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 169-201 
Massie, R.K., Peter the Great, His Life and World (London, 1981) 
Matthee, R., “The Decline of Safavid Iran in Comparative Perspective”, Journal of Persianate 
Studies 8, 2 (2015), 276-308 
 -- , Persia in Crisis: Safavid Decline and the Fall of Isfahan (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012) 
 -- , “Unwalled Cities and Restless Nomads: Firearms and Artillery in Safavid Iran” in C. 
Melville (ed.), Safavid Persia: The History and Politics of an Islamic Society (London and 
New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 389-417 





Nicolle, D., The Janissaries, Osprey ‘Elite’ 58 (London: Osprey, 1995) 
Ostapchuk, V., “Crimean Tatar Long-Range Campaigns: The View from Remmal Khoja's 
History of Sahib Gerey Khan”, in B. Davies (ed.), Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1500-1800 
(Leiden and London: Brill, 2012), 147-72 
Payaslian, S., The History of Armenia: From the Origins to the Present (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007) 
Parker, G., The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
 -- , “The Military Revolution, 1550-1660 – A Myth?”, in C. J. Rogers (ed.), The Military 
Revolution Debate, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 37-55 
Parrott, D.A., The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early 
Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
 -- , “Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years’ War: The ‘Military Revolution’ ”, in C. J. 
Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 227-53 
Paul, M.C., “The Military Revolution in Russia, 1550-1682”, The Journal of Military History 
68, 1 (2004), 9-45 
Poe, M., “The Military Revolution, Administrative Development and Cultural Change in 
Early Modern Russia”, Journal of Early Modern History 2, 3 (1998), 247-73 
 -- , “Muscovite Personnel Records, 1475-1550: New Light on the Early Evolution of Russian 
Bureaucracy”, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 45, 3 (1997), 361-77  
 -- , “The Consequences of the Military Revolution in Muscovy: A Comparative Perspective”, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 38, 4 (1996), 603-18 
Ramazani, R.K., The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs, 1500–
1941 (The University Press of Virginia, 1966) 
Roberts, M., “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660”, in C. J. Rogers (ed.), The Military 
Revolution Debate (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 13-37 
Rogers, C. J. (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995) 
 -- , “The Military Revolution in History and Historiography”, in C. J. Rogers (ed.), The 
Military Revolution Debate (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 1-13 
 -- , “The Military Revolution of the Hundred Years War”, in C. J. Rogers (ed.), The Military 
Revolution Debate (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 55-95 
Rywkin, M. (ed.), Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917 (London and New York, 1988) 
Savory, R., Iran Under the Safavids (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 
Setton, K.M., Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: The 
American Philosophical Society, 1991) 
Sicker, M., The Islamic World in Decline: From the Treaty of Karlowitz to the Desintegration 
of the Ottoman Empire (London, 2001) 
Smith, D.L., “Muscovite Logistics, 1462-1598”, The Slavonic and East European Review 71, 
1 (1993), 35-65 
Stevens, C.B., Soldiers on the Steppe: Army Reform and Social Change in Early Modern 




Storrs, C. (ed.), The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2009) 
Sumner, B.H., Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire (Oxford, 1949) 
Suny, R.G., The Making of the Georgian Nation (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1994) 
Uyar, M. and E.J. Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk 
(Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, 2009) 
Williams, B.G., The Sultan's Raiders: The Military Role of the Crimean Tatars in the 
Ottoman Empire (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 2013) 
Wittram, R., Peter I. Czar und Kaiser. Zur Geschichte Peters des Großen in seiner Zeit 
(Gottingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1964) 
Witzenrath, C., Cossacks and the Russian Empire, 1598-1725: Manipulation, Rebellion and 
Expansion into Siberia (London: Routledge, 2007) 
 
Internet Sources: 








Tussen 1695 en 1739 ondernam Rusland een reeks van militaire expedities die 
tot doel had om zijn invloedsfeer over de Pontische Steppe, de Kaukasus en de 
Donauvorstendommen te versterken en uit te breiden. Deze militaire 
inspanningen gericht tegen de rijken van de Osmanen en de Safavieden worden 
meestal als afzonderlijke conflicten beschouwd. Deze dissertatie probeert ze 
echter voor het eerst als “Zuidelijke Campagnes” in onderlinge samenhang 
onder de loep te nemen. Terwijl de meer algemene politieke en militaire 
aspecten van het Russisch-Osmaanse conflict al eerder goed zijn bestudeerd, 
zijn de praktische prestaties in het veld van de betrokken legers onderbelicht 
gebleven. Deze studie wil deze leemte wegnemen door aan de Russische kant te 
onderzoeken op welke manier de vroeg achttiende-eeuwse hervormingen van de 
overheid hun weerslag hebben gehad op de prestaties op het slagveld en in 
hoeverre de opgedane krijgservaringen tijdens deze campagnes hebben geleid 
tot verbetering van die prestaties.  
 
Met behulp van een groot aantal primaire en secundaire bronnen wordt vooral de 
praktische kant van de oorlogvoering geanalyseerd: de dagelijkse logistiek en 
het verloop van veldslagen, belegeringen en troepenverplaatsingen. Ook het 
leiderschap in de veld, alsmede de gehanteerde strategieën en tactieken van het 
Russische commando worden kritisch tegen het licht gehouden, steeds in de 
context van de uiterst lastige geografische en klimatologische omstandigheden. 
Bovendien worden de Russische prestaties afgezet tegen die van hun Osmaanse 
en Perzische tegenstanders.  
 
De dissertatie bestaat uit twee delen. Het eerste deel analyseert de militaire 
evolutie van de Russische legers in het algemeen en de hervormingen van Peter 
de Grote in het bijzonder. De sterkte/zwakte analyse van het Russische leger 
krijgt een comparatief kader door een gelijksoortige ontleding van de Osmaanse 
en Perzische legers en van de lokale troepenmachten in de grensgebieden van de 
Krim en de Kaukasus. Het tweede deel van de dissertatie volgt de tien 
opeenvolgende zuidelijke campagnes in chronologische volgorde. Iedere 
campagne wordt systematisch bestudeerd aan de hand van (a) de historische 
achtergrond, (b) de belangrijkste bronnen, (c) het verloop van de campagne, en 
(d) een beoordeling van de prestaties in het veld, steeds in het licht van de reeds 
genoemde logistieke omstandigheden van geografie en klimaat. 
 
Het onderzoek biedt een nieuw overzicht en deels ook nieuwe informatie op het 
gebied van de rekrutering, de omvang, de kosten en bedrijfsvoering van het 




beter inzicht in de ontwikkelingsgang van het zuidelijke Russische leger. Zo 
paste men net als in het Westen steeds meer veldartillerie in, maar bleef men 
ook veel langer dan daar vertrouwen op lichte cavalerie, hield de infanterie veel 
langer vast aan het gebruik van lansen, en perfectioneerde men de al bestaande 
traditie van oorlogvoering vanuit mobiele veldforten. Kortom, de specifieke 
aandacht voor de verwaarloosde zuidelijke campagnes van het Russische leger 
relativeert het dominante Westerse paradigma van de militaire revolutie en laat 
zien hoe ook de ervaringen aan het zuidelijke front de ontwikkeling van het 
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